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ABSTRACT 
Culpable homicide is the unlawful negligent killing of a fellow 
human being. As such it is in many respects a 'residual' crime 
being the verdict prosecutors may expect when they are unable to 
prove the i ntenti on to kill when prosecuti ng for murder. A 
fea ture of th i s was that in the past when defences such as, for 
instance, intoxication or provocation were raised at murder 
trials, convictions of culpable homicide were almost automatic. 
In recent years, under the influence of the 'purist' current in 
our Criminal law, intoxication has become a defence to culpable 
homicide and provocation resulting in loss of self-control has 
a 1 so become a defence to cul pab 1 e homi ci de. These developments 
are unacceptable to some writers on criminal law and a move away 
from the purist approach to the 'traditional' or pragmatic 
approach is to be expected. Greater emphasis will be placed on 
practical results than on the achievement of logical consis-
tency. This could result in the law of culpable homicide 
becoming more socially effective than it is at present. 
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OPSOMMING 
Strafbare manslag is die onregmatige nalatige veroorsaking van 
die dood van 'n medemens. As sulks is dit in baie opsigte 'n 
'residuele' misdaad, synde die skuldigbevinding wat aanklaers mag 
verwag wanneer hulle nie in staat is om die opset om te dood by 
'n vervolging weens moord te bewys nie. In die verlede was een 
aspek hiervan dat wanneer, byvoorbeeld, die verweer van dronken-
skap of van provokas i e by moordverhore opgewerp is, skul di g-
bevindings weens strafbare manslag byna automaties gevolg het. 
Onlangs, onder invloed van die 'juri dies suiwere' benadering tot 
ons strafreg, het dronkenskap 'n verweer teen strafbare manslag 
geword en provokasie wat aanleiding gee tot 'n verlies aan self-
beheer het ook 'n verweer teen strafbare manslag geword. Hierdie 
ontwikkelings is onaanvaarbaar vir sommige skrywers oor strafreg, 
en 'n beweging weg van die 'juridies suiwere' na die 
'tradisionele' of pragmatiese benadering kan verwag word . Groter 
nadruk salop praktiese resultate as op logiese konsekwentheid 
geplaas word. Dit kan aanleiding daartoe gee dat die reg 
aangaande stra fbare mansl ag meer 50S i aal effek ti ef kan word as 
wat huidiglik die geval is. 
- v -
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1 Object of Study and Method to be Employed 
2 The problematic areas of the South African law of culpable 
homicide and why an investigation into the law of culpable 
homicide is deemed necessary 
3 Terminology and definitions 
CHAPTER I : THE FAULT ELEMENT IN CULPABLE HOMICIDE 
Page 
1-7 
1-3 
4-7 
,7 
8-149 
1.1 Introducti on 8-12 
1.2 The Problem 12-17 
1.3 The Solution 17-18 
1.4 Negligence as Conduct in the Crimi nal Law 18-22 
1.5 Conclusion 22-24 
2 The Traditional Approach to Mens Rea and its Development 24-29 
2.1 Explanatory 24 
2.2 Gardiner and Lansdown 24-26 
2.3 Burchell and Hunt 27-29 
3 The Concept 'Skuld' 30-72 
3.1 Introduction 30-31 
3.2 De Wet and Swanepoel 31-39 
3.3 Snyman 39-50 
3.3.1 Snyman's Views of the Normative Fault Doctrine 50-63 
3.4 NJ van der Merwe 63-65 
3.5 DA Botha 65-69 
3.6 Concluding Remarks on 'Skuld' 70-72 
4 Summary of Views on Mens Rea and/or 'Skuld' 72-73 
5 Current Views of South African Writers on Culpa (negli-
gence) with Particular Reference to Culpable Homicide 73-110 
5.1 The First Editions of Burchell and Hunt and of Hunt 73- 75 
5. 2 The Second Editions of Burchell and Hunt and of Hunt 75 
5.2.1 Introduction 75 
5.2.2 The Views of DA Botha 75-83 
5.2 . 3 Acceptance of Botha's Views by Burchell and Hunt and 
Hunt 83-87 
5.2 .3.1 Burchell and Hunt's Views on Negligence in Statutory 
Offences 87-90 
5.3 Criticism of the Views of Burchell and Hunt and Hunt 90-97 
5.4 Snyman's Views on Negligence 98-100 
- vi -
5.5 De Wet and Swanepoel 's Views on Negligence 
5.6 Criticism of De Wet and Swanepoel 's Views 
6 South African Decisions on Criminal Negligence 
CHAPTER II ; CONSCIOUS NEGLIGENCE OR LUXURIA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Introductory 
Conscious Negligence Viewed as Foreseeing a Criminal 
Result and Hoping it will not Materialise 
Remote Possibilities and Recklessness as Components 
of Dolus Eventualis 
Remote Possibilities, Recklessness and Conscious 
Negligence 
South African Decisions 
Conclusion 
CHAPTER III ; INTENTIONAL UNLAWFUL KILLINGS WHICH ARE NOT 
MURDER 
1 Introduction 
2 Convictions of Culpable Homicide where Murder is 
Proved but a Conviction of Murder is not Procedurally 
Competent 
3 Intentional killings that are Committed in the Bona 
Fide but Unreasonably Mistaken Belief that thay are 
Lawful 
3.1 Introductory 
3.2 Killings Committed in Self-defence or Private 
Defence 
3.3 The Defence of Necessity, Duress or Compulsion 
3.4 Putative Necessity and Putative Private Defence 
3.5 Killing while Attempting to Effect an Arrest 
3.6 Decisions on Killing while attempting to Arrest 
4 Conclusion 
100-106 
106-110 
110-149 
150-180 
150-151 
151-153 
153-159 
159-163 
164-177 
177-180 
181-234 
181-184 
184-185 
185 
185-187 
187-195 
195-199 
199-200 
200-211 
211-234 
234 
- vi i -
CHAPTER IV ; CULPABLE HOMICIDE IN RELATION TO KILLINGS COMMITTED 
UNDER PROVOCATION OR UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF AlCOHOL 
AND/OR DRUGS AND KILLINGS COMMITTED BY YOUNG CHILD-
REN 235-389 
1 Initial Observations with Special Reference to the 
Effect of 'Toerekeningsvatbaarheid' on the Defences 
under Discussion in this Chapter 
1.1 Introduction 
1.2 Five Cases Dealing with Criminal Capacity 
2 The Defence of Provocation 
2.1 Introductory 
2.2 Nathan 
2.3 Anders and Ellson 
2.4 Gardiner and Landsdown 
2 .. 5 Pitman 
2.6 Barlow 
2.7 Brokensha 
2.8 De Wet and Swanepoel 
2.9 Burchell and Hunt 
2.10 Snyman 
2.11 Visser and Vorster 
2.12 Bergenthuin 
3 South African Decisions on Provocation 
4 The Defence of Intoxication 
4.1 Introductory 
4.2 The Law as Reflected in Johnson 
4.3 The Law in Chretien 
4.4 The Actio Libera in Causa 
4.5 Involuntary Intoxication 
4.6 Specific Intent and the Defences of Provocation 
and Intoxication 
4.7 Statutory Culpable Homicide Arising from Intoxi-
cati on 
5 
6 
The Defence of Youth 
'Toerekeningsvatbaarheid' in Relation to the Defences 
Discussed in this Chapter 
235-246 
135-237 
237-246 
246-324 
246-247 
247-252 
252-258 
258-267 
267 
267-269 
269-270 
270-278 
278-281 
281-283 
283 
284-285 
285-324 
324-373 
324-328 
328-335 
336-349 
349-362 
362-363 
363-371 
371-373 
374-387 
378-389 
- vi i i -
CHAPTER V : THE ELEMENT OF UNLAWFULNESS IN CULPABLE HOMICIDE 390-414 
1 General Remarks on Unlawfulness 
2 The Unlawfulness of Culpable Homicide 
3 Conclusion 
CHAPTER VI : THE ENGLISH LAW RELATING TO MANSLAUGHTER 
1 Some General Introductory Remarks on Murder and Man-
Slaughter in English Criminal Law 
1.1 Introductory 
1.2 Murder in English Criminal Law 
2 Manslaughter in English Criminal law 
2.1 Introductory 
2.2 Voluntary Manslaughter 
2.3 Involuntary Manslaughter 
3 The Mens Rea of Voluntary Manslaughter which Involves 
a Discussion of Provocation, Diminished Responsibility 
and Suicide Pacts 
3.1 Provocation 
3.2 Diminished Responsibility 
3.3 Suicide Pacts 
4 The Mens Rea of Involuntary Manslaughter 
4.1 Introductory 
4.2 Constructive Manslaughter 
4.2.1 The Requirements of an Unlawful Act Directed at 
Another 
4.2.2 The Act Must be Dangerous 
4.3 Killing Recklessly or by Gross Negligence 
4.3.1 Introductory 
4.3.2 Manslaughter Committed Recklessly or by Gross 
negl i gence 
5 The Effect of the Defences of Private Defence, Lawful 
Authority, Duress and Intoxication 
5.1 Introductory 
5.2 Private Defence or Self-Defence 
5.3 Lawful Authority 
5.4 Duress 
5.5 Intoxication 
6 Concl usi on 
390-401 
401-414 
414 
415-462 
415- 420 
415-417 
417-420 
420 
420-421 
421 
422-424 
425-437 
425-435 
435-436 
437 
437-454 
437-440 
440 
442-445 
445-447 
447 
447-449 
449-454 
455 
455 
455-458 
458-459 
459 
459-460 
461-462 
- ix -
CHAPTER VII THE GERMAN LAW CONCERNING NEGLIGENT KILLING AND 
CRIMES RESULTING IN DEATH NEGLIGENTLY CAUSED 463-502 
1 Introductory 463-474 
1.1 General Background 463-469 
1.2 Prodedure 469-473 
1.3 Conclusion 473-474 
2 Negligent Killing in German Criminal Law 474-493 
2.1 Homicide in the German Criminal Code 474-475 
2.2 Crimes Qualified by their Results in German Criminal 
Law 
2.3 Negligence in German Criminal Law 
2.3.1 Introductory 
2.3.2 Unconscious Negligence 
2.3.3 Conscious Negligence 
2.3.4 Negligence in Crimes Qualified by Resultant Death 
2.4 Conclusion 
2.5 Normative Fault 
2.6 Final Conduct 
2.7 Conclusion 
3 The Defences of Private Defence. Necessity. Provocation 
and Intoxication in Relati on to Negligenct Killing 
3. 1 Introduction : Mistake in German Criminal Law 
3.2 Exceeding the Bounds of Private Defence 
3.3 Exceeding the Bounds of Necessity 
3.4 Provocation 
3.5 Intoxication 
3.6 Conclusion 
CONCLUSION 
1 Purism and Pragmatism 
2 English Law and German law 
3 Conclusion 
TABLE OF CASES 
Sou th A fri ca 
England 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
LIST OF JOURNAL ARTICLES AND NOTES 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
475-479 
479-488 
479-483 
483-486 
486-487 
487-488 
488 
488-491 
491-492 
492-493 
493-502 
493-494 
494-496 
496-499 
499-501 
501 
501-502 
503-508 
503-506 
506-508 
508 
509-517 
509-516 
517 
518-526 
527-532 
533 
534 
- 1 -
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1 Object of Study and Method to be Employed 
T~e main object of this study is to make a detailed investigation 
into the law relating to culpable homicide in South Africa. This 
will entail an investigation into the positive law as well as the 
theoretical literature relevant to the subject. A lengthy inves-
tigation into the history of the crime of culpable homicide is 
not deemed necessary and no in-depth cons i dera ti on of the 1 aw 
before the second World War will be embarked upon. The starting 
point will be 1946 the year in which the fifth and second-last 
edition of Gardiner and Lansdown appeared. 
An exception will be made in the case of the defence of provoca-
tion. The law relevant to this defence has undergone changes in 
the recent past and these will be considered against the back-
ground of the history of this defence in South African criminal 
law. The history of the defence of provocation will also provide 
a background against which the normative fault doctrine may be 
considered. The submission will be made that in the treatment of 
. the defence of provocation by our courts prior to the most recent 
developments, an example of the application of a concept of fault 
of a normative nature is to be found. 
South African criminal law had become fairly stable and settled 
by 1946 and a study of the law as it was at that stage will be a 
sufficient preface for the study of the changes that followed. 
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These changes came about mainly as a result of the appearance in 
1949 of the first edition of De Wet and Swanepoel. The import-
ance of this book was not appreciated for some years with the 
result that the si xth and 1 ast edi ti on of Gardi ner and Lansdown 
which appeared in 1956, is, in the field of the theoretical 
development of our law, something of an anachronism. Like its 
predecessors, it was nevertheless an extremely useful practi-
tioner's vade mecum. 
Because of the undeniable influence of English law on our crim-
inal law the current English law of manslaughter will be consid-
ered briefly. As this is not a study in comparative law detailed 
investigation would serve no useful purpose. The reason for 
looking at English law is to consider whether English criminal 
law is to be looked to for guidance in the development of our law 
of culpable homicide. 
Since 1949 German criminal law and especially German criminal 
legal th eory1) has exerted a strong and increasing influence 
on our criminal law and criminal legal literature. A bri ef 
investigation of the German law relating to negligent killing 
will therefore al so be undertaken. German criminal law has 
received increasing attention from South African writers over the 
1) Strafrechtswissenschaft. 
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past decades 2) and an introducti on to the German approach" to 
criminal law will not be necessary. 
A detailed investigation of negligent killing in German criminal 
law would be unnecessary. Attention will focus mainly on the 
diversity of crimes that in effect constitute the crime of negli-
gent killing in German criminal law. The reason for investiga-
ti ng the German 1 aw is that German crimi nal 1 aw may be expected 
to continue to exert an influence on ours and consideration of 
the question whether German law should be looked to for guidance 
in the development of ours, is necessary. 
After considering whether English and/or German law should be 
looked to, submissions will be made on these questions. General 
conclusions will also be stated on the problematic areas in the 
South African Law of culpable homicide. 
2) eg in Strauss (Toestemming), CR Snyman's textbook Strafreg 
(referred to as Snyman (Strafreg) the English translatlon 
Crimi na 1 Law bei ng referred to as Snyman), Morke 1 (Na 1 at-
igheidJ, Morkel (Rational Policy), Van Oosten (Kausali-
teit), Van der Westhuizen (Noodtoestand), Bergenthuin 
(Provokasie) and Badenhorst (Mi sdaadbegrip). These are 
but a few writings in which the German approach to crimin-
al law is discussed, there are also Oe Wet and Swanepoel, 
Van der Merwe and Olivier and innumerable journal articles 
eg Badenhorst 1983 TSAR 183, Bergenthuin 1986 OJ 98, Berg-
enthui n 1986 SACC zu,-Bergenthui n 1982 OJ 272-;-Van Oosten 
1983 THRHR 3lIT;'"Labuschagne 1985 OJ 381, Oosthui zen 1985 
THRHR 407, Van der Merwe 1981 Obiter 142, Hermann 1981 OJ 
39, CR Snyman 1981 OJ 68. 
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2 The problematic areas of the South African law of culpable 
homicide and why an investigation into the law of culpable 
homicide is deemed necessary 
In two landmark decisions 3 ) the Appellate Division rejected the 
doctrine of versari in re illicita in our Criminal law in the 
early 1960's. Prior to these two decisions culpable homicide had 
been defined as the unlawful killing of another human being4 ) 
and the doctri ne of versari in re ill i cita had been invoked 
mainly to obtain convictions for culpable homicide in cases of 
death resulting from an assault. 5 ) It had not been necessary 
to estab 1 i sh fau1 tin the shape of neg1 i gence in respect of the 
death itse1f,to obtain convictions in such cases. 
With the rejection of the versari doctrine it became necessary to 
es tab 1 i sh fault in the shape of neg1 i gence in respect of an 
unlawful killing, to obtain a conviction of culpable homicide. 
This gave rise to divergent views and opinions on the nature of 
criminal negligence and the nature of the crime of culpable 
homicide, which found expression inter alia in the dispute on the 
questi on whether an accused proved gui lty of murder cou1 d be 
convicted of culpable homicide. 6 ) This dispute has now been 
3) 
4) 
5 ) 
6 ) 
van der Mescht 1962 1 SA 521 (A) and Bernardus 1965 3 SA 
287 (Al. 
Gardiner and Lansdown 1537 and 1557. 
Barlow 37. 
vide Se~tember 1972 3 SA 389 (C); Smith 1981 4 SA 140 (C); 
Zoko 19 3 1 SA 871 (N); Breakfast 1984 3 SA 302 (E).Contra 
AleXander 1982 4 SA 701 (T). 
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settled by the Appellate Division in Ngubane7 ) 
Essential to the ratio in Ngubane is the statement that criminal 
negl i gence is to be vi ewed as conduct and not as ~ ~. 
Negligence as fault in the crime of culpable homicide will there-
fore be one of the main topics for investigation in this study . B) 
Negligence is a complex concept and a chapter will be devoted to 
the question whether only unconscious negligence (culpa) is 
recognized by our law or whether conscious negligence (luxuria) 
is also part of our law. 
An investigation of the partial excuse doctrine in terms of which 
i ntenti ona 1 kill i ng coul din certa in ci rcumstances qualify as 
cul pable homicide rather than murder, wi 11 not be necessary as 
this doctrine has been rejected by the Appellate Division in 
Bai 1 ey. 9) There are, however, still cases of intentional 
7) 19B5 3 SA 677 (A). 
B) No investigation will be made into the question whether 
negl igence ought to form the basis of criminal 1 iabil ity 
and whether crimi nal conduct corrmi tted negl i gently ought 
to be punished. To do justice to this question would 
require a very lengthy investigation and this has in any 
event been done recently by DW Morkel in Morkel (Nalatig-
hei d). It is submitted that because of the sanctity of 
human life it goes without saying that the negligent 
killing of a human being should be regarded as a crime and 
puni shed with greater or 1 ess severity, dependi ng on the 
exact circumstances of each case. 
9) 19B23 SA 772 (Al . 
• 
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killing amounting to culpable homicide and not to murder in our 
law and this will be investigated. 
Closely related tq this latter question is the question whether 
ignorance of the 1 aw, a val i d defence si nce De B1 om, 10) has any 
bearing on the crime of culpable homicide and if so what that 
bearing and its effects are. This will be investigated mainly in 
connection with homicide committed under the bona fide but mis-
taken belief that it is lawful. 
Since Chretien 11 ) voluntary intoxication has become a complete 
defence to unlawful conduct in our law and an investigation into 
the effect of this development on the crime of culpable homicide 
will be necessary . 
The question, when is a killing unlawful, will also be investi-
gated. This is necessary as it is no longer accepted in our theo-
retical literature that this question can simply be approached 
along the line that any killing is prima facie unlawful, unless 
it falls within a recognised category of lawful ki11ing. 12 ) 
The question of causality in cases of homicide has received some 
10) 1977 3 SA 513 (A). 
11) 19811SA1097 (A). 
12) Snyman 68; Hunt 401 ff . 
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attention after the recent Daniels13 ) decision. The problems 
appear more complex in cases of murder than culpable homicide, 
and as discussion would be more appropriate in connection with 
the former crime, causality will not be investigated in the 
present thesi s. 
3. Terminology and definitions 
Culpa will be used in the sense of criminal negligence and will 
be used interchangeably wi th the term 0 negl i gence 0 • Dol us wi 11 , 
be used to mean criminal intent and where necessary it will be 
indicated whether dolus directus, dolus indirectus or dolus 
eventualis is being referred to. 
Culpable homicide will be taken to mean the unlawful negligent 
killing of another human being and murder the unlawful intention-
al killing of another human being. 
13) 1983 3 SA 275 (A). 
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CHAPTER I 
THE FAULT ELEMENT IN CULPABLE HOMICIDE 
1 TWO CURRENTS IN OUR CRIMINAL LAW ILLUSTRATED BY THE DEBATE 
OF WHETHER MURDER IS A DEFENCE TO A CHARGE OF CULPABLE 
HOMICIDE. 
1.1 Introduction 
Two currents have been and are at work in the recent development 
of South African criminal law. There is the pragmatic, empirical 
or positivist current and the purist, dogmatic or 'strafregweten-
skaplike' current. 1) 
Historically the pragmatic current can be traced back to the 
fi rst half of the 19th century. In 1949 it was represented in 
the then authoritative textbook on South African criminal law, 
the fifth edition of Gardiner and Lansdown. 2) 
The purist current commenced with the work of Professors H D J 
1) vide Forsyth 186 ff; JMI Labuschagne 1982 DJ 381-2; 
Badenhorst 283 ff (who uses the terms 'aksiomaties-geslote 
sisteem'and 'problematies-ope' sisteem for purism and 
pragmatism respectively). Cf Badenhorst 1983 TSAR 183; du 
Pl essi s 1984 SALJ 301, 302-3; CR Snyman 19SO"S"ALJ 120, 
127-30; du Plessis 1985 SALJ 503, 513; van BTer1( 1984 
THRHR 255, 267-77; Burchel~d Hunt 48-9. 
2) vide Badenhorst 83ff for criticism of Gardiner and Lans-
down. 
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Bodenstein,3) I van Zyl Steyn,4) LI Coertze5 ) and CJC Gie. 6 ) 
But with the appearance in 1949 of the first edition of de Wet and 
Swanepoel the purist approach to criminal law made its first sig-
nificant7 ) and generally accessible contribution. Si nce 1949 
puri sm steadily gained ground and has made gi ant stri des duri ng 
the past three decades. 8 ) 
The pragmatists are said to favour casuistic solutions for legal 
prob 1 ems without thi nk i ng in terms of the long term effect of a 
particular solution or the role to be played by the solution in 
the criminal law as a whole. This method results in a loosely 
structured system. Many of the problems created by this approach 
are sol ved on an ad hoc basi s by changi ng or adapti ng rul es of 
procedure or evidence and shifting issues that belong to the 
i nqui ry into gui 1 t or innocence to the i nqui ry into appropri ate 
sentence. 
3) Author of 'Engl ish Infl uences on the Common Law of South 
Africa', 1915 SALJ 337 and 'Phases in the Development of 
Criminal mens rea', 1919 SALJ 323, 1929 SALJ 18. Vide 
Badenhorst 99-102. -- --
4) Author of 'The Comparative method in Legal Study' 1931 SALJ 
203. Vi de Badenhorst 103-4. --
5) Author of 'Wat beteken Culpa in die Suid-Afrikaanse Straf-
reg' 1937 THRHR 85. Vide Baaenhorst 104-5. 
5) Gie made a strong attack on the unsystematic nature of 
South African criminal law in 'n Kritiek op die Grondslae 
van die Strafreg in Suid Afrlka Unpubl1shed doctoral 
Thesls, Umverslty of Pretorla 1941; vide Badenhorst 
105-10. 
7) vide Badenhorst 110-1. 
8) vide Forsyth 185ff under the heading: 'The Triumph of 
Purism' and cf Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 130. 
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The dogmatists or purists are said to favour the creation of a 
logically coherent system in which universally valid solutions to 
legal problems are sought. The object is to obtain legal cer-
tainty through the consistent application of basic principles 
that form a harmonious, smoothly functioning whole. 9 ) 
The pragmatists and purists do not necessarily work in opposition 
to each other and at times they have striven towards and gained 
the same objectives. 10 ) 
Each of the two currents has its advantages and di sadvantages. 
Pragmatism leads to ready solutions that are easily understood in 
isolation. The system so created can however become a collection 
of casuistic rules lacking in logical coherence. 11 ) 
Purism results in logical coherence and the consistent applic-
ation of defined principles, but it can lead to a dogmatic system 
of rigidly applied concepts in which mechanical reasoning could 
on occasi on cause practi cal exi gency to be abandoned in· favour of 
1 ogi ca 1 consi stency. 
This could result in the criminal law becoming an ' arena of 
9) Badenhorst 283 ff provides a detailed discussion. 
10) vide Forsyth 194 referring to the adoption of the subjec-
tive test for mens rea. 
11) This is a patent deficiency in Gardiner and Lansdown; vide 
Badenhorst 86-8. 
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refined but unpractical debate,12) rather than an instrument 
for achieving socially useful results. 
It will be one of the submissions of this thesis that certain 
purist or 'strafregwetenskaplike' concepts have reached, or are 
in the process of reaching, a stage of rigidity that can lead to 
. socially unacceptable results. 13 ) 
The concepts to be investigated are 'skuld', 'toerekeningsvat-
baarheid' and conscious negligence. The final-conduct doctrine, 
the normative fault doctrine and the subjective test for negli-
gence will also be examined and evaluated. 
The recent history of culpable homicide surrounding the debate of 
whether murder is a defence to a charge of culpable homicide has 
provided students of criminal law with an example of rigid dog-
matic reasoning leading to a socially unacceptable result. It 
also provides an example of pragmatic opposition to an unaccep-
table purist proposition and the reasoning that led to it. More 
recently, however, there would appear to be a satisfactory solu-
tion in the shape of a unanimous decision of the Appellate 
12) vide Labuschagne 1985 OJ 381-2, where the author states 
that German 'Strafrechtswissenschaft' is uneconomical in 
that its results do not justify the amount of energy 
expended in achieving them . 
13) vide CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 240, 250. 
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Division in Ngubane14 ) which contains a balanced blend of 
tempered purism and restrained pragmatism. 
1.2 The problem 
Culpable homicide is unique among common law crimes in that it is 
the only common 1 aw crime whi ch requi res cul pa and not dol us as 
its mens rea or fault. 1) 
Culpa, or criminal negligence, is generally regarded as being 
entirely different from dolus and not to be regarded as a lesser 
form of dolus. 2) So great is the difference between these two 
forms of mens rea that it has been submitted by academic writers 
that culpa, unlike dolus, is not a state of mind but a fonn of 
conduct. 3) 
Until very recently our courts have viewed criminal negl igence 
as a state of mind. 4) This resulted in the abovementioned 
'murder is a defence to culpable homicide' debate between 
14) 1985 3 SA 677 (A). 
1) Hunt 397; Burchell and Hunt 192. 
2) Hunt 417-20. 
3) Burchell and Hunt 195; Hunt 413; Visser and Vorster 337; 
Snyman 114; Snyman (Strafreg) 195; van der Merwe and 
Olivier 125-6; de Wet and Swanepoel 157. It is not clear 
what the view of van der Merwe and Olivier is, since they 
regard negligence as a reproach and intent as a reproach; 
cf the criticism of Zoko 126 n45. 
4) Zoko 1983 1 SA 871 (~86 C-F. 
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writers5) on criminal law and some interesting judgments of 
certain provincial divisions of the Supreme Court. 6) 
The problem results from the submi ss i on that as cu1 pa is an i n-
advertent, negative state of mind consisting of lack of foresight 
and dolus is a positive, advertent state of mind of which fore-
sight is always an ingredient, culpa and dolus cannot co-exist or 
overlap. A person charged with culpable homicide therefore can 
not be convicted of that crime once he has been proved guilty of 
murder. The intent or dolus required for the latter crime would 
exclude any possibility of the negligence or culpa required for 
the former crime being present. 
Logically, the argument is irrefutable and socially it is inde-
fensib1e. It is an example of what Glanville Williams calls 
' ... the 'jurisprudence of conceptions', where legal concepts are 
5) Hiemstra 545; De Wet and Swanepoe1 231-3; Hunt 417-9; van 
der Merwe and 01 ivier 126 esp n45; van der Merwe 1972 
THRHR 299, 1983 THRHR 82; Middleton and Rabie 1972 THRHR 
383; Hugo 1973 SALJ 334; Skeen 1983 SALJ 177; Van Oosten 
1981 OJ 343; Snyman (Strafreg) 199; Snyman 185-6. Contra 
Rossouw 1973 THRHR 151; du Plessis 1984 SALJ 50; van Zy1 
1983 THRHR 100. van Zy1' s vi ews are baseoon a vi ew of 
normative fault; this represents an example of purism 
agreeing with pragmatism. 
5) September 1972 3 SA 389 (C); Smith 1981 4 SA 140 (C); Zoko 
supra; Breakfast 1984 3 SA 302 {El. Contra Alexander ~ 
4 SA 701 {Il. The facts of these cases are of little 
importance. What happened was that an accused charged 
with culpable homicide in a regional court was in each 
case proved guilty of murder. Except in Alexander, it was 
held that conviction of culpable homicide was competent 
notwithstanding proof of intent to kill. 
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applied without considering their purpose. ,7) 
The main argument against the logical view that the proof of 
intent to kill renders a conviction of culpable homicide impos-
sible i s that it leads to the unpractical result that an accused 
charged with murder cannot be convicted of that crime if it was 
reasonably possible that he may have killed negligently. On the 
other hand he cannot be convicted of culpable homicide either if 
it was nevertheless reasonably possible - although not proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt - that he had killed intentionally . 
Here, the danger of the mechanical application of concepts, 
designed to facilitate an understanding of the law rather than to 
dominate its application, becomes evident .8 ) The conceptual 
nature of culpa and dolus would become so dominant that an 
accused who had clearly committed either murder or culpable homi-
cide could be convicted of neither: the less serious crime being 
a defence to the more serious crime and vice versa .9) 
7) Crimi na 1 Law GP 15. 
8) Hans Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als-Ob 8ed 1922 
deve lops the i nteresti ng vi ew deri ved from the 
metaphys i cs of Kant - that the human mi nd works with 
fictional constructs to represent ' realities'. These 
constructs are ai ds to the understandi ng and any attempt 
to apply them too rigidly in practice results in 
antinomies and self-contradictions. Closer analysis could 
reveal that dolus is possibly, and c4jpa is almost certainly, such a 'fiction'; vide Ol i vier . 
9) vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 50 for an analysis of the ab-
surdities involved. UTdcott J stresses the absurdities 
in Zoko (889 H) stating that the absurd results of refus-
ing~convict of culpable homicide on proof of intent are 
the overriding reason for his views . 
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Practical exigency would dictate that an accused who must 
clearly have committed either negl igent homicide or intentional 
homicide, should be given the benefit of the doubt and convicted 
of the lesser crime: 101 an application of the principle in 
dubio pro reo. 
In Zoko Didcott J11 I subjected the fault element in <:ulpable 
homicide to penetrating investigation. He pointed out that prior 
to the rejection of the doctrine of versari in re illicita in van 
·der Mescht121 and Bernardus,131 culpable homicide had been 
defined as the unlawful killing of a human being. Once convic-
tion could no longer follow automatically on proof of an unlawful 
killing, an element of fault became essential. This element of 
fault was negligence, as killings that had resulted from conduct 
that were not per se unlawful ,14 1 had resulted in convictions 
of culpable homicide when the versari doctrine was still part of 
our law, provided such killings had been committed negligently. 
101 De Wet and Swanepoel (2321 suggest this solution, but the 
judgment of Didcott J in Zoko is clearly misunderstood; 
vide du Plessis 1985 SALJ ~03. Cf Chimbamba 1977 4 SA 
803 (RADI. -
11 I Kumleben J concurring and Thirion J delivering a separate 
but not dissenting judgment. 
121 1962 1 SA 521 (AI. 
13 I 1965 3 SA 287 (AI. 
141 By this is meant conduct, eg driving a motor car, which is 
not criminal except if done negligently; vide Matsepe 1931 
AD 150. In English law a lawful act does not become un-
lawful because it is negligently performed; Smith and 
Hogan 316. 
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As Didcott J pointed out1S ) negligence was treated as a form of 
mens rea by our courts; in other words, as a state of mind. He 
further pointed out that once one accepted the doctrine that the 
fault element of culpable homicide is a state of mind, it is not 
a great step further to accept that that state of mind could be 
dolus . The learned judge used the following metaphor :16 ) 
'Having swallowed the camel, in short, one must not strain at the 
gnat' .17) 
Didcott J, accordingly, found himself constrained to regard neg-
ligence as a state of mind in view of the indisputable trend in 
our law to that effect. Having decided that an intentional 
killing could result in a conviction of culpable homicide he 
therefore proposed the fo 11 owi ng re-phrased defi niti on of that 
crime: 18 ) 
'Culpable homicide is the killing of a human being which 
is both unlawful and blameworthy' . 
The definition had obvious merit in that it described what was 
indeed the practice of the courts; namely, to convict of culpable 
15) 
16) 
17) 
18 ) 
886 C. 
887 D-E. 
888 B. It was also pointed out that the problem of 
convicting of culpable homicide in cases where intent to 
kill is proved, woul d be eas il y sol ved if our 1 aw adopted 
the approach of English law; namely, that negligence is 
conduct. A negligent killing would be unreasonable 
conduct and so would an intentional killing. 
888B. 
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homicide where an unlawful blameworthy killing had been proved 
although the exact basis of the blameworthiness; namely, negli-
gence or intent, had not been established. It is, with respect, 
doubtful whether the definition was theoretically sound. It 
appeared to imply a view of culpa that was perhaps too wide in 
the 1 i ght of the many di cta l9 ) to the effect that cul pa was 
negligence. 
1.3 The solution 
The problem came before the Appellate Division in Ngubane 20 ) 
whi ch hel d that negl i gence shoul d be vi ewed as conduct . When 
this is done an intentional killing can result in a conviction of 
culpable homicide. Jansen JA stated the view of the court as 
follows : 21) 
'The concepts of dol us and cul pa are totally different. 
Dolus connotes a volitional state of mind; culpa connotes 
a failure to measure up to a standard of conduct. Seen in 
this light it is difficult to accept that proof of dolus 
excluded culpa'. 
19) eg Nkosi 1928 AD 488, 489; De Bruyn 1968 4 SA 498 (A) 510 
D-E; Burger 1975 4 SA 877 (A) 818-9. 
20) 1985 3 sA 677 (A). 
21) 687 E. 
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After analysing the facts before him22 ) the learned judge of 
appeal concl uded that the accused had foreseen that he might 
possibly kill the deceased. In persisting with conduct that 
could have this result, he had acted in a manner that fell short 
of the standards of a reasonable man. 
In stating that negligence is conduct rather than a state of mind 
the Appellate Division has now brought ~he theoretical view of 
criminal negligence into line with the view generally taken of 
negligence in the law of delict. 23 ) 
1.4 Negligence as conduct in the Criminal law 
It is submitted that the view that negl igence is conduct may 
obviate theoretical difficulties such as those that gave rise to 
the controversy whether proof of dolus rendered a conviction of 
culpable homicide incompetent or not. However, the state of mind 
resulting in negligence must be investigated when deciding on 
sentence. It is also submitted that for a person not to consider 
the possible consequences of hi s conduct does not necessarily 
mean that he has no state of mind at all in respect of that 
conduct. His state of mind could be blameworthy inadvertence. 
22) 687 E-H. The facts are of no importance. The accused had 
pleaded guilty of culpable homicide on a charge of 
murder. This plea was accepted, but on proof of intent to 
kill, he had been convicted of murder. The Appellate 
Division held that a conviction of murder was procedurally 
incompetent. 
23) Boberg 269. 
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Not to have certain thoughts in one's mind is a state of mind 
just as having no oxygen in one's lungs is a state of respira-
tion. 
It must, however, be borne in mind that negligence had been 
viewed or treated as conduct in at least one field of criminal 
liability before Ngubane; namely, negligent driving and culpable 
homi ci de resulti ng from negl i gent dri vi ng. The further parti c-
ulars customarily furnished by public prosecutors in response to 
requests for further particulars of negligence they aver against 
persons charged with negligent driving or with culpable homicide 
arising out of alleged negligent driving, may serve to make this 
clear. A typical list of such particulars usually contains the 
foll owi ng: 
1 he failed to keep proper look-out; 
2 he drove at an excessive speed ; 
3 he followed behind the complainant at a distance dan-
gerously close to the complainant's veh i cle; 
4 he failed to give any or adequate warning of his 
approach; 
5 he drove dangerously near the centre of the road while 
negotiating a r i ght hand turn; 
6 he drove on his incorrect side of the road; 
7 he failed to stop at a 's t op' sign; 
8 he proceeded from a 'stop' sign without first ensuring 
that it was safe to do so; 
- 20 -
9 he entered into an interersection without ensuring that 
it was safe to do so; 
10 he crossed a robot-controlled intersection against the 
red light; 
11 he failed to take into account other users of the road; 
12 he made a sudden left-hand turn without any or timeous 
warning of his intention to do so. 
Thi s 1 i st coul d be extended and is simil ar to the 'further 
particulars' often furnished in response to a request for further 
particulars in civil actions for damages arising out of motor car 
acc; dents. 24) The feature of these parti cul ars of negl i gence 
is that, with the possible exception of the eleventh one, 
conduct is described without any reference to the state of mind 
or attitude of mind of the accused. 25 ) 
It, therefore, seems that in relation to motor accident cases 
24) vide Bullen and Leake 796. The examples are from English 
law, but they are familiar to the South African practi-
tioner. 
25) A litigant could possibly take exception to the eleventh 
on the ground that it is vague and embarrassing, or 
request that further and better particulars be given as to 
the exact manner in which the accused allegedly failed to 
take into account other users of the road. The answer, if 
any is given, would also consist of allegations of con-
duct. If the accused were to be convicted the magistrate 
would also make certain findings as to the conduct of the 
accused on which the finding of negligence is based. 
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there has always been substance in the contention that negligence 
is not a state of mi nd but conduct. In other words the conduct 
complained of is measured against the norms prescribed by society 
and an inference as to its blameworthiness or otherwise is drawn 
without an investigation into the state of mind of the accused. 
A person charged with a crime of negligence arising from the 
driving of a motor vehicle can be convicted in spite of proof on 
his part that his state of mind was not careless. If an accused 
is confronted with a charge based on negl igence in that he, for 
instance, drove into an intersection in front of another vehicle 
which had the right of way, it will sel dom, if ever, be of any 
use to him to give evidence to the effect that he did look to his 
1 eft and hi s ri ght most carefully before enteri ng the i ntersec-
tion. This evidence could in "most cases not be contradicted. It 
is unlikely that any eye-witness would be available, to say that 
he or she watched the accused and saw him enter the stop street 
without first looking to his left or his right . 
Even if the uncontradi cted evi dence of the accused were to be 
accepted, the court might still hold that he may have wished or 
intended to look properly, but he could not have done so properly 
otherwise he would have seen the approaching car. Such an 
accused therefore would be convicted of a crime of negligence in 
spite of proof that, subjectively, he was not careless. 
• 
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The Ngubane decision, adopting the pragmatic positivist view that 
negligence is conduct, has therefore brought greater consistency 
in our criminal law and harmonised it with our law of delict. 
The view that intent to kill (dolus) excludes culpa leads to the 
socially unacceptable result, that murder can be a defence to 
culpable homlcide. It seems unbelievable that this logical 
argument (sic) with its unacceptable result, could have been so 
persistently advanced and so steadfastly defended in our law. Is 
the practical result in September,26) Smith,27) Zok028 ) and 
Breakfast29 ) not to be preferred to that in Alexander?30) 
The answer must obviously be, 'yes'. Nevertheless the weight of 
academic opinion was against this answer. 31 ) 
1.5 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the 'murder as a defence to culpable 
homicide' debate is an example of purism going too far in its 
adherence to concepts. From the nature of the two concepts of 
intention and negligence the inference is drawn that they cannot 
overlap. This is true, but it does not follow that murder and 
26) 1972 3 SA 384 (e). 
2?) 1981 4 SA 140 (C). 
28) supra . 
29) 1984 3 SA 302 (E). 
30) 1982 4 SA 701 (T) . 
31) vide n5 supra. 
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culpable homicide do not overlap. These crimes overl ap 
considerably, the only difference being that dolus is the mens 
rea or fault of murder while culpa or negligence is the mens rea 
or fault of culpable homicide. The essential features of 
unlawfulness, blameworthiness and killing are the same in both. 
In cases where, for technical procedural reasons, a conviction of 
murder cannot be brought, the pragmatist or empirical approach 
would be that one is in any event dealing with an unlawful 
killing and that no injustice is done by convicting the accused 
of the less serious crime of negligent killing when he is in fact 
guilty of the far more serious crime of intentional killing. 
The hyper-dogmatic approach is absolutely against this. Dolus 
and culpa are conceptually different and there the matter ends. 
That the law may forfeit part of its social value in the process 
is apparently of no importance. Dogma and concept must prevail, 
so it is apparently reasoned, no matter what the cost may be in 
practical terms. 
N gubane I s32) case, whi ch represents a curb on thi s trend (but 
32) The judgment contains a discussion of purist concepts and 
doctrines (viz conscious negligence, the view that 
objective negligence should found unlawfulness and 
subjective negl igence fault, as well as the view that 
fault is reproach) and it arrives at the empirical 
conclusion that negligence is conduct. It therefore 
represents a balanced purist - pragmatist approach. 
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without drastic innovation) is to be welcomed. 
2. The traditional approach to mens rea and its development 
2.1 Explanatory 
By the 'traditional' approach to mens rea is meant the approach 
to be found in the various editions of Gardiner and Lansdown and 
in Burchell and Hunt, particularly in the first edition of the 
latter work. This 'traditional' approach is contrasted with the 
approach to be found in Afrikaans textbooks. 
2.2 Gardiner and Lansdown 
The German influence in our criminal law dates from about 
1949.1) Prior to then, 'skuld' was virtually an unknown term 
except as the equivalent of debt or guilt . South African courts 
and writers used the terms mens rea and this was regarded as the 
mental element of crime . 
In 1949 the leading textbook on Criminal Law in general use was 
the fifth edition of Gardiner and Lansdown .2) 
1) ie from the appearance of the led of de Wet and Swanepoel: 
see infra 3.l. 
2) Ori gi na lly by F G Ga rdi ner and C W H Lansdown the fifth 
edition being prepared by C W Hand AV Lansdown - 1946. 
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Little attention is paid to the criminal act as such in this 
textbook. There is the statement tha't mere criminal intentions 
are not punishable unless they are translated into action. 3 ) 
Authority for this is to be found in two cases on uncompleted 
attempt, 4 ) as the conduct of the accused had not gone beyond 
acts of preparation although there was no doubt about their crim-
inal intentions . 
Mens rea or 'the mental element in crime' is dealt with in the 
first section5 ) of chapter IV, the chapter being headed: 'Prin-
ciples of criminal responsibility'. 
Suffice it to say that a distinction is made between intent and 
negligence as forms of mens rea. But there is a strong tendency 
to regard intent objectively on the strength of the doctrine that 
a person is presumed to intend the reasonable and probable 
consequences of his conduct. 6 ) 
There is no specific mention of the doctrine of versari in re 
illicita. However, it is implicit in sections to the general 
effect that the mens rea of a contemplated, but unachieved crime, 
3) l. 
4) Topken and Skelly 1 Buch AC 471; Sharpe 1903 TS 868. 
5) 30-42. 
6) 36; cf Badenhorst 86-8 for criticism of this approach. 
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will suffi ce for convi cti on in respect of a crimi nal result not 
contemplated, but achieved in the same course of conduct. 7 ) 
In the final edition of Gardiner and Lansdown8 ) the exposition 
relating to mens rea is much the same as in the fifth edition, 
but in the light of some (then) recent Appellate Division 
decisions,9) a more subjective view is taken of intention. 
Negl i gence is vi ewed as a form of mens rea .10) But culpable 
homicide could result from negligent conduct or unlawful conduct 
which need not be negl igent in relation to the ensuing 
death. 11 ) 
Gardi ner and Lansdown was 'a practi ti oner' s handbook often some-
what derisively referred to as 'a prosecutor's manual'. It was 
not the kind of book that could ultimately meet the academic 
challenge posed by De Wet and Swanepoel. It stated the positive 
law without any critical evaluation of the judgments of the 
courts or investigation of the Roman-Dutch authorities. 12 ) It 
is small wonder that although this book had been the practi-
tioner's vade mecum in the criminal courts from its first 
7) 36; an exampl e is to be found in Sharpe. The accused 
sought his intended victim with a loaded rifle, but could 
not find him. 
8) 6 ed 1957. 
9) Nsele 1955 2 SA 145 (A); Bergstedt 1955 ,4 SA 186 (A). 
10) 42. 
11) 1537 and 1557. 
12) Preface to 6 ed XIV. 
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appearance in 1919, it had no real part to play in the theoret-
ical development of our criminal law from 1950 onwards . 13 ) 
2.3 Burchell and Hunt 
In 1970 the first edition of Burchell and Hunt made its appear-
ance. 14 ) 
Separate chapters are devoted to the actus reus and mens 
rea.l 5 ) The authors adopt the division of crime into physical 
and mental elements stating that: 
every crime invol ves an unlawful physical condition 
(actus reus) and " ' , and unlawful mental condition (mens 
rea) . 16 ) 
Noteworthy is the doctrine that 'volition' is part of the 
act. l 7) It is stated that: 'An act for legal purposes must be 
13) 'General principles' are discussed in less than half of 
the first volume, the rest consisting of a detailed expo-
sition of criminal procedure and evidence . Space simply 
did not allow for a critical discussion of principles. 
The work is perhaps best compared with Archbold, cf Elliot 
and Wood (10) for a perhaps unkind view of Archbold. 
14) Subtitled 'formely Gardiner and Lansdown', probably as a 
matter of courtesy since it bore little relationship to 
its predecessor. 
15) Actus reus chapter 5, mens rea chapter 6. 
16) 91. 
17) 101. 
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voluntary in the sense that it is subject to the accused's will 
'18) This is a clear indication that mens rea or the mental 
element does not contain volition as one of its components. 
Mens rea could take the form of either intention (dolus) or neg-
ligence (culpa) .19 ) The authors adhere to the view that negl i-
gence should, strictly speaking, not be regarded as a state of 
mind but add: 'Nevertheless being a kind of fault it is usually 
classed as such' .20) 
In the second edi ti on 21 ) the vi ew that an act must be vol untary 
in the sense of the actor's body being controlled by his will, is 
even more strongly expressed than in the first edition and great 
reliance is placed on certain passages in the judgment of Rumpff 
CJ in Chretien22 ) for this doctrine. 
The original view that criminal conduct is to be divided into 
physical and mental components, is adhered to. 23 ) The mental 
components are intention (dolus) and negligence (culpa) . 
Negligence is regarded as mens rea because it is a form of 
18) 101-2. 
19) 116. 
20) 148 . 
21) 1983 by EM Burchell, JRL Mil ton, and JM Burchell. 
22) 1981 1 SA 1097 (A). 
23) 98-9 and 110. 
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fault. 24 ) 
Both editions of Burchell and Hunt contain detailed scholarly 
discussions of topics such as the criminal act (actus reus) and 
guilty mind (mens rea), and a critical evaluation of judgments of 
the courts. For thi s reason, Burchell and Hunt, though often 
quoted by the courts, has not been the ' Bib 1 e' of practi sing 
criminal lawyers in the same way Gardiner and Lansdown used to 
be. Whether it is still possible to produce a book on South 
African criminal law that will contain a statement of the 
positive law as desired by practitioners and provided by Gardiner 
and Lansdown in the past, is doubtful. There are many debatable 
issues25 ) in our criminal law at present, and our courts have 
shown a willingness in the past two decades to deviate from 
accepted principle and doctrine. 26 ) 
24) 148-9; From what the authors say on 148 one gai ns the 
impression that they would prefer to regard negligence as 
a form of conduct rather than a mental state. 
25) eg whether conscious negligence (luxuria) should be 
recognized by our courts, vide ch II infra; whether there 
is a subjective test for negligence, vide 5.2.3 infra; 
whether 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' can be successfully 
raised as a defence by an accused who killed intentionally 
while under provocationJvide Lesch 1983 1 SA 814 (0). 
26) eg De Blom 1977 3 SA 513 (A); Chretien 1981 1 SA 1097; 
Barnard 1985 4 SA 431 (W). 
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3. The concept 'skuld' 
3.1 Introduction 
The word 'skul d' was vi rtua lly unknown in our cri mi na 1 1 awl) 
before the appearance in 1949 of the first edition of De Wet and 
Swanepoel. Si nce then it has become of great theoretical and 
practical importance and the time has undoubtedly arrived for a 
close look at the word 'skuld' and its uses. It has become 
necessary to determi ne whether the word has a cl ear meani ng and 
if so, what that meaning is, or whether it is perhaps a vague 
term loosely used which ought to be clarified or possibly 
abandoned. In Theron 2 ) it became obvious that lack of clarity 
concerning the meaning of the word 'skuld' was sought to be used 
by the appell ant, to persuade the court to pl ace the onus of 
proof in respect of extenuating circumstances in the crime of 
murder on the prosecution. The argument advanced on behalf of 
the appellant was that the onus of proving the 'skuld' of the 
accused rested on the prosecution, that the presence or absence 
of extenuating circumstances was a question concerning the 
1) Except in the sense of 'skuldig' ie guilty of a crime, or 
'onskuldig' ie not guilty of a 'crime'. 'Skuldig' in this 
sense means fully proven guilt resulting in a conviction. 
To this day an accused who pleads 'onskuldig' does not put 
only fault in issue but every element of the crime as well 
as authorship. 
2) 1984 2 SA 868 (A), discussed by du Plessis in 1985 SALJ 
394. 
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'skuld' of the accused and that, consequently, it was part of the 
genera 1 burden of proof resti ng on the prosecuti on to prove the 
absence of extenuating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In a unanimous judgment of the Appellate Division Rabie CJ3) 
rejected this argument and affirmed that the onus to prove the 
presence of extenuating circumstances on a balance of probabil-
iti es rested on the accused. 4) In so deciding, the learned 
Chief Justice pointed out that there are two types of 'skuld'; 
namely, that which founds a conviction, or juridical 'skuld', and 
that which is relevant to sentence only.5) 
'Skuld' used with reference to criminal liability therefore has 
at least these two meanings. The word 'skuld' however, does have 
more meanings than these and in consequence of this, its use can 
give rise to confusion. 6 ) 
3.2 De Wet and Swanepoel 
In the first edition of De Wet and Swanepoel a chapter?) is 
devoted to .'skuld'. This is also the case in the second 
3) Joubert JA, Ci 11 i er JA, Smuts AJA and Grosskopf AJA con-
curring . 
4) 878 G-H. 
5) 880 E-F. 
6) Some of the meanings of 'skuld' are discussed in 3.2 
infra. 
7) Chapter V 62-109. 
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edition,B) the third9 ) and the fourth. 10 ) 
In the first edition it is clear from the chapter-heading that 
'skuld' is dealt with as one of the elements of crime and this 
also appears to be the case in the subsequent editions. 
In the first edition the authors state that the word has more 
than one meaning11 ) and in the three subsequent editions they 
amend this and state that 'skuld', and terms derived from it, are 
used with different meanings. 12 ) 
The fi rst meani ng alluded to, comes from the pri vate 1 aw and is 
indebtedness (indebitum) or debt. The second meaning of 'skuld' 
is one known in our criminal law for a very long time; namely, 
gui lt or proven gui lt in the sense of an accused bei ng found 
guilty (skuldig) of a crime. The thi rd meani ng, the one in 
respect of which one could possibly say hinc i11ae lacrimae is 
the one with which the chapter is concerned. In the first 
editi on the authors calli t the b 1 ameworthy13) attitude of mi nd 
which accompanies the commission of an act, and in the second and 
B) 90-144. 
9) 99-157. 
10) 103-63. 
11) 62. 
12) 2ed 90, 3ed 99, 4ed 103. 
13) 62 verwytbare. 
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th i rd editions, the deplorable attitude of mind (laakbare gesind-
heid) which accompanies a criminal act . 14 ) 
This blameworthy (verwytbare) or deplorable (laakbare) attitude 
of mind (gesinpheid) has to be present, so it is said in all four 
editions, before a person who has done something unlawful can be 
reproached with his deed. In the second, third and fourth edi-
tions it is also mentioned that 'skuld' has the additional 
meaning of carelessness or negligence. 1S ) 
A meaning of the word 'skuld' which is not mentioned is fault. 
It is a well known and longstanding meaning of the word in 
expressions such as 'Dit is sy Ma se skuld dat Pietie so stout 
is; sy bederf hom alewig'. 
The substitution of 'laakbaar' (deplorable) for 'verwytbaar' 
occurs in the 1 ater edi ti ons of the book,16 ) In the fi rst 
edition there is at least one reference to 'skuld' as being a 
'1 aakba re ges i ndhei d ' .17) 
The problem with the statement, doctrine, idea or notion that 
'skuld' is a ground for reproach or blame, is that it results in 
14) 2ed 92, 3ed 99, 4ed 103. 
15) ibid. This is the general meaning of the Dutch word 
'schul d' in the cri mi na 1 law of the Netherl ands (Peters 
1 ) . 
16) 2ed 92, 3ed 99, 4ed 103. 
17) 63. 
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a tautology and gi ves ri se to tautologous or quasi tautologous 
statements that cause one to wonder whether the word serves any 
rea 1 purpose )8) To say that the requirement of 'skuld' is 
necessary for criminal liability to be founded, because a person 
must have a blameworthy attitude of mind before he can be blamed 
or reproached for his conduct, tells us nothing about blame-
worthiness or 'skuld'. It amounts to saying that blameworthiness 
is blameworthy. To take matters further than this tautology one 
must determine what constitutes a blameworthy state of mind; in 
other words, one must determine what attitude of mind has to be 
proved on the part of the accused before a criminal court will 
blame or reproach him for his conduct. The tautologous nature of 
the statements of de Wet and Swanepoel is at its clearest in the 
sentence commencing as follows in the first edition: 'Die verwyt 
dat hy skuld het ... ,19) Bearing in mind that they define 
'skul d' as a bl ameworthy state of mi nd20 ) the sentence coul d be 
read : 'The reproach that he has a state of mind which can be 
reproached'. In Afrikaans the sentence could be altered to read: 
'Die verwyt dat hy 'n verwytbare gesindheid het •.. '21) 
18) 
19) 
20) 
21) 
Van der Merwe and Olivier 110 n82 point out that De Wet 
and Swanepoel 's view of 'skuld' is tautologous. They add 
that on analysis the 'skuld' concept of De Wet and Swane-
poel proves to be empty. 
'The reproach that he has fault ... ' led 70. 
led 62. 
'The reproach that his attitude of mind is open to re-
proach ... '. 
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The use of the word '1 aakbare' in the three 1 ater editi ons does 
not rid statements made concerning 'skuld' of their tautologous 
connotations. 'Laakbaar' as ordinarily used, means bad or 
deplorable or of such a nature as to give rise to reproach. 
Depending on the context in which the word is used, it could also 
mean reprehensible, contemptible, disgusting or shocking. 22 ) In 
the sense De Wet and Swanepoe 1 use it, it means blameworthy or 
open to reproach, in other words, 'verwytbaar'. 
In treating the content of 'skuld' the authors deal with 'toerek-
eningsvatbaarheid', dolus and cUlpa. 'Toerekeningsvatbaarheid' 
means the capacity to attract criminal liability.23) The most 
recent English equivalents 
criminal responsibility,2S) 
are criminal accountability,24) 
and criminal capacity.26) Imput-
ability would have been the best English equivalent but its use, 
although found in Snyman,27) is obsolete. 28 ) 
In their treatment of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' the authors adopt 
the view that 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' is not included in the 
22) Tweeta 1 i ge Woordeboek by DB Bosman, IW van der Merwe and 
LW Hiemstra, Bed by PA Joubert and JJ Spies. 
23) vide Burchell and Hunt 64 n131 (translation of passage 
from judgment in Chretien 1981 1 SA 1097 (A)). 
24) Visser and Vorster 205. 
25) Snyman 117. 
26) Arnold 1985 3 SA 256 (C); Burchell and Hunt 239-40. 
27) 117. 
28) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1984. 
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concept 'skuld' but is a prerequisite for it. 29 } An 'ontoer-
ekeni ngsvatbare' person is one who cannot be hel d cri mi na lly 
accountable because he is unable to distinguish between right and 
wrong or even if able to do so is i ncapab 1 e of contro 11 i ng hi s 
acti ons in conformity wi th hi s appreci ati on of the wrongful ness 
of his conduct or proposed conduct. It is, therefore, 
necessary, accordi ng to De Wet and Swanepoel, to establ i sh that 
the accused was 'toerekeningsvatbaar' before any inquiry into his 
'skuld' would be relevant. 30 } Whether this view of the role 
and relevance of dolus and culpa is justified, falls outside the 
scope of the present discussion. What is relevant to this 
discussion is that 'skuld' is eventually reduced to a collective 
noun31 } comprising the two concepts dolus (intent) and culpa 
(negligence). It therefore means mens rea: thus, it may be asked 
why mens rea has to be referred to as 'skuld' especially as mens 
rea was in common use in both Afri kaans and Engl ish before the 
appearance of de Wet and Swanepoel 's first edition. 32 } 
'Skul d' as used by de Wet and Swanepoe 1 woul d appear to be an 
29} led 70, 2ed 99, 3ed 106, 4ed 110. 
3D} ibid. 
31} In all four editions of De Wet and Swanepoel. 
32} Mens rea was the term commonly used by Afrikaans as well 
as Engl, sh-speaking practitioners until fairly recently. 
Now there is a tendency for Afrikaans-speaking 
practiti oners to use 'skul d' . 
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attempted imi tati on of the German word 'Schul d ,33) and the use 
of 'skuld' instead of mens rea is not only unnecessary but could 
give rise to, and indeed has given rise to, confusion.34 ) One 
reason for this confusion is that 'Schuld' does not mean mens rea 
in the sense in which South African criminal lawyers have used 
thi s term. Furthermore, the wi der and different meani ngs of the 
word 'Schuld' in German criminal legal theory and practice have 
become attached to mens rea as a result of the employment of the 
word' skuld', without these wider and different meanings always 
• 
being recognized as such. 35 ) 
The key to the si tuati on is provi ded by the use of the words 
'verwytbaar', 'verwyt' and '1 aakbaar' . 'Verwyt' denotes stronger 
condemnation than 'blame ' and is more accurately translated into 
Engl ish as 'reproach'. The Afrikaans equivalent of blame is 
'blaam' (noun) from which is derived the verb 'blameer'. 
33) 'Schuld' in German possibly has more natural meanings than 
'skuld' in Afrikaans. An accused at a German trial could 
also say that he is 'schuldig' in other words guilty. Used 
in the sense of fault the word has at least the two mean-
ings ascribed to 'skuld' in Theron supra. 46 (1) StGB 
corrrnences with the statement that the 'Schuld' of the 
accused (Tater) shall be the basis for assessing punish-
ment. There is a German translation of Dostoevsky's Crime 
and Punishment entitled Schuld und SUhne. 
34) vide the confusion in Theron (supra) dispelled by Rabie 
CJ. 
35) As used in De Wet and Swanepoe 1 'sk ul d' coul d probably be 
translated as mens rea . CR Snyman, more in line with 
recent developments in Germany than De Wet and Swanepoel 
translates it as mens rea (1985 SALJ 120,121), but ob-' 
viously means blameworth,ness in awl"de sense. This is 
pointed out by du Plessis in 1985 SALJ 503, 505. 
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'Verwyt' has a harsher ring about it than 'b1ameer' just as 
'reproach' has a harsher ring than 'b1ame,.36) 
Once mens rea is conj oi ned with '1 aakbaarhei d' 37) and 'verwyt-
baarheid'38) intent or negligence is no longer investigated and 
viewed clinically with the sole object of determining whether the 
accused person fall s to be convicted or not. A connotati on of 
reprobation, reproof or moral censure is added which clouds the 
inquiry into guilt or innocence and ought only to be relevant 
after conviction when punishment is considered. 
The idea of adding reprobation, reproof or censure as an ingred-
ient of 'sku1d' is of German origin. 'Schuld' is investigated by 
a German crimi na1 court not only to arri ve at a fi ndi ng on the 
presence or absence of intent (Vorsatz) or negligence (Fahr-
1assigkeit) but also to arrive at an evaluation of the conduct of 
the accused with a vi ew to sentence. 39) Thi sis so because a 
36) 
37) 
38) 
39) 
Verk1arende Afrikaanse Woordeboek by MSB Kritzinger, · FJ 
Labuschagne and P de V Pienaar 1972, Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary and Tweeta1ige Woordeboek (supra) may 
be consulted on the meanlngs of these words. 
ie being deplorable, reprehensible, contemptible or des-
picable. 
Being open to reproach. 
The German trial is a one-phase trial. 'Schuld' being the 
basis of sentence (n33 supra) as well as an element of the 
crime. It is therefore inevitable that 'Schuld' would be 
judged normatively in both inquiries - they are simultan-
eous - and that the guilt as well as the sentence of the 
accused will be arrived at by considering what society 
expected of him in the circumstances. 
- 39 -
German criminal trial is at one and the same time an inquiry into 
guilt or innocence as well as an inquiry into appropriate sen-
tence. This has given rise to a theoretical development to the 
effect that intent or negl i gence be longs to the crimi nal act40 ) 
and that the inquiry into 'Schuld' is a normative inquiry into 
the motives of the accused and other factors leading to his crim-
inal conduct. 41 ) 
3.3 Snyman 
In 1981 Snyman's textbook on criminal law appeared in Afrikaans 
and in English in 1984. 
In this publication the view that 'skuld' is more than mens rea 
because it embodi es reproach or b 1 ameworthi ness, is stated very 
clearly. The incongruities and self-contradictions involved in 
equating 'skuld' with mens rea become obvious, especially because 
of the use of mens rea in the English translation as the equiva-
lent of the word 'skuld' as used in the Afrikaans original. 
It woul d have facil itated cl arity of expressi on had the author 
used either 'blameworthiness' or 'fault' as the equivalent of 
40) 
41) 
The so-called 'finale Handlungslehre' (vide CR Snyman 1979 
SACC 4 and 136 and du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301) which is 
closely related to the normative fault concept (du Plessis 
op cit, 315-7). 
du Plessis n39 supra; counsel's argument in Bailey 1983 3 
SA 772 (A); Bergenthuin 297-300. 
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'skul d' .42) He does suggest these terms as more appropri ate, 
but whether 'fault' would be suitable in all respects is doubtful 
as 'fault' when used by criminal lawyers in Anglo-Saxon and 
Anglo-Saxon related countri es means mens rea; in other words 
intent and/or negligence, or recklessness. 43 ) 
In Snyman' s di scussi on one encounters conti nuous confusion bet-
ween a subjective and an objective approach to 'skuld', or mens 
rea as the author calls it in the English text, and the exposi-
tion would have been clearer had the author confined himself in 
one part of the discussion to the subjective elements of crime 
and in another to the subj ecti ve and obj ecti ve factors relevant 
to sentence only. 
To divide criminal conduct into physical and mental elements is, 
according to Snyman simpl istic44 ) or facile. 45 ) Thi s state-
ment is based on four considerations; namely, that the mental 
element is reflected in the definition of certain crimes; that 
some accused are acquitted in spite of the mental element of the 
crime in question being present in their actions; and that negli-
gence or, at least, unconscious negligence, is not a mental 
state, but rather the total absence of a mental state. The 
fourth consideration is that the division of crimes into physical 
42) Snyman 112. Visser and Vorster use cul pabil ity as the 
equivalent of 'skuld' or mens rea 287ff. 
43) vide Hosten et al 715. 
44) Snyman (Strafregl 123; Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 123-4. 
45) Snyman 113. 
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and mental components makes the defence of ignorance of the law 
too wi de .46 ) 
As an example of a crime in which a mental condition is part of 
the physi cal el ement of the crime, the author refers to as saul t 
with intent to do grievous bodily harm. 47 ) The contention 
appears unfounded. All crimes except possibly crimes of strict 
liabil ity48) require a mental state to accompany their physical . 
commission. One coul d, therefore, if Snyman' s objecti on is 
val id, argue that the requirement of a mental element in crime 
46) Snyman 114 . 
47) Snyman 65-6 amplified at 114. The view that a distinction 
cannot be drawn consistently between actus reus and mens 
rea as physical and mental elements of cnme appears 
related to adherence to the German term 'Tatbestand' which 
is described as the 'description of the prohibition' (63-
5). It is surely no valid objection to dividing crimes 
into actus reus and mens rea that German writers use 
'Tatbestand' ln the senses mentioned in the text and foot-
note relerred to. The term 'description of the prohibi-
tion' immediately gives rise to the following question: 
What is prohibited? Killing as such or killing which is 
either intentional or negligent? It is submitted that the 
better view is that killing as such is prohibited, but 
that the person who commits it can only be convicted if he 
acts intentionally or negligently. To take the other view 
is to equate 'crime' or 'wrongdoing' with actus reus which 
is obviously what CR Snyman is doing in 1985 SALJ 120, 
120-1 . The discussion therein is evidence of the confusion 
that is caused by translating 'skuld' in the sense of 
blameworthiness with mens rea: vide du Plessis 1985 SALJ 
503, 505. CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120,123 fi rmly rejects the 
division between actus reusand mens rea. If by actus 
reus he means wrongdolng or crime (see 121 op cit) and by 
mens rea blameworthiness, the view is acceptable (vide du 
Plessls 1984 SALJ 301,320). 
48) A person must---at'least be conscious and sane to commit a 
crime of strict liability, vide Glanville Williams GP 14. 
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renders the mental el ement somehow a component of the physical 
act or, at least, no longer purely psychological. 49 ) This is 
difficult to follow. Although the mens rea of certain ' crimes 
may be complex in that it consists of one intent coupled with 
another intent, it is in practice not difficult to determine what 
has to be proved in addition to the physical element of the crime 
and authorship on the part of the accused in order to obtain a 
conviction. An example is housebreaking with intent to commit a 
crime. If a housebreaking by the accused is to be established by 
the pro sec uti on, it is neces sary for the prosecuti on to prove 
that the accused broke into the house intentionally and also that 
when break i ng in he had the addi ti ona 1 intent to commit a crime 
on the premises broken into. 50 ) The complexity of the intent, 
which is more apparent than real, is surely no ground for saying 
that the intent is not psychological, and should not be sought in 
the mind of the accused, but has somehow become part of the actus 
reus. The same appl ies to the example Snyman quotes; namely, 
assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. 51) He states 
49) In this connection one must think in terms of final-con-
duct and normative fault. In terms of the final-conduct 
doctrine intent belongs with the act and in terms of the 
normative fault doctrine fault is not psychological; vide 
du Pl essi s 1984 SALJ 309; CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120 and du 
Plessis 1985 SAL~. --
50) Hunt (YO?) defl nes housebreak i ng with intent to commit a 
crime as follows: 'Housebreaking with intent to commit a 
crime consists in unlawfully breaking, and entering prem-
ises with intent to commit that crime.' 
51) Hunt (467-490) defi nes assault wi th intent to do gri evous 
bodily harm as 'Intentionally applying force to the person 
of another, committed with intent to do gri evous bodil y 
harm'. Snyman (65) states that such a crime renders the 
division into actus reus and mens rea unacceptable. 
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tha t the mens rea is compl i cated, because the phys i cal element 
(namely assault) has to be accompanied no~ only by the intent to 
assault,52) in other words to apply force, but also by a 
further intent to do grievous bodily harm. This difficulty is 
virtually non-existent in practice: the means employed, the 
nature of the attack and the harm inflicted usually establish the 
intent without any difficulty. Why a crime of this type should 
cause one to give up the view that mens rea is in the mind of the 
accused, is difficult to understand. It appears to have resulted 
from a tendency imported from Germany to be too techni ca 1 about 
the nature of a criminal act53 ) in the physical sense. If we 
regard the physical act as that part of the charge or indictment 
which alleges what the accused did in the physical sense and mens 
rea as the intent which the prosecutor also alleges and sets out 
to prove agai nst the accused, the matter is not very compl i-
cated. Snyman is clearly confusing the German concepts 'Tatbe-
stand', 'Unrecht' and 'Handlung' with our terms actus reus and 
'crime'. Consequently, he also confuses the German concept 
'Schuld' with our concept mens rea. 54) 
52) Snyman 114 nl12. 
53) vi de references in n40 .supra. 
54) vide references in n47 supra. 'Tatbestand' means the crime 
with all related circumstances relevant to sentence as 
well as conviction. 'Unrecht' means wrongdoing ie crime 
in the sense of all the el ements to be proved for a con-
viction. 'Handlung' meant the physical act but has come to 
mean the physical act including intent or negligence and 
'Schuld' which meant intent or negligence has come to mean 
the blameworthiness attached to the crime. These develop-
ments are to be found in discussions on the 'finale Hand-
1 ungslehre' and normative fault eg Bertelsman 1974 AJ 34 
and Jescheck 1975 CILSA 112, CR Snyman 1979 SACC rand 
136. 
r 
, 
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Snyman also states that in many cases mens rea has to be present 
before there is unlawful ness. 55) In other words the formal 
description or definition of the crime contains mental as well as 
physical elements. This is undoubtedly so, but why it should lead 
to the discarding of the view that mens rea is a mental, subjec-
tive or psychological element of crime, remains an unanswered 
question. It is submitted that this is due to confusion in 
attempting to accommodate the the German concept 'Unrecht ' in our 
law. Technically, one could possibly say that the physical ele-
ment of a crime is not in itself proved to be unlawful unless 
mens rea is also proved. The unlawful killing of a human being 
is neither murder nor culpable homicide and therefore not a crime 
unless intent to kill or negligence is also proved. The use of 
the word 'unlawful I in the previous sentence is, therefore, 
possibly not appropriate, because a killing cannot be unlawful 
unless it is a crime. This reasoning is unpractical. 56 ) In 
most cases where a murder prosecution fails notwithstanding proof 
of a killing by the accused, it is clear that the killing was 
unlawful and that the accused was acquitted because of the 
prosecution's inability to prove ~ rea. This appears to have 
been the case in Stellmacher. 57) Technically, one could say 
55) 114 and 70. 
56) vi de n47 supra. 
57) 1983 2 SA 181 (SWA). After a day of fasti ng the accused 
drank too much in too short a time. He lapsed into a 
state of automatism or 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid ' or both 
and ran amuck in a bar, firing several shots from a 
pistol. He wounded one man and killed another. He was 
acquitted on all charges on the ground of 'ontoerekenings-
vatbaarheid ' . He had no mens rea in addition to lacking 
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that on the court's fi ndi ngs of fact: namely, that the accused 
was so drunk as not to know what he was doi ng, the kill i ng was 
pure acci dent and therefore not un 1 awful. But a more practi cal 
view would be that the killing was unlawful, but the killer could 
not be convicted because his mens rea or criminal capacity could 
not be proved. 58) The manner in which the proven facts are 
ana lysed is rea 11 y immateri a 1 • The accused escaped convi cd on 
because of what could not be proved and that was the mens rea or 
the subjective element of crime. The matter is put clearly, 
plainly, briefly and to the point by Hosten et al who say that: 
the question of fault cannot be answered without an 
investigation into the state of mind with which an act is carried 
out'.59) 
If the presence of mens rea in the formal definition of crime, or 
the necessity of mens rea being present to render conduct unlaw-
ful, clashes with the view that mens rea is the equivalent of 
'skuld', the reason obviously is that mens rea is not the 
equivalent of 'skuld'. It surely cannot be seriously contended 
that crimes have no subjective element or that mens rea is not 
crimi na 1 capaci ty, but it cannot be said that the ki 11 i ng 
was lawful or not unlawful. For comment on this decision 
vide du Plessis 1984 THRHR 98 and CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 
240, 243. 
58) It woul d al so seem that the accused coul d have been 
aqui tted on the ground that he had not acted, as he had 
lapsed into a state of automatism (vide Snyman 40 n8). 
59) 715. 
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the mental element of crime. These vi ews coul d only become 
acceptable if we were to adopt a totally behavioristic approach 
to human conduct in general and crimes in particular . 50 ) 
A further objection to the subjective approach to mens rea or 
'skuld' raised by Snyman 51 ) is that a child under seven or a 
mentally ill or mentally defective person could have the intent 
to kill, but that such a person could not be convicted of murder 
because of his age or mental illness or defect; in other words 
because of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid'. It is argued that the 
view that mens rea is a subjective or phychological element of 
crime is without substance because the subjective or psycholog-
ical element; namely, intent, is present but the person concerned 
is nevertheless not convicted . 
It is respectfully submitted that this argument ;s unsound. It 
is too readi ly assumed that 'i n tent' formed ina di seased or 
defective mind is intent . 52 ) Once an unl awful kill ing and 
authorship plus intent to kill have been proved, conviction is 
not automatic. More than this has to be established for 
conviction. Assuming that a killing by a child under seven or a 
50) vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301, 315. 
51) 113-4; and is also mentlOned by De Wet and Swanepoel 110, 
criticized by Badenhorst 121-2. 
52) vide du Plessis 1985 SALJ 503, 509, cf Badenhorst's criti-
ci sm that De Wet anQ5Wanepoel contradi ct themselves by 
referring to 'skuld' in the case of persons who are 'on-
toerekeningsvatbaar' (Badenhorst loc cit n51 supra) . 
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menta lly ill or defecti ve person has been proved, a convi cti on 
cannot follow because the defences of youth or insanity can be 
successfully ra i sed. I f these defences negati ve mens rea then 
the position is the same as it woul d be if they are treated as 
negativing 'skuld'.63) The 1 a tter is the vi ew expressed in 
Snyman. The author states that 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' is not 
an ingredient of 'skuld' but a prerequisite for 'skuld' .64) 
The argument does, however, go deeper than that. What is also 
involved is whether youth and mental illness or defect; in other 
words, 'ontoerekeni ngsvatbaarhei d', are defences which negative 
mens rea or whether they are special defences which, if success-
ful, result in an acquittal irrespective of what else may have 
been proved against or established concerning the accused. 
It is submitted that the better view is not that these defences 
negati ve mens rea. Treatment of these two defences as standi ng 
on their own quite apart from the question of the presence or 
63) One could argue; a) That the accused is not guilty because 
being mentally ill or defective, he could not fonn an 
intent (ie act knowingly) and therefore had no mens rea or 
b) that the accused is not guilty because he was mentally 
diseased or mentally defective as a result of which he 
lacked criminal capacity. This latter condition precludes 
'skuld' and he could therefore not be blamed notwithstand-
i ng hi s intent. The 1 a tter is a more roundabout way of 
arriving at the same result as the former. Both really 
mean that an 'intent' formed in a diseased mind is not an 
, intent' for the purposes of the cri mi nal 1 aw in other 
words it is not 'skuld'. 
64) 117. 
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absence of mens rea, 1 eads by a shorter route to the same 
practical result as the view that they negative mens rea. The 
latter approach has the merit of avoiding sterile discussion on 
whether a child under seven or a mentally diseased or defective 
person can form a criminal intent. 65 ) 
On the other hand there is much to be sai d for the vi ew that 
youth or mental illness or defect negatives mens rea as it is 
doubtful whether a child of tender years or a mentally ill or 
defective person falling within the ambit of Section 78 (1) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, can be said to have an 'intent' or to 
be negligent for the purpose of fixing criminal liability.66) 
Put somewhat colloquially, the question is whether the 'intent' 
of a young child or mentally ill or defective person 'counts' as 
an intent for a criminal conviction. Does 'i ntent' not mean 
'intent' formed in the mind of a sane person at least older than 
seven years? Similar considerations could be raised on the 
question whether such a person could be held to be negl igent. 
The view that negligence should be regarded as conduct runs into 
more difficulty when dealing with children and mentally ill or 
defective persons than does the view that negligences is a state 
of mind. If negl i gence is not mens rea but conduct alone, 67) 
65) vide Burchell and Hunt 239-41. 
66) ibid. 
67) As was decided in Ngubane 1985 3 SA 77 (A); it is an open 
question whether stare decisis applies to the description 
gi ven to a phenomenon ( in th i s case negl i gence) by a 
court. 
-, 
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surel y the conduct of a young chi 1 d or a menta 11y i 11 or defi-
cient person can, objectively viewed, be as negligent as that of 
a sane adult. It is only when one views the individual concerned 
subjectively that one realises that on the one hand one is deal-
ing with an immature mind of which reasonable care cannot be 
expected, 68) and on the other hand an unsound mi nd concerni ng 
which such an expectation can also not be entertained. 
Concerning the accused who is acquitted in terms of Section 78(6) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act69 ) one could further argue that 
his intent is not an intent that can be regarded as 'laakbaar' or 
relevant from the point of view of deciding on his guilt, 
because he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his con-
duct or to act in accordance wi th such an appreci ati on. An 
intent formed in such a mind is an 'intent' by courtesy of lan-
guage only. It is not an intent for the purpose of the criminal 
1 aw: the person forming the intent does not know what he is 
doing or is unable to control himself because of mental illness 
or defect. In the 1 atter case, there can hardly be any tal k of 
intent since the accused is the victim of determinism caused by 
his mental condition. The argument that mens rea treated as a 
68) 
69) 
It is submitted that this simple consideration would have 
prevented the patent injustice to children occasioned by 
Jones NO v SANTAM BPK 1965 2 SA 542 (A) corrected somewhat 
artlflclally ln Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 
1983 (1) SA 381 (A); vlde Boberg 680ff; I 1986 SA 112 (0). 
No 51 of 1977. -
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state of mind cannot account for the acquittal of children and 
mentally ill or defective persons is therefore without substance. 
3.3.1 Snyman's views of the Normative fault doctrine 
Snyman refers to the traditional approach that mens rea consists 
of intent or negligence as the psychological concept of mens rea 
and for the four reasons di scussed above, 1) he states that it 
ought to be abandoned in favour of the normative concept of mens 
rea. A further reason given in Snyman for preferring the norma-
tive concept of mens rea is that it deal s more adequately with 
the defence of ignorance of the law. 2) 
The normative concept of mens rea is stated in snyman3) as 
follows: 
' •.. mens rea is simply the blameworthiness of the unlawful 
act. It is a negative judgment of the act . The blame is 
based on the following three considerations a) X knew or 
coul d have known the ci rcumstances whi ch made hi s act 
correspond to the description of the prohibition and 
rendered it unlawful (awareness of unlawfulness). b) He 
could have acted in accordance with the law (he was not, 
1) supra 40-1. 
2) 114. 
3) 114. It is interesting to note that by implication fault 
is excluded from the 'description of the prohibition'. 
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for example, mentally ill - this is the requirement of 
criminal responsibility). c) He nevertheless decided to 
proceed wi th hi s act, thereby contraveni ng the 1 aw (the 
decision to act, or intention'). 
At first blush this statement of a concept of mens rea appears to 
have nothing at all in common with what has traditionally been 
regarded as mens rea, in other words intention or negligence, in 
our law. Bearing in mind that in terms of De Blom'l) ignorance 
of the law has become a defence, one may argue that ignorance of 
the law negatives mens rea and that point a) in Snyman's descrip-
tion does refer to mens rea as traditionally understood. 
A broader vi ew shoul d, however, be taken of the statement that 
the accused knew that his conduct conformed with the description 
of the prohibition: It is not only a question of his knowing the 
law, but of his knowing the circumstances in terms of which his 
conduct amounts to breaking the law. 5) 
An objective as well as a subjective test could be envisaged in 
the sentence marked a). If the accused did not know the circum-
stances the questi on ari ses: coul d he have known them? It is 
then a matter of whether he made a reasonable or unreasonable 
mistake of fact. Similar considerations would apply to a mistake 
4) 1977 3 SA 513 (A). 
5) cf Botha 308. The accused is making neither a mistake of 
fact nor of law. 
- 52 -
of law. 6) 
The ingredient or element of the normative concept of mens rea 
marked b) is' toerekeni ngsvatbaarhei d' 7) and the i ngredi ent or 
element marked c) appears to refer to a decision to act, prior to 
the act taking place. Snyman calls this the decision to act or 
i ntenti on. Thi s cannot be intent as understood in the tradi-
tional view that intent is a form of mens rea. Intent in this 
latter sense is a much wider concept than a decision to act. It 
would include knowledge of the relevant facts, insight into the 
criminal result (for instance, the death of a human being) that 
would or could follow directly or indirectly but inevitably, or 
indirectly but possibly, from the conduct of the accused; 
consciousness on the part of the accused of what he is doing, and 
a "failure on his part to desist from the conduct on which he has 
decided . This leads to the conclusion that calling 'skuld' mens 
rea in the context of normative fault is confusing. 8) Mens rea 
is subjective. This is clearly indicated by the use of the Latin 
word mens. But the factors relevant to normative fault as 
explained in Snyman are subjective and objective. 9) Fault in 
this sense is a negative value judgment passed on the conduct 
6) cf Burchell and Hunt 160ff, where mistake of law and mis-
take of fact are treated in identical terms. 
7) cf Snyman (Strafreg) 124. 
8) JMT Labuschagne 1985 OJ 381, 383 comments on the al tered 
meaning given to 'skuTQT in the normative fault context. 
9) Rabie 1985 THRHR 332, 343 concludes that the views 
expressed by $nyman could result in negl igence being the 
only form of 'skuld' recognized by him. 
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of the accused by his judges. More factors than the state of 
mind of the accused when committing the act complained of are 
taken into account than dolus or cUlpa . 
This is clear from the rest of the discussion in Snyman. 10 ) 
Psychological fault11 ) is discussed in juxtaposition to 
normative fault and rejected in favour of the latter. 
The reasoning is that psychological fault consists of either 
dolus or culpa and nothing besides. This cannot explain why a 
child of five or a mentally diseased or mentally defective person 
who can nevertheless intend to commit a crime, cannot be 
convicted. 
There are a number of answers to this consideration beside the 
answer rejected by Snyman that such a chil d or such a person 
cannot form an intent. 12 ) 
The most obvious answer is that an intent formed in the immature 
10) 114-6. 
11) Snyman regards psychological fault as the view that fault 
consists of dolus or cUlpa. Another view of psychological 
fault is that the motlVes leadi ng to the deci si on of the 
accused to commit a crime are considered in the light of 
thei r effect on the subj ecti ve make-up of the accused. 
This is then contrasted with normative fault in terms of 
which the motives of the accused are consi dered in the 
light of what society expects of him i n the circumstances; 
(vide Bergenthuin 198; Bailey supra 776-7 (counsel's 
argument); du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301, 316). 
12) 113-4. -
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mind of a child or the diseased mind of a mentally ill or defec-
tive person is not regarded as an intent for the purposes of the 
criminal law. The mind in which the intent was formed is too 
immature, ill or defective to appreciate the implications of what 
it 'intends' to do and therefore the intent is not thrown into 
the scales of justice against the accused. This could be 
regarded as a normative judgment; in other words, a judgment to 
the effect that it can not be expected of the child or the men-
tally ill or defective person not to form such an intent and that 
the intent is therefore not fault in the normative sense. This 
latter argument is really a psychological theory of fault pre-
sented as if it were not psychological but normative. Thus, when 
one views the accused psychologically, one decides that subjec-
tively he lacks certain psychological attributes such as 
maturity, mental normality or health, and that this deficiency 
renders his intent nugatory. This is not very far from saying 
that because of immaturi ty of mi nd or mental ill ness or defect 
the accused was unable to form a (criminal) intent. 
There is the further consideration that Snyman 13 ) rejects 
psychological fault because it is only a necessary, not a 
sufficient, ground for conviction. 14 ) Thi s no one has ever 
denied. Notwithstanding proof of authorship, actus reus and 
intent or neg1 i gence, an accused may sti 11 be acquitted. The 
13) ibi d and Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 124. 
14) vide du Plessis 1985 ~J 503, 509; cf ATH Smith On Actus 
Reus and Mens Rea ·i n lreSnapi ng the Crimi na 1 Law ed by PR 
Glazebrook (95 esp 104-5). 
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obvious answer is that, assuming the accused to be mature, sober 
and sane,15) his conduct must have been justified in the 
circumstances. The most clearly relevant defence in this connec-
tion is duress. The current view is that the defence of 
necessi ty or duress if successfully raised, negati ves unl awful-
ness. There is also, however, the view that it negatives 
fault)6 ) If an accused acted sanely and intentionally, but 
under duress and is excused because he lacked fault, then 
obvi ously fault has a wi der meani ng than i ntenti on. Thi sis 
really no more than a matter of interpretation or systematisa-
tion. There are difficulties involved in regarding the defence 
of duress as excluding fault just as much as there are difficul-
ties involved in regarding it as excluding unlawfulness)7) If 
it excludes fault notwithstanding proof of intent, fault clearly 
does not mean mens rea. The objection to extending the meaning 
of fault beyond mens rea is that it becomes vague and confused 
with unlawfulness. 18 ) 
15) Mental maturity, sobriety and sanity are all psychological 
factors; (cf Arnold 1985 3 SA 256 (C)). If temporary 
'insanity' due to extreme provocation (Arnold) is included 
the number of psychological factors affecting guilt 
appears to be exhausted, except that duress of an extreme 
form could also cause a person to become temporarily 
insane. 
16) CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 124-5. 
17) vide C R Snymai1f9"85 SALJ, 120, 124-5; du Plessis 1985 
SALJ 503, 509-10; counseT'""s argument (774-89) in Bailey 
supra; de Wet and Swanepoel 81-92. 
18) vi de CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 126-7. It seems cl ear that 
writers who accept normative fault are compelled to widen 
the concept of fault. Writers who accept psychological 
fault would include the widened area alluded to by Snyman 
in unlawfulness or in factors affecting sentence only 
(vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301, 315-21 and 1985 SALJ 503, 
506-7) This latter v:rew-gains support from Bai.,-ey-supra 
and Theron 1984 2 SA 868 (A). 
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The better view, it is submitted, is that duress negatives unlaw-
fulness 19 ) unless it has a mentally deranging effect on the 
accused and because of this, a psychological factor, negatives 
mens rea. 
As far as mens rea in the shape of dolus is concerned 'skuld' in 
the normative sense is clearly not mens rea. 
Negl igence, regarded as an attribute of conduct and not as a 
state of mind in our criminal law since Ngubane,20) would now 
probably qual ify as normative, rather than psychological, fault. 
Snyman 21 ) stresses thi s poi nt and it is in conformity with the 
views of writers on criminal law22 ) as well as the law of 
de 1 i ct. 23) 
In so far as negligence is concerned with what an accused ought 
to have foreseen or how an accused ought to have acted or 
reacted, it is a form of normative fault. It is a value judgment 
passed from outside on the accused and his conduct. In terms of 
psychological fault the accused is regarded as having acted with 
mens rea in that he did not advert to certain foreseeable 
19) Burchell and Hunt 347; Snyman 92; De Wet and Swanepoel 92. 
20) 1985 3 SA 677 (A). 
21) 114. 
22) Burchell and Hunt 194-6; Hunt 398-400; Morkel 192-7. 
23) Boberg 269; Van der Walt 65; Macintosh and Scoble 8; Mc-
Kerron 25. 
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consequences of his conduct. This state of mind although nega-
tive is still a state of mind, and it is condemned by society. 
To view negligence as conduct only, is to pass the same judgment 
wi thout the added consi derati on that the negl i gent conduct has 
resulted from a careless state of mind. 
Snyman24 ) appears to regard 'toerekeni ngsvatbaarhei d' as a pre-
requisite of 'skuld', but seems to be self-contradictory in this 
connection. In the exposition of normative fault25 ) it is the 
second ingredient of fault that is considered 'the requirement of 
mental responsibility ' . In a later passage it is unequivocally 
stated that criminal responsibility is 'an indispensable pre-
requisite for mens rea' .26) 
The only explanation for this contradiction is that whereas crim-
inal responsibility is a prerequisite for psychological fault, it 
is an i ngredi ent of normati ve faul t. Thi sis borne out by the 
following passage from an earlier section of the book;27) 
namely, 
'In my opinion it is preferable to regard all the subjec-
tive elements of the crime as forming part of the descrip-
tion of the prohibition,28) and then to adopt and 
24) 117. 
25) 114. 
26) 118. 
27) 66. 
28) Compared with the ingredients of normative fault listed on 
114 this is a clear contradiction vide n3 supra . 
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employ a normative concept of mens rea (according to which 
mens rea is merely a reproach) but this is, of course, not 
the classification employed by our courts'. 
Nevertheless a self-contradictory element remain~. Criminal 
responsibility ('toerekeningsvatbaarheid') must surely be subjec-
tive. If it is part of normative fault then 'all the subjective 
elements of the crime' have not been kept distinct from that form 
of fault. To make of mens rea 'merely a reproach' is unaccep-
table . This makes mens rea a concept without content. 29 ) 
Criminals are reproached or blamed for their conduct, but as has 
been pointed out by JC de Wet,30) that does not make reproach 
an element of crime. It is a consequence of crime; in other 
words, . a consequence vi si ted in the shape of puni shment on a 
person against whom authorship, actus reus and mens rea have been 
established, and against whom a verdict of 'guilty' has been 
formally recorded. 31 ) 
The view that mens rea is a reproach, or that 'skuld' is 'verwyt' 
has its origin in German Criminal Legal theory and the German 
one-phase criminal trial. According to one of the earl iest 
29) Or as it is said in German: 'Ein blutarmes Gespenst ' . 
30) 1970 THRHR 68, 72. 
31) It cannot be over emphasised that this view has been very 
strongly supported by the Appell ate Di vi si on in Theron 
supra. 
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German publications 32 ) in which a normative concept of 'skuld ' 
is expounded it is evident that the author is writing mainly 
about factors a ffecti ng sentence. If one takes the vi ew that 
'skuld' is not only an element of crime but also the basis of 
punishment,. it becomes plain why the remarkable theory that mens 
rea33 ) is not in the mind of the accused but in the minds of 
his judges, came into being. Naturally the reproach to be 
levelled at an accused in respect of his proven criminal conduct 
is in the mind of the judges who weigh up all the evidence placed 
before them not only to arrive at a conviction or an acquittal, 
but in the event of the former, also at a proper sentence. 
I n a one-phase tri al, the two types of ' skul d' di scussed in 
Theron34 ) are investigated in one inquiry and pronounced upon 
simultaneously at the end of the inquiry. 
It is not possible to analyse the proceedings at a German crim-
inal trial in such a way as to say: 'at this stage the accused 
would have been convicted in a South African trial ' and 'at this 
stage sentence would be considered separately in a South African 
trial'. However, a rough division can be attempted. Guidance is 
to be found in Snyman' s statement 35) that the German crimi na 1 
32) Ober den Aufbau 
(1907) • 
des Schuldbegriffs by Reinhard Frank 
33) Obviously in the sense of blameworthiness and not in the 
sense of dolus. 
34) supra 879 B-H. 
35 ) 1985 SALJ 120, 121. 
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legal theorist Hans Welzel did distinguish between 'Unrecht' and 
'Schuld' although he regarded intent as being part of the crim-
i nal act and not part of the 'Schul d' attached to that act. 
'Unrecht' means 'wrong' (noun) or 'wrongdoi ng' 36) and 'Schul d' 
in the sense used by Welzel means 'blameworthiness' .37) If 
'crime' is substituted for 'wrongdoing' the puzzling features 
disappear. 
Welzel insisted that intent belonged to the act (Handlung) and by 
the same token to the 'Unrecht' (crime) .38) Consequently what 
his theory really amounted to translated into South African 
procedural terms, was that intent is one of the el ements that 
have to be proved in order to establ ish a crime39 ) and once 
this has been done the blameworthiness of the proven crime is 
i nvesti gated. 40) It is submi tted that the astute and i nteres-
ting investigations of Welzel would have been unnecessary if the 
German crimi na 1 tri a 1 were a two-phase tri a 1 system and 'wrong-
doing' and 'blameworthiness' were ab initio procedurally 
separated. 41 ) 
It would be an over-simplification to regard what has just been 
36) ibid. 
37) du Plessis 1985 SALJ 503, 504-5. 
38) CR Snyman 1985 S~120, 121. 
39) Or 'Unrecht' (wrongdoing). 
40) du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301, 320. 
41) In other words ~confusion dispelled from our law by 
Theron supra is not so readily defi nab 1 e in German 1 aw 
because of the one-phase German criminal trial. 
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wri tten as the 1 ast word on the subject. One of the factors 
taken into account when investigating sentence at our criminal 
trials is whether the accused acted unreasonably or in conflict 
with what society expected of him. When crimes of negligence are 
under consideration this is investigated in order to convict or 
acquit. This brings one back to the view that negligence or 
unreasonable conduct is a normative concept. It cannot be 
otherwise. Reasonableness is a statement of a general objective 
standard of behaviour. In other words the requirement that 
conduct shoul d be reasonable is normati ve. In thi s sense the 
fault of the accused is a judgment in the mind of his accusers. 
Snyman 42) does not appear to be prepared to accept that blame-
worthiness should be investigated after, and not before, convic-
tion. It, therefore, becomes a very pertinent question: what 
remains of the subjective element of crime if intent and negli-
gence are included with the physical element in the unitary 
concept 'act' which, separated from blame, is included in 'wrong-
doing'? 
The answer seems to be that one divides the subjective element 
into intention or vol ition on the one hand and knowledge or 
awareness of unl awful ness on the other. 43) Vol ition or 
42) 1985 SALJ 120, 125-7. 
43) Snyman 1979 SACC 3 and 136, 136 ff. 
44) 1985 SALJ 1~127. 
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intention which is viewed as natural or colourless is part of the 
act or conduct and knowledge or awareness of unlawfulness is mens 
rea or fault. Knowledge of unlawfulness in this context means 
that the accused is making neither a mistake of fact nor of law . 
This .is, however, an artificial demarcation and it is difficult 
to understand why a writer who is so opposed to treating the 
objective and subjective elements of crime as separate,44) can 
advocate a division into parts, of the subjective element. 
Surely the latter line of demarcation must be even mere difficult 
to draw than a line of demarcation between that which is physical 
and that which is mental . Whether knowledge of unlawfulness is 
all that remains of mens rea in Snyman's view of normative fault 
is not clear. He states that normative fault is a reproach or 
negative value judgment of the act, and also states, (perhaps not 
in so many words, but the purport is clear), that normative fault 
or normative mens rea is awareness of unlawfulness. 45 ) 
The statements are not reconcilable except in the limited sphere 
of ignorance of the law. Snyman46 ) is of the opinion that 
ignorance or mistake of law is not a defence that should on being 
established automatically negative fault. It would negative 
psychological fault, but not necessarily normative fault. 47 ) 
45) 1979 SACC 136, 138 ff. 
46) 178-80:-
47) Normative fault being an objecti ve evaluation of how the 
accused ought to have behaved and what he 0~9h{9 to have 
known, al I fault becomes negligence; vide Rable 85 THRHR 
332, 343. 
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An enquiry directed at determining whether normative fault is 
present woul d centre around the questi on whether the accused 
ought to have known the 1 aw and not whether as a fact he did know 
the law. Actual ignorance of the law would not negative dolus if 
it were grossly unreasonable. This was the finding of Coetzee J 
in Barnard,48) the learned judge relying on Snyman (Strafreg) 
as authori ty. 
.. 
Bearing in mind that Snyman's views on mistake of law have been 
demonstrated by Rabie to lead inevitably to the conclusion that 
the only form of blameworthiness is negligence49 ) one hopes 
that negligent but bona fide mistakes of fact will not on reason-
ing similar to that adopted in Barnard lead to convictions of 
murder. Thi s woul d take the 1 aw back to the vi ew taken by the 
trial court in Mbombela . 50 ) The tri a 1 judge instructed the 
jury that Mbombela's mistaken belief that he was killing a 
spiritual entity and not a human being would not absolve him from 
murder if it were an unreasonable mistake . This was the expres-
sion of a normative concept of fault. No matter whether it was 
cul pa psychologically, the mens rea of the accused woul d be 
normatively adjudged dol us. 
3.4 NJ van der Merwe 
The normative fault doctrine has found favour with writers other 
48) supra 436 B-G. 
49) vide n47 supra . 
50) 1933 AD 269. 
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than CR Snyman. 1) Two of them will be consi dered bri efly, 
namely, NJ van der Merwe 2) and DA Botha. 
The view expressed in Van der Merwe and Olivier is that 'skuld' 
is a reproach. It cannot be a state of mind or disposition as 
negligence, which is a form of 'skuld', is not a state of mind or 
disposition. 3) 
NJ van der Merwe discussed his concept 'skuld' in an article in 
the South African Law Journal. 4) Here he advanced a normative 
1) Bergenthuin (thesis); Bergenthuin 1986 OJ 98; Oosthuizen 
1985 THRHR 407; Kok 1982 SACC 27. --
2) NJ van der ~1erwe discusses the doctrine in 'Die 
Onregmati ge Daad in die Sui d-Afrikaanse Reg' co-authored 
by PJJ Olivier. 
3) Van der Merwe and Olivier 110 . Professor JC de Wet 
attacked the view that 'skuld' is a reproach on the basis 
that it is the object of a reproach (n30 supra). Van der 
Merwe and Olivier's reply (110 n82) is to the effect that 
Professor de Wet does not define what he means by -'skuld' 
in the sense of its being the object of a reproach. It is 
then ei ther an i nsubstanti a 1 'somethi ng' or the dep 1 orabl e 
disposition (laakbare gesindheid) described in De Wet and 
Swanepoe 1 (3ed 99 and 136, 4ed 103). The authors repeat 
the criticism that 'skuld ' cannot be a disposition, it is 
a reproach. Footnore 82 on page 110 of van der Merwe and 
Olivier is very interesting. It demonstrates that De Wet 
and Swanepoel's definition of 'skuld' is tautologous and 
it indicates that van der Merwe and 01 ivier's own use of 
the term 'skuld' as reproach or blameworthiness, is mean-
ingless. Reproach as Professor JC de Wet points out (n30 
supra) is not an element of crime, it is the disposition 
of soci ety towards the person who has committed a crime. 
Thus, in one footnore there is a di scussi on of the term 
'skuld' which makes it doubtful whether the term is worth 
retaining. The footnote summarises an unmistakeable clash 
between the normative and psychological - approaches to 
faul t. 
4) 1976 SALJ 280. The article is concerned with 'skuld' in 
the CrTmTnal Law . 
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concept of faul t wi thout reference to any German wri ters . It is 
evi dent from the arti cl e that the author regards 'skul d' as 
reproach and that he fails to distinguish between defences on the 
merits and mitigating factors. 5) All-in-all this theory of 
crimi na 1 fault cannot be regarded as workable. It mi ght have 
some practical function in a German one-phase trial, but this is 
doubtful. The author says fault is a reproach but does not say 
what gives rise to the reproach. 6 ) 
3.5 D A Botha 
In four articles l ) D A Botha advances a view of 'skuld' which 
seems to be aimed at removing dolus and culpa from the field of 
mens rea and 1 eavi ng knowl edge or awareness of unl awful ness as 
the sol e subj ecti ve el ement of crime. Without referri ng to the 
final-conduct doctrine of the German theorist Hans Welzel, the 
author proposes a vi ew of mens rea and criminal conduct that 
5) The article contains some startling statements concerning 
'skuld', inter alia that conduct subsequent to the crime 
coul d negatl ve faul t and lead to an acquittal. On 288 
(n45) it is made clear that 'subsequent conduct' is not to 
be viewed as relevant to sentence only. 
6) vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301, 318-9. 
1) 1975 SALJ 280, 1975-sArJ 380,1977 SALJ 280,1980 SALJ 
277. "J1ieViews expresSeOand argumentsaavanced in these 
four articles are largely based on views expressed and 
arguments advanced in the author's unpub 1 i shed doctoral 
thesis Wederregtelikheidsbewussyn in die Strafeg Univer-
sity of Pretoria 1973 . The articles are, however, to be 
preferred in some respects, the latter two being post De 
Blom 1977 3 SA 513 (A) in which ignorance of the law was 
recognized as a defence. The exposition in the thesis is, 
however, not to be ignored as it is in greater depth. 
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comes very close to the views of Welzel .2) 
If one considers Snyman's3) exposition of Welzel's doctrine it 
appears that, shorn of all metaphysical and philosophical embell-
ishment, the doctrine amounts to this; namely, a criminal act 
shoul d not be regarded as separate from the i ntenti on wh i ch 
accompanies it. This intention which accompanies an act is, how-
ever, not to be regarded as dolus but as 'natural' or 'ordinary' 
or 'traditional' intention. Such intention is, on Snyman's 
analysis, one part of dolus which has a 'dual character'. One of 
, 
the two components is 'intention' which is colourless (so one 
presumes) and the other is knowledge of unlawfulness. In terms 
of Welzel's theory, as interpreted by Snyman, only 'knowledge of 
unlawfulness' belongs to fault, while the rest of 'intention' 
belongs with the act. 4 ) 
Botha divides intention into two parts in much the same way, and 
concludes that intention belongs with the act, and knowledge of 
unlawfulness is the sole component of fault or 'skuld'. His 
exposition is a little difficult to follow at first,5) but once 
the reader real izes that mens rea as used by the author means 
fault, 'skuld' or blameworthiness, the difficulty can be over 
2) Welzel's views are to the effect that intent and negli-
gence belong wi th the act (Handl ung) and shoul d not be 
treated as part of fault (Schuld). 
3) 1979 SACC 3 and 136. Vide also du Plessis 1984 SALJ 30l. 
4) 1979 S~3 and 136, 138ff. 
5) He expresses himself with greater clarity in his Thesis 
288ff. 
- 67 -
come. Confusi on wh i ch may be caused by pri or readi ng of the 
articles written in English, is dispelled by the opinion expres-
sed in the very first paragraph of the 1980 article6 ) that 
dolus should be viewed as not encompassing intent (opset).7) 
The author analyses mens rea in an unusual way and comes to the 
conclusion that intent has no function at all in formally 
defined crimes like, for example, rape8) and incest. 9) He 
arrives at this conclusion, after considering certain cases on 
the possession of dagga. 10 ) 
It appears from the discussionll ) however, that the author may 
have confused knowledge of the fact that a substance is a for-
bidden substance with knowledge of the statutory provision which 
makes the substance in question forbidden. Moyage12 ) was 
decided on the question whether the accused knew that what they 
were conveying was dagga, and not on their knowledge of the 
statutory measure prohibiting its conveyance. It must be borne 
in mind that the decision as well as the article and Botha's 
thesis were written before ignorance or mistake of law was made a 
defence on the merits in De Blom. 13 ) 
6) 1980 SALJ 380. 
7) cf Botha 288. 
8) 1975 SALJ 380, 383. 
9) 1980 SALJ 380, 380. 
10) Moyage""TI"5"8 3 SA 400 (A); Ngwenya 1979 2 SA 96 (A). 
11) 1980 SALJ 380, 387 ff. 
12) supra. 
13) supra. 
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The main thrust of the argument in' What Preci sely Constitutes 
Mens Rea'14) is that intention is only a requirement of 
'result' crimes such as murder and that it plays no part in 
formally defined15 ) crimes. 16 ) In the case of these crimes 
the volition of the accused cannot be described as intent, it is 
at most consciousness that he is acting and as such belongs with 
the act. Mens rea or fault consists in knowing that the act is 
unlawful. 
Thus the statement is made that 'it should be obvious that inten-
tion in its dictionary meaning, plays no role in rape,.l7) 
It is difficult to agree with this statement. By 'intention in 
its dictionary meaning' the author means 'having an objective'. 
This statement should be read with the analysis in Botha's 
thesis 18 ) in which the author explains that it has been a mis-
take to translate the Latin word dolus as 'opset' or 'intent' or 
'intention'. He rejects the view that intent is a legal term of 
art refined over centuries which need not be a dictionary trans -
14) 1975 SALJ 380. 
15) A 'result crime' is a crime in which a result eg the death 
of a human being is forbidden no matter how it is brought 
about. A formally defined crime is a crime in which the 
criminal act is formally defined eg to be in a forbidden 
place or to be in possession of a forbidden substance. 
16) This argument is treated in greater depth in Botha 288 ff. 
17) 1975 SALJ 380, 383 . What the author is saying, possibly 
without realising it, is that rape is a crime of basic 
intent, not specific or ulterior intent; vide Glanville 
Williams (Textbook) 117-8. 
18) 288 ff. 
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lation of dolus. 19 ) It is difficult to agree: anyone who uses 
intention in the senses of dolus directus, dolus indirectus and 
dolus eventualis is clearly not using the word in its dictionary 
sense. It is a legal term of art the ultimate basis of which in 
our law, is knowledge of what one is doi ng or foresight of the 
consequences of one's conduct. 20 ) 
The objective a man may have in having intercourse with a woman 
without her consent is irrelevant from the point of view of his 
guilt or innocence. If he has intercourse with her knowing that 
she is a woman, that she is alive and that she does not consent, 
he has the 'intent' to commit rape. Botha states that knowledge 
of unlawfulness is the only ingredient of the mens rea of rape. 
Closely considered this statement says nothing new. By knowledge 
of unlawfulness he means that the accused is not making a mistake 
of fact, or a mistake of law. This has always been the case but 
why it should now be used to bolster the argument that intention 
belongs to the act and is not fault or 'skuld' is not clear. 
Reading the four articles mentioned together with the relevant 
passages 21 ) in Botha one can but conclude that Botha is advoca-
ti ng the adopti on of a theory or doctri ne of normati ve fault 
identical to that favoured by C R Snyman. 22 ) 
19) Botha 289-90. 
20) Knowi ng that the conduct or the results of the proposed 
conduct is or are unlawful is inextricably interwoven with 
this knowledge. 
21) 288 ff. 
22) ie the normative fault theory and the final-conduct the-
ory. 
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3.6 Concluding remarks on 'Skuld' 
It is worth noting that in the fourth and latest edition23 ) of 
De Wet and Swanepoel the normative fault doctrine is not mention-
ed in the index. It is nowhere referred to by name, but the 
discussion of mistake of law24 ) and the various German theories 
relevant to this topic has a strong bearing on normative fault. 
De Wet and Swanepoel coul d hardly be expected to accept thi s 
doctrine as their views of ignorance of the law as a defence stem 
from the German theory opposite to that espoused by Snyman. 25) 
De Wet and Swanepoel also appear sceptical of Welzel's 'final-
conduct' doctri ne. 26) Rej ecti on of thi s doctri ne almost 
inevitably leads to rejection of the normative fault doctrine. 
In a bri ef arti cl e 27) JMT Labuschagne di scusses the normati ve 
fault doctrine and, although he finds some good in it,28) seems 
on the whole to reject it. He is critical of the German orient-
ated legally scientific (regswetenskaplike) approach to the 
criminal law on the basis that it is uneconomical and results in 
a waste of intellectual energy.29) 
23) 1985, prepared by Professor JC de Wet. 
24) 149. 
25) 178-81. 
26) 137-8, n178. 
27) 1985 DJ 381. 
28) On 38~he holds out the hope that the normative fault con-
cept may be the fi rst ina seri es of developments that 
could lead to the disintegration of the dogmatics of 
'Strafrechtswissenschaft' . 
29) 381. 
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In other words, it represents what one may call a disproportion-
ate preponderance of the means over the end. 
One of his concluding remarks is worth quoting in full; namely, 
'Kenmerkend van die ontwikkeling is dat die begrip 'skuld' 
behou word, maar daar word 'n ander inhoud daaraan gegee. 
Die rede hiervoor is gelee in die feit dat sekere 
dogmadraende begrippe gepostuleer word waardeur en waar-
binne die strafreg moet funksioneer. Dit is 'n inherente 
gebrek in alle dogmatiese modelle wat insig belemmer en 
ontwikkeling vertraag.,30) 
As this passage indicates, the word 'skuld' has had its meaning 
changed. From being the equivalent of mens rea (in other words 
dolus and culpa in De Wet and .Swanepoel) it has come to mean 
'reproach' or 'blameworthiness' or 'knowledge of unlawfulness' or 
'culpability' in the publications of CR Snyman, NJ van der Merwe 
and DA Botha. 
To use 'skuld' as the equivalent of mens rea as is done in Snyman 
and in Botha's articles written in English is confusing. It is 
30) 'Characteristic of the development is that the concept 
'skuld' is retained but given a different content. The 
reason for this is that certain dogma-bearing concepts are 
postulated by means of which and within which the criminal 
law must function. This is an inherent weakness in all 
dogmatic models which clouds insight and retards develop-
ment' (my translation). 
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submi tted that the word shoul d be used wi th great care and that 
one should be perpetually on one's guard against simply equating 
it with mens rea when reading criminal legal literature or pub-
lications on delict in which it is used. 
4. Summary of Views on Mens rea and/or 'sKuld' 
The current views on mens rea and/or 'skuld' in the textbooks on 
South African criminal law could be summarised as follows:-
Burchell and Hunt divide crime into two components: actus 
reus and mens rea. The latter is the mental or subjective 
element of crime and is divided into intent (dolus) and 
negl i gence (cul pa) . There is a strong tendency to regard 
negligence as conduct. 
De Wet and Swanepoel follow the same division but call 
mens rea 'skuld'. Its components are intent (opset) and 
negligence (nalatigheid), both are regarded as blameworthy 
states or attitudes of mind. 
There is no great difference between the vi ews of De Wet 
and Swanepoel and Burchell and Hunt in this respect. The 
only difference worth mentioning is that De Wet and Swane-
poel insist that 'skuld' is a ground for 'verwyt' (re-
• 
proach or blameworthiness). 
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Snyman concedes that the above division is followed by our 
courts, but di sapproves of it. The author prefers the 
normative fault theory which involves an acceptance of 
Hans Welzel 's view that intent and negligence form part of 
the criminal act. This leaves knowledge of unlawfulness 
as the sole or main ingredient of 'skuld'. Whether an 
accused is to be acquitted because of lack of knowledge of 
unlawfulness is to be answered normatively, not psycholog-
ically. The normative inquiry is : 'What ought he to have 
known?' The psychological inquiry is: 'What did he in 
fact know?' 
Van der Merwe and Olivier and Botha appear to accept the 
normative fault theory but they do not accept Wel zel 's 
final-conduct doctrine in so many words. 
s. Current views of South African writers on culpa (negli-
gence) with particular reference to culpable homicide 
S.l The first editions of Burchell and Hunt, and of Hunt 
Burchell and Hunt discuss negligence,1) at length as does 
Hunt2) in connecti on with cul pab 1 e homi ci de. A compa ri son of 
these discussions in the first editions with those in the second 
1) led 148-61, 2ed 192-213. 
2) led 373-84, 2ed 413-20. 
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editions is revealing. In the first edition of Burchell and Hunt 
negligence is discussed along traditional lines. By this is 
meant that it is regarded as a state of mi nd3 ) arrived at by 
considering the conduct of an accused objectively and deciding 
whether hi s conduct compl i ed wi th the standa rds of care that a 
reasonable man would have observed in the circumstances. 4 ) The 
personal characteristics of the accused are not taken into 
account, except that the 'reasonable man' placed in his position 
is credited with such special knowledge and such special skills 
as the accused may have. 5 ) 
The authors rejected6 ) the view of De Wet and Swanepoel that 
negligence should be judged subjectively according to the nature 
and character of the accused and not accordi ng to the standards 
of the reasonable man. In this regard they relied7) on argu-
ments advanced by Hunt. 8) These latter arguments were to the 
effect that it would result in chaos and legal uncertainty to 
judge every person according to his or her own standards and 
abilities in order to determine whether he or she has been negli-
gent. A reckless, careless, hot-tempered, foolish person would 
then be entitled to more lenient treatment than one who is self-
composed and circumspect. 
3) 148-5l. 
4) 150. 
5) 15l. 
6) 152. 
7) 152 n46. 
8) led 379-83. 
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Neither Burchell and Hunt, nor Hunt, di scussed the problem of 
cultural differences. 9 ) 
5.2 The Second Editions of Burchell and Hunt and of Hunt 
5.2.1 Introduction 
In the second editions 10 ) of both Burchell and Hunt and Hunt 
the discussions are substantially different from those in the 
first editions. The question of the subjective test for negli-
gence is discussed at some length and the approach of DA Botha 
in his article 'Culpa - a form of Mens Rea or a Mode of Con-
duct?'ll) is approved of and followed.1 2 ) It would therefore 
be appropriate to discuss Botha's views at this stage. 
5.2.2 The views of 0 A Botha 
Botha comes to the conclusion that negligence or culpa should be 
investigated twice in crimes of negligence. 13 ) First, the 
presence or absence of cul pa shoul d be investi gated objectively 
to determine whether the act is unlawful and then it should be 
investigated subjectively to determine whether the accused is to 
9) As stated in Nkomo (I) 1964 3 SA 128 (SR), 131 in an oft-
quoted passage contrasting the Batonka fisherman with a 
university professor. 
10) cf nn 1 and 2 supra. 
11) 1977 SALJ 29. 
12) BurcheT"land Hunt 200-3; Hunt 398-401, 413-20. 
13) vide Ngubane supra 686-7. 
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be blamed or reproached for having committed the act. 
Although Botha does not refer to German criminal legal dogmatics, 
he appears to follow the finalistic trend to divide crime into 
'Unrecht' or wrongdoing, on the one hand, and 'Schuld', (that is, 
blameworthiness, fault or culpability) on the other hand,14) 
and to regard negl igence as belonging to the former and not the 
1 atter. 
According to Botha the killing of a human being should first be 
investigated with a view to detennining whether it is unlawful. 
In the case of a prosecution for culpable homicide this investi-
gation detennines whether, objectively considered, the kill ing 
was negl i gent. 
Once negligence in this sense has been established, the killing 
is unlawful. This is, however, not sufficient to establish crim-
inal liability on the part of the accused. The court would also 
have to determine whether he has 'fault' before he can be convic-
ted. This fault, culpa or blameworthiness on the part of the 
accused is investigated subjectively by measuring the conduct of 
the accused against what could be expected of him in the light of 
his own circumstances, characteristics, knowledge and person-
ality.lS) 
14) vide Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 12l. 
15) Botha 1977 SALJ 29,JI. This appears to be an investiga-
ti on of the psychol ogi ca 1 fault (if any) of the accused, 
after a normative (fault?) inquiry has established that 
the killing was unlawful. This duplicated inquiry could 
only result in fault being coupled with unlawfulness in a 
confusing manner. 
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It is submitted that this suggestion is unpractical. The conduct 
of the accused would be measured against what two phantoms would 
have done in the situation in which the accused had caused 
death.16 ) The first phantom is the traditional reasonable man 
or bonus paterfamilias. If the accused failed to measure up to 
his standards, the act was unlawful. The second phantom is the 
accused himself, not as he was at the time of the act, but as he 
could have and ought to have been, had he measured up to his own 
standards of reasonableness. The accused is therefore measured 
against his own reasonable double, alter ego, 'Doppelganger' or 
'besseres Ich' in this second inquiry. If he has failed to 
comply with his own standards of reasonableness, his conduct is 
cul pab 1 e. On thi s reasoni ng negl i gence becomes negl i gence twi ce 
over. Botha would seem to have overlooked the fact that the 
accused will in any event always be cons i dered as an i ndi vi dual 
when sentence is passed. 17 ) 
If the individualized negligence test advocated by Botha is 
app 1 i ed, an accused may be found to have acted un 1 awfully be-
cause, objectively, he acted negligently. But he could neverthe-
16) vide Visser and Vorster 346. 
17) There can be little doubt that the proposed procedure of 
investigating or considering negligence twice as an ele-
ment of the crime charged, has its origin in thinking 
based on the German one-phase tri a 1. The guil t or i nno-
cence of the accused would be investigated by considering 
the alleged negligence objectively. Appropriate sentence 
woul d be i nves ti ga ted by cons i deri ng the alleged negl i-
gence subjectively. As the two investigations are simul-
taneous, it is conceivable that to some theorists, and 
probably to some judges, they merge. 
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less be acquitted because subjectively he did not act negli-
gently. It is doubtful whether any court wou14 ever con sci ously 
set out upon these two inquiries in order to deci de whether to 
convict. 18 ) Traditionally, two inquiries are pursued routinely; 
first, whether the accused was objectively negligent in which 
case he is convicted, and second, to what extent he as a person 
deserves to be punished. This is not to suggest that our courts 
do not consider subjective factors when deciding upon negli-
gence.1 9 ) 
The arguments advanced by Hunt20 ) against the app 1 i ca ti on of a 
subjective test for negligence are countered by Botha as 
fo 11 ows : 21 ) 
18) 
19) 
20) 
21) 
'Hunt wri tes that "i f a hot-tempered i ndi vi dua 1 loses 
control of himself and (lacking intent to kill) causes 
death, he cannot then be convicted of culpable homicide, 
for if we are to judge him by his own characteristics he 
has acted predictably and in accordance with the disposi-
tion which a variety of background influences have 
shaped". The fallacy in this argument should be 
The double test adopted by Tredgold J in Tenganyika 1958 3 
SA 7 (F) is the nearest analogy. 
Such subj ecti ve factors are the knowl edge or speci ali zed 
knowledge of the accused, his special skills and (prob-
ably) his age, depending on how much weight is to be given 
to the judgment of M T Steyn J in I 1986 2 SA 112 (0). 
led 378. -
37-8. Visser and Vorster (345) also reject Hunt's (led) 
views, the interpretation placed on van As 1976 2 SA 560 
(A) in Ngubane could cause these authors to change their 
views. 
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apparent. It lies in the assumption that the legally re-
quired conduct has to be fixed by means of the standard of 
the accused himself. This is wrong. The court must have 
recourse to the "reasonable man" to determi ne if the 
accused's conduct was unlawful. If the court finds that 
the accused did act unlawfully. thereby causing the death 
of the deceased. the court mus t go on to enqui re whether 
the accused acted with cul pa. that is. whether with his 
mental make-up he could and should have foreseen the 
possibility of causing another's death. The accused 
shoul d not escape blame if he. knowi ng that he is apt to 
lose his temper and control over himself. allows himself 
to get involved in an argument leading to such a loss of 
temper and the death of the deceased. In this respect he 
is in no different a position to that of the unskilled 
person who undertakes work for which he knows that he is 
not qual ifi ed. Both are aware that they have certain 
shortcomings and both shoul d know that they dare not act 
if such shortcomings may lead to injury to others. 
It is further argued by Hunt that if a naturally clumsy or 
careless individual causes an accident he would not be 
responsible on the subjective approach. This argument is 
without substance. If a cl umsy person has caused damage 
through his clumsiness. the wrongfulness of his conduct is 
determined by the 'reasonable man' test. His culpa will 
depend on the foreseeabil ity. for him. of the damage he 
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had caused . If he undertakes a task knowi ng that hi s 
clumsiness may result in damage, and fails to take due 
care, culpa will most likely be found to be present. 
Hunt then cites the exampl e of a person whose re 1 i gi ous 
upbringing induces in him a belief that his child can be 
cured by prayer but not by medical treatment; he refuses 
medi ca 1 treatment and causes the chil d's death. Assumi ng 
the court finds that contemporary mores demand that a 
person in the shoes of the accused should have obtained 
medical treatment, his unlawful conduct will be estab-
1 i shed. If the court further fi nds that despi te his 
religious beliefs the accused ought to have foreseen the 
possibility of death, he will have acted with cUlpa. 
The unskilled person whose innate foolishness leads him to 
believe that he is competent to drive a motor car and who 
causes a fatal collision must be dealt with in the same 
way. If it is establ ished that his conduct was unlawful 
because it was objectively unreasonable, the next step is 
to enquire whether he, with his mental make-up, had the 
ability to foresee the consequences of his conduct. If he 
did not have this abil ity, no fault can be imputed to 
hi m' . 
It is repectfully submitted that Botha's response to Hunt's argu-
ments are unconvincing. He postul ates that every hot-tempered 
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individual will know in advance that he may be involved in a 
specific argument and ought therefore immediately to avoid, or 
remove himself from, the developing situation that could lead to 
the anticipated altercation. However, arguments can flare up on 
the spur of the moment and provocative remarks givi ng ri se to 
quick retaliation can be made without warning. Is the hot-
tempered person to be excused if he negligently kills someone in 
such a situation, but not if he notices that an argument is 
developing and fails to go away before he loses his temper? What 
of the hot-tempered man who is so lacking in circumspection as 
not to realise that someone may shortly provoke him? Is he to be 
excused in circumstances where a more intelligent hot-tempered 
man would not? Botha does not deal with these problems and a 
consideration of them shows that he really has no answer to the 
arguments of Hunt. 
Similarly the clumsy man is not to be excused if he undertakes a 
task which he knows his clumsiness will not allow him to carry 
out successfully. But what · if he is a1 so an eternally fool ish 
optimist and this optimistic part of his mental make-up leads him 
to believe that he will overcome the handicap of his clumsiness? 
Once more Botha's answer to Hunt's argument is shown to be un-
sound. 
What Botha does in hi s answers to Hunt is merely to shi ft the 
negligence one step away from the criminal result . The hot-
tempered man cannot be blamed because he is hot-tempered, but he 
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can be blamed for not having appreciated that his hot-
temperedness could soon assert itself. The clumsy man cannot be 
blamed for his clumsiness, but he can be blamed for not having 
realised that his clumsiness would lead to disaster. In both 
cases an objective test must eventually be applied unless one is 
to fall into the trap,22) pointed out by Hunt, of allowing 
every man to set the standard of hi s own reasonable conduct, 
thereby ensuring that individuals who are naturally pugnacious, 
clumsy, foolish or lacking in commonsense enjoy an advantage not 
enjoyed by their more sensible fellow-citizens. 
The man who believes his child can be cured by prayer is in the 
same category. The more firmly he believes in faith-healing the 
less likely it is that he ought subjectively to have foreseen the 
possibility of the death of the child. Thus does his faith take 
him beyond the reach of the law although it is his duty to 
protect his child and although human 1 ife is the most precious 
thing known to the criminal law. 
Similar considerations apply to the unskilled driver. The more 
foolish 23 ) the simpleton who sets out to drive a motor car, 
without knowing how, the more likely he is to be found blameless 
on Botha's reasoning. In this connection one may well enquire 
wha t person woul d 1 ack the abil i ty to real i se the danger of 
22) Referred to by Hunt 1st ed 378-9. 
23) And by the same token! the more potenti a lly dangerous. 
- 83 -
driving a motor car whilst lacking the necessary knowledge and 
skill? The only answer that readily comes to mind, is one who is 
utterly foolish or arrogant and a danger to his fellow men; that 
is, of course, if he tries to drive. A reasonable man would 
rea 1 i ze the danger and not try to dri ve. 
Although Botha's article, on close study is, with respect, not 
entirely convincing, he does touch on two serious difficulties 
relating to culpable homicide; namely, the question when uninten-
tional killings are unlawful, and the question whether children 
are to be subj ected to the 'reasonable man' test when thei r 
negligence is considered. 24 ) 
A further weakness of Botha's article is that he strongly 
supports the view that criminal liability is in the last instance 
determined with reference to moral ity or moral consi der-
a ti ons .25) Yet he does not attempt to define these moral 
considerations or to give any indication of their nature except 
to suggest that moral behaviour26 ) is what society regards as 
reasonable. 27) 
5.2.3 Acceptance of Botha's views by Burchell and Hunt and Hunt 
In Hunt's second edition no attempt is made to counter Botha's 
24) 37 cf I supra. 
25) 30. -
261 Apparently in the context of negligence. 
27 31. 
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arguments. Indeed, in both the later editions of Burchell and 
Hunt, and Hunt, views substantially similar to those of Botha are 
expressed. 28) 
In Burchell and Hunt culpa is treated as a form of mens rea with 
a very strong leaning towards treating negligence as conduct 
rather than a state of mind. 29 ) The authors found themselves 
compelled to treat negligence as a state of mind, because that 
was the way in which it had been treated by the courts. 3D ) 
Referring to negligence conceived as conduct they write: 
'Almost by definition, one who "negligently", say, causes 
the death of another neither wills, intends or even fore-
sees death as a consequence of his conduct. Negligence is 
thus the antithesis of intention (dolus) and so different 
in character as to defy description as a state of mind and 
thus as mens rea. 
However, this argument rests on the premise that the term 
mens rea means "a state of mind" which necessarily invol-
ves a cognitive mental state. It is more accurate though 
28) supra 5.2.2. 
29) 194-5 thereby anti ci pati ng Ngubane (supra) one must add. 
Ngubane appears to be one notable recent decision in which 
the English approach to criminal law rather than the 
German approach, has been favoured. 
30) 192 . 
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to understand mens rea as denoting a condition of 
blameworthiness expressed in terms of the state of mind of 
an actor in re 1 ati on to a prohi bited act or consequence. 
On this approach there is no difficulty in conceiving of 
mens rea as consisting in dolus or culpa. Where intention 
(dolus) is mens rea, blameworthiness is postulated upon 
the accused's intentional bringing about of some unlawful 
act or consequence; where negligence (culpa) is mens rea, 
blameworthiness is postulated upon the accused's inadvert-
ence vi s-a-vi s an unl awful act or consequence. If the 
term 'negligence' is understood to denote a form of 
cul pabil i ty or b 1 ameworthi ness, there is no reason why 
negl i gence cannot serve to express the mens rea of some 
crimes' . 
It is difficult to understand this passage. It would appear 
that the authors accept the doctrine that mens rea is reproach or 
b 1 ameworthi ness and subscri be ob 1 i quely to a rather obscurel y 
worded versi on of the normati ve fault theory. What is meant by 
'a condition of blameworthiness expressed in terms of the state 
of mind of an actor in relation to a prohibited act or conse-
quence'? Does it mean that the act or its result is looked upon 
as blameworthy and that this gives rise to a fiction that the 
actor had a state of mind which is termed negligence? This could 
be stated more di rectly by simply sayi ng an act whi ch is 
negligent (as an act) is blameworthy, as society expects people 
not to act in that way. This would be a statement of normative 
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fault31 ) and as has been said, the mens rea of the accused is 
in the minds of his judges, not in his own mind. 32 ) It is also 
not clear from the quoted passage whether the blameworthiness 
causes the mental elements (both intent and negligence) to be 
postulated, or whether the postulated mental elements give rise 
to the blameworthiness. The general statement in the passage is 
circular and tautologous: blameworthiness postulates dolus or 
culpa and dolus or culpa gives rise to blameworthiness. In this 
respect the authors have become involved in much the same 
tautology as De Wet and swanepoel. 33 ) As indicated above,34) 
De Wet and Swanepoel's difficulties originate in the use of the 
word 'skuld' as a 'something' that gives rise to reproach and the 
diffi culti es of Burchell and Hunt ori gi nate in the use of the 
concept of bl ameworthi ness wh i ch is not defi ned. The cri ti ci sm 
1 evell ed at De Wet and Swanepoel by van der Merwe and 
Olivier35 ) can therefore al so be levelled at this passage in 
Burchell and Hunt. 
A further diffi culty of Burchell and Hunt is thei r attempt to 
31) The vi ew that negl i gence is conduct is normati ve, the 
psychology of the de cujus is not investigated. The 
di ffi culti es experi enced by j:he authors of Burchell and 
Hunt and Hunt, referred to in the text, are no doubt due 
to their having to reconcile their view that negligence is 
conduct with the clear tendency of the courts, before 
Ngubane, to regard negligence as mens rea. The problems 
attendant upon viewing negligence as mens rea are reviewed 
by Didcott J in Zoko supra. 
32) Snyman 115. --
33) vide supra 33 ff. 
34) ibid. 
34) supra 64 esp n3. 
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find the unlawfulness of negligent crimes in objective negligence 
and the mens rea in a vague notion o"f blameworthiness which is 
subjective and. at the same time. objective. 36 ) The initial 
objective negligence consists in the failure to measure up to the 
standards of the reasonable man. The subjective negligence 
consists in being negligent (or culpable or blameworthy) through 
failing to measure up to one's own standards of reasonable 
conduct. The 1 atter phenomenon is descri bed as b 1 ameworthi ness 
expressed as a state of mind. It is to be expected that ina 
future edition of the textbook the Ngubane371 view that 
negligence is conduct will obviate some of the difficulties here 
alluded to. 
5.2.3.1 Burchell and Hunt's views on negl igence in statutory 
offences 
Burchell and Hunt's vi ew of negl i gence in statutory offences 1) 
is closely related to that of Botha. 2 ) and it is submitted 
equally untenable. A consideration of some of the difficulties 
to which it gives rise demonstrates this. 
Accordi ng to Burchell and Hunt the unl awful ness of statutory 
36) 197-202. 
37) Discussed 1.3 supra. 
1) 20ff . 
2) vide supra 3.5. 
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offences is provided by the statutory provision itself. 3 ) 
Negligence, which is the failure to act as a reasonable man would 
have acted in similar circumstances, has no role to play in 
statutory offences. 4) Whether an accused can be convi cted on 
proof that he has contravened a statutory provision depends 
sol ely on hi s personal, subjectively eval uated, bl ameworthi ness 
or culpability.5) 
The main' example referred t06 ) is Arenstein . 7l Under pres-
sure of work Arenstein had forgetfully failed to ·comply with the 
provisions of a statutory notice served on him. The court held 
that it was not necessary for the State to establish dolus on his 
part for a conviction, as culpa would suffice as the mens rea of 
the crime8 ). 
It is clear that the court convicting Arenstein found his failure 
to comply with the notice to have resulted from alack of the 
concern which a reasonable man would have shown. A reasonable 
man would not have overlooked the requirements of the notice in 
the ci rcurnstances in whi ch Arenstei n overlooked them . To say 
that negligence in the sense of objectively unreasonable conduct 
was irrelevant to the commission of the offence is not 
3) 200ff. 
4) ibid. 
5) ibid. 
6) 20l. 
7l 1969 1 SA 361 (A). 
8) 3668 - 367 A. 
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justified. 9) Placing the reasonable man in the position of the 
accused is not the same as attributing all the characteristics of 
the accused to the reasonable man. 
It is al so not to be overlooked that some statutory offences 
require dolus as their mens rea10 ) and that it is sometimes no 
easy task for a court to determine whether dolus or culpa is the 
mens rea of a statutory offence. ll ) If objective negligence is 
di spensed wi th by the ci rcumstance that the statutory measure 
makes the relevant conduct unlawful, one wonders what it is that 
the courts mean when they fi nd that the mens rea of a statutory 
offence is culpa? There is no clear statement that negligence in 
terms of the personal standards of the accused is meant. In this 
connection it is also worth mentioning that in the section on 
mens rea in statutory offences, Burchell and Hunt12 ) appear to 
have overlooked what they say about negligence not really being a 
requirement in their section on mens rea. 13 ) 
If one considers the offence of drunken driving14 ) concerning 
which there is a general opinion that the mens rea is culpa,15) 
it becomes clear that the requirement of objective negligence is 
9) In the light of the dicta referred to in n8 supra. 
10) 220ff. 
11) ibid and compare JH du Plessis 61-3. 
12) 221-3. 
13) supra 2.2. 
14) Contravening section 140 (1) (a) of the Road Traffic 
Ordinance 21 of 1966 (Tvl). 
15) Fouche 1974 1 SA 96 (A); JH du Plessis 61-2. 
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not dispensed with by the statutory measure which defines the 
crime. If an accused is proved to have driven under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs and there is neither 
culpa nor dolus on his part, he will be acquitted . 16 ) If he 
rai ses the defence of absence of mens rea the questi on whether 
objectively, he acted reasonably will be very thoroughly 
investigated)?) If it is not objective negligence which is 
investigated in this context but some vague concept of personal 
blameworthiness, one of the results of the Chretien18 ) decision 
coul d be that almost every accused charged with drunken driving 
could raise the defence, with a fair prospect of success, that a 
drunken reasonable man would have acted as he did. To argue that 
a reasonable man would not get drunk knowing that he may have to 
drive19 ) would elicit the retort that a reasonable alcoholic 
might very well get drunk in such circumstances depending on the 
strength of his craving. 20 ) 
5.3 Criticism of the views on Negligence of Burchell and Hunt 
and Hunt 
Adhering to the view that negligence should be objectively 
16) 
I?) 
18) 
19) 
20) 
Fouche supra. 
ibid . 
1981 1 SA 1097 (A). 
As was done in Fouche . 
vide JH du Plessls 60 . 
coul d ever be found to 
test for negligence. 
The author states that no accused 
have complied with the subjective 
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investigated to establish unlawfulness and subjectively to estab-
1 ish fault, Burchell and Hunt arrive at the following statement 
of the requirements of negligence: 1) 
'An accused will have been negligent where 
I He (could and) shoul d reasonably have foreseen the 
possibil ity of the occurrence of the consequence or 
the existence of the circumstance in question, in-
cluding its unlawfulness; and 
II He (could and) should reasonably have guarded 
against that possibility; and 
III He failed to take the steps which he (could and) 
should reasonably have taken to guard against it' . 
The bracketed requirement is subjective and bolsters the position 
of the alcoholic as ·discussed in connection with drunken driving 
above. It also places a premium, as do the views of Botha,2) 
on natural stupidity and inborn or acquired foolishness. 3) 
When discussing the positive law, the authors draw no clear 
picture of negligence which supplies the element of unlawfulness 
in contrast to negligence which supplies the element of fault. 
1) 203-4. 
2) Discussed supra 5.2.2. 
3) vide supra 5.2.1. 
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This is because such a doctrine is not part of our positive law, 
a 1 though there may be a tendency among judges occas i ona lly to 
consider negligence subjectively.4) This tendency is said to 
have manifested itself at its strongest in van As.5) But 
commentators 6 ) on that case could have read more into the 
judgment than the court intended. 7 ) 
In Hunt's second edition culpa is discussed in connection with 
culpable homicide. 8 ) The discussion in the first edition is 
much to be preferred. Culpable homicide is defined as the 
unlawful negligent killing of another person. 9 ) Yet a great 
deal of the discussion that follows is devoted to establishing or 
postulating that objective negligence is the element which makes 
a killing other than an intentional killing, which is murder, 
unl awful. Further di scussi on is then devoted to the theme that 
negligence is in fact not negligence in the sense of fal.ling 
short of the standards of a reasonable man, but some vague, 
ill-defined individualised moral blameworthiness on the part of 
the person who has caused the death. 
4) Where the accused has special knowledge or expertise 
(Burchell and Hunt 293) or is very young. 
5) 1976 2 SA 92l (A). 
6) eg Schafer 1978 THRHR 201; Goosen 1979 Obiter 60. 
l) Burchell and Hunt (203) suggest this; vlde JH du Plessis 
60 and 73 n88. 
8) 41Uf. It should perhaps be mentioned that the second 
edition of Hunt was prepared by JRL Milton, PMA Hunt 
having died tragically young. 
9) 401. 
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For some reason which is not in any way made clear the author 
does not follow the simple course of holding that it is the 
killing of a human being which is forbidden and therefore unlaw-
ful. 10 ) Instead, he adopts the view that what is forbidden is 
'conduct which has fatal consequences for human beings.' This is 
patently mistaken. Inflicting injury or assaulting a human being 
can and often does have fatal consequences. But the unintention-
al inflicting of bodily injury is no crime in our law. ll ) The 
passage in which the statement is made, and which is self-
contradictory and vague is worth quoting in full; namely, 
'Culpable homicide, like murder, is a crime in which the 
law's prohibition is directed at a consequence (viz death) 
of prior conduct. Thus, in effect, the law's prohibition 
of homicide is a direction to citizens not to engage in 
conduct which has fatal consequences for . other human 
beings. ,12) 
The sentence commencing with 'thus' is redundant and contradicts 
the previous sentence. What is prohibited is the kill ing of 
human beings as is said in the first sentence. Dangerous conduct 
is not prohibited; the only unlawful element of culpable homicide 
is the killing. Conduct which does not result in death and which 
is not some intentional crime, for instance assaul t, is not 
10) ibid. 
11) Unlike German law, StGB 230. 
12) 401. 
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prohibited by the common law. The use of the verb 'has' in this 
second sentence demonstrates the di ffi cul ty. Conduct whi ch has 
fatal consequences iss imply k i 11 i ng. Thus the second sentence 
can be regarded as a confusing and unnecessary repetition of what 
is said in the first sentence. The author could clearly not have 
meant to say that the law prohibits conduct which may have fatal 
consequences; it prohibits conduct which has fatal consequences. 
In other words, it prohibits killing. 
But, having embarked on the course of saying that it is dangerous 
conduct whi ch is forbi dden, the author proceeds and i nvo 1 ves 
himself in unavoidable difficulties and inconsistencies. He 
continues: 
'However, the ways of ki 11 i ng and the types of conduct 
that may be fatal to human life are so numerous as to defy 
specific identification. In the case of murder thi s 
difficulty is largely negated by the requirements of the 
existence of an intent to kill. Acts which are intended 
to kill are usually likely to do so and rarely have any 
justification or purpose which may be set off against the 
loss of human life. The unlawfulness of the act is thus 
apparent from its facilitation of an intent to kill. 
'In culpable homicide, however, this method of determining 
the unlawful nature of fatal conduct is not so readily 
available. Essentially, this is because culpable homicide 
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involves the unintended killing of a human being. The 
conduct which has brought about death thus cannot (as in 
murder) be characterised as unlawful because it was 
intended to kill. Indeed, it is almost invariably the 
case that unintended killings result from activities which 
are plainly lawful and usually directed towards achieving 
some legitimate social end' .13) 
The above passage suggests that there is little difficulty with 
establishing the unlawfulness in murder as that element is 
provided by the intent to kill. If one compares this statement 
with the paragraph14 ) headed 'Unlawful' in the section on 
murder it seems to contradict what is said in that paragraph. 
The approach to unlawfulness in this paragraph and the section in 
Burchell and Hunt15 ) to which it refers, is, apparently, that 
killing is unlawful unless it is justified. in the sense of a 
defence excluding unlawfulness succeeding. The approach is not 
that intentional killing is unlawful. 
expressly stated. 16 ) 
At least this is not 
13) The passage rai ses questi ons. Does a 1 awful acti vity 
become unlawful because it is carried out negl igently or 
dangerously or because a statute or statutory regul ati on 
forbids its being carried out negligently or dangerously? 
If the latter view is adopted the dangers of reverting to 
versari in re illicita are obvious. 
14) 341. 
15) Burchell and Hunt Part II. 
16) 341. 
- 96 -
It would therefore appear that Hunt's treatment of the unlawful-
ness of killing is not consistent. The idea that the unlawful-
ness of an act is to be determined with reference to the mens rea 
with which it is committed, can lead to difficulties and will be 
discussed below)?) For the present it is submitted that the 
most rational wayl8) of viewing the unlawfulness of murder and 
culpable homicide, is to regard the killing of a human being as 
prima facie unlawful, and unless some defence justifying the 
killing is successfully raised, the prima facie unlawfulness 
becomes unlawfulness proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 19 ) 
A second statement in the quoted passage deserves attention; 
namely, that killings which form the basis of prosecutions for 
cul pab 1 e homi ci de usually result from otherwi se 1 awful conduct . 
Whether this statement is true depends on what one means by 
lawful conduct. Driving motor cars is. lawful, but driving them 
negligently is forbidden by the various Road Traffic Ordinances. 
Controlling industrial premises is lawful but allowing dangerous 
conditions to prevail on such premises is forbidden by industrial 
legislation. Killings that result from assaults are clearly 
unlawful and such killings form the subject matter of a large 
proportion of killings resulting in convictions of culpable 
homi ci de. On the other hand there is no record of any 
17) vide infra ch V. 
18) If not the most rational certainly the most practical . 
19) This is a practical 'working' approach to unlawfulness. 
There is, however, more to the topic than is stated in the 
text; vide infra ch V. 
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prosecuti on for cul pab 1 e homi ci de resulti ng from a dea th caused 
by dangerously20 rough play during a rugby match. Apparently 
what some persons would regard as sporting hooliganism is still 
socially acceptable in South Africa and therefore not 'unlawful'. 
The authors are al so very much in favour of a more subjective 
approach to negl i gence 21 ) and cri ti ci ze 22 ) our courts for not 
di sti ngui shi ng between the 'negl i gence' whi ch provi des the el e-
ment of unlawfulness and the negligence or ~ which provides 
the element of culpability or mens rea. They argue, somewhat 
incongruously, that because of the increasing emphasis on subjec-
tivity when deciding on dolus, culpa should also be so treat-
ed. 23 ) The argument is a non sequitur. Dolus is by its very 
nature viewed subjectively. Why should negligence, which is by 
its very nature objecti vely determi ned, be vi ewed subjectively to 
bring it in line with dolus? The very reason for the emphasis 
placed on the subjectivity of dolus by our courts is to avoid 
confusion with culpa and to prevent those who are grossly negli-
gent from being treated as if they were malicious. 24 ) 
20) Normal 'rough ' play would be lawful because of the consent 
of the participants in the game. 'Rough play' that goes 
beyond the 1 imit of personal injury to which a person may 
consent can only be 1 awful on the ground that it is 
socially acceptable. In passing it is remarkable that a 
nation which idolizes sport as do the South Africans has 
so little in its criminal law or law of delict on rough 
sport. 
21) 404, 415 ff. 
22) 415. 
23) ibid. 
24) vide the judgment of Didcott J in Zoko 1983 SA 871 (N) esp 
885 C-E . 
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5.4 Snyman's views on Negligence 
Snyman's vi ews on negl i gence are not very compl i cated once one 
has accustomed oneself to thinking in terms of normative fault. 
The author is in agreement with our courts that negligence should 
be viewed objectively. The section where negligence is discussed 
is lucid and there is no inquiry into negligence as the element 
founding unlawfulness in an unintended homicide. Such negligence 
is also not contrasted with the personal negligence of the 
accused. It is doubtful whether Snyman' s bri ef di scuss i on is 
justified in view of the complicated discussions of unlawfulness 
and fault or mens rea, in earlier sections of the book. 1) The 
answer is probably due to the fact that in his discussion 2) of 
negligence the author is more concerned with stating the positive 
law than embarking on theoretical discussion. He states that it 
is settled principle in practice to regard negl igence as a form 
of mens rea. 3) He al so states unequivocally on the basis of 
the normative fault theory that the test for negligence is not to 
be confused with the test for unlawfulness. His main reason for 
this latter view is that the unlawfulness of an act is often 
determined in the light of factors that become evident after the 
commi 5si on of the act, whereas the negl i gence of an accused is 
1) 110-7. 
2) 18lff. 
3) 183. 
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determined in the 1 ight of factors known to him only before and 
duri ng the commi ssi on of the offence. 4) Unfortunatel y Snyman 
gives no examples from real or hypothetical cases to ill ustrate 
what he means. However, this argument appears to be a sound 
reason for rejecting the view that unintentional killings can 
only be regarded as unl awful if obj ectively negl i gent. Even 
objective negligence cannot be arrived at in the light of subse-
quent facts. 
In relation to culpable homicide, the discussion of unhwful-
ness5 ) is also uncomplicated. The test for unl awful ness in 
respect of culpable homicide is regarded as the same as the test 
for unlawfulness in respect of murder. In connection6 ) with 
the latter the view is that killing is unlawful unless it is 
justified in terms of one of the defences excluding unlawful-
ness. This uncomplicated view of unlawfulness is in contrast 
with the discussion of unlawfulness in the general part of the 
book. 7l 
The views expressed in the general part are to the effect that 
one cannot simply regard the physical commission of an offence as 
prima facie unlawful unless some ground of justification exists. 
The. grounds of j ustifi cati on are not a numerus cl ausus and there 
must be criteria in terms of which the courts can determine 
4) 182-3. 
5) 383. 
6) 376-7. 
7) 68. cf J Burchell's criticism 1982 SALJ 466, 468-9. 
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whether a freshly advanced ground of justification qual ifies as 
such or not. A second reason is that every ground of justific-
ation has its limits and a more general insight into unlawfulness 
is necessary to determine whether the bounds of a ground of 
justification have been exceeded or not. B) 
5.5 De Wet and Swanepoel's views on Negligence 
I n the four editi ons of De Wet and Swanepoe 1 the vi ew that a 
subjective test should be applied in order to determine the 
presence or absence of culpa is adhered to throughout. 9) 
According to De Wet and Swanepoel, culpa is a state of mind or a 
species of deplorable attitude. 10 ) It is also a form of 
, skul d' (faul t) and as 'skul d' is subj ecti ve, it is a contradi c-
tion in terms to talk of an objective test for 'skuld'. This 
statement appears to be a petitio principii. The initial assump-
tion is that fault (including negligence) is subjective and then 
the conclusion is drawn that negligence must be subjective. 
At the outset of the discussion the statement is made that it 
B) Snyman's views on unlawfulness are more fully discussed 
infra chapter V,l. 
9) Morkel (Rational Policy) (109-11 and 176) regards this as 
a serious weakness in the book. It is an attitude which 
is totally at variance with the positive law and logically 
indefensible. 
10) 156-7. 
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woul d be correct to condemn 1 i abi 1 ity founded on negl i gence as 
being contrary to the maxim nulla poena sine culpa if negligence 
amounted to falling short of the standards of a reasonable 
man. 11 ) A fi ndi ng that an accused has acted ina way in whi ch a 
reasonable man would not have acted, does not say anything about 
the attitude of the accused.1 2) In a system13 ) which accepts 
the principle nulla poena sine culpa one is not concerned with the 
question whether objective standards have been complied with, but 
whether the conduct of the accused was accompanied by a deplorable 
attitude. 
In their fourth edition the tendency to view negligence as having 
a twofold function; namely, first, to determine whether there is 
unlawfulness and, second, to determine whether there is fault 
(skuld) is discussed in the light of German law and legal theory, 
and rejected. 14 ) The discussion is brief and the rejection 
peremptory. For an author so enamoured of German ideas one finds 
this surprising. An inkling that professor JC de Wet, who prepar-
ed the fourth edition, was becoming disenchanted with the eternal 
hair-splitting of the German theorists, is unavoidable. 15 ) 
11 ) 156. 
12) ibid . 
13) What does emerge from the general discussion in De Wet and 
Swanepoel (156ff) is that this textbook would have no use 
for the normative fault concept, in terms of which the 
accused is judged according to what society would expect of 
him in the circumstances ie objectively. 
14) 157-8 . 
15) vide 70 n4, 156 n267, 137 n178. 
- 102 -
In a footnote16 ) it is stated that objective negligence which 
is considered necessary to determine whether there is unlawful-
ness, is in fact unnecessary. 
In the fourth edition the discussion of culpa, apart from refer-
ences to German 1 aw and a bri ef reference to Dutch 1 aw 17) is , 
almost identical to that of the first edition. 18 ) 
The description of negligence preferred is that of van der 
L i nden19 ) who descri bes it as the 'fail ure to use one's under-
standing and powers of circumspection properly' .20) Moorman's 
inclusion of ignorance and carelessness21l is criticised 
because ignorance can only be an ingredient of negligence if such 
ignorance is due to carelessness ('onbedagsaamheid'). This state-
ment apparently means that it is careless for a person to under-
take an activity if he 1 acks the necessary knowl edge to do it 
properly. 
There is apparent reluctance to discuss the view that the know-
ledge of the accused is attributed to the reasonable man. This 
expl ai ns the exampl es of the ignorant 1 abourer who cannot be 
16) 158 n275. 
17) 157-8 
18) Some later cases are referred to. 
19) 158. 
20) 'Niet behoorlijk gebruiken van zijn verstand en oplettend-
hei d' . 
21) 158: 'onkunde en onvoorsigtigheit'. 
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blamed for giving his children a detonator to play with. A very 
simple objective analysis of this example would be that the reas-
onable man is not an expert on explosives. He does not know that 
a small capsul e of smooth metal he fi nds at a roadsi de may be 
filled with a dangerous high explosive. If a man who knows about 
detonators were to give his children a detonator to play with, 
the matter would be different. 22 ) 
J udgments 23 ) to the effect that negl i gence amounts to fail ure 
to exercise the degree of skill and care which a reasonable man 
would exercise are criticised. The conviction of the accused in 
Mbombela24 ) is strongly attacked on the basis that it is unfair 
to judge an ignorant third world youth according to the standards 
of a western man and to state that his belief in the 'tikoloshe' 
was an unreasonable belief. 25 ) 
This criticism of a case which is more than fifty years 01d26 ) 
shows exactly why one shoul d be hesitant to make the test for 
negligence subjective. Assume that the court held that belief in 
the'tikoloshe' is not per se unreasonable, then it would surely 
still have had to consider whether, in the 1 ight of his belief, 
22) Consider the inquiry into the appellant's knowledge of the 
reduction process on the gold mines in van der Mescht 1962 
1 SA 521 (A). 
23) Meiring 1927 AD 41; Mbombela 1933 AD 269. 
24) supra. 
25) The criticism is repeated in all four editions. 
26) It is a sobering thought to imagine what would have hap-
pened to Mbombela in Germany in 1933. 
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the accused had exercised such care and circumspection as he was 
capable of exercising.2?) The following questions wou1 d then 
become relevant: What exactly did he bel ieve about the 'tiko-
loshe'? Was this belief reasonable in the light of the belief 
held by similar persons in the same area? What was the source of 
the belief? Had he correctly understood and remembered the 
belief as originally imparted to him or had he deviated from it 
unreasonably and had such devi ati on gi ven ri se to the kill i ng 
with whi ch he was cha rged? Was it reasonable, in the 1 i ght of 
his knowledge or beliefs concerning 'tiko1oshes', for him to have 
assumed without further investigation that the deceased was a 
'tiko1oshe'? Would it not have been more reasonable for him to 
have considered, in the light of the number of children he knew 
or ought to have known were usually playing in the kraal, that 
the two little feet he saw were probably the feet of a child and 
not the feet of a 'tiko1oshe'? Was it reasonable for him to 
believe, in the light of the 'tiko1oshe' being a spirit and 
therefore i nvu1 nerab 1 e, that he cou1 d k i 11 or harm it with an 
axe?28 ) 
This list is not exhaustive. Was it not more sound and in the 
interests of justice for the court to find, purely on the 
27) The question in fact becomes: How is a man who is reason-
ably holding an unreasonable belief to act in the light of 
his own standards of what is reasonable. Posing such 
questions would make the law unworkable. 
28) To quote Hamlet when warned against following the Ghost: 
'And for my soul, what can it do to that 
Being a thing immortal as itself?' (1, IV, 6?). 
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strength of his belief, that the accused had acted unreasonably 
and to sentence him leniently because his background allowed for 
his holding the belief? It is submitted that the latter is the 
better view. 
After making the point29 ) that the law can only create certain 
rules of conduct30 ) by following the reasonable man test as 
laid down in Meiring,31l and that the fault of the · accused who 
contravenes any of these rules, cannot be determined in this way, 
but must be determined by considering him personally, De Wet and 
Swanepoel give a large number of examples of instances in which 
the reasonable man test cannot be appl i ed. Most of these exam-
ples consist of cases where an ignorant person is judged 
accordi ng to the same rul es as a knowl edgeab 1 e person, and the 
rule that the knowledge or specialised knowledge of the accused 
is ascribed to the reasonable man, is overlooked. 
The statement by De Wet and Swanepoe1 32 ) that common sense 
teaches that one cannot measure an engineer by the same standards 
as his handyman, is misleading. It suggests that specialised 
knowledge is ignored when our courts investigate culpa. Even on 
an objective test this is not done. The reasonable man test, if 
29) 159 . 
30) 'Gedragsvoorskrifte' . 
31) supra. 
32) 159-61. 
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applied to the engineer, would take into account his specialised 
knowl edge. No such knowl edge woul d be taken into account when 
judging the handyman. The handyman's negligence could consist in 
hi s tak i ng steps or i ndul gi ng in conduct on the engi neeri ng 
premi ses, without beari ng in mi nd that it coul d be dangerous. 
Th i sis analogous to the pos i ti on of the accused in van der 
Mescht . In deci di ng whether he had been negl i gent the court 
investigated the question whether he had any knowledge or 
experi ence, as a worker on the mi nes, in the 1 i ght of whi ch he 
ought to have known that melting gold amalgam was dangerous. Had 
the accused been a qualified chemical engineer he would have been 
negligent. He would similarly have been negligent if he had such 
experience of the reduction process on gold mines as would have 
put a reasonable man on his guard against the dangers of melting 
gold amalgam. It is perhaps worth noting that if a person with 
speci ali sed knowl edge of the chemical processes i nvo 1 ved in van 
der Mescht ' s enterprise, had caused the deaths caused by van der 
Mescht, he would have been hard pressed to avoid convicti on of 
murder on the basis of dolus eventualis. 33 ) 
5.6 Criticism of De Wet and Swanepoel's views 
De Wet and Swanepoel come out strongly in favour of a subjective 
test for negligence. One must not look at the hypotheti ca 1 
33) It is of course inconceivable that a person who was aware 
of the danger would not have taken precautions. 
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reasonable man, but at the accused. The question to be asked is: 
What ought this accused with all his characteristics reasonably 
to have known, foreseen and done? What the 1 earned authors do 
not attempt to answer is how one can ever find negligence along 
this line of inquiry. Why di d the accused not di sp 1 ay that 
degree of care which could (subjectively) be expected of him? No 
subjective test can answer this without exonerating the accused 
or fi ndi ng that he took a con sci ous ri sk at some stage of the 
course of conduct 1 eadi ng to hi s 'crime'. No room is 1 eft for 
unconscious negligence. Some subj ecti ve and, therefore, con-
scious factor, must account for the failure of the accused to act 
as he ought to have acted. If the factor is unconscious, its 
existence can only be determined objectively. Where is the line 
to be drawn in the application of subjective factors favourable 
to the accused? The reason for his failure to measure up to his 
own objectively ascertained standards, must also be subjective. 
On what basis is such reason not to be regarded as absolving the 
accused? Because it was unreasonable? By what standards? Those 
of the accused? Then why could he not live up to these standards 
on this occasion? The subjective test would lead into an infin-
ite regression and De Wet and Swanepoe1 seem to admit this, a1-
beit unwittingly, in the following sentence: 'En so is daar 
onte1 bare persoon1 ike en 1 iggaam1 ike eienskappe van die besku1-
dige wat die vraag of hy na1atig was of nie, kan be"inv10ed' . 34) 
34) 161. 'And so there are innumerable mental and physical 
attributes of the accused that can have a bearing on the 
questi on whether he had been neg1 i gent or not' (my trans-
lation). 
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What court can investigate innumerable attributes? In what 
circumstances could a court conclude that such an investigation 
was complete? In other words where is the objective line drawn? 
Basically De Wet and Swanepoel present very much the same sol u-
tion to determining negligence as do the other writers who favour 
a subjective test. The accused is measured against the standards 
of his own reasonable alter ego, double or 'Doppelganger' .35) 
The question remains: Why did he not measure up to his own stan-
dards? If the answer to this question is sought subjectively, 
its blameworthiness will elude the investigator until he applies 
an objective test . There will al ways be some subjective factor 
that explains the lapse on the part of the accused . At what 
stage do we draw the line and refuse to take into account further 
excul patory subjective factors? De Wet and Swanepoel give no 
indication of subjective factors that ought not to excuse the 
accused; they merely mention that any specialised knowledge which 
he may have would count against him. 36 ) 
If, in the light of the subjective test for negligence, we 
consi der the famous exampl e of the Batonka fi sherman contrasted 
with the university professor37) and adapt it to the f acts in 
Mbombela, we could arrive at the following interesting problem: 
What if a university professor in anthropology had killed the 
35) vide Visser and Vorster 346. 
36) 16l. 
37) Posed in Nkomo supra. 
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deceased believing him to be a 'tikoloshe?' This would have given 
rise to a public outrage. Why woul d a university professor 
believe in the existence of a 'tikoloshe'? There may have been 
subjective factors at work in him which would cause such a belief 
to ri se to the surface from the depths of hi s unconsci ous. 38) 
Strange thi ngs have happened to anthropo 1 ogi sts who do fi e 1 d 
investigation. Some have commenced as hostile sceptics and ended 
as complete conve~ts.39) 
Assuming that the defence of insanity is not raised on behalf of 
such a professor, how woul done determi ne negl i gence or the 
absence of negligence on his part? Engrossed in his study of the 
'tikoloshe' and living among people who believe in this evil 
entity, he loses his resistance to a belief which his academic 
colleagues would not only describe as unreasonable, but as irra-
tional. 'Tikoloshe' may correspond to an archetype in his uncon-
scious mental make-up.40) What investigations would not be 
requi red to determi ne the gUil t of the professor? Where woul d 
38) vide William Sargant: 'Battle for the Mind' 93ff for the 
history of Maya Deren a western anthropologist who became 
a voodooist while doing scientific research into voodooism 
in Haiti. 
39) One must never forget the early history of St Paul, part-
icularly not when dealing with extremists. 
40) Archetypes of thi s nature have inca 1 cul ab 1 e power over 
men. As Jung poi nted out, it was to some extent in 
response to archetypal bel iefs, that mill ions of men gave 
the ancient Roman salute in Germany in 1941 and marched 
to almost certain death in Russia; vide CG Jung: 'The 
concept of the collective unconscious' Part 2. 
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it end? Would it not be simple and just to say that no reason-
able man would act as he had acted and to regard subjective psy-
cho 1 ogi ca 1 factors that may have caused hi s acceptance of the 
belief as mitigating factors? The personal peculiarities of the 
accused are always taken into account when deciding on approp-
riate sentence. 41 ) 
6. South African Decisions on Criminal Negligence 
Meiring,l) although reported in 1927 was still regarded as 
stating the law relating to criminal negligence in 1949. 2) 
Mei ri ng was concerned with whether the pres i di ng judge in the 
court a quo had given an adequate description of criminal negli-
gence to the jury in his sunrning up at a culpable homicide 
tri a 1 . 3) 
The judge had omitted to inform the jury that the standard by 
whi ch the conduct of the accused was to be measured was that of 
the reasonable man. The presiding judge had, however, made a 
detailed analysis of the evidence to the jury and instructed them 
to deci de, on the facts 4 ) admi tted by the accused, whether the 
41) Burchell and Hunt 80. 
1) 1927 AD 41. 
2) Gardi ner and Lansdown 5ed Vol II 1423; De Wet and Swane-
poel led 106; Barlow 20. 
3) 46. 
4) Namely that he had driven without keeping a proper look-
out. 
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accused had not placed the deceased in peril by his lack of fore-
sight. S) Deciding .the point in favour of the Crown, Innes CJ 
said: 'Now the conduct thus outlined was conduct of which clearly 
no reasonable man would be guilty'. 
The judgment is therefore to the effect that although the 
pres i di ng judge had not speci fi ca 11y referred to the reasonable 
man test, he had summed up in such a way that the jury would con-
vict if in their opinion the accused had not acted as a reason-
able man would have a~ted. This finding has prompted De Wet and 
Swanepoel to remark that the jury had come to the right conclu-
sion without having the reasonable man brought to their atten-
tion. 6) This comment is, with respect, beside the point. 
Without mentioning the reasonable man the presiding judge had in 
fact adequately described the reasonable man test. It is not 
clear from the decision whether negl igence is regarded as mens 
rea or conduct. The following passage suggests that conduct is 
in issue rather than mens rea when a court consi ders whether 
certain evidence discloses negligence: 
'The crime in this instance was culpable homicide; the 
Crown alleged that the homicide was wrongful and unlawful 
because it was negl i gent. Now negl i gence can never be 
disentangled from the facts; but its existence is best 
S) 48. 
6) 162. 
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ascertained by applying to the facts of each case the 
standard of conduct whi ch the 1 aw requi res. And that 
standard is the degree of care and skill which a reason-
able man would require under the circumstances'.7) 
The decision was of great importance because it also laid down 
tha t the test of 1 i abil ity for negl i gence was the same in crim-
inal matters as in civil matters. 8 ) The submission that as in 
Engl ish 1 aw, a greater degree of negl i gence was requi red for 
criminal liability was rejected. 9 ) 
The next important decision on criminal negligence was Mbom-
bela,10) the famous 'tikoloshe' case. This decision laid down 
that in conSidering whether an accused had acted reasonably, he 
had to be judged objectively according to the standards of the 
reasonable man and not subjectively according to his own racial 
and cultural peculiarities. 11 ) 
This case has been a favourite target of De Wet and Swanepoel in 
all four editions. 12 ) Their criticism is not based on a 
7) per Innes CJ, 45. 
8) 47. This is still the law today. 
9) 45-6 . 
10) 1933 AD 269. 
11) 272-4; cf van Aswegen v Minister van Polisie en Binne-
landse Sake 1974 1 PH Jl (T); Camplin 1918 1 AER 1236. 
12) led 106-7, 2ed 129-130, 3ed 140-1, 4ed 143-4. The wording 
of the discussion is identical in all four editions. 
- 113 -
correct assessment or analysis of the judgment. They criticise 
without taking into account the extreme difficulty of the problem 
with which the court had to deal . It had to apply a system of 
law crystalised out of more than 2000 years of jurisprudential 
development in Europe to an accused who lived in primitive condi-
tions in Africa and who held beliefs that were not acceptable in 
terms of the cultural background against which this system of law 
had developed. 
The court had to be just to the accused and maintain civilized 
standards. In addition, the law applicable was partly statutory 
and partly common law,13) The court was faced with a difficult 
task and came to an eminently just and fair conclusion. It would 
probably be adjudged just and fair to-day and14 ) one must bear 
in mind that it was decided over fifty years ago. 
The main problem with understanding the Mbombela judgment arises 
from the fact that Mbombela had been convicted of murder on the 
basis that his mistake in believing the deceased, a nine-year old 
13) 272. 
14) Bertelsman AJ 1973, 34 ff concludes on the strength of the 
normative fault theory that Mbombela should have been 
acquitted. The approach and discussion are totally un-
realistic. At a (present day!) German one-phase trial the 
accused coul d possi bly be decl ared 'stra fl os', but that 
woul d be a far cry from a total acquittal at a South 
African trial. At a present-day South African trial he 
would probably receive a suspended sentence which would 
also amount in effect to declaring him 'straflos'. 
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boy, to be a I ti ko 1 oshe' had been unreasonable. There was no 
doubt that Mbombela had made this mistake and that the mistake 
had been bona fide. 
There were two questions before the Appellate Division; namely, 
(1) whether Mbombela should have been judged by the standards of 
the reasonable man to determi ne whether hi s mi stake had been 
reasonable or whether he should have been judged by the standards 
of a youth of ei ghteen who had grown up in an area in whi ch 
belief in the existence of 'tikoloshe ' was general;15) and, (2) 
whether the judge in the court a quo had not erred in directing 
the jury that the accused could not be convicted of culpable 
homi ci de.1 6 ) 
The first part of the judgment of de Villiers JA was directed at 
answeri ng the fi rst questi on namely whether I reasonabl e I meant 
reasonab 1 e accordi ng to the standards of the reasonable man or 
according to the standards of the individual accused)?) This 
questi on was answered to the effect that the test for what is 
reasonable cannot be varied from person to person as that would 
amount to having no standards. 18 ) 
The second question; namely, whether the jury had been correctly 
instructed that the accused could not be convicted of culpable 
15) 271. 
16) 274. 
I?) 272-4. 
18) 272. 
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homicide, was answered on the basis that the jury ought to have 
been instructed that a verdict of guilty of culpable homicide was 
competent. In coming to this conclusion the court did not deem 
it necessary to decide what the answer would be in terms of the 
common law as the definition of murder contained in the Transkei-
an Penal Code was app 1 i cab 1 e19 ) and was such that a bona fi de 
mi stake of fact, even if unreasonable, woul d be a good de~ 
fence. 20) The qu.esti on, therefore, was whether the accused 
ought to have been convicted of culpable homicide, and the answer 
was 'yes', as such a verdi ct was competent and hi s mi stake of 
fact had been unreasonable when judged by the standards of a 
reasonable man. 21 ) 
De Wet and Swanepoe 1 are of the opi ni on22 ) that the court was 
about to find that the accused had been correctly convicted of 
murder, but baul king at the awful nature of its own concl u-
sion23 ) took refuge in a minor technicality ('n tegniese 
puntjie) to avoid this conclusion . This comment is inexact . The 
'tegniese puntjie' was the important consideration that the crime 
had been committed in the Transkei and that the Transkeian Penal 
Code was applicable. The decision has been interpreted as laying 
down that in the common law a bona fide, but unreasonable mistake 
19) 
20) 
21) 
22) 
23) 
274. 
ibid. 
275. 
143. 
'Die Hof deins 
. . , 
ele menlng ... 
judgment. 
egter terug vir die afgryslikheid van sy 
Unwarranted comment on a well-considered 
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mistake, would be no defence to a charge of murder. 24 ) This 
conclusion is unfounded. The question as to what the common law 
would be, was clearly left open. It was, however, decided that 
in terms of the common law, which was in this respect not super-
seded by the Transkei an Penal Code, 25) the test of reasonab1 e-
ness was the objective test of the reasonable man. 
If one considers the facts objectively; namely, that Mbombe1a saw 
two little feet in a hut in a village where there were a number 
of small children, decided that the small feet were that of an 
evil spirit, and then precipitately attacked the 'evil spirit' 
with an axe, one cannot but conclude that he acted unreasonably. 
In sentencing him the court took his personal beliefs into 
account. The sentence of twe1 ve months impri sonment seems a bi t 
harsh to-day, but was it so fifty years ago? Besides, it is the 
duty of the court to protect the pub1 ic - a1 so small sl eeping 
chi 1 dren from bei ng kill ed on the strength of an unfounded and 
uninvestigated26 ) belief that they are evil spirits. 
An important case in the law relating to culpable homicide is van 
der Mescht. 27 ) In th i s case the court refused to convict a man 
of culpable homicide purely on the ground that he had caused 
24) 
25) 
26) 
27) 
De Wet and Swanepoel 143 n28; Gardiner 
272 top of page . 
Had the accused 'investigated' whether 
a 'tikoloshe' before striking the 
deceased would not have been killed. 
1962 1 SA 521 (A). 
and Lansdown; 58. 
he was dealing with 
fatal blows, the 
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people to die while he had been involved in an unlawful activ-
i ty. It therefore i nvesti gated the submi ssi on that he had been 
negl i gent as negl i gence on hi s part was the second 1 eg of the 
argument advanced by the State in favour of a conviction. 
The well known facts of the case are that appell ant and one 
Groesbeek melted gold amalgam in the house of Groesbeek. In so 
doing they caused mercury vapour to be released from the 
amalgam. The inhaling of the mercury vapour caused the death of 
Groesbeek and four chi 1 dren. The conduct was unl awful in terms 
of statutory measures control 1 i ng the possessi on and mel ti ng of 
unwrought gold. 
The main judgment was given by Steyn CJ. Relying on the evidence 
of the district surgeon that an average person would not expect 
that the heating of mercury could have fatal consequences, the 
Chief Justice concluded that the bonus paterfamilias would not 
have known that heating the gold amalgam could be dangerous to 
human life. 28 ) The question whether the accused has been 
negligent would therefore have to be decided in the light of what 
the accused actua 11y knew concerni ng the danger of me lti ng the 
substance. 29 ) On the evidence the Chief Justice concluded that 
the State had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused had such knowledge of this danger as to have established 
negligence on his part. Botha JA concurred in this judgment. 
28) 525 F-H. 
29) ibid. 
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Hoexter JA was of the opinion that the accused had sufficient 
knowledge of the danger involved to render his conduct negli-
gent. According to Hoexter JA the accused had, however, allowed 
his anxiety to gain possession of the gold to cloud his judgment 
and consequently he failed to direct his mind at the danger 
inherent in his conduct and to take precautions against it.30) 
It is interesting to note that the learned judge of appeal did 
not regard the knowledge of the appellant as knowledge that the 
melting could have fatal consequences, but only as knowledge that 
it coul d be harmful. Thus he says :31) 
, I n my opi ni on therefore, the evi dence proves that the 
appell ant was negl i gent because he was inadvertent to a 
danger which was within his knowledge, that danger being 
one of bodily harm to others against which a reasonable 
man would have taken steps to guard'. 
Van Blerk JA concurred with the Chief Justice. Also concurring 
with the Chief Justice, van Winsen AJA pointed out the weakness 
in Hoexter JA's view of the proven facts. 32 ) The State had not 
established its case and the inconsistencies and evasions in the 
evidence of the appellant, could not cure this defect. Hoexter 
JA's view of the law relating to negligence was, however, not 
criticised. 
30) 541 O-F. 
31) 541 F -G. 
32) 54 O-E. 
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Three judges in van der Mescht33 ) emphasised that the question 
whether death following an unlawful assault would amount to 
culpable homicide, irrespective of the negligence of the accused, 
had been left open. 34 ) 
It woul d then seem that, in the light of the van der Mescht 
decision, negligence in our criminal law was tested objectively 
with reference to the reasonable man, that the special knowledge 
of the accused would be held against him in determining his 
negligence35 ) and that unreasonable failure to foresee harm to 
human beings, as opposed to fail ure to foresee death, coul d be 
sufficient for a conviction of culpable homicide. The general 
approach of the court, particularly that of Hoexter JA, was that 
negl i gence was a state of mi nd, more parti cul arly unreasonable 
failure to advert to the danger of inflicting harm. 
The question left open36 ) in van der Mescht came up for consid-
eration by the Appellate Division in 8ernardus;37) namely, 
whether a person who commits an assault resulting in death can be 
convicted of culpable homicide purely on the strength of the 
initial assault, an unlawful act, or whether conviction is only 
possible if negligence in respect of the death is also estab-
1 i shed . To convi ct purely because there had been an i niti a 1 
33) Hoexter and van 8lerk JJA and van Winsen AJA . 
34) 538C, 542 8-C, 542 H - 543 A. 
35) ie that it would be credited to the reasonable man . 
36) n32 supra. 
37) 1965 3 SA 287 (A). 
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assault which resulted in the eventual death would, in the ab-
sence of some element of fault in respect of the death, amount to 
an application of the versari in re illicita doctrine. 
Although the doctrine of versari in re illicita was finally 
rej ected in thi s case, 38) the accused was hel d to have been 
negligent when causing the death of the deceased and his convic-
tion of culpable homicide by the trial court was left undis-
turbed. 
The facts of the case are simple. The appellant was a rural 
Black who had an altercation with his father-in-law. He left the 
scene of the altercation and in the words of the classic anec-
dote: 'repaired to ' his place of domicile to arm himself with the 
accoutrements of war' .39) He came back armed with two sticks 
and, advancing on his father-in-law, found himself faced by the 
luckless deceased who was adopting the thankless task of peace-
maker and indulging in the generally disliked pursuit of inter-
fering in other people's affairs. Accused would have none of the 
peacemaking and hurled one of his sticks at the deceased. The 
stick which was not unduly heavy, hit the deceased on the side of 
hi s head above the ear and penetrated four or fi ve inches into 
38) In terms of the majority decisions. Vestiges of the doc-
trine were retained in the minority decision of Rumpff JA, 
which has not been followed. 
39) Translated as: 'Hy het na sy huis gegaan en sy kierie gaan 
haa l' . 
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his skull, killing him. 40 ) 
Wrestl i ng with the versari problem the court consi dered whether 
reasonably foreseeable injury, short of death, to a human being 
would suffice for a conviction of culpable homicide. This had 
been the view of Hoexter JA in van der Mescht and it was rejected 
by Steyn CJ. 41) In rej ecti ng th is vi ew Steyn CJ approved of 
the opinion of E M Burchel1 42 ) that such a view would amount to 
an application of the versari doctrine, and that the mens rea for 
culpable homicide would still be lacking. 
Consi deri ng whether the appe 11 ant had been negl i gent43 ) Steyn 
CJ stated that the stick must have been hurled with some violence 
and that a reasonable man in the situation of the appellant would 
have realised that he could cause serious injury by such an 
assault and that a reasonable man would have foreseen that it 
could possibly be mortally dangerous. Wessels JA and Potgieter 
AJA concurred in the judgment of Steyn CJ. 
In view of later developments in the law,44) the judgment of 
Rumpff JA (as he then was) is of some importance. Reluctant to 
have a person who commits an assault resulting in death acquitted 
of culpable homicide, because death was not a reasonably fore-
seeable result of the assault, and nevertheless in agreement that 
40) 305H - 306B. 
41) 298 8-C. 
42) 1962 SALJ 247. 
43) 300 B-~ 
44) Particularly in van As 1976 2 SA 921 (A), in which the 
minority view of Rumpff JA was rejected. 
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the versari doctri ne shoul d be rej ected, the 1 earned judge of 
appeal made a serious attempt to couple criminal negligence to 
any assault resulting in death. In so doing he expressed the 
view45 ) that cases in connection with assaults resulting in 
death which had lead to convictions of cul pable homicide on an 
application of the versari doctrine, had not been wrongly 
decided, but had only been incorrectly motivated. In his opinion 
death coul d result so easily from any assault, that he who 
assaults someone intentionally must be presumed to foresee that 
as a resul t of the as saul t death may supervene as the ul timate 
injury, even though he may not have expected death to supervene, 
and even though death may have been an unusual consequence; 
provided that a causal connection between the deed and the death 
was established. 46 ) Later in the judgment he says: 
'Net so goed as iemand wat nie wereldvreemd is nie, weet 
dat 'n mens soms ongelooflike beserings oorleef en soms op 
ongelooflike wyse die dood vryspring, net so goed weet hy 
dat die mens soms sterf deur 'n onverwagte oorsaak. Oaar-
om moet 'n normale mens kan voorsien dat deur 'n ligte 
aanranding 'n ongewone en onverwagte dood kan intree;.47) 
45) 301 O-E. 
46) 302 H- 303 A. 
47) 304 E 'Just as someone who is not lacking in worldly wis-
dom, knows that a human being may sometimes survive 
unbelievable injuries and sometimes escape death in an 
incredible way, he knows equally well that human beings 
sometimes die of unexpected causes. Consequently a normal 
person ought to be able to foresee that an unusual and 
unexpected death may result from ali ght assault' (my 
transl ati on). 
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It is perhaps necessary to remark at this stage that certain 
passages in the judgment are difficult to understand. For in-
stance: 48) 
'Daar bestaan 'n opvatting in ons reg dat daar by aanrand-
ing wat die dood veroorsaak twee vorms van skuld is. Die 
een vorm is die opset om aan te rand en hierdie skuld dek 
net die aanranding omdat die dood 'n gevolg is wat buite 
daardie besondere opset val, al was die dood 'n voorsien-
bare gevolg. Om skuldig te wees aan strafbare manslag 
moet daar 'n ander skuldvorm wees, nl. die gebruiklike 
'nalatigheid'. Die opvatting kom hierop neer dat daar in 
so 'n geval nalatigheid is omdat, nieteenstaande die dood 
voorsien kon word, die aanranding nie vermy is nie. In 
werklikheid is die posisie, natuurlik, dat wat die aan-
rander moes vermy het, het hy opsetl ik gedoen. Na my 
mening is te verkies die opvatting dat die onregmatige 
48) 301 D-G. 'There is a view that in assaults resulting in 
death there are two forms of fault. The one form is the 
intent to assault and this fault covers only the assault 
because death is a result which falls outside that 
speci fi c i ntenti on, even though death was a foreseeable 
result. To be guilty of culpable homicide there must be 
another form of fault, namely the usual 'negligence'. The 
view amounts to this that in such a case there is negli-
gence because, notwithstanding that death could have been 
foreseen, the assault was not avoided. In reality the 
position is that the assaulter deliberately did that which 
he ought to have avoided. In my opinion the vie\~ is to be 
preferred that the unl awful causi ng of foreseeabl e death 
by assault, is punishable as homicide, not because the 
death resulted from negligence, but because as a result of 
an intentional unlawful assault death supervened as a 
foreseeable result' (my translation). 
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veroorsak i ng van voors i enbare dood deur aanrandi ng 
strafbaar is as manslag, nie omdat die dood weens 
nalatigheid plaasgevind het nie, maar omdat as gevolg van 
'n opsetlike onregmatige aanranding die dood as voorsien-
bare gevolg ingetree het'. 
The effect of these statements is diffi cult to ascertain. If 
death was foreseeable, one presumes by the reasonable man, the 
person committing the assault is guilty on the basis of negli-
gence. If it was not foreseeable, he can only be guilty on the 
basis of versari or that approximation to versari known as 
'result 1 i abil ity' .49) 
What the learned judge was in fact doing was to add to the accom-
plishments and characteristics of the reasonable man, knowledge 
that any assault can result in death. This may be true of a 
person who reflects that in the midst of life we are in death, 
but there are many, many assaults that do not result in death. 
Some men are frail, but most are tough. The reasonable man would 
know that thousands of schoolboys gi yen 'cuts' by thei r head-
49) 'Gevolgsaanspreeklikheid ' . There follows (302-3) a discus-
sion of crimes qual ified by their results in Dutch and 
German law in which the learned judge, with respect, 
appears to have been unaware that in 1953 a measure (StGB 
18) had been enacted in Germany to the effect that where 
an increased penalty is provi ded for a crime if a 
specified result, for instance death, supervenes, the 
increased penalty is only to be imposed if the accused was 
at least negligent in respect of the result in question. 
- 125 -
headmasters, youths sentenced to juvenile cuts 50} , adul t 
offenders sentenced to whi ppi ngs, 51} persons sl apped or punched 
in brawl s, boxers knocked unconscious, rugby players robustly 
tackled, cricketers hit by 'bouncers' and wrestlers jumped upon 
by their opponents after being hurled about in the ring and 
bounced up and down, survive. Would the reasonable man, knowing 
this, expect any person to die of any assault, however slight, at 
any time? The answer must be 'no'. Once the decision to do away 
with versari had been taken, a person committing an assault could 
not, unless negligence in respect of the death were also proved, 
be convi cted of cul pab 1 e homi ci de if the assault resulted in 
death. The 'ongewone gevolg' {unusual result}52} could not be 
regarded as reasonably foreseeable . The only answer is that the 
'reasonable man' has been fixed with foresight no normal person 
has. In other words, assault shoul d be a crime that gives ri se 
to purely causal 1 i abi 1 i ty, if it results in death. In essence 
the view of Rumpff JA in Bernardus is a clearer retention of 
versari in respect of assaults than the .view of Hoexter JA 
unanimously rejected by the majority of the court. In Hoexter 
JA's vi ew the reasonabl e foreseeabil ity of bodily i nj ury is the 
least requirement for a conviction of cul pable homicide; this 
qualification is not to be gleaned from the dicta of Rumpff JA. 
Holmes JA, in a clear and uncomplicated judgment, accepted the 
50} Imposed in terms of s294 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
51} Imposed in terms of s292 of the Crlmlnal Procedure Act. 
52} 303 pr. 
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final rejection of versari by the Chief Justice53 ) and consid-
ered whether the accused had been negl i gent when ki 11 i ng the 
deceased. He came to the concl usi on that the accused had been 
negl i gent because: 'when he threw the sti ck at the deceased, [he] 
ought reasonably to have foreseen that it might cause 
death' .54) 
It is interesting to note that in setting out his reasons for 
this finding, Holmes JA took into account the background of the 
accused which would ensure that he had a sound knowledge of the 
dangers of fighting with and throwing sticks. He al so 
states': 55 ) 'Furthermore, the possibility of serious injury 
bei ng reasonably foreseeable, the appe 11 ant ought to have fore-
seen the possibility of death hovering in attendance'. Liability 
is therefore indisputably coupled to failure to foresee the 
rea so nab ly foreseeable, in other words cul pa. What must be 
reasonably foreseeable is death, not injury. 
Thi sis not to be rega rded as an acceptance of the vi ews of 
Hoexter JA differently worded. It is a statement that in those 
circumstances, once the possibility of serious bodily injury 
ought to have been foreseen, the possibility of death ought also 
to have been foreseen. 
53) 304 H. 
54) 306G. 
55) 307A. 
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Beari ng in mi nd that Rumpff JA was in the mi nority it can be 
concl uded from the judgments of Steyn CJ, in which two of his 
colleagues concurred, and the judgment of Holmes JA, that the 
general possibility that death may result from the lightest 
assault, because of 'the thousand natural shocks that flesh is 
heir to', is not sufficient for death to be regarded as a 
reasonably foreseeable result of any assault. 
The assault should be of such a nature that death is foreseeable 
as a real possibility. This is a qualification on the insights 
of the reasonabl e man: he does not foresee any assault as a 
reasonably possible cause of death. This makes the reasonable 
man a man of practical experience, aware of the thousands of 
assaults, some of a serious nature, that do not result in death. 
It does seem very clear from the judgments that negl igence is 
regarded as a form of mens rea and not as a form of conduct 
only. The general tenor is al so that the standards of the 
reasonable man are applied to the accused to determine whether he 
was negligent. 
In Zok056 1 Di dcott J sums up the result of the van der Mescht 
and Bernardus decisions as follows: 57l 
56 1 1983 1 SA 871 (Al. 
57) 883. 
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'The effect on culpable homicide was the emergence of mens 
rea as an indisputable and indispensable element of the 
crime. Not only the unl awful act but al so its fatal 
result had to bear that stigma. The old definition would 
no longer do. 58) It made no menti on of mens rea. A 
fresh definition which remedied the omission was needed. 
I n the s ituati on envi saged by Gardi ner and Lansdown, the 
one in whi ch no i ntenti on to kill was proved, negl i gence 
was left as the sole sign of mens rea the killing might 
display. That it served as such for the purpose of 
cul pab 1 e homi c i de had been recogni sed by the Bernardus 
decision. It at least therefore had to be proved in all 
future prosecutions for the offence'. 
What really happened is that from being a widely defined crime, 
culpable homicide had become a narrowly defined crime. Or, to 
put it differently, there had been two forms of culpable homicide 
before the van der Mescht and Bernardus deci s ions. Culpable 
homicide had been the unlawful killing of a human being and the 
unlawful negligent killing of a human being. The first of these 
two defi ni ti ons had now been di scarded. The second of these 
definitions had been applicable in accident cases where the 
activity resulting in the death of a human being had not been 
intrinsically unlawful. The main example of the intrinsically 
unlawful act had been assault. But negligent driving had also 
58) ie 'the unlawful killing of a human being'. 
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qualified as an unlawful act, sufficient for conviction of 
culpable homicide if it resulted in death, in Matsepe. 59 ) 
Whil e the parti a 1 excuse doctri ne was part of our 1 aw, i nten-
tional killing in situations of partial excuse could also qualify 
as culpable homicide. 60 ) 
Leaving aside the doctrine of partial excuse it can be said that 
since van der Mescht and Bernardus culpable homicide in our law 
was defi ned as the unl awful negl i gent kill i ng of a human bei ng 
and that the element of negligence was treated as a form of mens 
rea until the Ngubane decision in 1985. This view is supported 
in a number of Appellate Division decisions referred to by 
Didcott J in Zoko. 61 
In Mtshiza Holmes JA stated62 ) the definition of culpable homi-
cide as 'the unlawful negligent causing of the death of a fellow 
being' .63) 
Except for the proposed restated definition of culpable homicide 
in Zoko,64) the definition in the judgments of Holmes JA in the 
cases referred to above has been accepted. 
59) 1931 AD 150. 
60) Hunt led 373, 2ed. 401. 
61) 883-4; Mtshiza 1970 3 SA 747 (A); Ngobozi 1972 3 SA 476 
(A); Ntul, 1975 1 SA 429 (A); Burger 1915 4 SA 877 (A). 
62) 752 C-E. 
63) This was repeated in Ngobozi, Ntuli and Burger. 
64) Rejected in Ngubane at 681 H. 
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It is also clear from these judgments that negligence or culpa 
was regarded as a form of mens rea; in other words, as constitut-
ing the mental element of the crime of culpable homicide, whereas 
the physical killing was regarded as the objective element or 
actus reus. 
A case which deserves special mention is Van AS,I) because cer-
tain dicta in it have given rise to the view that our courts were 
moving away from the traditional objective test for negligence to 
a subjective test. 2) 
A lengthy discussion of the judgment and the academic comment to 
whi ch it gave ri se, is not necessary, as certain allegedly 
obscure dicta of Rumpff CJ have been clarified by Jansen JA in 
Nkwenya3) and Ngubane4). 
-The facts of van As are that during an altercation deceased had 
tol d accused that he coul d 'go to hell'. Accused then sl apped 
deceased. Deceased, who was an exceptionally fat man ,5) fell 
onto hi s back as a result of whi ch hi s head came into sharp 
contact wi th the surface of the cement stoep on whi ch he was 
11 
2) 
3 ) 
4) 
5 ) 
1976 2 SA 921 (A). 
vide Burchell and Hunt 202; Goosen 1979 Obiter 60; Schafer 
1978 THRHR 201; J H du Plessis (60) regards van As as the 
leading case on the test for negligence. 
1985 2 SA 560 (A) 572-3. 
1985 3 SA 676 (A) 687. 
925 E. 
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standing . He incurred a fractured skull with intracranial 
haemorrhage and died of his injuries. The accused did not raise 
the defence that he had reacted unthinkingly or automatically to 
the insult,6) and the court a quo found him guilty of culpable 
homicide. 
In finding that the accused had been negligent, the trial court 
placed reliance on the dicta in the minority judgment in Bernar-
dus to the effect that death may be reasonably expected to result 
from a light assault. 7) 
The question before the Appellate Division was whether the 
accused had acted negligently in slapping the deceased and there-
by causing his death. On the minority view expressed by Rumpff 
JA (as he then was) in Bernardus, the answer would have been in 
the affirmative, as negligence - in this case the foreseeability 
of death and fail ure to avoi d causing it - woul d be establ i shed 
on mere proof of the assault. Rumpff CJ, however, expressed the 
view that the majority judgments in Bernardus had been supported 
in subsequent decisions of the Appellate Division8 ) and that 
the mi nori ty judgment had, in the 1 i ght of the maj ori ty j udg-
ments, gone too far. 9) The court a quo had accordi ngly made a 
6 ) 
7l 
8) 
9 ) 
926H. The doctrine that an automatic act or reaction is 
not an 'act' was not as popular then as it is now. 
927 D-E. 
927 E. 
927 G. 
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mistake in relying on the minority judgment. 10 ) 
The premise that a reasonabl e man woul d automatically foresee 
death as a possible result being rejected, Rumpff CJ found it 
necessary to formul ate the exact nature of the test for negl i-
gence. In doing so, the learned Chief Justice made certain state-
ments that have been interpreted as a 'swing' or move to the 
subjective test for negl i gence. These will be bri efly consi d-
ered. 11 ) 
A passage which has caused some difficulty is the following: 12 ) 
'In die strafreg, wanneer die dood volg op 'n onregmatige 
aanrandi ng, moet di t bewys word, a 1 vorens 'n bevi ndi ng 
10) 927 H. 
11) Bearing in mind that he nowhere criticises the majority 
judgments in Bernardus, nowhere directly rejects them and 
that a court of three judges could not overrule views, 
substantially similar to if not identical with each other, 
expressed by four judges on a previous occasion, it 
strikes one as strange that some passages in van As could 
give rise to the opinion that the objective approach adop-
ted in the majority judgments in Bernardus were being 
rejected. It is submitted that one ought slmply to inter-
pret the judgment on the basi s that a court whi ch wi shes 
to change the 1 aw wi 11 say so cl early and unequivocally 
and that, in the absence of such a clear statement, a 
judgment shoul d be read on the assumption that well known 
existing principles are accepted, assumed and taken for 
granted. So viewed the van As judgment loses its mystical 
aura to become a realistlc statement of the law based on 
the views of the majority of the court in Bernardus. 
12) 927 H - 928 B. 
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van strafbare manslag gedoen kan word, dat die beskuldigde 
redel ikerwyse kon en moes voorsien het dat die dood kon 
intree as gevolg van die aanranding. Die uitdrukking 
"Moes voorsien het" word gebesig in the sin van "behoort 
te voorsi en het". Indi en di t bewys word dat 'n beskul d-
i gde we 1 di e dood as moontl ike gevo 1 9 rede 1 i kerwyse moes 
kon voorsien het, en dat aan die kausaliteitsvereiste 
voldoen is, is die saak afgehandel. Die vraag is dus een-
voudig: kon en moes die beskuldgide redelikerwys voorsien 
het dat die oorledene deur so 'n klap kon sterf' .13) 
What makes translation of this passage difficult, is the use of 
the word 'moes' in the Afrikaans text . 'Moes' is past tense for 
'meet' which means 'must'. 'Moes' is, however, not only the past 
tense of 'moet', it also has subjunctive connotations. In other 
words 'moes' can be taken to have 'ought to have' as one of its 
natural meanings. This is reflected by the statement that 'moes 
voorsien het' is used in the sense of 'behoort te voorsien het'. 
13) 'In the criminal law, when death follows on an unlawful 
assault, it must be proved, before a finding of cul pable 
homicide can be made, that the accused could and must have 
reasonably foreseen that death could supervene as a result 
of the assault. The expression "must have foreseen" is 
used in the sense of "ought to have foreseen". If it is 
proved that an accused could and must have been able to 
foresee death, and that the requirement of causation has 
been met, the matter is di sposed of. The questi on is 
therefore simply: Coul d and ought the accused reasonably 
to have foreseen that deceased would die as a result of 
such a slap' (my translation) . The translation is 
substantially the same as that of Messrs Juta's in their 
English translations of Afrikaans judgments; vide also 
Burchell and Hunt 208. 
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As the learned judge explains the sense in which 'moes voorsien 
het' is being used, one can assume that he uses the phrase in 
that sense in the rest of the passage. What adds to the problem 
though, is the addition of the word 'kon' in the following 
phrase, 'redel ikerwyse moes kon voorsien het'. The word 'kon' 
which is past tense for 'kan' and means 'could' is not retained 
in translation, but the sense in which it is used is retained by 
the use of 'have been able'. 
It is submitted that 'kon' was used in the sentence to make it 
clear that one is dealing with a subjunctive construction. Other-
wise the exact meaning of 'moes voorsien het' would be doubtful. 
Without the subjunctive connotation the phrase could be taken to 
mean that the accused did as a fact foresee, or could not but 
foresee. The use of 'kon' indicates the meaning to be that such 
a person coul d have foreseen but in fact di d not. The use of 
'moes' indicates that he has no excuse for not foreseeing. In 
context' redel ikerwyse moes kon voorsien het ' means 'reasonably 
he could have foreseen' in other words 'he ought to have 
foreseen' . 
It is submitted that it is unsound to draw an inference from this 
passage that a subjective approach was being favoured. The judg-
ment does not say that in the light of the peculiar characteris-
tics the accused, ~ ought reasonably to have foreseen the death 
of the deceased. 'Reasonably', taken in conjunction with what is 
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later on said about the reasonable man,14) must undoubtedly be 
taken to mean 'in conformity with the standards of the reasonable 
man'. In the absence of a clear indication that the traditional 
'reasonable man' test was being departed from, linguistic 
-obscurities cannot be regarded as indicating a radical departure 
from established principle. 
Unfortunately this does not dispose of the problems arising from 
the judgment and passages on the next two pages of the judg-
mentIS) could also be misinterpreted. 
Having decided that his minority view in Bernardus was not to be 
supported and that the negligence or lack of it of the accused in 
committing that particular assault had to be investigated without 
recourse to any rule that death is always a reasonably forseeable 
result of an assault, the Chief Justice proceeded to examine 
negligence as a general concept in the criminal law and then 
examined the negligence or otherwise of the accused. 16 ) 
The Chi ef Justice commenced by poi nti ng out that negl i gence in 
the criminal law consists of two elements; namely, failure to 
foresee an undesi rab 1 e result whi ch was reasonably foreseeable 
14) 928 C-D; contra Burchell and Hunt 202, but vide J H du 
Plessis 60 and 73 n88. 
15) 928-9. 
16) 928 A - 930 pro 
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and failure to take reasonable steps to avoid this result from 
coming about. In the case of an unl awful as saul t the second 
element is not the subject of inquiry, because a reasonable 
person would not have assaulted unlawfully.l?) 
Then the Chief Justice continued to say that 'negligence' is not 
quite the same as culpa. 18 ) 
Without in any way condemning the tradition or practice the Chief 
Justi ce then makes the statement that in our 1 aw we have been 
using the concept of the diligens paterfamilias as someone who 
would act in a certain way in certain circumstances; what this 
diligens paterfamilias would do is regarded as reasonable . 19 ) 
Then follows an interesting passage20 ) which could give rise to 
16) 
17) 
18) 
19 ) 
20 ) 
928 A-930 pro 
With respect, it is submitted that in an investigation 
into alleged culpable homicide the question is whether a 
reasonable man woul d have foreseen death and refrained 
from assaul ti ng. To descri be every as saul t as unreason-
able in the context of death possibly resulting from an 
assaul t, is casting the net of unreasonable conduct so 
wide as to come perilously close to adopting the rejected 
minority view in Bernardus. 
928 B-C. 'Wat die graad van nalatigheid betref, moet in 
gedagte gehou word dat die woord "nalatigheid" ... nie 
juis weergee wat bedoel word nie. In die deliktereg gaan 
dit in die algemeen wat culpa betref oor 'n versuim om te 
voorsien en om versigtig te wees'. ('Concerning the degree 
of negl i gence it must be borne in mind that the word 
"negligence" ... does not correctly reflect what is meant. 
In the law of del ict culpa is generally concerned with a 
failure to foresee and to be careful'. (my translation)). 
928 C. 
928 D-F. 
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misunderstanding, unless one bears in mind throughout that there 
is no clear reason for believing that the law was being changed : 
'Ons gebruik nie die diligentissimus paterfamilias nie, en 
wat die diligens paterfamilias in 'n bepaalde geval sou 
gedoen het, moet di e regterl ike beampte na die beste van 
sy vermoe beslis. Hierdie diligens paterfamil i as is 
natuurlik 'n fiksie en is maar al te dikwels nie 'n pater 
nie. Hy word "objektief" beskou by die toepassing van die 
reg, maar skyn wesenl ik sowel "objektief" as subjektief 
beoordeel te word omdat hy 'n bepaal de groep of soort 
persone verteenwoordi g wat in dieselfde omstandighede 
verkeer as hy, met di esel fde kenni svermoe. Indien 'n 
persoon dus nie voorsien nie wat die ander persoon in die 
groep wel kon en moes voorsien het, dan is daardie element 
van culpa naamlik versuim om te voorsien, aanwesig . Oat 
voorsienbaarheid en versigtigheid aan mekaar geskakel is 
en dat gebrek aan versigtigheid gewoonlik spruit uit 
versuim om te voorsien, kan, dink ek, beswaarlik ontken 
word' . 21) 
21) 'We do not use the diligentissimus paterfamilias and what 
the diligens paterfamilias would have done In a given 
case, the JudIcIal offIcer must decide to the best of his 
ability. This diligens paterfamilias is of course a 
fiction and is all too often not a pater at all. He is 
regarded "objectively" in the applicatIon of the law, but 
substantially appears to be judged both "objectively" and 
"subjectively" because he represents a particular group or 
type of person who are in the same circumstances as he, 
with the same abil ity to know. Shoul d a person therefore 
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Unfortunately, examples of the various groups persons could 
belong to, are not given. Examples of how the objective and 
subjective requirements are investigated and applied, are also 
not given. The rel evance of these consi derati ons to the matter 
under inquiry is also not indicated. To what special group of 
persons di d the appellant belong? There is no suggestion that 
the appellant ought to be treated di fferently from any other 
person giving another a slap in anger. One can only submit that, 
in the absence of any i ndi cati on to the contrary, the 1 earned 
Chief Justice was explaining the law as it had been up to that 
time and still was, and that he did not intend to change it. 
By 'a particular group or type ' the Chief Justice could only have 
meant persons with special or specialised knowledge, and possibly 
very young people. There is no indication that he was attempting 
to create a series of phantoms; namely, the reasonable constable, 
the reasonable detective, the reasonable professor, the reason-
able Xhosa, the reasonable Hollander, the reasonable boxer, the 
reasonable rugby player, and so forth ad infinitum, out of that 
one fiction 'the reasonable man' or diligens paterfamilias. 
Where indeed would such a list end? 
not foresee what the other persons in the group could and 
must have foreseen, then that element of cul pa, namel y 
failure to foresee, is present. That foreseeablility and 
carefulness are linked and that a deficiency in careful-
ness usually arises from failure to foresee, can, I think, 
hardly be denied' (my translation). 'Knowledge capacity' 
('a vile phrase' to quote Polonius) is used by Goosen 1979 
Obiter 60. In the Juta's translation of the SALR 'Kennis-
vermoe' is translated simply as 'knowledge'. 
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The submission that the Chief Justice had no intention to depart 
from traditional views on the subject, is strengthened by his 
reference22 ) to R v Meiring23 ) without criticism. 
Considering the facts of the problem before him he stated that in 
cases of an assault one must view the attacker, the victim, the 
manner of the assault and the circumstances in which the assault 
took place. 24 ) If a person sitting in his armchair is given a 
fairly hard slap in the face, it is not reasonably foreseeable 
that he may fall over backward and incur a fractured skull. If a 
tight-rope walker on his tight-rope is given the lightest of taps 
serious injury is foreseeable in the absence of safety nets. This 
latter example is, with respect, a little out of place. Inter-
fering with a tight-rope walker who has no safety nets below him 
would almost certainly result in death and the person so inter-
fering, with death resulting, would be very fortunate to escape 
conviction of murder. The inquiry would be one into dolus not 
cul pa . 
Then the Chi ef Justi ce came to the concl usi on that a person in 
the position of the accused could not be said, beyond doubt, to 
have reasonably foreseen that the deceased would have fallen and 
cracked his skull as a result of a slap delivered sideways . Such 
22) 928-929. 
23) 1927 AD 41. The view of Innes CJ in this case was that 
negligence amounted to falling short of the standards of a 
reasonable man. 
24) 929 D; vide the comment in JH du Plessis 60. 
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a result was so unusual and of such a decidedly rare nature that 
it coul d not be sai d that the prosecuti on had proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused ought to have foreseen it. 25 ) 
In coming to this conclusion the Chief Justice took into account 
that the accused had a limited knowledge and some experience of 
boxing and judo .26 ) It is submitted that the reference to the 
particular class of person the 'reasonable man' may belong to, is 
to be explained, and solely to be explained, as a reference to 
the accused belonging to a class of person that has this limited 
knowledge and experience of boxing. 
The references to the attacker 27) , and the fact that the 
accused was a young strongl y bui 1 t man, 28) means no more than 
that the strength of the person delivering the blow would be one 
of the factors a reasonable man would take into account in 
deciding whether death was a reasonably possible result of the 
assault. 
It is submi tted that there is no solid basis to be found in this 
judgment for the conclusion that a subjective approach to culpa 
was being espoused. 29 ) 
25) 929 G-H. 
26) 929 F. 
27) 929 C. 
28) 929 E. 
29) A very simpl e approach to the facts woul d have been to 
consider whether it had been reasonably foreseeable that a 
very fat person, standi ng on a hard cement surface coul d 
fall and fatally injure himself as a result of a fairly 
hard quick slap delivered by a rather strong man. Bearing 
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The view that the reference to particular classes of persons by 
the Chief Justice in van As is a reference to persons with 
special or specialised knowledge, is shared by Snyman. 30 ) 
Burchell and Hunt31 ) concede that the judgment coul d mean no 
more than this. 
I n the fourth editi on of De Wet and Swanepoe 1 a suggesti on is 
made32 ) that the reasonable man test had not really been 
employed in van As. Comi ng from such strong and pers i stent 
opponents of the objective test this brief statement, made with-
out explanation, can be taken as an indication that support for 
the subjective test can only be found in van As on a strained 
interpretation. 
Before proceeding to the leading Nkwenya33 ) and Ngubane34 ) 
decisions it would perhaps serve a useful purpose to consider a 
30) 
31) 
32) 
33) 
34) 
in mind the ungainly build of the deceased, and the well 
known dangers attendant on falling on a cement surface, it 
is submitted that death had been reasonably foreseeable 
and that the appeal against the conviction ought to have 
failed. Why the detailed discussion of negligence was 
necessary, is not clear. It was possibly deemed necessary 
in view of the move away from the minority view in Bernar-
dus (vide Gazambe 1965 4 SA 208 SR). This move away from 
an-extreme of 'objectivity' which could have been regarded 
as a retention of part of the versari doctrine, is not to 
be construed as a move into hitherto unknown subjectivity. 
189. 
203. 
162 n 203. The statement is quite untenable in view of 
the repeated references made by the Chi ef Justi ce to the 
reasonable man and the diligens paterfamilias. 
1985 2 SA 560 (A). 
1985 3 SA 677 (A). 
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Rhodesian case in which a clear subjective approach to negligence 
was adopted. 
It is Mara. 35 ) The judgment was delivered by Young J. 
It was a case of a rather brutal assault which had resulted in 
death in an unusual manner, namely that deceased, having been 
knocked unconscious by accused, had died of shock in consequence 
of partial regurgitation of his stomach contents. The magistrate 
had not been certain whether an assault, which would in any event 
result in serious bodily harm, could form the basis of a convic-
tion of culpable homicide, where, although death ought, broadly 
speaking, to have been foreseeable, the precise manner in which 
it supervened was not foreseeable .36 ) 
In upholding the conviction of culpable homicide, Young J rejec-
ted Rumpff CJ' s mi nority judgment and gave an extremely subjec-
tive interpretation to the majority judgments in Bernardus, 
which, with respect, cannot be justified in the 1 i ght of those 
judgments . His view was that according to the majority: 
'Killing in the course of an unlawful assault is culpable 
homicide if the accused, given his mental and physical 
make-up, woul d, had he thought about the matter, i nevit-
ably have recognised that in some way danger to life might 
35) 1966 1 SA 82 (SR). 
36) 82-3. 
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be involved in the act. 37) 
This is a far-reaching interpretation of the majority judgments 
in Bernardus and it was not necessary to apply this 'rule' to 
uphold the conviction. 3B ) 
Young J a1 so stated the subjective test very unmistakably where 
he says: 39) 'In the present case the accused must, if he had 
thought about the matter, have realised that death might result 
from the serious assault he committed'. 
This appears to be a statement of the law contrary to principles 
accepted at the time. The traditional test is that a reasonable 
man in the position of the accused would have thought about the 
matter and would have realised that death could result. Bernardus 
37) 83G emphasis added. The statement is one of an extremely 
subjective approach which cannot be found in the Bernardus 
judgments. It reminds one of 'Caldwell recklessness' in 
English law although Caldwell is only reported in 1981 1 
AER 961: vide Lord Diplock's dictum at 982g. 
38) The facts were simple: a very serious assault which anyone 
cou1 d foresee mi gh,t result in death, di din fact result in 
death. The real question, namely whether the exact manner 
of death ought to be foreseeable before a conviction can 
be brought, is also easily answered in the light of long 
established principle. It is a question not of fault but 
of causal liability, and it has long been established that 
in homicide cases death is 'caused' by the conduct of the 
accused setting in motion a train of events causing death, 
even though the chain of events may unfo1 d in an unusual 
way not planned or foreseen by the accused. The question 
is thoroughly canvassed in the judgments of Van Winsen and 
Jansen JJA in Daniels 1983 3 SA 275 (A). 
39) 84 A. 
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certainly is no authority for evicting the reasonable man. 40 } 
An important case on cul pab 1 e homi ci de is the recent Appell ate 
Division decision of Nkwenya. 41} A perusal of the judgments 
makes it clear that the interpretation of van As as opening the 
door to the adoption of a subjective test is not endorsed, and a 
strong objective approach to negligence is adopted. 
The facts are that the two accused had pl an ned and thereafter 
1 aunched a simul taneous attack on a man and a woman who were 
sitting in the back of a car, with the intention of robbing them. 
A blow which must have been light according to the medical evi-
dence, proved fatal to the man. I twas uncertai n how thi s blow 
40} The weakness of the subjective test is also to be seen in 
this passage from the judgment of "Young J . If the accused 
could have foreseen death, had he thought about the 
matter, why did he not, 'given his mental and physical 
make-up' think about it? Was it unreasonable for him not 
to give thought to the matter? If so, by what standards 
of reasonableness? His own? Then the question why he did 
not thi nk about thi s matter becomes unanswerable. It 
becomes the question: Why did he not live up to his own 
standards? Because he was angry? But, judging by his own 
standards, is it not unreasonable that he should not think 
about the consequences of hi s acti ons "When he is angry. 
Clearly, on the facts, he was not a man who thought about 
the consequences of hi s acti ons when angry. Therefore, 
given his mental and physical make-up, and judging by his 
standards, he was not acting unreasonably. To arrive at a 
finding that his conduct was unreasonable one would 
inevitably have to apply a standard of reasonableness 
which is not that of the accused. At what stage does one 
apply it? This question no subjectivist can answer. 
41) discussed by du Plessis 1985 SALJ 1,2. 
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was delivered and also which of the two accused had delivered 
it. It was certain that they had acted with a common purpose and 
that the one could therefore be held responsible for such acts of 
the other as fell within the scope of the common purpose. 
In view of the lightness of the fatal blow, the court refused to 
hold that in striking the blow the appellant who had struck it, 
ought to have foreseen that death may result. 42 ) 
The prosecution advanced the argument that when planning the 
robbery the two accused ought reasonably to have foreseen that 
one of the intended victims could be fatally injured. 43 ) 
In deciding on this submission the court arrived at differing 
vi ews on the facts. Rabi e CJ wi th Mi 11 er JA concurri ng, held 
that the facts were not such that, at the planning stage, the 
accused ought to have foreseen the death of one of their proposed 
victims. The maj ority of the court; namely, Jansen JA with 
Joubert JA and Grosskopf AJA concurring, took the opposite view 
and held that the nature of the planned robbery was such that at 
the planning stage both accused ought reasonably to have foreseen 
that their scheme could have fatal consequences. 
42) 570 A-D. It is interesting to compare the facts in Nkwenya 
with the Rodesian case Gazambe 1965 4 SA 208 (SR). A 
great deal appears to hinge on the violence of the assault 
itself . But, as in van As, the physical surroundings of 
the accused and his vlctim could affect the potentially 
dangerous nature of any assault. 
43) 570 E. 
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Both Rabie CJ and Jansen JA viewed the facts objectively and 
applied an objective test. Rabie CJ laid stress on the slight 
violence actually used and Jansen JA laid stress on the inherent-
ly dangerous nature of the enterprise. Hence their differing 
conclusions. Jansen JA, correctly it is submitted, pointed out 
that the accused ought to have anticipated violence, that the 
exact nature of the violence could not be foreseen and that the 
appell ants ought therefore to have desi sted from thei r intended 
robbery. 
In both judgments the view taken of the law is the same. The 
difference is in the application of the law to the facts. 
It is also significant that Jansen JA specifically refers to van 
As and states that the van As judgment is not contrary to the 
finding made by him,44) because the basis of the van As 
decision is whether the accused ought reasonably to have foreseen 
that in those ci rcumstances a sl ap in the face of the deceased 
would have caused him to fall backwards onto the stoep banging 
his head on its surface. 45 ) 
By , reasonab 1 y' (rede 1 i kerwys) in the passages referred t046 ) 
the learned judge of appeal, with respect, meant ' reasonably' in 
the accepted legal sense of the word; namely, according to the 
44) Nkwenya 572-3. 
45) 573 A. 
46) 572-3. 
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standards of the reasonable man. It is also abundantly clear 
that Jansen JA interpreted the van As judgment as laying down an 
objective test, because the basic question in that judgment 
according to him, was whether death had been reasonably fore-
seeab 1 e to the accused. In other words, woul d a reasonable man 
in the position of the accused, have foreseen the death of the 
deceased as a result of the slap. 
In deciding on the liability of the appellants, Jansen JA also 
states unequivocally that their liability depended inter alia on 
the question whether a reasonable person ( ' n redelike mens) or 
bonus paterfamilias would have foreseen death as a possibility in 
the ci rcumstances . 47) There can therefore be no doubt that in 
Nkwenya the Appellate Division has reiterated and underlined that 
the test for criminal negligence is objective. 
The approach to the problem of negligence in Nkwenya is basically 
similar to that in Steynberg. 48 ) In Steynberg's case the 
accused, armed with a loaded revolver, had gone to the house of 
the deceased to seek a confrontation and to overpower the 
deceased . During the ensuing confrontation a shot was fired from 
the revolver and deceased was ki 11 ed. There was no rel i abl e 
evidence concerning the exact nature of the argument and ensuing 
phys i ca 1 struggl e in the course of whi ch the fatal shot was 
46) 572-573. 
47) 572 F-G . 
48) 1983 3 SA 810 (A). 
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fired. The trial court had found the accused guilty of murder, 
but as neither direct or indirect intent to kill had been proved, 
the conviction coul d not stand. The question remained whether 
negl i gence had been estab 1 i shed. Hoexter JA hel d49 ) that even 
if the shot had gone off accidentally, a reasonable person in the 
position of the appellant would have foreseen at the stage when 
he decided upon seeking the confrontation with a strong man 
whilst armed with a revolver, that a shot could be fired uninten-
tionally in the course of the ensuing events and that such a shot 
coul d ki 11 the person wi th whom he was seek i ng the confronta-
tion. In this portion of the judgment it is clear that had the 
accused deliberately fired the shot during the confrontation, but 
without intent to ki 11, he woul d have been gui lty of cul pab 1 e 
homicide. But in the absence of proof of such a del iberate 
firing of the shot, he was in any event guilty of culpable homi-
cide as his mens rea (negligence) came into existence at the time 
when he decided to seek out the deceased and confront him. 
The test applied was the reasonable man test and its application 
was very objective. At a time as yet somewhat remote from the 
killing, the accused had failed to foresee what a reasonable man 
would have foreseen and had not guarded against what a reasonable 
man would have guarded against. 
49) 150 B-D. 
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In Ngubane50 ) Jansen JA had occasion to refer to the subjective 
test for negl i gence. He decl i ned to express any opi ni on on the 
view that there was a 'swing to the subjective approach' to 
negligence, but added, significantly it is submitted ' ... save 
for menti on that there may be some doubt whether the phrase 
"redel i kerwyse kon en moes voorsi en het", used in S v van As, 
connotes anything more than the conventional objective standard, 
albeit somewhat individualised' .51) 
It is submitted that by 'somewhat individualised' the learned 
Judge of Appeal meant no more than that the reasonable man is 
placed in the position of the accused and credited with such 
special or specialised knowledge as the accused may have. 52 ) 
50) 1985 3 SA 577 (A). 
51) 587 B-C. 
52) vide du Plessis 1985 SALJ 1, 7-8. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONSCIOUS NEGLIGENCE OR LUXURIA 
1. Introductory 
In keeping with the general purist trend to incorporate German 
doctrines into our law there is the possibil ity that conscious 
negl i gence may be promoted as a doctri ne for i ncorporati on into 
our law. Hence the examination of this concept in the present 
chapter. 
Conscious negligence or luxuria has not been expressly applied in 
any reported judgment of our courts.1) It has been written 
about by South African academic writers 2) and has been referred 
to, but not applied, in the important Ngubane3 ) decision. 
Conscious negligence (bewusste Fahrl~ssigkeit) is well known in 
German criminal legal theory and is also known in other continen-
tal systems. 4) 
There is more than one version of what conscious negl igence 
1) vide Bertelsman 1976 SALJ 59, 68 . 
2) Bertelsman 1974 AJ 3~76 SALJ 59; 1980 SACC 28; Morkel 
1981 SACC 162; 1'9"82 THRHR 3Z1; 1983 THRHR87; 1981 TRW 
101; Morkel (Rational Policy) 76; MorkellNalatighelCiT 
136-8 and 145-7; van Oosten 1982 THRHR 183; 1982 THRHR 
423; Middleton 1973 THRHR 181; Burchell and Hunt 148-50; 
Snyman 186; LAWSA 6 89-90; Visser and Vorster 363-4. 
3) 1985 3 SA 677 A. 
4) Ngubane 685 B-C. Jansen JA refers to 'the Continent' 
meaning Germany, France and the Netherlands, one supposes. 
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amounts to. 5) It is proposed to identify and briefly discuss 
various academic versions and · then to investigate some reported 
decisions in which the concept was allegedly applied. 
2. Conscious negligence viewed as foreseeing a criminal 
result and hoping it will not materialise 
The 'classic' version of the concept of conscious negligence is 
discussed by Jansen JA in Ngubane. 6) The learned judge of 
appeal points out that dolus eventualis contains a volitional 
component which is absent from conscious negl igence. The con-
sciously negligent person foresees a possible undesirable result 
of his conduct, but does not take it into the bargain. He hopes 
that it will not eventuate. In this connection Jansen JA refers 
to a Dutch writer previously referred to by him in Dladla.7) 
Here one of the tests for distinguishing between dolus eventualis 
and conscious negligence is stated as asking the question whether 
the accused, had he been informed that the possibility he foresaw 
would certainly eventuate, would have · desisted from his course of 
conduct. If the answer to this question is no, his mens rea is 
dolus eventual is; if the answer is yes, his mens rea is conscious 
negligence. Another question is : What would the accused have 
preferred: the accomplishment of his design with the undesirable 
result taken into the bargain, or woul d he have given up his 
5) In Ngubane there is a brief discussion (685) of some of 
the dlfferent views. This does not state our positive law 
which does not know conscious negligence. 
6) 685 C-G. 
7) 1980 1 SA 1 (A); the Dutch writer is van Hattum. 
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design, rather than have the undesirable result eventuate? In 
the first case his mens rea would be dolus eventualis; in the 
second case it would be conscious negligence. 
The two tests result in the same answers and are fundamentally 
similar. In both cases the distinction between dolus eventualis 
and conscious negligence is dependent on a volitional component; 
namely, whether the accused takes the undesired result into the 
bargain or whether he wishes or hopes that it would rather not 
supervene. If he reconciles himself with the undesirable result 
his mens rea is dolus eventual is; if he does not, his mens rea is 
conscious negligence.8) 
This view of conscious negligence is open to criticism. The most 
obvious criticism is that it is really nothing other than dolus 
eventualis and that in the context of our positive law with its 
very strong emphasi s on the subjective nature of dol us and the 
objective nature of culpa, the volitional component could at most 
be relevant to the question of sentence. A person who is aware 
of a possible undesirable consequence of his conduct and takes it 
into the bargain is conceivably more blameworthy in the moral 
sense than the person who hopes and wishes that the undesirable 
consequence will not materi ali se. I n South Afri can posi ti ve 1 aw 
the strictly legal liability of both persons is the same: their 
mens rea is dolus eventual is. 
8) Ngubane 685 F-H; Dladla 2. 
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The above versi on of conscious negl i gence has not found great 
favour with South African academic writers. 9) 
The interest of South African academic writers has mainly centred 
around two features of the definition of dolus eventualis in 
South African criminal law; namely, the foreseen possibility and 
the reckless carelessness. These features will be discussed in 
the next sub-section. 
3. Remote possibilities and recklessness as components of 
dolus eventualis 
The current definition of dolus eventualis in South African crim-
inal law is that of Burchell and Hunt. In respect of conse-
quences it is stated as follows: 
'Legal intention (dolus eventualis) in respect of a conse-
quence consi sts of foresi ght on the part of the accused 
that the consequence may possibly occur coupled with reck-
lessness as to whether it does or not; ,10) 
and in respect of circumstances as follows:-
9) 
10) 
Its main proponent is Bertelsman in his publications 
referred to in n2 supra. 
141. 
- 154 -
'Legal intention (dolus eventual is) in respect of 
ci rcumstances consi sts of foresi ght on the part of the 
accused that the circumstances may possibly exist coupled 
with recklessness as to whether it does or not. '11) 
The possi bil ity of consequences and ci rcumstances has recei ved 
attention, as well as the recklessness in respect of the conse-
quences and circumstances. 
In this connection it would seem that there is a divergence of 
views between our courts when stating and applying the positive 
law, and the views of some modern writers. This is particularly 
the case on the questi on whether remote pos sibil iti es actually 
foreseen, suffice for dolus eventualis to be present,12) 
provided the other requirements are met. 
A number of South Afri can writers are in di sagreement with the 
view that any possibility, as long as it is actually foreseen 
will suffice.l3 ) Once it is accepted or proposed that a very 
remote or unlikely possibility will not suffice for dolus even-
tualis, the question arises whether any mens rea and, if so, what 
11) 156. 
12) De Bruyn 1968 4 SA 498 (A); Shaik 1983 4 SA 57 (A),62 B-F; 
Burchel I and Hunt 146. 
13) Burchell and Hunt 145-8; Snyman (Strafreg) 169; Morkel 
(Rational Policy) 64-5; Morkel 1982 THRHR 321; 1981 SACC 
162-73; Bertelsman 1976 SALJ 59; 1974 AJ 34; 1980 SACC~ 
Visser and Vorster 298. Contra van Oosten 1982 TH~183. 
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mens rea will be present if the remote or unlikely possibility 
does, notwithstanding its remoteness l4 ) or unlikelihood, never-
theless eventuate? The answer proferred is that the mens rea 
will be conscious negligence. 15 ) 
This answer, although it has found favourl6 ) is unsatisfac-
tory. It blurs the distinction between dolus and culpa by recog-
nizing a form of culpa; namely luxuria, that must in practice be 
indistinguishable from dolus eventualis. The nett effect of 
recognizing conscious negligence in our positive law would thus 
be to make dolus eventual i s a vague and unworkable concept. It 
would be extremely difficult if not impossible to distinguish 
between very remote, fairly remote, real, substantial and 
concrete possibil iti es objectively as questi ons of fact. The 
courts would also have to determine how the accused assessed the 
possibil ity subjectively. As dolus eventualis must be tested 
subjectively, this would be the crux of the inquiry. It would be 
far more practical to retain our law as it is; namely, a 
possibility actually foreseen no matter how remote, is a 
possibility and suffices for dolus eventualis. 
Natura 11 y thi s does not mean that the i ndi vi dual who foresaw a 
14) 
15) 
16 ) 
The remoteness or unlikelihood of the possibility is to be 
judged subjectively from the point of view of the accused 
and according to his assessment, Ngubane 685G. 
Burchell and Hunt 148-50. 
Burchell and Hunt 148-50; Snyman (Strafreg) 170; Morkel 
1982 THRHR 321. 
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remote possibil ity or who has assessed a possibil ity as remote, 
will always be in the same position as one who foresaw a substan-
tial possibility as substantial. Our trials, unlike German 
tri al s, are heard in two phases.17) Once gUil t has been estab-
1 i shed on the basi s that the accused di d as a fact foresee a 
possibility, the remote or concrete nature of the possibility 
woul d be rel evant to the questi on of sentence. In murder cases 
the fact that the mens rea was dolus eventual is is not in itself 
an extenuati ng ci rcumstance, but thi sis taken into account in 
conjunction with all other relevant facts to determine whether 
there are extenuating circumstances. 18 ) 
What must not be lost sight of is that if the possibil ity does 
not eventuate no crime, except perhaps attempt, will have been 
committed. On the other hand, the possibility may eventuate and 
the stark fact will be that, no matter how remote, the possibil-
ity was real in the sense that it did become a reality.19) 
The term 'recklessness' in the definition of dolus eventualis has 
17) Theron 1984 2 SA 868 (A) - as to the German one-phase 
trIal vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301, 317. 
18) Sigwahla 1967 4 SA 566 (A);---neBruyn 19684 SA 498 (A). 
19) The poss i bil ity that one of two I ntendi ng robbers woul d 
shoot and kill the other must be remote, but it did happen 
in Nkombani 1963 4 SA 877 (A); similarly the possibility 
of one security guard fatally shooting another, but this 
happened in Nhl apo 1981 2 SA 744 (A). There can be no 
questi on that the accused in both cases were gui lty of 
murder. 
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been descri bed as a 'col ourl ess concept' 20) Thi s means that a 
certai n wanton bravado or callous indifference is not necessary 
for the requirement of recklessness to be met. It simply means 
that if an accused subjectively foresees the possibility of a 
criminal result flowing from his conduct and nevertheless contin-
ues with such conduct, he is reckless as to whether the criminal 
result is or is not brought about by his conduct. It is there-
fore doubtful whether the word reckl essness serves any useful 
purpose in the definition of dolus eventualis. 21 ) Perhaps it 
should be omitted or supplanted with a clearly neutral word like, 
for instance, 'heedless'. 
This may be illustrated by referring to two well-known dicta on 
dolus eventualis in judgments of the appellate division in Mini 
and Sigwahla. 
The first is: 
'The proposition is well established in our law that a 
person has the necessary intention to kill if he 
appreciates that the injury which he intends to inflict on 
another may cause death and nevertheless inflicts the 
injury reckless whether death will ensue or not' .22) 
20) Burchell and Hunt 152; Markel (Rational Policy) 68-7l. 
21) Morkel (Rational Policy) 68-71. 
22) per Hoexter JA in Mini 1963 3 SA 188 (A), 190. 
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It is submi tted that 'reckless' coul d be 1 eft out of thi s sen-
tence, either alone or with all the words following it, and the 
sentence would still remain a statement of the nature of dolus 
eventual is. 'Reckless' could also be substituted with 'heedless' 
without altering the accuracy" of the sentence as a statement of 
dolus eventual is. The word 'heedless' or other near equivalents 
such as 'careless', 'unmindful', or 'indifferent' would also ful-
fil no real function in the sentence. 
The second is: 
'It is sufficient if the accused subjectively foresaw the 
possibility of his act causing death and was reckless of 
such result.'23l 
Here the phrase 'reckl ess of such resul t' coul d be substi tuted 
with 'nevertheless carried on'; or 'reckless' could be substi-
tuted with 'heedless' or 'unmindful'; or the phrase 'was reck-
less of such result' could be sUbstituted with: 'carried on with 
the act', or wi th: 'and di d not allow such fores i ght to deter 
him' . 
It is therefore suggested that the following definition of dolus 
eventual is would be less confusing: 
23l per Holmes JA in Sigwahla 1967 4 SA 566 (Al, 570. 
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'Dolus eventua1is is that form of dolus which is encoun-
tered when an accused carries on with a course of conduct 
aware that a criminal result could possibly flow from such 
conduct ' . 
In conclusion, it may be noted that in the two current Afrikaans 
textbooks on criminal 1aw24 ) 'roeke100s', the exact Afrikaans 
equivalent of 'reckless', is not used in the definitions of dolus 
eventual is. 
4. Remote possibi 1 iti es, reclel essness and con sci ous negl i-
gence 
Those writers who are of the opinion that only real or concrete 
possi bi 1 iti es shou1 d suffi ce for dolus eventual is, seek to fit 
remote or unlikely possibilities, actually foreseen, and which do 
eventuate, into the niche of conscious neg1igence. 25 ) 
This appears to be a view of conscious negligence entirely 
24) Snyman (Strafreg) 168-9; De Wet and Swanepoe1 139-40. In 
both textbooks the accused is sai d to 'versoen' (recon-
cile) himself with the foreseen possibility, but from the 
discussion it is clear that the term is used neutrally and 
not in the sense of calculatedly, maliciously or reckless-
ly accepting the possible result. De Wet and Swanepoel do 
not recognize conscious negligence; vide Morke1 (Rational 
Po 1 icy) 87. 
25) Burchell and Hunt 148-9; Morke1 (Rational Policy) 89; 
Morkel 1981 SACC 162, 171-3. 
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different from the view that conscious negl igence is foresight 
minus the voluntative component which is said to be a component 
of dolus eventualis. 26 ) 
If the possibility is very remote the accused is simply cons-
ci ously negl i gent shoul d he carryon regardl ess of whether the 
consequence eventuates or not. A remote possibility, on this 
line of thinking, does not require that degree of care to avoid 
its eventuating, as does a real or concrete possibility. This 
view is untenable. At the stage when the accused falls to be 
convicted because of the relevant findings of fact, it will have 
been established that he foresaw the possibility, that he ignored 
it and that it eventuated. On what basis could his assessment of 
the possibility as remote affect his legal guilt or 'juridiese 
skuld'27) so as to make his mens rea such that it is not dolus 
eventualis? The obvious answer is that his mens rea, so ana-
lysed, is clearly dolus eventual is. Some proponents of conscious 
26) Morkel 1982 THRHR 321, 324-5. Morkel (Rational Policy) 89 
expresses the d1fference very clearly by stating that the 
accused who hopes that the possibility will not material-
ise has dolus eventualis as his mens rea, but the man who 
trusts that 1t w111 not material1se 1S consciously negli-
gent. The distinction is, however, unacceptable: the man 
who really trusts that the result will not materialise, no 
longer foresees it as possible . Noteworthy is that the 
man who 'hopes' would in any event lack the voluntative 
component. Morkel (Rational Policy) 68-9 states that if a 
man were to cause a dangerous occurrence and actively pray 
that no one woul d di e as a result, hi s mens rea woul d 
still be dolus eventual is. Clearly this man 1n earnest 
prayer would lack the vol1tional component. 
27) For this term vide Theron (supra) at 880 D-F. 
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negl i gence28 ) are aware of thi s, and fa 11 back on the a 11 eged 
volitional component of dolus eventualis as a means of distin-
gui shi ng between dol us eventual is and con sci ous negl i gence in 
this context. If the possibility is remote, so they say, the 
accused cannot be said to have taken its materialization into the 
bargain. This is not a convincing argument: it would be anoma-
lous to place the man who foresees a remote possibility and takes 
it into the bargain in a worse position than the man who foresees 
a concrete possibil ity but does not take it into the bargain 
while, nevertheless, not avoiding it. In the case of the first 
man the volitional component is present and in the case of the 
second man it is absent, but on a commonsense view the former is 
less blameworthy than the latter. 
The I remote I or I concrete I nature of the possi bil ity, standi ng 
a lone, cannot serve as an adequate cri teri on for di sti ngui shing 
between conscious negligence and dolus eventual is. To make the 
presence or absence of the volitional component purely dependent 
on the remoteness or concreteness of the possibility, is unsatis-
factory. The accused may be able to prove that in spite of the 
concrete nature of the possibility he did not take it into the 
bargain and the prosecutor may be able to prove that notwith-
standing the remote nature of the possibility the accused did, as 
a fact, take it into the bargain. 
anomaly above referred to . 
Thi s woul d result in the 
28) Bertelsman 1974 AJ 34, 1976 SALJ 59, 1980 SACC 28; van 
Oosten 1982 THRHR~23. 
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Other proponents of conscious negligence, focus their attention 
on the el ement of reckl essness in dol us eventual is . On thei r 
view the accused who was aware of the possibility of a criminal 
result, but who took precautions against such possibility event-
uating, is not reckless. He is therefore consciously negligent 
and does not have dolus eventualis as his mens rea. The argument 
is not convincing and has led to contradictory statements 
concerni ng the effect of taking precauti ons. 29) The nature of 
the precauti ons and thei r effi cacy in the eyes of the accused, 
have also given rise to divergent vi ews. 30 ) 
The accused who takes precautions which he knows or believes are 
not sufficiently effective to guarantee that the undesirable 
result will not supervene, is simply making the foreseen possi-
bility more remote. His position is still that of a person who 
foresees a possible criminal result of his conduct but does not 
desist. The accused who takes adequate precauti ons or, more 
importantly, who believes that he has taken adequate precautions 
and that the undesired result will not supervene, obviously no 
29) Here the interesting polemic between Morkel and van Oosten 
in their notes and articles in THRHR referred to in n2 
supra has the merit, inter alia, of providi ng insight into 
the difficulties created by the view that the taking of 
precautions influences the question whether one is dealing 
with dolus eventualis or luxuria. Van Oosten i s clearly 
right that once a man belIeves his precautions to be ade-
quate, he no longer foresees the possi bil ity; 1982 THRHR 
423, 431-2. 
30) vide the Morkel-van Oosten polemic supra. 
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longer foresees the possi bil i ty. 31) Such an accused cannot be 
said to have dolus eventualis as mens rea. His carelessness 
caused him to take precautions which, to his mind, removed the 
possibil ity. As far as he is concerned the possibility is 
non-existent and he can therefore at most be unconsciously 
negligent in respect of the possibility if it is realised. It 
has been sai d that one is deal i ng with consci ous negl i gence in 
such a case because the accused knew of the possible result. His 
knowl edge is, however, no longer the crux of the matter. The 
crux of the matter is that he took inadequate precautions negli-
gently but genuinely believing them to be adequate. He was 
therefore unaware that the precauti ons woul d be ineffective and 
consequently his negligence is unconscious. 
It is simply incorrect to say that he was ' taking a chance'. If 
he believed the possibility previously anticipated had been 
effectively ruled out, he was taking no chance at all. As far as 
the theoretical 1 iterature is concerned, there can be no doubt 
that the views expressed by South African writers are very diver-
gent and to some extent confusing. 32 ) 
It now remains to investigate and consider decided cases in which 
conscious negligence is said to have been considered and/or 
appl i ed. 
31) vide Bertelsman's criticism of Bodenstein in 1976 SALJ 59, 
69. 
32) ibid and the Morkel-van Oosten polemic n2 supra. 
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5. South African Decisions 
Conscious negligence is not recognized by our courts. In 
Ngubane1 ) it is discussed for the sake of argument but neither 
approved nor incorporated into our law . 2 ) 
It has, however, been said3 ) that our courts have applied the 
concept of conscious negl igence without stating it in so many 
words. Cases in whi ch thi sis sai d to have happened are inter 
van Zyl ,4) Dube 5) 
--' 
Dladla 6) 
-,-,-,-,-' 
Fernandez7 ) and Hed-
Van Zyl was a case about reckless driving and in a much quoted 
passage,9) Steyn CJ is said to have given some recognition to 
conscious negligence. 
What emerges very cl early is that Steyn CJ regarded con sci ous 
negligence as dolus eventual i s. Thus he says:l0 
11 1985 3 SA 677 (A). 
2) 685 A - 686 C, particularly 686 C; cf du Plessis 1986 SALJ 
1, 3-4. 
3) Bertelsman 1976 SALJ 59. 
4) 1969 1 SA 533 (A~ 
5) 1972 4 SA 515 (W). 
6) 1980 1 SA 1 (A). 
71 1966 2 SA 259 (A). 
8) 1958 1 SA 362 (N). 
9) 577 A-E. Cooper (507) says the passage is difficult to 
apply. 
10) 557 A-B. 
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'Waar 'n bestuurder se besef van gevaar of moontlike 
gevaar wat hy op die pad skep, gepaard gaan met onverskil-
1 i ge aanvaardi ng daarvan en voortsetti ng van sy handel s-
wyse, sou sy optrede moet deurgaan as roekeloosheid in die 
sin van 'n doen of late met risiko-bewustheid, maar dit 
sou regtens buite di e grense van di e grofste na 1 ati ghei d 
val en op dolus eventualis neerkom'll 
Whether the recklessness required for reckless driving amounts to 
dolus eventualis or not is a matter of interpreting the statutory 
provision in question,12) and not a question of what our common 
law on the subjects of dolus eventualis and conscious negligence 
may be. No authority is to be found in van Zyl for the view that 
conscious negligence is part of our law. 
Hedley is a case in which conscious negligence was allegedly 
applied.!3) Although, at first blush this appears to be the 
10) 557 A-B. 
11) 'Where a driver's realization of danger or possible danger 
created by him on the road is accompani ed by reckl ess 
acceptance thereof and a continuation of his conduct, his 
conduct would have to be regarded as recklessness in the 
sense of an act or an omi ssi on with ri sk -consci ousness, 
but juridically this would fall outside the borders of the 
grossest neg 11 gence and amount to do 1 us eventua 11 s •.. ' 
(my translat10n, emphasis added). 
12) In terms of van Zyl recklessness has two meanings in the 
context of the statutory offence of reckless driving viz 
contraveni ng sec 138 (1) and (2) of the Transvaal Road 
Traffic Ordinance No 21 of 1966; vide Cooper 509-15. 
13) v1de Bertelsman 1976 SALJ 59, 73. 
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case, it is doubtful whether con sci ous negl i gence was indeed 
applied. The judgment is, with respect, somewhat loosely worded, 
mainly because the result of the appeal with which the court was 
dealing, was so obvious that a minute analysis and detailed 
discussion were not called for. 
The accused had fired two shots at a bird which was swimming on a 
dam. The second bullet ricochetted off the water and killed a 
woman who was sitting about '32 yards off the line of fire.'14) 
It was contended on behal f of the accused that he coul d not 
reasonably have foreseen that the bullet would deviate from the 
direct line of fire and kill a person. 1S ) 
Broome JP di sposed of thi s contenti on on the ground that the 
accused knew that there were human dwellings behind the bird and 
that there would probably be human beings. Unfortunately the 
following is also reported to have been said by the learned Judge 
President: 'He knew that the bullet he was. firing would strike 
the water and might ricochet and that if it did ricochet it might 
pass near the huts and so might hit someone.'16) 
Taken literally this passage means that the accused had dolus 
eventualis as his mens rea; in other words, he was guilty of 
murder. This could not possibly have been what the Judge 
14) 363 B-C. 
15) 363 O-E. 
16) 363 G-H. 
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President meant in finding that the accused had been correctly 
convicted of culpable homicide17 } What the passage really 
meant, taken in context, is that the accused knew that he was 
firing in the direction of human habitations and that he ought to 
have known that he might kill someone irrespective of his precise 
knowl edge of how a bull et coul d be expected to ricochet off 
water. Conscious negligence was completely unknown in our case 
1 aw at the time (1957) and it is unacceptabl e that the court 
would have applied it in such a cursory manner. 
Fernandez is a well known case of an omission leading to a con-
vi cti on of cul pab 1 e homi ci de. The accused was in charge of a 
baboon. He knew that it was dangerous, but failed to keep it 
under proper control. He was convicted of culpable homicide in 
respect of the death of a child killed by the baboon. 
On the fatal day the baboon had escaped from its cage and the 
accused, after arming himself with a revolver, had lured it back 
into the cage. He then set about repairing the cage with the aid 
of another person. Whil e work i ng at one end of the cage he 
allowed the other end to remain in a condition that allowed the 
baboon to escape as it had escaped in the first place. 
16} 363 G-H. In The sentence was impri sonment for three months with the 
alternative of a fine of R50, the entire sentence being 
conditionally suspended for three years, 363 pro 
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The accused was aware of the danger but was c1 early not aware 
that the deceased and her mother were approaching. The baboon 
escaped and kill ed the deceased. It was a c1 ear case of the 
accused being aware of danger and taking inadequate precautions 
to protect the pub1ic. 18 ) There is no indication at all in the 
judgment that he was aware of the inadequate nature of his 
precauti ons. There is no i ndi cati on that he knew the deceased 
to be in danger and hoped that the danger would not materialize 
or that he was aware of a remote possibility that deceased could 
be killed but did not take it into the bargain. It was a clear 
case of unconscious neg1 igence. The conviction was upheld on 
that basis and there is not the slightest mention of conscious 
neg1 igence in the judgment. The accused was, unreasonably, 
unaware that the way in which he set about solving the problem of 
the escaping baboon did not rule out the possibil ity of a human 
being's death. The reasons for the court's finding are summed up 
by Ogilvie-Thompson JA as follows : 
on the facts of this case it was established by the 
State that appell ant ought reasonably to have foreseen 
that death might result from this baboon's not being 
prevented from leaving its cage.'19) 
18) At 264 B it is said that appellant took no steps to ensure 
that the baboon wou1 d not escape a second time. Appell-
ant's enticing the baboon back into its cage was, however, 
a precaution. 
19) 264-5. 
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This is a statement of unconscious negligence as traditionally 
understood. 
Dladla has been regarded by Bertelsman20 ) as a case in which 
recklessness, dolus eventualis and conscious negligence were 
placed in proper perspective. Recklessness, so Bertelsman 
argued, had been jettisoned and the 'real' dolus eventual is 
finally recognized. As a necessary corollary, conscious negli-
gence is also at last given its rightful place - so it is 
argued. 21 ) 
The judgment22 ) is concerned with sentence, more particularly 
the question whether there were extenuating circumstances connec-
ted with a murder of which Dladla had been convicted. Counsel 
had submitted23 ) that dolus eventualis is an elastic concept. 
At one end of the scale it borders on dolus directus and at the 
other end of the scale it borders on CUlpa. Jansen JA dealt 
specifically with this contention and it was clear that his 
object was to prevent the 'elasticity' of dolus eventualis from 
causing the distinction between dolus eventualis and culpa to 
become blurred . 24 ) 
19) 
20) 
21 ) 
22) 
23) 
24 ) 
264-5. 
1980 SACC 28. 
1981 ~ 162, 163. 
Morke~981 SACC 162, 163) expressed the view that 
Bertelsman was reading more into the judgment than had 
been intended by the court delivering it and Morkel 
appears to be right. 
2 F-C. 
3 H- 4pr. 
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The learned judge of appeal clearly stated that dolus eventualis 
was concerned wi th what the actor foresaw as a fact; cul pa was 
concerned with what the actor ought to have foreseen according to 
an objective criterion. 25 ) Then he added that in the case of 
do 1 us eventual is there was also the characteri sti c vol untati ve 
decision26 ) nevertheless to accept the possible result. It is 
submitted that the learned judge of appeal was describing the 
nature of dolus eventualis in this part of his judgment and not 
mak i ng consci ous negl i gence part of our 1 aw. He does menti on 
conscious negl igence but refers to cul pa only, stating that the 
voluntative decision is not part of it. This is in accordance 
with our accepted positive law. A negligent person is not aware 
of the possible harmful · consequences of his conduct and by 
necessary inference does not and can not be said to accept them. 
The learned judge then quoted fairly extensively from a Dutch 
writer. 271 In the quoted passages two theories concerning the 
between dolus eventualis and culpa are distinction 
discussed. 28 ) One theory29) is to the effect that there is 
dolus eventualis if the actor would have carried on with his 
proposed conduct even had he been certain that the harm foreseen 
by him as a possibility would ensue. The other30 ) theory is 
25) 4 A. 
26) 4 A-B. 
27) van Hattum. 
28) 685 C-F referring to Dladla supra 4 B-G. 
29) I de voorstell i ngstheorl e I. 
30) I de wil stheori e I • 
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to the effect that dolus eventua1is was present if the actor 
would have preferred the intended results of his conduct to ensue 
together with the unintended results, rather than to desist from 
his conduct, thereby avoiding both the intended and unintended 
results. The passages were obviously quoted to stress the 
subjective nature of dolus eventua1is and not to give recognition 
to conscious negligence. This it is submitted is clear from the 
judgment viewed as a whole. 
Jansen JA concluded with the remark that it might be difficult to 
prove that a person foresaw and reconciled himself with an 
extremely improbable result. 31 } There is nothing to indicate 
that by an actor reconcil ing himself with a foreseen possible 
result, anything more is meant than that he nevertheless 
continues with the course of conduct that could possibly bring 
about that result. No mention is made in the Dutch texts quoted 
of the effect of a wi sh or hope32 } on the part of the actor 
that the result should not ensue. 
Kok 33 } views D1ad1a differently from Morke1 34 } stating that 
the views expressed in the Dutch texts are in sharp contrast to 
Morke1 's views. Nevertheless the relevant passages are only 
concerned with the subjective nature of dolus. The enti re 
discussion is in any event in the context of an inquiry into 
31 } 4H . 
32) vide van Oosten 1982 THRHR 423, 431. 
33) 1982 SAee 27, 29. 
34) 1981 SAce 162, 163. 
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whether extenuating circumstances were present, in other words an 
inquiry into moral blameworthiness. 
It is al so to be noted that Kok is very sceptical about the 
contents of the Dutch passages. He sums them up as being to the 
effect that dolus eventualis only qualifies as dolus if the 
actor, were he certain that the possible result would ensue, 
would bring it about with dolus directus. 35 ) This would bring 
an extremely dangerous hypothetical and speculative element into 
the concept of dolus eventual is. 
The concept of consci ous negl i gence appears to be at its most 
viable in cases of reckless or grossly negligent driving. It 
would be going too far to suggest that driving a motor car is 
intrinsically dangerous, and that, consequently, anyone who 
drives a motor car is consciously negligent in that he realises 
that he is engaged in a dangerous activity and hopes and trusts 
that harm to or the death of a human being will not result. 36 ) 
Nevertheless a person who drives at an excessive speed through a 
built up area or who 'shoots' a robot in busy traffic or who 
overtakes on a bl ind rise or overtakes in the face of oncoming 
traffic, could reasonably be described as being consciously 
negl i gent. Hi s reck 1 essness is a very gross form of negl i gence 
35) 29. 
36) Morkel 1982 THRHR 321, 322; van Oosten 1982 THRHR 423, 
424. 
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and could amount to dolus eventualis. 37) No person of normal 
intelligence and even limited driving experience would be unaware 
of the fact that such driving is extremely dangerous. 
Here one must, however, be careful to distinguish the mens rea of 
the crime of negligent or reckless driving from the mens rea of a 
negl igent or reckless driver whose driving results in another 
person's death, in respect of that death. 
A person who makes a slow U turn in fairly busy traffic is delib-
erately driving negligently. The name of the crime of 'negligent 
driving' does not preclude an act which amounts to negligent 
driving from being committed intentionally.38) Although it 
will generally be irrelevant in a prosecution for negligent driv-
i ng, the mens rea of such a dri ver in respect of his negl i gent 
driving would be dolus directus. The same applies to reckless 
drivi ng. Shoul d two motori sts deci de to race each other through 
a city or town and do this at high speed, they would intention-
ally be committing the crime of reckless driving. 39 ) Their 
mens rea in respect of that crime would be dolus directus. 
Assume that a collision occurs as a result of the U turn 
37) van Zyl supra 557 A-8. 
38) Vl de Nxuma 10 1982 3 SA 856 (A) 860F where Corbett JA 
speaks of I a deliberate course of negligent conduct'. 
39) ibid. 
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descri bed above and someone di es as a result of the colli si on: 
the driver making the u turn would in all probability be 
convi cted of cul pabl e homi ci de as he ought reasonably to have 
foreseen the acci dent and resul tant death. His mens rea in 
respect of the death would be culpa. 
The two racers, if thei r raci ng results ina fatal acci dent, 
could be in much the same position. They ought reasonably to 
have foreseen that thei r dri vi ng whi ch is undoubtedl y reckl ess, 
could result in someone's death. Would their mens rea in respect 
of the death be unconsci ous negl i gence, con sci ous negl i gence or 
dolus eventual is? The answer to the question wo uld depend on 
what they as a fact foresaw. If they foresaw the death of the 
person killed as a possible result of their conduct their mens 
rea woul d be dolus eventual is. I f they di d not as a fact so 
foresee it, their mens rea would be culpa. There is no room in 
our law - at this stage of its development - for conscious negli-
gence. 40 ) For the dri vers to have known that thei r conduct 
could possibly result in the death of the deceased would amount 
to dolus eventualis even if they wished or hoped that death would 
not result or if they regarded the possibility as very remote. 
The matter is, however, not devoid of complexity. If two such 
drivers or a driver driving grossly negligently or recklessly, 
39) ibid. 
40) Van Zyl supra 557 A-B makes this clear. 
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were to cause a fatal accident, it would in some cases be poss-
ible to prove that the driver concerned was aware of the possibi-
lity of a fatal accident resulting from his conduct. Yet, even 
in such cases, the prosecution is invariably in respect of culp-
ab 1 e homi ci de. One is at a loss to know why. One answer woul d 
be that unlawful killings resulting from road accidents are trad-
i ti ona lly treated as cases of cul pab 1 e homi ci de by the prosecu-
tion and the courts. 41 } If this is indeed so, we have, in 
deaths resulti ng from acci dents caused by extreme reckl essness, 
examples of dolus eventual is being the mens rea of culpable homi-
cide. Dolus eventualis, so treated, could with some justifica-
tion be called conscious negligence. This would, however, be a 
de facto rather than a de jure description. In practice it 
would be extremely difficult, in the absence of a confession, to 
prove dolus eventualis in respect of death resulting from a fatal 
motor acci dent. In most cases there woul d be no di ffi culty in 
proving that the accused ought to have foreseen the accident with 
its fatal consequence as a possible result of his conduct. In 
many cases it would be possible to prove that the accused as a 
fact subjectively foresaw the accident as a possible result of 
his conduct, but whether he foresaw the possibility of the death 
41) In Mathlojoa 1971 1 SA 523 (W) Irving Steyn J (523-A) 
expressed the view that the accused, who had been 
extremely reckless, could regard himself fortunate not to 
have been indicted of murder. He had been committed for 
tri al on a charge of murder but the Attorney-General had 
indicted him of cul pable homicide. The learned judge 
referred to the evidence as disclosing ' ... almost 
murderous negligence' and' ... deliberate recklessness.' 
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of the deceased would be a different matter. This would have to 
be estab 1 i shed beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused woul d 
deny it. It could not be argued in the face of his denial that 
anyone who foresees the possibil ity of an acci dent foresees the 
possibility of death. That would be to apply a mechanical 
objective mode of reasoning which is no longer acceptable. 
Dube42 ) i 11 ustra tes some of the poi nts made above. The accused 
drove in an extremely reckless manner in an effort to escape from 
the pol ice. He overtook a heavy vehi cl e on its 1 eft and in the 
process drove on the verge of the road, in other words off the 
actual surface of the road. He found himself about to drive into 
a culvert of which he had been unaware. Swerving to his right to 
avoid the culvert he lightly brushed against the heavy vehicle he 
was overtaking. This caused the driver of that vehicle to un-
accountab 1 y43) lose control of it, swerve across the road and 
collide with another vehicle. A person in this third vehicle was 
killed in the collision. The accused was charged with murder on 
the basis of dolus eventualis . Irving Steyn J refused to convict 
of murder on the grounds that, notwithstanding his extreme 
recklessness, the accused had not subjectively foreseen that a 
cul vert woul d cause him to swerve and that the driver of the 
heavy vehicle would lose control of his vehicle in the manner in 
which he did. Although the language used in the judgment creates 
42) 1972 4 SA 515 (W). 
43) 519 8-E. 
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the impression that Irving Steyn J was applying an objective test 
in assessing dolus eventualis,44) the result shows that he was 
app lyi ng a subj ecti ve test. The accused di d not foresee the 
possibility of that particular fatal accident and could conse-
quently not be convicted of murder. In connection with Dube it 
is interesting to note that Middleton45 ) is of the opinion that 
on Irving Steyn J's reasoning; namely, that the accused could not 
reasonably have foreseen the chain of events that 1 ed to the 
death of the deceased, the accused ought not to have been convic-
ted of culpable homicide either. Middleton's argument is that 
in the case of a fatal motor accident the negligence of the 
accused must extend beyond his negl igent driving to reasonable 
foreseeabil ity of the death of the deceased as a result of such 
driving. 46 ) This, it is submitted, was not the case on Irving 
Steyn J's view of the facts . 47 ) 
6 Conclusion 
It is submitted that conscious negligence or luxuria has no place 
in our criminal law. 48 ) It is an ill-defined term. 49 ) In so 
far as it amounts to knowing of a possibility of harm resulting 
44) vide 520 and Middleton 1972 THRHR 181-5, 182. 
45) Middleton 1972 THRHR 181, 183-4. 
46) ibid. 
47) ibid. 
48) To introduce it woul d place a concept between dolus and 
culpa ie along a dividing line which is already d,ff,cult 
to determine. 
49) vide Ngubane supra 685A - 6868. 
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from conduct and neverthel ess pursui ng such conduct with the 
pious or foolish hope that the harm will not eventuate, it is 
dol us eventual is. In so far as it amounts to bei ng awa re of the 
possibility of harm as a very remote or far-fetched possibility 
and nevertheless risking its eventuating, it can be viewed in 
different ways as a basis of criminal liability. The mere 
remoteness of a possibility does not remove it from the ambit of 
dol us eventual is. 50) The question does, however, ari se whether 
conduct resulting in the realization of a very remote possibility 
of harm can al ways be cl assifi ed as unl awful. This point is 
taken by van Oosten51 ) in response to Morkel's52) examples of 
the -man who knows that driving can result in death and neverthe-
1 ess buys a motor car and the man who knows that hunti ng can 
result in some individual, unseen by the hunter, being shot and 
killed and who nevertheless continues hunting. Van Oosten points 
out that buying a motor car is not unlawful and that hunting is 
not unlawful either. The same considerations would apply to 
rough and dangerous sports like rugbi and boxing. A further 
consideration is that in the case of a very remote or fanciful 
possibility it may be open to serious doubt whether the conduct 
of the accused caused the result to come about. This could be 
the case in Dube. Although the accused could be said, in a 
general sense, to have foreseen death as a possible result of his 
driving, it is doubtful whether he caused the death of the 
50) Shaik supra 62S-F. 
51) loc cit supra n36. 
52) loc cit supra n36. 
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deceased. He di d not foresee the i nexpl i cab 1 e way in whi ch the 
driver of the heavy vehicle lost control of his vehicle and this 
could amount to a nova causa interveniens. The argument that a 
foreseen nova causa does not sever the cha in of causal i ty53) 
woul d not defeat the defence of the accused as the court found 
that he did not and could not reasonably have foreseen this nova 
causa. 
Motor acci dent cases pose a theoreti ca 1 problem in the 1 aw of 
culpable homicide. A consideration of reckless driving, of which 
dolus can be the mens rea 54) leads one to bel ieve that on a 
--'-'-'----'-'- ' 
strict application of the law relating to dolus eventual is, 
murder not culpable homicide could in some cases be the crime 
committed by persons who kill as a result of reckless driv-
ing. 55 ) It does, however, seem that the prosecuti on and the 
courts do not regard motor accidents as a proper field for apply-
ing the law of murder except where the driver deliberately 
tries to 'run down' a pedestrian. 56 ) The result is that in 
some cases of death resulting from motor accidents one could be 
dealing with convictions of culpable homicide where the mens rea 
is dolus eventualis. This results in the tenable submission that 
a 1 though it may not have been so spe lt out in any deci si on, the 
53) Grot john 1970 2 SA 355 (A). 
54) Nxumalo supra 860 F. 
55) Van 2y I supra 557 AS. 
56) As was the case in Chretien 1981 1 SA 1097 (A), bearing in 
mind that the accused was charged with murder and attemp-
ted murder and it was his intoxication that cast doubt on 
whether dolus had been established. 
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'negligence' which sustains some convictions of culpable homicide 
arising from motor accidents, is conscious negligence or luxuria 
if it is negligence at all, and not in fact dolus even-
tualis. 57) 
57) It could be submitted that the courts avoid the stigma of 
'murder' when convicting of culpable homicide arising out 
of motor car accidents involving gross recklessness. It 
is an open question whether a sentence of 6 years' impris-
onment for culpable homicide is to be preferred to a sen-
tence of 4 years imprisonment for murder with extenuating 
circumstances. 
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CHAPTER III 
INTENTIONAL UNLAWFUL KILLINGS WHICH ARE NOT MURDER 
1 Introduction 
While the partial excuse doctrine was still accepted in our law, 
intentional killing could result in convictions of culpable homi-
cide,!) This happened in Bail ey2) in the court a quo. The 
accused who had killed intentionally was found guilty of culpable 
homi ci de because of the duress to whi ch he had yi e 1 ded when 
commi tti ng the crime. The Appellate Division held that the 
defence of necessity failed and that, as the accused had killed 
intentionally, he shoul d have been convicted of murder. The 
conviction of culpable homicide was therefore altered to one of 
murder. At the same time the partial excuse doctrine was rejec-
ted. The definition of culpable homicide as the unlawful negli-
gent killing of another human being is therefore definitive. As 
negligence means inadvertence, it is difficult to understand how 
an accused can be convicted of culpable homicide in circumstances 
where he knew as a fact that his conduct would or could result in 
the death of a human being. It seems strange that such a killing 
1) Hunt led (373) defines culpable homicide as follows: 'Cul-
pable homicide consists in the unlawful killing of another 
person either negligently or intentionally but in circum-
stances of partial excuse'. The definition in the 2ed 
(401) is as follows: 'Culpable homicide consists in the 
unlawful negligent killing of another person'. 
2) 1982 3 SA 772 (A). 
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could be regarded as inadvertent. Intent in criminal law is a 
term of art and in the context mentioned, the inadvertence, if 
inadvertence is found, would be in relation to the unlawfulness 
of the killing. It is now accepted particularly since De 
Blom3) that in South African criminal law intent is not 
colourless;4) it must be accompanied by knowledge or awareness 
of unlawfulness. If such an awareness is absent there cannot be 
dolus; at most, there can be cUlpa. This latter element could be 
present if the accused made an un reasonab 1 e mi stake of fact or 
law or of both which rendered the absence of awareness of 
unlawfulness culpable. 
It is in connection with this last mentioned feature that there 
is a difference of opinion among writers as to the nature of the 
defence of ignorance or mistake of law. 
The view accepted by the courts5) is that a bona fide mistake 
of law negatives intent irrespective of whether such mistake is 
reasonable or not. This is a psychological view of fault. 
Adherents of the normative fault doctrine disagree with this view 
and submit that ignorance or mistake of law should negative 
intent only in cases where such ignorance or mistake is 
3) 1977 3 SA 513 (A). 
4) Bailey supra. 
5) And supported by Burchell and Hunt (164-5); Hunt 419-20 
and De Wet and Swanepoel, 153-4. 
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unavoidable. 6) If it could have been expected of the accused 
that, in the circumstances, he should have known the law then, in 
terms of the normative fault doctrine, he should be treated as if 
he did know the law. 7) 
This doctrine is accepted 
supported by Snyman. 8) 
in German positive law and is strongly 
Snyman criticizes our courts for 
adopting the view that any bona fide mistake of law negatives 
intent. He poi nts out that South Afri ca is the only country 
adopting the psychological fault doctrine which allows for such a 
wide application of the defence of ignorance of the law. 9) 
The first indication that there may be a move away from the rule 
that a bona fide mistake of law will always negative dolus is to 
be found in Barnard10 ) which will be discussed below. The word 
'intentional' in the heading of this chapter means intentional in 
the dictionary sense, in other words without the requirement of 
6) Snyman 178-80. Cf the discussion by Whiting 1978 SALJ l. 
Rabie 1985 THRHR 332, 343 poi nts out that Snyman' s views 
result in culpa becoming the sole form of mens rea. It is 
submitted that to allow ignorance of the law to succeed as 
a defence only in cases where such ignorance was literally 
'unavoidable' would differ very little from the rule that 
ignorance of the law is no defence. Both are examples of 
normative fault. In the first case the accused is 
reproached for unavoidable ignorance and in the other case 
for ignorance, or, to put it differently, in the one case 
the accused is expected not to be unavoidably ignorant and 
in the other case he is expected not to be ignorant. 
7) Snyman 178-80. 
8) ibid. 
9) ibid. 
10) 1985 4 SA 431 (W) discussed infra 222ff. 
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knowledge or awareness of unlawfulness. 
In the immediately following section a brief discussion will be 
devoted to the feature that on occasion an accused proved gui lty 
of murder, that is an intentional unlawful killing committed with 
awareness of unlawfulness, can be convicted of culpable homicide. 
2 Convictions of culpable homicide where murder is proved 
but a conviction of murder is not procedurally competent 
This topic gave rise to fairly lively controversy among academic 
writers and differences of opinion in the judgments of our 
courts. 1l But the debate has now been resolved in Ngubane2) 
in which case five judges of the Appellate Division unanimously 
decided that a conviction of culpable homicide is competent when 
murder is proved but a conviction. of murder is procedurally 
excluded. 
This could happen in the regional courts which lack jurisdiction 
to convict of murder)) If, in such a court, intent to kill is 
established against an accused charged with culpable homicide, he 
could be convicted of culpable homicide . In serious cases the 
prosecution woul d generally, once it becomes obvious that the 
1) vide supra ch I, 1.1 . 
2) supra . 
3) This was the case in September supra, Smith supra, Alexan-
der supra, Zoko supra and Breakfast supra. 
- 185 -
crime is murder, apply for the proceedings to be converted into a 
preparatory examination so that the accused may be indicted for 
murder in the supreme court. 
A simi 1 ar state of affairs coul d ari se in the Supreme Court. 
This happened in Ngubane. The accused may be charged with culp-
able homicide and, notwithstanding proof of intent to kill, the 
prosecution might not be in a position to apply successfully for 
the charge to be amended to one of murder. An intentional kill-
ing could then result in a conviction of culpable homicide. 
Another possibility is that the prosecutor might accept a plea of 
guilty of culpable homicide .4) In such a case it is now 
clearS) that even if the court does not convict on the strength 
of the plea,6) but orders the matter to go to trial,7) the 
accused may only be convicted of cul pable homicide or a lesser 
crime, but not of murder. Thus an intentional unlawful killing 
duly proved in the supreme court, could result in a conviction of 
culpable homicide. 
3 Intentional k.illings that are cODIDitted in the bona fide 
but unreasonably mistak.en belief that they are lawful 
3.1 Introductory 
Mistakes of fact can occur in an infinite number of forms. If an 
4) As happened in Ngubane supra. 
5) This was one of the issues finally decided in Ngubane. 
6) ito section 112 Criminal Procedure Act. 
7) ito section 113 Criminal Procedure Act. 
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accused intentionally kills a being which he believes not to be 
human and it turns out that he in fact killed a human being, the 
bona fide nature of the mistake precludes a conviction of murder 
because there was no intention to kill a human being. If the 
mistake was unreasonable the accused would be guilty of culpable 
homicide. 8) Basically the mistake of fact leads to the 
erroneous but bona fide belief on the part of the accused that he 
is acting lawfully. 
I ntenti ona 1 ki 11 i ngs that are relevant to the present secti on 
are those in which an accused knows that he is killing a human 
being, but believes the act to be lawful because of a mistake of 
fact or of 1 aw or a mi xed mi stake of fact and of 1 aw on hi s 
part. If the mistake is unreasonable but bona fide he would in 
most cases be adjudged guilty of culpable homicide. But, because 
of a limited application . of the normative fault concept, the case 
of Barnard9) held that a grossly unreasonable bona fide belief 
wi 11 not suffi ce for the crime to be reduced from murder to 
culpable homicide. 
The situation in which a mistake of fact or of law could cause an 
accused unreasonably to believe that he is acting lawfully are 
many. However, the discussion will be confined to certain main 
8) Mbombela 1933 AD 269. 
9) 1985 4 SA 431 (wI. 
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headi ngs. These are sel f-defence . or private defence, 10) duress 
or necessity and lawful authority. 
3.2 Killings committed in self-defence or private defence 
It is generally accepted that a person who kills another in order 
to save his own life which is seriously and unlawfully endangered 
by that other, is acting lawfully and entitled to an acquittal in 
respect of the killing. This rule is subject to the proviso that 
the person acting in self-defence should not exceed the bounds of 
what is reasonably necessary for him to defend himsel f success-
fully.11) 
Before the doctrine of versari in re illicita had been rejected, 
a person who killed another while exceeding the bounds of self-
defence woul d have .been convicted of cul pabl e homici de on the 
basi s that he had kill ed whil e acti ng unl awfull y. After the 
10) 'Self-defence' is the term more commonly used and 
understood by laymen, but 'private defence' is more 
appropriate (vide Burchell and Hunt 322). As the accused 
does, in fact, more often than not, plead that he was 
defendi ng hi mse lf the terms 'se If- defence' and 'pri vate 
defence' w;11 be used interchangeably. 
11) It is not necessary to di scuss the exact nature of the 
defence for present purposes. It has undergone a certain 
amount of refinement since I van Zyl Steyn complained in 
1932 SALJ 452, that the defence had been treated only 
casuistlcally and not scientifically, vide: Gardiner and 
Lansdown 4ed 1255-8, 5ed 1422 and 1412-15, 5ed 558 and 
1545-9; Burchell and Hunt led 272-82, 2ed 322-35; De Wet 
and Swanepoel led 33-40, 2ed 55-72, 3ed 71-80, 4ed 72-81; 
Hiemstra 3ed 543-4; Visser and Vorster 107-24; Snyman 
(Strafreg) 80-92; Snyman 73-85; Van der Merwe and Olivier 
71-80. 
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rejection of this doctrine it became necessary for the prosecu-
tion to prove not only that the accused had acted unlawfully, but 
also that he had been negligent in respect of the killing. 
The effect of kill ing in self-defence was al so affected by the 
partial excuse doctrine in terms of which self-defence could have 
been one of the partial excuses that reduced an intentional 
killing to culpable homicide in circumstances where such killing 
was neither wholly justified nor entirely blameworthy.12) 
The law relating to self-defence has seldom been clearly stated 
in decisions of our courts because sel f-defence usually takes 
place in circumstances where there is a brawl in which liquor is 
probably involved,13) where there is provocation,14) or where 
there has been a history of acrimony.1S) 
Krull ill ustra tes the above s i tuati ons. The accused who was 
young and hot-tempered and while to some extent under the influ-
ence of liquor and angry because of a prior altercation, killed 
the deceased immediately after the latter had provoked him by 
insulting him. The latter had al so caused the accused to think 
in terms of self-defence by threatening to shoot him. Not one of 
12) Hunt led 383-84, 2ed 418-9; Hercules 1954 3 SA 826 (A) and 
Goliath 1972 3 SA 1 (A) (the dIssenting judgment of Wess-
eisJA). 
13) eg Krull 1959 3 SA 392 (A). 
14) eg Ntuil 1975 1 SA 429 (A). 
15) eg Attwood 1946 AD 331. 
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these defences taken singly appears to have been good. But their 
cumulative effect was for the conviction of murder to be reduced 
to one of culpable homicide. 16 ) 
In the course of his judgment Schreiner JA stated that: 
'If you kill intentionally within the limits of self-
defence, you are not gUil ty. If you exceed those 1 imits 
moderately you are guilty of culpable homicide; if immod-
erately, you are guilty of murder.'17) 
The passage is not easy to interpret. But if one reads it with 
what follows almost immediately18) the meaning becomes clear-
er. This reads as follows: 
'Under our system it does not follow from the fact that 
the law treats intentional killings in self-defence, where 
there has been moderate excess, as culpable homicide, that 
it should also treat as culpable homicide a killing which 
though provoked was yet intentional. Since a merely pro-
voked killing is never justified there seems to be no good 
16) What really happened as far as can be seen from the point 
of view of a practitioner is that all the factors mention-
ed enabled the defence to 'kick up dust' and cast a 
reasonable doubt on whether intent to kill had been 
proved. On the probabilities, as opposed to what could be 
establ i shed beyond a reasonabl e doubt, Krull appears to 
have been guilty of murder: vide the dissenting judgment. 
17 399 C-D. 
18) 399 D-E. 
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reason for ho 1 di ng it to be 1 ess than murder when it is 
intended' . 
Although the statement that intentional killing is culpable homi-
cide if it is moderately in excess of the bounds of self-defence, 
could be viewed as a bare statement of the partial-excuse doc-
trine,19) the reference to intentional killing under provoca-
tion never being justified whereas intentional killing within the 
bounds of self-defence is justified, leads to a different conclu-
sion. The person who moderately exceeds the bounds of self-
defence when killing could, unreasonably, believe that he is not 
exceeding the bounds of self-defence. In such a case he would 
1 ack knowl edge of unl awful ness and hi s mens rea woul d not be 
dolus. 
Support for this view is to be found in Hunt20 ) and Sny-
man. 21 ) It must be added that the accused would not be making 
a mistake of law, but of fact. At the time when Kru1l 22 ) was 
decided mistake of law would have been no defence. 23 ) The 
19) The judgment in Krull (supra) has been criticized by 
opponents of the partial excuse doctrine particularly in 
the context of the defence of provocation; vide De Wet and 
Swanepoel 3ed 134-5, 4ed 135; Snyman (Strafreg) 160; Hunt-
419 and 395. 
20) 419. 
21) 384. 
22) supra. 
23) Thi s has been a defence onl y si nce De B 1 om 1977 3 SA 513 
(A) Krull was al so deci ded before Bernardus and only un-
lawfulness had to be established for a conviction of 
culpable homicide. 
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killing done in moderate excess of the bounds of self-defence 
woul d therefore be a resul t of an unreasonabl e or negl i gent 
assessment of the factual situation and although the accused had 
intended to bri ng about the death of the deceased, hi s mens rea 
would be cUlpa. The intention to kill would not be an intention 
to kill unlawfully.24) 
In cases where the bounds of self-defence are exceeded immoder-
ately while killing intentionally, the accused would know that he 
is acting unlawfully, that the danger to which he had been or was 
still exposed did not require killing, his mens rea would be 
dolus and he would be guilty of murder. 
Krull can no longer be regarded as an accurate statement of our 
law25 ) mainly because of the objective view taken of provoca-
tion. 
The leading case on culpable homicide resulting from killing when 
the bounds of self-defence were exceeded is Ntuli. It is impor-
tant to note that this case was decided after the rejection of 
the doctrine of versari in re illicita, and that it is regarded 
as a case heralding the rejection of the partial excuse doc-
trine. 26 ) 
The facts in Ntuli are that the accused, a strong young man, went 
24) Hunt led 383-4, 2ed 418-9 . Cf Burchell and Hunt 313-4. 
25) De Wet and Swanepoel, 135. 
26) Burchell and Hunt 330. 
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to his mother-in-law, a frail, shrewish old woman, to enquire 
about the whereabouts of his wife. He received misleading infor-
mation, insults and blows in response to his enquiry, and after 
he had become entangl ed ina thorny fence in hi s efforts to 
escape the persistently and continuously aggressive old woman, he 
killed her by beating her rather severely with the butt of an 
assegai. 
He was found guilty of culpable homicide by the trial court. At 
the time there was a statutory measure27) in force which prov-
ided for more serious penalties for culpable homicide where death 
resulted from an assault than when death did not result from an 
assault. The tri al court found that there had been no assault 
and the State brought the matter before the Appellate Division 
for determination of the question whether there had been an 
assault or not. This question involved the deeper question as to 
whether there had been dolus on the part of the accused when he 
hit the old woman causing her death. Holmes JA investigated the 
law28 ) and came to the conclusion that dolus, and by the same 
token an assault, had not been proved. Thi s was so in that it 
had not been proved that when exceedi ng the bounds of se 1 f-
defence the accused had been aware of this. He had therefore not 
been aware that he was acting unlawfully. Dolus requires actual 
27) S 334 quat 2 (b) Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 55 
of 195~ 
28) 435 H - 438 pro 
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knowledge of unlawfulness and this had not been established. The 
accused had however acted unreasonably in that he ought to have 
known that he was acti ng unl awfully and ought to have real i sed 
that he could kill the deceased unlawfully.29) 
The decision is important for the emphasis placed on knowledge of 
unlawfulness30 ) as an ingredient of dolus. In this connection 
it must be borne in mind that Ntuli was decided before De 810m 
and that mi stake of 1 aw or ignorance of the 1 aw was not yet a 
defence to a criminal charge. The mistake the accused made was a 
mistake of fact; namely, failure to realise that his conduct was 
exceeding the bounds of self-defence, which caused his failure to 
realize that he was acting unlawfully. This is the effect of any 
mistake of fact which is a valid defence to a criminal charge. 
In a situation where a person exceeds the bounds of self-defence 
it could be extremely difficult to determine whether he is making 
a mistake of fact, a mistake of law or both. Thus an accused may 
have a bona fide but mistaken belief as to the extent to which he 
may pursue or enforce measures taken in sel f-defence. He may 
believe that the law is such as to allow him to continue an 
assault on his former assailant at a stage when the law does not 
allow this. In such a case he would be making a mistake of law 
which could very easily be viewed objectively as a mistake of 
29) 437 H. 
30) vide Visser and Vorster 115 . 
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fact. This is illustrated by van Wyk 31 ) which held that a 
person may kill in defence of property in certain circumstances. 
In van Wyk the accused, driven to desperation by a series of 
burglaries, set a trap for the next would-be burglar, advised the 
police of what he was doing, and placed a notice outside his 
premi ses that there was a deadly trap insi de. A burgl ar was 
killed by a discharge of shot from a shotgun, the lethal 
component of the trap. The Appellate Division held that the 
accused had acted lawfully in that he had done all that could be 
reasonably expected of him. The decision is still subject to 
controversy.32) Before this decision the general view was that 
killing in defence of property was not lawful. 33 ) 
The accused in van Wyk clearly had no intention to break the law. 
He consul ted the pol ice. But had he made a mi stake of 1 aw he 
would not have been acquitted on appea1. 34 ) This is a clear 
case of private defence divorced from a drunken brawl, provoca-
ti on and immedi ate danger to the person exerci si ng the ri ght to 
private defence. A mistaken assessment of the facts could not be 
in issue, only a mistaken assessment of the law. Prior to De 
Blom such a mistake would not have availed as a defence on the 
merits. Now it presumably would. But one must bear in mind the 
recent development in Barnard where the normative fault doctrine 
31) 1967 4 SA 488 (A). 
32) vide. 
33) Gardiner and Lansdown 1549-50; contra De Wet and Swanepoel 
2ed 67 n34 . 
34) Ignorance of the law was as yet no defence. 
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was invoked to arrive at a conclusion which is not easy to 
reconcile with Ntuli or De Blom. 
Subject to the possible effect of Barnard it is plain in the 
light of these decisions that a person who kills intention-
ally35) while exceeding the bounds of self-defence could, if 
he is making a bona fide but unreasonable mistake of fact or of 
law, be convicted of culpable homicide with culpa as his mens rea 
or fault. Absence of awareness of unlawfulness on his part would 
have to be found to be unreasonable for such a finding, otherwise 
he would be acquitted. 
3.3 The defence of necessity, duress or compulsion 
Necessity, duress or compulsion differs from self-defence or 
private defence in this respect that the accused invades the 
ri ghts of or i nj ures or ki 11 s an innocent pa rty1) in order to 
avert harm to himsel f or others. Until comparatively recently 
this defence was not available on a charge of culpable homi-
cide2) and murder. 3) 
35) Searing in mind that in the absence of awareness of unlaw-
fulness intention is not dolus; vide Hiemstra 97. 
1) Burchell and Hunt 336-8; Snyman 85-6; De Wet and Swanepoel 
81-2; Visser and Vorster 124. 
2) Gardiner and Lansdown 108-11; De Wet and Swanepoel 2ed 80 
Snyman 91; Burchell and Hunt 343 ff. 
3) Culpable homicide in the sense of a negligently accidental 
killing under compulsion is difficult to imagine except, 
perhaps, in the case of someone driving recklessly to get 
a dangerously ill person to a hospital (Pretorius 1975 2 
SA 85 (SWAll, or driving recklessly 'at gun-point' to 
assist an escaping criminal . 
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In Hercules4 ) the defence of duress was raised with partial 
success to a charge of murder by an accused who had been threat-
ened with immediate death by being shot if he did not take part 
in an armed robbery. On an application of the partial excuse 
doctrine, the accused was convicted of culpable homicide although 
he had taken part in an intentional killing . In Bradbury5), a 
subsequent case, duress was not viewed as an extenuating circum-
stance sufficient to avert the death penalty for murder. 6) 
The tendency commenced in Hercul es 7l came to a more posi ti ve 
result in Goliath8 in which the Appellate Division in a major-
ity judgment, hel d that no person coul d be expected to be more 
heroic than an ordinary human being would be and that, in approp-
riate circumstances, the defence of duress could result in comp-
1 ete acqu i tta 1 on a charge of murder. 9) Rumpff CJ who deli v-
ered the majority judgment declined to make a final statement as 
to whether duress is a defence which excludes unlawfulness or 
whether it is a defence which excl udes fault.l 0) The general 
4) 1954 3 SA 826 A. 
5) 1967 1 SA 387 A. 
6) It is a case apparently decided on policy. The accused had 
to choose between the discipline of a gang of criminals 
and the law of the land. 
7l supra. 
8) 1972 3 SA 1 (A). 
9) The accused had been forced with threats of death by a 
companion to hold the deceased while he (the companion) 
stabbed the deceased to death. The accused had been 
acquitted by the trial court. The judgment of Rumpff CJ 
has been praised (Visser and Vorster 133); de Wet and 
Swanepoel (3ed 87 n1l4) say that it is disjointed (onsame-
hangend) . 
10) 25 H. 'Dit is onnodig vir die beantwoording van die 
voorbehoue vrae om vas te stel in watter lig die 
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general tenor of the judgment, however, appears to suggest that 
the defence excludes unlawfulness. 11 ) 
In Bail ey 12) the Appellate Division had to deal with the same 
question and although the conviction of the accused on a charge 
of culpable homicide was altered to a conviction of murder, the 
principle that duress could be a complete defence to murder was 
not disturbed. The question whether the defence is a defence 
excluding unlawfulness or excluding fault was also not finally 
deci ded .13 ) 
Academic opinion is generally to the effect that the defence of 
necessity, duress or compulsion excludes unlawfulness. 14 ) 
strafopheffi ng weens dwang gesi en moet word nl of di t 
weens die regmatigheid van die handeling onder dwang is of 
weens die opheffing van die volle skuld'. (It is unneces-
sary for answering the questions reserved to determine in 
what light the decision not to punish because of duress is 
to be seen viz whether it is because of the lawfulness of 
the act under duress or because of the negati on of all 
fault (my translation)). 
11) Snyman 92; Burchell and Hunt 347, esp n214; De Wet and 
Swanepoel 89-92; Visser and Vorster 133. 
12) 1982 3 SA 772 A. 
13) It is of some significance to note the court's toleration 
of an unusually lengthy argument by counsel for the State 
(774C-789F) in which he submitted, relying mainly on Ger-
man theory, (775C-777F) that the normative fault doctrine 
should be adopted by the court in preference to the 
psychological fault doctrine (788 D-E). The court did not 
adopt the normati ve fault doctri ne but di d not reject it 
either. 
14) Visser and Vorster 133; Snyman 86-93; Burchell and Hunt 
336; De Wet and Swanepoel 89-92. 
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In regard to the crime of culpable homicide the defence of neces-
sity, duress or compulsion can be treated on the same footing as 
the defence of self-defence. Bai 1 ey, a case on duress, fi na lly 
rejected the partial excuse doctrine,15) A person who kills 
intentionally under duress, as did the accused in Bailey, will 
not be convi cted of cul pab 1 e homi ci de on an appl i cati on of the 
partial excuse doctrine. This does not mean that such a person 
cannot be convicted of culpable homicide at all. Should he or 
she have acted in the bona-fide but unreasonable belief that the 
killing was lawful a conviction of culpable homic i de would be 
competent. The accused in Bailey di d not raise the defence of 
ignorance or mistake of law. Yet, this issue and its possible 
bearing on the finding of the court is discussed at some length 
in the judgment,16) This discussion flows from the questions 
of law reservedl7 ) and it is submitted that had the court found 
that the accused had acted under a mistaken and unreasonable but 
bona fide belief that he was acting lawfully, his conviction of 
culpable homicide by the lower courtl8 ) would have been upheld . 
Like self-defence or private defence, necess i ty, duress or comp-
ulsion can give rise to a conviction of culpable homicide in 
respec t of an intentional l9 ) kill i ng, if there is an absence of 
15) 799C. 
16) 796. 
17) 795C-E. 
18) Apparently on an appl ication of the partial excuse doc-
trine. 
19) Bearing in mind that' intention' is only dolus if there is 
an awareness of unlawfulness; vide Hiemstra 97. 
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awareness of unlawfulness and it is adjudged unreasonable. 
3.4 Putative necessity and putative private defence 
In the fields of necessity and private defence one finds the 
phenomena of so-called putative necessity and putative private 
defence. In cases where this could be applied the enquiry is no 
longer as to whether the conduct of the accused was lawful, but 
whether his belief that he was acting under duress, compulsion or 
necessity, or his belief that he was acting in private defence, 
was bona fi del) and if so, whether it was reasonabl e or not. 
It therefore amounts to no more than the defence of absence of 
mens rea. 
Where an accused has killed in circumstances of putative neces-
sity or putative self-defence, the bona fides of his mistake, if 
accepted, should exclude a finding of dolus on his part and 
consequently he could not be convicted of murder. If the mistake 
were unreasonable he would nevertheless be convicted of culpable 
homicide. The defence of putative necessity or putative private 
defence therefore, would be simply a defence of mistake of fact 
or, since the De 810m2) decision, mistake of law. The many 
cases of exceeding the bounds of self-defence could also be the 
1) A mistake must be bona fide in this context, a mala fide 
mistake would not quallfy as a mistake. A bona flde mlS-
take woul d not occur where the accused is aware that he 
may possibly be mistaken. 
2) 1977 3 SA 513 (A). 
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result of a mi stake of fact or of 1 aw on the part of the 
accused. 3) 
3.5 Killing while attempting to effect an arrest 
Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977 reads as 
foll ows: 
'49. Use of force in effecting arrest 
(I) If any person authorized under this Act to arrest or 
to assist in arresting another, attempts to arrest 
such person and such person -
(a) resists the attempt and cannot be arrested with-
out the use of force; or 
(b) flees when it is clear that an attempt to arrest 
him is being made, or resists such attempt and 
fl ees, 
the person so authorised may, in order to effect the 
arrest, use such force as may in the circumstances be 
reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance or to 
prevent the person concerned from fleeing. 
3} At a stage when he is no longer acting lawfully, the accu-
sed woul d not be aware of this (Ntul i). An accused may 
imagine the danger greater than it is, that would be mis-
take of fact, or he would imagine that in law he is allow-
ed to react more violently than the law in fact allows, 
that would be mistake of law. 
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(2) Where the person concerned is to be arrested for an 
offence referred to in Schedule 14 ) is to be arres-
ted on the ground that he is reasonably suspected of 
having committed such an offence, and the person 
authori zed under thi s Act to arrest or to assi st in 
arresting him cannot arrest him or prevent him from 
fleeing by other means than by killing him, the kill-
ing shall be deemed to be justifiable homicide'. 
Section 49 (2) is, and has been consistently viewed, as very 
drastic. From the wording of the sub-section it is plain that an 
accused who raised the defence that he was acting in terms of it, 
would be averring that his conduct was lawful. S) 
4) Namely, treason; sedition; murder; culpable homicide; 
rape; indecent assault; sodomy; bestiality; robbery; 
assault, when a dangerous wound is inflicted; arson; 
breaking or entering any premises, whether under the 
common law or a statutory provision, with intent to commit 
an offence; theft, whether under the common 1 aw or a 
statutory provision; receiving stolen property knowing it 
to have been stol en; fraud; forgery or utteri ng a forged 
document knowing it to have been forged; offences relating 
to the coinage; any offence, except the offence of escap-
i ng from 1 awful custody in ci rcumstances other than the 
ci rcumstances referred to immediately hereunder, the 
punishment whereof may be a period of imprisonment exceed-
ing six months without the option of a fine; escaping from 
lawful custody, where the person concerned is in such 
custody in respect of any offence referred to in this 
Schedule or is in such custody in respect of the offences 
of escapi ng from 1 awful custody; any conspi racy, i nci te-
ment or attempt to commit any offence referred to in this 
Schedule. 
5) De Wet and Swanepoel 71 n8, are of the view that 'justi-
fied homicide' would be a more appropriate than 'justi-
fiable homicide' in section 49(2). 'Justifiable' is to be 
preferred. Once a court has pronounced such a ki 11 i ng 
lawful it is 'justified' up to that stage it is 'justifi-
ab 1 e ' . 
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It was accepted for a long time that an accused who raises the 
defence, that a killing cOlTillitted by him was lawful in terms of 
the SUb-section, bore the onus of proving that his conduct fell 
within the four corners of the measure he relied on. 6 ) This 
came to be doubted because of certa in obi ter di cta 7) and the 
opinion was expressed8 ) that the onus would soon shift from the 
accused to the prosecution. In keeping with the sound approach 
that a measure so drastic should be interpreted in such a way as 
to make anyone think twice before killing a human being in 
rel iance or purported or assumed reliance on it, the Appellate 
Division held in Swanepoe1 9) that the onus of proving that the 
killing fell within the ambit of the said measure rested on the 
accused; such onus to be discharged on a balance of probabi 1-
ities . 
The points to be proved by the accused are the following : 10 ) 
6 ) 
7) 
8) 
9 ) 
10) 
i) that he was a person authorised in terms of the 
Hartzer 1933 AD 306; Britz 
3 SA 220 (T). 
1949 3 SA 293 (A); Koning 1953 
Matlou v Makubedu 1978 1 SA 946 (A) per Rumpff CJ at 956 A 
and Jansen JA at 962 D-E . On the strength of these obiter 
di cta it was confi dently assumed that the onus was no 
longer on the accu sed; v i de Hi emstra 98; Kotze 1980 OJ 
126; De Wet and Swanepoel 71; Snyman and Morkel 167. The 
obi ter di cta were apparently followed in an unreported 
Natal declslon: vide Swanepoel 1985 1 576 (A) 588 G-H. 
n6 above and Lansdown and Campbell 196-7; Visser and . 
Yorster (175) are more cautious. 
1985 1 SA 576 (A). 
For these points vide Snyman and Markel 167-9; Hiemstra 
96-7. 
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Criminal Procedure Act, to effect an arrest in the 
circumstances; 
ii} that it was his intention to arrest the deceased; in 
other words, to arrest him with the intention of 
dealing with the deceased according to law;11} 
iii} that the deceased was to be arrested for the commis-
sion or the reasonably suspected12 } commission of 
an offence menti oned in Schedul e I of the Cri mi na 1 
P rocedu re Act; 
iv} that he attempted to arrest13 } the deceased and 
that the deceased fled from or resisted the 
arrest,14} and 
v} that killing was the only way in which the deceased 
could be prevented from escaping15 } 
In view of the decision in Macu vs du Toit16 } one could add a 
sixth requirement; namely, that the deceased knew that he was to 
ll} 
12} 
13} 
14 } 
15 } 
16 } 
vi de Swanepoel supra 589 A Macu v du Toit 1983 4 SA 629 
(A), particularly the dissenting judgment of Botha JA. 
This requirement makes 'reasonableness', generally a 
factor that would exclude culpa, a prerequisite for 
1 awful ness. 
The proposed arrest must not be for the purpose of follow-
ing up vague suspicions or questioning the suspect with 
the purpose of establishing whether he had committed an 
offence, but must result from actual knowledge that the 
person sought to be arrested had committed an offence men-
tioned in Schedule I or a reasonable suspicion that he had 
committed such an offence; vide Wiesner v Molomo 1983 3 SA 
151 (A). 
Swanepoel supra 589 A-B. 
Hiemstra (97) points out that the onus created by this 
requirement is not lightly discharged . 
supra n10. 
• 
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be arrested. On the majority judgment1?} in Macu the word 
'arrest' as used in the following phrase in sub-section (b): 
' ••. when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him is being 
made' has to be given a commonsense objective meaning and 
unfounded or fanciful suspi ci ons subj ecti ve ly entertained by the 
arrestee that he is to be dealt with unlawfully; for instance, to 
be thrashed or killed, are not to be given such weight as to make 
the otherwi se 1 awful conduct of the arrestor unl awful .18 ) On 
the dissenting judgment of Botha JA, which incorporates a de-
tailed but, with respect, unduly formalistic l9 ) analysis of the 
provision and its interpretation, the person to be arrested must 
be cl ear in hi 5 mi nd that the i ntenti on of the arrestor is to 
deal with him according to law. 20 ) The judgment is with 
respect, unacceptable in that it clearly seeks to place such an 
onus on a private person effecting an arrest as to amount to an 
amendment, rather than an interpretation of section 49 (2) (b). 
The amendment would be that private persons are not allowed to 
kill in terms of the provision unless and until they have con-
vinced the person sought to be arrested to his full subjective 
17) Cill ie JA with Wessel s JA, Viljoen JA, and James AJA 
concurring. 
18) So one concludes from the passage at E-G. 
19) The statement that an accused who has once been arrested 
in respect of a crime and who escapes is on immediate 
re-arrest not arrested for the original crime but for the 
crime of escaping from custody (643 A) is difficult to 
accept. The arrest of an accused in respect of a crime 
does not wi pe out that crime. Hi s re-arrest may be a 
result of an immediate escape and in essence the arrest is 
still in respect of the original crime. 
20) 646 A - 647 A. 
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sati sfacti on and without his enterta i ni ng 1 i ngeri ng doubts that 
the intention is to deal with him according to law. As this 
would be practically impossible, private persons would never, or 
hardly ever, be justified in killing in terms of section 49 (2) 
(b).21) This could, on the reasoning of Botha JA, be extended 
with equal force to policemen on duty, but for some reason clad 
in mufti, or to 'plain clothes' detectives, because the absence 
of a uniform could raise doubts as to the lawfulness of their 
i'ntentions in the mind of the proposed arrestee. 22 ) It may 
also be added that Botha JA's view that the uniform worn by a 
policeman would serve to allay the suspicions of the person 
sought to be arrested could be unsound, as many persons, whether 
the belief is justified or not, do believe that they are to be 
treated with 'pol ice brutality' after arrest . The exact nature 
of the possible sixth point is therefore not clear. But it is 
clear that a killing would not be justifiable unless, in addition 
to the other points listed, the person killed was aware that he 
was about the be 'apprehended' ,23) and, objectively view-
ed,24) it appeared that he would be dealt with according to 
law. 
21) Thi s appears to be the intenti on of the 1 earned judge; 
vide 646 F. 
22) The learned judge does not extend the suspicions concern-
ing private persons to policemen in uniform 645H - 646A. 
23) ie hi s freedom of movement was to be taken away. 
24) ie if a reasonable man would draw that conclusion irre-
spective of the subjective fears of the arrestee 644F. 
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As ought to be clear from the above discussion of Macu,25) 
section 49 and particularly section 49 (2) have given rise to a 
fai r amount of differences of judi ci a 1 opi n i on and academi c 
criticism and debate. It is to be regretted that the practical 
application of a measure so radical as to provide for the justi-
fication of the killing of human beings should still be so uncer-
tain. 
From the point of view of the law relating to culpable homicide, 
it is clear that a person who kills intentionally in terms of the 
section and who can establish all the points listed above, inclu-
ding the sixth point as interpreted in the majority judgment in 
Macu, would be guilty of neither murder nor culpable homicide as 
his conduct will have been lawfu1. 26 ) The question is : What 
if he fails to establish one of these pre-requisities for the 
justification of his conduct? If anyone of the six points can 
not be establ ished, and this is due to the mala fides of the 
accused or to the absence of bona fides on his part, he would be 
guilty of murder. Such instances would be rare. Often encoun-
tered are cases where one of the six pOints is absent because of 
a bona fide but unreasonable mistake made by the accused. As 
dolus is not colourless in our law, but includes knowledge of 
25) The uncertainty is to a large extent due to the wording of 
the section in that it takes an element of fault viz 
reasonabl eness and incorporates it into the el ement of 
unlawfulness. 
26) Hiemstra 98-9 relying on Britz 1949 3 SA 293 (A) points 
out that the initial onus is on the prosecution to prove 
an intentional killing, whereafter the onus shifts to the 
accused to prove that the killing was lawful. 
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1 awful ness, 27) the answer to the problem posed by the accused 
who has killed or attempted to kill in the bona fide but unreas-
onable belief that such killing was justifiable in terms of sec-
tion 49 (2), should be that his mens rea was culpa and that he 
cannot be convi cted of any crimes of whi ch dol us is the mens 
rea. 28) 
This was the solution adopted until fairly recently.29) But in 
some recent decisions 30 ) attempts have been made to treat such 
killings as murder and such attempted killings as attempted 
murder, notwithstanding the good faith in which the mistake of 
fact or of law was made by the accused. 
The accused who claims to have acted under a bona fide belief 
tha t hi s conduct was j ustifi ed in terms of secti on 49 (2) poses 
di ffi cult problems to the courts and academi c cOlTl11entators . He 
may not be able to establish on a balance of probabilities, that 
his conduct was lawful. It being accepted that the onus of prov-
ing lawfulness rests on the accused, the question is whether the 
onus of provi ng the exi stence of the bona fi de bel i ef that the 
conduct was lawful al so rests on the accused. In other words: 
does the prosecution bear the onus of proving mens rea while the 
27) De Wet and Swanepoel 149 ff; Snyman 171 ff; Burchell and 
Hunt 160-71; Bailey supra; Barnard 1985 4 SA 431 IW), 
435G. 
28) vide Hiemstra 97; cf Lansdown and Campbell 195-6. 
29) vide Matlou 1959 4 SA 102 IC); Mnanzana 1966 3 SA 38 IT). 
30) Nel 1980 4 SA 28 IE); .Barnard and possibly Swanepoel; cf 
Iansdown and Campbell 295 bottom of page. 
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accused bears the onus of proving lawfulness. 31 ) The question 
is not purely academic or of no practical importance. An accused 
who ra i ses the defence that he acted in terms of secti on 49 (2) 
is usually facing a charge of murder or culpable homicide or 
attempted murder or assault wi th intent to do gri evous bodily 
harm, or common assault. If he has killed someone he can be 
convicted of culpable homicide if dolus is not established. If 
he has only injured or attempted to injure, or kill, he cannot be 
convicted at all on mere proof of CUlpa, only dolus will suffice. 
It would therefore seem that to cast the onus of proving mens rea 
on the prosecuti on coul d to a substanti al degree negati ve the 
effect of the onus of proving ~lawfulness being on the accused. 
It does, however, seem indisputable that the prosecution bears 
the onus of proving mens rea beyond a reasonabl e doubt even 
though the accused may have failed to prove that his conduct was 
lawfu1. 32 ) In practice, it will invariably mean, that although 
31) If the vi ew (n26 supra) that the prosecuti on must fi rst 
establish an intentional killing before the onus in res-
pect of lawfulness passes to the accused, is accepted -
and there is no reason for not accepting it - the prosec-
ution must obviously bear the onus of providing mens rea 
throughout. If the defence fails to prove that the kil-
ling was lawful, the initial proven mens rea may still be 
totally rebutted if the accused could reasonably possibly 
have made a reasonable bona fide mistake or it could be 
partially rebutted if the accused could reasonably pos-
sibly have made an unreasonable bona fide mistake. In the 
1 atter case the mens rea of the accused woul d be hul pa. 
The bona fide mistake would relate to his belief t at he 
was acting ito section 49 (2). 
32) nn 26 and 30 supra. 
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the accused coul d not prove that his conduct was 1 awful, the 
prosecution would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
did not entertain the bona fide bel ief that his conduct was 
lawful. Except where the charge is murder or culpable homicide, 
the failure to disprove the bona fide belief alleged by the 
accused would lead to a complete acquittal. 33 ) In the case of 
a prosecution for murder or culpable homicide a conviction of 
culpable homicide could always be obtained if the prosecution 
proves that the bel i ef re 1 i ed on by the accused though held in 
good faith, was unreasonable. 
This state of the law is open to criticism. 34 ) It enables an 
accused who relies on section 49 to raise his defence twice; 
namely, fi rstly, in order to rebut the a 11 egati on that he acted 
unlawfully and, secondly, to rebut the allegation that he had the 
necessary mens rea. In the absence of mala fides the defence is 
likely to succeed on the second attempt as it is not likely that 
a person who kills or attempts to kill in terms of section 49 (2) 
would do so deliberately in bad faith. Even if this should be 
the case it would be extremely difficult for the prosecution to 
prove it. Killings or woundings in terms of section 49 (2) 
usually take place in the course of hectic and/or heated 
confrontati ons between arres tor and arrestee when sp 1 it-second 
33) Sam 1980 (4) SA 289 (T) leaves no doubt as to this (294 
D-E) although it was not a case involving a killing. 
34) vide Barnard at 438 A-B. 
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decisions are made while the parties are excited. Experienced 
counsel acting on behalf of the arrestor, who is usually charged 
with murder or assaul t, coul d use the general confusi on and 
excitement to cast doubt on the mens rea of the accused . In this 
connection one must bear in mind that a person who is attempting 
to arrest a criminal or suspected criminal, who is attempting to 
escape, cannot be judged by the standards of a man sitting calmly 
in his arm-chair and deciding coolly and rationally on what the 
accused ought to have done in the heat of the moment. 35) The 
latter consideration also contributes to making proof of un-
reasonable conduct or poor judgment on the part of the accused 
diffi cult. 
There would be little point in discussing those many deci-
sions 36 ) in which it was held that a bona fide but unreasonable 
mistake made by a person purporting to act lawfully in terms of 
secti on 49 amounts to cul pa on hi s part and coul d found a con-
viction of culpable homicide . These decisions were in accordance 
with accepted principle and the accepted view of culpable homi-
ci de. Before the rejection of the doctrine of versari in re 
illicita an accused who had killed while believing that he was 
acting in terms of the predecessors of section 49 (2) would 
35) vide Macu vs du Toit 1983 4 SA 629 (A) 635-6. 
36) The best known and most often referred to is Koning 1953 3 
SA 220 (T); cf Mathlau 1958 1 SA 350 (A); Metelerkamp 1959 
4 SA 102 (E); Denysschen 1955 2 SA 81 (0); Mnzana 1966 3 
SA 38 (T); Ne 11 1957 4 SA 489 (SWA). 
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automatically have been guilty of culpable homicide once he had 
failed to establish that his conduct had been lawful. Since the 
rejection of the doctrine it has been necessary to establish that 
his conduct was unreasonable in addition to being unlawful. 37 ) 
3.6 Decisions on killing while attempting to arrest 
Certa in deci si ons seem to poi nt the way to the 1 aw accepti ng a 
principle, that a bona fide belief, if totally unreasonable, will 
not serve to negative dolus on the part of an accused who raises 
the defence that his mens rea was not dolus as he believed in 
good faith that his conduct was lawful in terms of section 49 
(2). The first of these decisions is Nel. 38 ) The facts were 
to some extent in di spute, but the court found the fo 11 owi ng to 
have been establ i shed : The accused were two of three young 
policemen who decided to set up an 'impromptu road block'.39) 
They set about this clad in plain clothes. The 'road-block' 
consisted of a flashing blue light, placed at the side of the 
road near a parked police van with the accused and their com-
pani on standi ng or movi ng in the vi ci nity. 40) They all egedly 
37) The development is admi rab 1 y traced by Di dcott J in Zoko 
1983 1 SA 871 (N). 
38) 1980 4 SA 28 (E); discussed by Milton 1980 SACC 305; DP 
van der Merwe 1982 SALJ 430. 
39) 30 pr. 
40) This is the version accepted by the court. The accused 
testified that they had placed the flashing blue light in 
the mi ddl e of the road, had put on the head-l i ghts of 
their vehicles and had stood in the road waving torches. 
This latter version was rejected (34G). 
• 
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had flashlights in their hands. After considering the conflic-
ting evidence concerning the 'road block' the court came to the 
conclusion that it was not a road block in the accepted sense. 
At about midnight, while the accused and their companion were 
conducting their 'road block' a car drove 'through' or past the 
'road block'. The accused fi red two shots at the ca r hi tti ng 
it. The driver of the car stopped. 
The accused were subsequently charged with attempted murder in a 
regi onal court and convi cted. The magi strate rejected their 
evi dence concerni ng the 'road block' and accepted that of the 
complainants at whom they had shot . He held that they had not 
suspected the complainants of committing a 'first schedule 
offence' . Consequently thei r conduct had not been 1 awful; they 
could not rely on section 49 (2). 
On appeal, relying on Banet41 ) and De Blom counsel for the 
appellants advanced the argument; 
'that the evidence showed that the appellants had made an 
essential mistake, either of fact or law or of both, as to 
their right to act as they did, and that this mistake was 
based on a bona fide belief that they were entitled to so 
41) 1973 4 SA 430 (RA). 
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act. This bona fide belief, he submitted, negatived mens 
rea, and the appe11 ants ought therefore to have been 
acqu itted' .42) 
This submission was rejected by Eksteen J. The line of argument 
adopted by the lea rned judge reads as follows: 43 ) 
'What exactly the mi stake of fact or mi stake of 1 aw was 
that the appe11 ants were supposed to have 1 aboured under 
was not clearly stated by Mr. Mouton. It could hardly 
have been that they bona fide believed that they 'reason-
ably suspected' the complainants to have committed an 
offence referred to in Schedule 1, so as to entitle them 
to claim the protection of section 49 (2) of the Act . As 
was pointed out in S v Purcell-Gilpin44 ) it would be the 
height of anomaly for the appellants to claim the protec-
tion of section 49 (2) on the grounds that they bona fide 
but unreasonably suspected the complainants of having 
committed a First Schedule offence, when the section 
expressly requires a reasonable suspicion. 
At best for the appellants thei r case must be that they 
bona fide held the view that, if a motorist failed to stop 
at a road block, they were entitled to shoot him. This is 
42) 34 A-E. 
43) 34 E- 35A. 
44) 1971 3 SA 548 (RA) 553. 
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in itself so unreasonable a proposition that, more partic-
ularly when applied to trained policemen, I do not think 
that any court could accept that it was a belief bona fide 
he 1 d. But even if, for the purpose of a rgument, it be 
accepted that this could have been a bona fide view, then 
cl early it was a vi ew based on the exi stence of a proper 
road block as contended for by the appellants in their 
evi dence. Th i s evi dence, however, was rejected by the 
magistrate, and it has not been suggested that either of 
the appellants could possibly have claimed to hold a bona 
fide belief that they were entitled to shoot at a passing 
motorist simply because he had driven past a flashing blue 
light at the side of the road, as occurred in the present 
case. The submi ssion therefore that the State had failed 
to rebut the suggestion that the appellants had acted on a 
bona fide belief that they were entitled to act as they 
did cannot prevail, and the convictions of both appellants 
must be confirmed'. 
The reference to Purcell-Gilpin in the above quoted passage is 
s i gnificant. It demonstrates in a few words how unlawfulness and 
mens rea as prerequisites for criminal liability are latently 
confused in the wording of section 49. 
It also illustrates how the application of section 49 can lead to 
the confusion of factors excluding unlawfulness on the one hand 
and mens rea or fault on the other hand. Section 49 can only 
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render conduct 1 awful if its requi rements are met. One of its 
requirements is a reasonable suspicion. If an accused fails to 
prove that hi s suspi ci on was reasonabl e, hi s conduct was unl aw-
ful. It does not mean that his conduct was intentionally unlaw-
ful. It is after all well established that even an unreasonable 
mistake negatives dolus. 45 ) If an unreasonable mi stake does 
not negative dolus the law has moved back to where it supposedly 
was at the time of the much criticized Mbombela46 ) decision . 
Similarly the rule that culpa and dolus do not overlap is under-
mined. To establish culpa an objective inquiry is made, dolus is 
established subjectively. To make unreasonableness, an objective 
concept, an element of or ground on whi ch to base dolus mu st 
amount to a fusion of dolus with cUlpa. 
It is with respect, by no means clear that this was not done by 
Eksteen J in the passage quoted. In support of the learned judge 
one must point out, as indeed he did, that it is not clear on 
exactly what allegedly bona fide mistake the accused were 
relyi ng. 47) Furthermore they were very poor witnesses and 
their conduct was, on any view, at best grossly unreasonable. 
45) vide Sam supra . 
46) 1933 AU269. De Wet and Swanepoel (43) have never tired 
of criticizi ng this decision for being to the effect that 
a grossly unreasonable mistake cannot negative dolus. 
Mbombela is not authority for this proposition and ;s 
correctly summarised by Gardiner and Lansdown (58, 59) as 
being to the effect than an unreasonable mistake suffices 
for a conviction of culpable homicide. 
47) 35 E-F. 
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Ne vertheless it is, with respect, doubtful whether on the line of 
reasoning adopted by the learned judge, they were not, on a full 
consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, 
convicted of a crime requiring dolus for its mens rea on proof of 
culpa in the shape of gross negl igence and grossly unreasonable 
conduct. 
The accused apparently chose to stand or fallon appeal on their 
version of how their 'road block' had been constituted. This 
means that inter ali a they re 1 i ed on the contenti on that the 
flashing blue light was in the middle of the road. This gave 
ri se to the complete rej ecti on of the bas is of the bona fi de 
bel ief the accused had relied on. It left the court with the 
task of deciding whether they had entertained a bona fide belief 
that they were entitled to shoot at the occupants of a motor car 
on the complainants' version of events, and not on the version of 
the accused. The cou rt rej ected the exi stence of such a bona 
fide belief and upheld their conviction of attempted murder. 
Whether the finding is unequivocally acceptable is, with respect, 
open to doubt. The obvious question arises : if the accused did 
not in good faith believe that they were entitled to shoot, why 
di d they shoot? From the questi ons and answers quoted from the 
record48 ) it appears that the accused did believe that they 
were entitled to shoot, or could reasonably possibly have 
believed that they were entitled to shoot. To hold otherwise 
48) 33, 34. 
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amounts to holding that they acted in bad faith, that they inten-
ded to kill people, whether innocent or not, simply because those 
people had failed to stop at a blue light flashing beside the 
road. It is submitted, with respect, that the evidence as 
discussed in the judgment does not fully support such a finding. 
Objectively viewed Eksteen J's finding, with respect, really 
amounts to a finding that gross negligence in the circumstances 
of the case, amounted to dolus. 
This is also how Hiemstra interprets the judgment, which he 
strongly supports. The relevant passage reads as follows: 49 ) 
, 'n Ge 100 f te goede r trou by 'n po 1 is i eman da t hy 
geregtig is om te skiet, is onvoldoende. · Dit is onhoud-
baar om te se dat hy "te goeder trou geglo het dat hy 'n 
redelike verdenking het". Sy verdenking moet altyd die 
verdenking van 'n redelike man wees . Die polisieman 
moet objektief goeie gronde he om te glo dat 'n misdryf in 
sy teenwoordigheid gepleeg is. Waar jong polisiemanne op 
eie inisiatief 'n ongemagtigde sogenaamde "padblokkade" 
opgerig het, was dit geen misdryf om daardeur te ry nie, 
en was dit geensins geoorloof om te skiet en dan 
49) 97. 
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immuniteit kragtens a.49 (2) te pleit nie'.50} 
It seems, with respect, that the learned author has overlooked 
the distinction between unlawfulness and mens rea. It was not 
lawful for the policemen to shoot because their conduct was 
unreasonabl e. But un rea so nab 1 e conduct is not suffi ci ent to 
establish dolus. Although it is not stated in so many words, 
there is a strong undercurrent in Nel to apply the objective 
requi rement for unl awful ness to the evi dence in order to arri ve 
at a subjective form of mens rea namely dolus . 
Swanepoe1 51 } is a case about an extremely unfortunate incident 
in which a member of the police force shot and killed an innocent 
man in the belief that the latter was a fleeing dangerous crimin-
al. The policeman was convicted of culpable homicide by a Prov-
incial Divisional and appealed against his conviction to the 
Appellate Division. It appeared that while travelling in his 
pol ice vehicle the appellant received a radio message that a 
certain very dangerous criminal who would not hesitate t o shoot 
50} 'A bona fide belief on the part of a policeman that he is 
entitled to shoot, is insufficient . It is untenable to 
say that he 'believed in good faith that he had a reason-
able suspicion' . His suspicion must always be the sus-
picion of a reasonable man. The policeman must object-
ively have good ground for believing that a crime had been 
commi tted in hi 5 presence. Where young pol icemen, on 
their own initiative, erected a 50-called 'road block' it 
was no cri me to dri ve through it, and it was by no means 
allowable to shoot and then claim immunity in terms of 49 
(2)' (my translation). 
51} 1985 1 SA 576 (A) . 
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if cornered and who was wanted by the pol i ce, had been seen 
driving a white Cortina motor-car with registration number 
FHZ911T. Shortly after receiving the message the appellant 
happened to see a white Cortina with registration FHZ911T driven 
by a person who looked very much like the wanted criminal who was 
known to the appellant. He notified police headquarters by radio 
and was instructed to arrest the fugitive. A more far-fetched 
set of co-incidental circumstances can hardly be imagined. The 
person driving the white Cprtina with registration FHZ91lT was 
not the criminal, but an innocent party . The criminal had , for 
reasons only known to him, placed a false registration number 
FHZ911T on a white Cortina used by him. The matter had therefore 
to be adjudicated upon as if the person driving the vehicle seen 
by the appellant were indeed the wanted criminal. 
The evidence on what the appellant did while pursuing the Cortina 
is not very clear. He could have signalled the Cortina to stop 
and he could have shouted at the driver. In evidence he stated 
that t he driver of the Cortina saw him. He believed this man to 
be the wanted criminal and concluded that he (appellant) had 
been recognized, that the wanted man was now desperate and would 
do anything. He took his pistol and fired two shots at the 
Cortina. It is not certain how much time elapsed between the 
firing of the shots. The first shot hit the metal work of the 
Cortina and the second shot hit the occupant, killing him. 
After deci di ng (correctly it is submitted) that the onus of 
proving that the killing was justified in terms of section 49 (2) 
.. 
. .' 
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rested on the appellant, Rabie CJ held that the appellant could 
have employed other means than shooting to prevent the 'escape' 
of the deceased, and that the appellant did not have reasonable 
grounds for bel i evi ng that the deceased was fl eei ng. 52) 
Consequently the appellant could not rely on the protection of 
section 49 (2). It still remained for the prosecution to prove 
that the appellant was guilty of murder or of a crime that is a 
competent verdict on a charge of murder. 53) As the accused 
could reasonably have foreseen that the shot fired by him could 
kill the deceased,54) his conviction of culpable homicide was 
upheld. The question whether the accused had a bona fide belief 
that he was entitled in terms of section 49 (2) to act as he did 
and the effect of such a bona fide belief on his mens rea or 
fault, was not considered . 
It is, with respect, difficult to agree with th i s finding on the 
facts. The coi nci dence referred to above is suffi c i ent ground 
for accepting that the appellant had believed in good faith that 
he was pursu i ng a dangerous wanted criminal. It must al so be 
accepted that he bel ieved that deceased (the wanted criminal to 
hi s mi nd) had seen him, kn ew that he was bei ng pursued and was 
tryi ng to escape. There was no possible means by which the 
prosecution could rebut his evidence that deceased had seen him 
52) 590 A. 
53) 590 8- C. 
54) 590 C-O. 
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and that he (accused) believed he had been recognized. In view 
of the undisputed evidence that the wanted criminal was a man who 
would shoot if cornered, it is also, with respect, unacceptable 
that appellant should have tried to bring the white Cortina to a 
halt by driving in front of it. 55 ) This would have amounted to 
'cornering' the man believed to be a dangerous criminal. He 
could then be expected to shoot and appellant would be making an 
easy target of himself, while attempting to stop the 'dangerous 
criminal' in this way. It is submitted that the finding that the 
appell ant had acted unreasonably is diffi cult to support. The 
appellant could possibly have called for assistance on his radio. 
The fail ure of the court to accept that appell ant had acted 
reasonably illustrates the restrictive application given to 
section 49 (2). But it is a pity from the point of view of the 
cl ari ty of our 1 aw that the effect of a bona fi de bel i ef on the 
part of appellant that he was acting in terms of section 49 (2) 
was not subjected to in-depth discussion. The result is that the 
decision leaves one with the impression that once section 49 (2) 
is found not to be applicable in rendering a killing justifiable 
or lawful, it is of no further relevance and has no bearing on 
the element of mens rea or fault. 
A passage in the judgment that must not be overlooked is one in 
55) 589 O-F. 
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whi ch the Ch i ef Justi ce says that, because the appe 11 ant had 
gi ven evi dence that he had shot at the body of the Corti na and 
not at the deceased, it was doubtful whether he had shot in order 
to facilitate the arrest of the deceased and consequently whether 
section 49 (2) was relevant. 56 ) This indicates how restrictive 
an interpretation could be put on the measure. In view of the 
drastic nature of the measure, this is not unacceptable. 
The evidence, dicta and findings in this important Appellate Div-
ision decision have been given attention to illustrate how the 
application of section 49 (2) can lead to confusion between the 
unlawfulness of killing in the process of arrest and the require-
ment of mens rea in deciding whether such a killing is murder or 
culpable homicide. 
8arnard57) is a case in which the difficulties experienced with 
section 49 (2) can be unmistakably perceived. The facts are very 
sketchily s ta ted in the reported pa rt of the judgment whi ch is 
regrettable as a great deal hinged on an exact evaluation of the 
56) 'Die appellant se getuienis was dat hy na die bakwerk van 
die Cortina geskiet het en geensins bedoel het om die 
bestuurder van die voertuig raak te skiet of te dood nie. 
In die omstandighede kom dit my as twyfelagtig voor of die 
appellant hom op art. 49 (2) kan beroep, (589 A-8)'. (The 
appellant's evidence was that he fired at the bodywork of 
the Cortina and did not in any way intend to hit or kill 
the driver of the vehicle. In these circumstances it 
seems doubtful to me whether he can rely on section 49 (2) 
at all'(my translation)). 
57) 1985 4 A 431 (W). 
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evidence and the facts proved. 58 ) 
The two accused apparently set a trap for the deceased, two 
burglars. They shot the deceased dead in circumstances in which 
it was not possible to determine who had fired the fatal shot 
that killed the one deceased and it was cl ear that only one of 
the accused had shot the other deceased. Consequently the two 
accused could only be convicted of attempted murder in respect of 
the death of the one deceased, and only one accused coul d be 
convi cted of murder or cul pab 1 e homi ci de. 59) No cornnon purpose 
to kill could be established. Consequently, if the mens rea of 
the accused were found to be cul pa, only the one who had been 
proven to have actually killed the one deceased, could be convic-
ted and then only of culpable homicide. In the absence of dolus 
neither coul d be convi cted of murder or attempted murder., 
The court found that the accused had not discharged the onus of 
proving that their conduct was lawful in terms of section 49 (2). 
This was a unanimous finding of the judge and his two assessors. 
The basis for this finding was that there were other ways of 
preventing the escape of the deceased and that it had been gross-
ly reckless and unreasonable to resort to killing them. 60 ) 
There was a difference of opinion between the judge and the 
58) cf Chimbamba 1977 4 SA 803 (RAD). 
59) 434 G. 
60) 434 F - 435 A. 
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assessors on whether the accused had entertai ned a bona fi de 
belief that they were entitled, in terms of the law, to kill the 
deceased. 61 ) There was apparently a serious dispute at the 
tri alas to whether the accused had set a trap for the deceased 
or not. If the trap had indeed been set, so the assessors found, 
the accused could not reasonably possibly have entertained the 
bona fide belief that they were acting lawfully. 
The conclusion arrived at by the assessors is stated as follows 
in the judgment;62) 
'Beide die here assessore is oortuig bo redelike twyfel, 
uit hoofde van die roekeloosheid van hierdie optrede, 
veral in die lig van die beskuldigdes se voorafkennis van 
die lokval, dat beide beskuldigdes inderdaad bewus was van 
die wederregtelikheid van hulle skote op die oorledenes; 
dat hulle inderdaad besef het dat hulle meer moes doen 
voor hul kon skiet om te verwond en moontl ik te dood, 
roekeloos of aan hierdie voorskrif voldoen word of 
nie'.63) 
61) 434 J - 435 C. 
62) 434 J - 435 A. 
63) 'Both the gentlemen assessors are convinced beyond reason-
able doubt, because of the recklessness of their conduct 
especi ally in the 1 i ght of the accused's pri or knowl edge 
of the trap, that both accused were in fact aware of the 
unlawfulness of their shots at the deceased; that they in 
fact knew that they had to do more before they could shoot 
to wound and possibly kill, reckless as to whether this 
requirement had been met or not' (my translation). 
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It would therefore seem that the assessors had found dolus even-
tualis to have been established as the mens rea of the accused. 
They were aware that they could possibly be acting unlawfully and 
nevertheless continued with their conduct. 
The trial judge took a more subjective view. On his view it was 
reasonably possible that the accused had believed, no matter how 
unreasonably, that they were entitled to kill the deceased. On a 
balance of probabilities he accepted that they did know that they 
were acting unlawfully, but this had not been established beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
It seemed clear that the accused would be convicted of murder and 
attempted murder on the findings of fact arrived at by the asses-
sors with the learned presiding judge dissenting and find i ng that 
only cul pa had been establ i shed beyond a reasonable doubt and 
that only one accused could be convicted and he of culpable homi-
cide only. The anomaly rel ati ng to the onus of proof when 
section 49 (2) is applied became very evident. Could an accused 
notwithstanding failure to establish that he had acted lawfully 
in terms of section 49 (2) not escape conviction because of fail-
ure on the part of the prosecu ti on to prove mens rea beyond a 
reasonable doubt? This latter failure could still be due to the 
reliance placed on section 49 (2) by the accused. 64 ) The 
defence that he had acted in terms of the sub-section would fail 
on the issue of unlawfulness, but succeed on the issue of mens 
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rea. This would happen because the onus to disprove unlawfulness 
would rest on the accused while the onus to prove mens rea would 
rest on the prosecution. This in effect amounts to allowing the 
accused to raise the defence that he was acting in terms of 
section 49 (2), twice. 65 ) 
There was no doubt that the accused had killed the deceased in-
tentionally. The only question was whether they had been aware 
of the unlawfulness of their conduct. Their failure to realise 
that they were acting unlawfully appears to have been a mistake 
of 1 aw rather than one of fact and is so treated by Coetzee 
J. 66 ) 
If intent, which included knowledge of unlawfulness, was the 
mens rea required for conviction of murder and attempted murder, 
the learned judge would clearly have had to hold it as not proved 
and he would have dissented from his assessors. The 1 earned 
judge preferred not to adopt this course for a socially 
acceptable reason67) which, it is submitted with respect, led 
64) vi de n20 supra . 
65) As explained supra. 
66) He does not clearly state this, but relies on the views on 
normative fault expressed in Snyman (Strafreg). These 
views are applicable to mistake of law and not to mistake 
of fact (Snyman (Strafreg) 124 and 188-9). It is particu-
larly on the strength of the normative fault theory that 
De Blom (supra) is criticized by Snyman. 
67) :,oclally acceptable in the sense of curbing killings 
whilst effecting arrests. 
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to a result whi ch is not 1 ega lly sound; it was based on nei ther 
bi ndi ng nor persuas i ve authority68) and is contra ry to a 
previous decision of the Transvaal Provincial Division; namely, 
Sam. 69 ) Furthermore, the resul t; namely, that extreme 
negligence can suffice for a conviction of murder, is against the 
entire strong trend of our law that dolus is the mens rea of 
murder and that dolus is arrived at subjectively.70) The 
reason why the learned judge refused to arrive at a finding that 
the accused could only be convicted of culpable homicide on his 
view of the facts, is the anomaly created by the onus on the 
accused to prove lawfulness or justification in terms of Section 
49 (2) and the onus resting on the prosecution to prove mens rea 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This is reflected in the following passage from the judgment: 71 ) 
68 ) 
69 ) 
70) 
71 ) 
It appears to be based on Snyman (Strafreg) (435H-6H) and 
counsel for the State's argument in Bailey supra (436 
I-J). Snyman (Strafreg) admits that the normative fault 
theory is not part of our 1 aw (125) and counsel for the 
States's invitation to the court to adopt the normative 
fault theory was not accepted in Bailey. 
1980 4 SA 289 (W). In Sam, a decision praised by de Wet 
and Swanepoel (156), a subjective approach to awareness of 
unlawfulness was adopted and the accused was acquitted on 
the strength of a bona fide mistake of law and fact. This 
mistake negatived dolus. Sam was decided by two judges 
Myburg and de Villiers A,r-;--and it is doubtful whether 
Coetzee J, sitting alone in Barnard, had jurisdiction to 
deviate from the ratio in Sam. 
This view gave rise to the extreme line of reasoning to be 
found in Alexander 1982 (4) 701 (T) in terms of which a 
person found gUl I ty of murder coul d not be convicted of 
culpable homicide. In Barnard a complete volte face 
occurs. Persons proved to have been grossly negligent are 
convicted of murder and attempted murder. 
428 B. 
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'Moet enige onnosele evaluasie van die situasie deur die 
opsetlike dader, maar wat nogtans bona fide kan wees, lei 
tot slegs strafbare manslag en word die strengheid van die 
bepaling nie daardeur aansienlik afgewater en uitgeskraal 
nie? Oit maak dan eintlik nie meer saak dat hy die bewys-
las nie bevredig nie. Kon sulke regsgevolge deur die Wet-
gewer bedoel gewees het? Ek betwyfel dit sterk' .72} 
To avoid this anomaly the learned judge applied the normative 
fault doctrine as stated in Snyman (Strafreg}73) and in coun-
sels's argument in Bail ey74} The normative fault doctrine is 
contrasted with the psychological fault doctrine. In terms of 
the latter, fault is intent or negligence. In terms of the 
normative fault doctrine fault is not the state of mind of the 
offender at the time of the offence, but a reproach levelled at 
the offender because : 75 } 
'a} da t di e dader geweet of kon geweet het van di e 
omstandighede wat sy handel ing laat voldoen aan die 
7l} 428 B. 
72} 'Must any stupid evaluation of the situation by the inten-
tional actor, but wh i ch can nevertheless be bona fide, 
lead to culpable homicide and does this not water down and 
emasculate the strictness of the provision considerably? 
In that case it does not make any difference that he 
failed to discharge t he onus. Could such juristic results 
have been intended by the legislator? I strongly doubt 
that' (my translation). 
73} 122-6. 
74} 778 E - 780 E. 
75} 436 C-E. 
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verbodsbeskrywi ng en di t wederregte 1 i k maak (di tis 
wederregtelikheidsbewussyn); 
b) dat hy in staat was om sy handelinge in te rig oor-
eenkomstig die regsvoorskrifte (hy was byvoorbeeld 
nie 'n geestesongestelde nie, dit is die toereken-
ingsvatbaarheidvereiste); en 
c) dat hy nogtans besluit het om voort to gaan IJ'et sy 
handeling, en sodoende regsvoorskrifte te oortree 
(handelingswil, of opset).76 ) 
Despite the fact that although this concept of fault had been 
considered by the Appellate Division in Bailey, but neither 
applied nor totally rejected, and despite South Africa being the 
only Western Country to adopt the psychological fault concept 
currently adopted by the Appellate Division,77) . the learned 
76) '( a) The actor knew or coul d have known of the ci rcum-
stances which made his conduct conform with the descrip-
tion of the prohibition and made it unlawful (that is 
knowledge of unlawfulness); b) he was capable of making 
his deeds conform to the legal precepts (he was for 
instance not mentally disordered, this is the requirement 
of accountability); c) he nevertheless decided to continue 
with his conduct and contravene the legal precepts (will 
to act or intent)' (my translation). 
77) 436 G-H. This statement is, with respect, only partially 
correct. The normative fault doctrine is not adopted in 
countries that adopt the Anglo-Saxon System of dividing 
crime into actus reus and mens rea. What makes the South 
African view of criminal intent unique is that it recog-
nises ignorance of the law as a defence which negatives 
intent (Snyman (Strafreg) 191-3). What Snyman is really 
criticizing is the way in which the defence of ignorance 
of the law is treated in our law namely psychologically in 
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judge decided that he would not apply the psychological fault 
doctrine so as to arrive at the undesirable result of convicting 
only the one accused of culpable homicide. 
The reasoning is difficult to follow. It seems at one stage that 
Section 49 (2) was being interpreted in such a way as to cast the 
onus on the accused to disprove intent and at another stage as if 
secti on 49 (2) was interpreted to the effect that if an accused 
who relies on it, fails to establish it, his mens rea is deter-
mined without reference to section 49 or any bona fide belief he 
might have held that section 49 was applicable to his conduct 
comp 1 a i ned of. Thi s woul d, accordi ng to Coetzee J, amount to 
allowing the initial knowledge that killing is unlawful, which 
unl awful ness is not removed in terms of secti on 49 (2), to 
survive and would thus be a basis of fault even in terms of the 
psychol ogi cal fault doctri ne. 
following passage: 78 ) 
The argument is stated in the 
'Die dader wat besluit om opsetlik te dood weet dat dit 
terms of the accused's actual knowledge and not norma-
ti vely in re 1 a ti on to what is expected of the accused in 
terms of society's norms (vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301, 
316; and generally Burchell and Hunt 164-5"'-- The 
discarded maxim 'Ignorance of the law is no excuse' could 
be regarded as a normative approach to fault. Society 
expects everybody to know the law. 
78) 438 E. 
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wederregte1ik is, tensy hy, objektief gesproke, tevrede is 
dat daar nie 'n ander rede1ike uitweg is nie. As hierdie 
objektiewe basis nie bestaan nie, dan b1y die aanvank1ike 
bewussyn van die wederregte1ikheid voortbestaan as die 
vereiste element, selfs in die psigo10giese sku1d be-
grip'J9) 
In the result the learned judge agreed, on his view of the law, 
with his assessors that the two accused were guilty of murder and 
attempted murder. 
He remarks: 80) 
'Moont 1 i k sa 1 hi erdi e re su ltaa t deur so 11111 i ge be skou word 
as 'n geringe inenting van die normatiewe begrip in hier-
die bepaa1de geva1, vir regspo1itiese rede, op die 
aanvaarde psigo10giese sku1dbegrip. Ek g10 egter nie dat 
dit prakties enige saak maak nie. Ek meen dat dit nodig 
is om wat andersins 'n onbevredigende juridiese prent is, 
he1derder in te k1eur. 
79) 'The actor who decides to kill intentionally knows that it 
is unlawful, unless he, objectively speaking, is satisfied 
that there is no other reasonable course to follow. If 
this objective basis does not exist, then the initial 
awareness of unlawfulness continues to exist as the re-
quired element, even in the psychological concept of fault 
(my translation). 
80) 438 F-G. 
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Myns insiens dus in casu, maak dit nie saak of, soos deur 
die assessore bevind is, daar die daadwerklike wederregte-
likheidsbewussyn, simplisties gesproke, aanwesig was of 
nie. Daar was nogtans, myns insiens, wederregtelikheids-
bewussyn in juridiese sin, as die beskuldigde objektief 
die situasie verkeerd beoordeel het'.81) 
The conclusion as stated by Coetzee J illustrates indisputably 
that an adoption of the normative fault concept would result in 
an objective approach to dolus in certain cases and in general 
uncertainty in our criminal law. The accused would be tried 
twice; once to establish the elements of the crime and the 
presence or absence of any speci al defence he may rai se and a 
second time to deci de in terms of normative concepts (which are 
not clearly expounded anywhere82 ) whether he is to be reproach-
ed or not. If he is not to be reproached he is acquitted irre-
spective of proof of the elements of the offence and absence of a 
81) 'Possibly this result will be regarded by some as a slight 
engrafting of the normative concept in this particular 
case, for reasons of legal policy, onto the accepted psy-
chological concept. I do not, however, bel ieve that it 
makes any di fference in practi ce. I am of the opi ni on 
that it is necessary to del ineate more clearly an other-
wise unsatisfactory juridical picture. In my view there-
fore in casu, it makes no difference whether, as was found 
by the assessors the actual knowledge of unlawfulness, 
simpl istically speaking, was present or not. There was 
nevertheless, in my view, knowledge of unlawfulness in the 
juristic sense, if the accused objectively assessed the 
situation wrongly' (my translation). 
82) vide CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 126. 
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special defence, if he is to be reproached he is to be convicted 
notwi thstandi ng failure to es tab 1 ish an exact el ement of the 
crime. 83 ) This is in fact what the learned judge did in 
Barnard on his version of the facts. 84 ) Dolus had not in fact 
been proved but the accused was held to be subject to reproach ~ 
2i dolus had been proved. The decision appears to be a result of 
the di ffi culti es occas i oned by the drasti c provi s i on of secti on 
49 (2). With respect, one has understanding for the difficulties 
of the court, but the normative fault theory can lead only to 
greater difficulites. 
It is significant that the normative fault concept is followed 
in Germany and on the Continent, but not in countries where the 
Angl o-Ameri ca system of cri mi na 1 procedure is app 1 i ed. 85) The 
normative fault concept can be of value in a one-phase trial 
system where a wrong-doing or crime is investigated simultan-
eously with its blameworthiness. In a two-phase trial like ours 
and those of the Anglo-Saxon Countries, the normative fault con-
cept is out of place and merely causes unnecessary complica-
tions. The question of reproach or blameworthiness is decided 
upon after conviction; in other words after a crime or wrong-
83) culpa lata instead of dolus. 
84) Unfortunately the facts are not dealt with in detail in 
the report. It is submitted that in view of the findings 
made by the assessors and Coetzee J's statement of his 
views at 435 C, the learned judge might very well have 
found that the accused were aware that they could possibly 
be acting unlawfully. The net of dolus eventualis is wide 
and the accused might have been convicted on that basis 
without recourse to the normative fault theory. 
85) vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301, 317. 
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doing has been established in the shape of a duly recorded 
conviction. 
BarnardB6 ) takes one to the very opposite pole from the main 
subject of this section: negligent killings that amount to 
murder. Nevertheless on an orthodox application of the law 
section 49 (2) is obviously a section that could result in 
intentional kill ings resulting in convictions of culpable homi-
cide because of bona fide mistakes of fact or of law or of both. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The requirement of knowledge or awareness of unlawfulness as an 
ingredient of dolus may lead to intentional killings being 
trea ted as cul pab 1 e homi ci de because of a bona fi de mi stake of 
law or of fact, in cases where the accused acted in private 
defence or under duress, if the circumstances are not such as to 
render the killing lawful. 
The normative fault doctrine could lead to culpa being treated as 
dolus and consequently to culpable homicide being treated as 
murder. This represents a radical departure from principle and 
consequently this doctrine should be avoided. 8?) 
86) On an application of our law relating to bona fide mis-
takes as encountered in Sam supra. 
87) The concl us i on in Barnard 1 ends support to Rabie 1985 
THRHR 332, 343, where the author states that on Snyman's 
Vlews of ignorance of the law negligence is the sole form 
of faul t. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CULPABLE HOMICIDE IN RELATION TO KILLINGS COMMITTED UNDER 
PROVOCATION OR UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS AND 
KILLINGS COMMITTED BY YOUNG CHILDREN 
1. Initial observati ons with special reference to the effect 
of 'toerekeni ngsYatbaarhei d' on the defences under di s-
cussion in this chapter 
1.1 Introduction 
The groupi ng together of ki 11 i ngs committed under proyocati on, 
the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and killings conmitted by 
young children may seem strange. The last category is clearly 
distinct from the first two. It could also be regarded as 
strange that the case of a sober person acting under provocation 
shoul d be treated in the same chapter as that of an i ntox i cated 
person. The reason for the groupi ng is to be found in the re 1 e-
vance of the concept of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' to all three 
categories. 
'Toerekeningsvatbaarheid' could be translated as criminal capa-
city or criminal accountability and may be regarded as the 
ability to attract criminal liability. The term made its first 
important appearance in our 1 aw in the fi rst edi ti on of De Wet 
and Swanepoe1. 1 ) It has since then become fairly strongly 
1) Which appeared in 1949 . 
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entrenched in our law. 2 ) 
De Wet and Swanepoel attacked the approach adopted before 1949 
that the defences of insanity, youth, intoxication and provo-
cation should be approached as defences excluding mens rea. 
Their opinion was that the approach should be to inquire whether 
the accused who raises one of these defences was criminally 
accountable ('toerekeningsvatbaar') at the time of the commission 
of the crime charged. 3 ) 
Criminal accountabil ity or capacity, according to the learned 
authors depended on whether the accused appreci ated the unl aw-
fulness or prohibited nature of his conduct, and whether, even if 
he did appreciate the nature of his conduct, he could control his 
conduct according to his appreciation of its nature. 4 ) 
Assuming that the approach to the defences to be discussed in 
this chapter was, before the acceptance of the doctrine of 'toe-
rekeningsvatbaarheid', that they excluded mens rea, the accep-
tance of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' as a prerequisite of criminal 
liability has broadened their scope considerably. 
2) It received judicial acceptance in Mahlinza 1967 (1) SA 
408 (A); vi de CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 130; but cf CR 
Snyman 1985 SALJ 240, 246 referrTiig to Mahl i nza. 
3) De Wet and Swanepoel led 71, 2ed 99, 3ed 106, 4ed 110; cf 
Burchell and Hunt, led, 209-13, 2ed 239-41. 
4) Quite literally, the question would be whether he was able 
to control hi mse If or whether he had lost hi s se If-con-
trol; vide Burchell and Hunt 174. 
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On the mens rea approach the question was whether an accused who 
had acted while provoked, intoxicated or still very young had 
acted intentionally or negligently. Subject to certain qualifica-
tions that will be discussed below, a person who had acted inten-
tionally under provocation and/or intoxication or while still 
youthful would be guilty of a crime requiring dolus as its mens 
rea committed in that condition. 5 ) Where intent was not 
required, as for instance in the crime of culpable homicide, 
culpa would be investigated, and, had the accused acted negli-
gently or unreasonably, he could still be convicted. 
'Toerekeningsvatbaarheid' is regarded by De Wet and Swanepoe1 6 ) 
and by Snyman7) as a prerequisite for criminal fault. Conse-
quently, if one views fault as being dolus or culpa, the absence 
of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' or the condition known as 'ontoerek-
eningsvatbaarheid' would result in an acquittal even if culpa 
were proved in the absence of dolus. 
1.2 Five cases dealing with Criminal Capactiy 
Our Common Law has advanced fa r along the road of all owi ng 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' as a defence excluding cUlpa. This 
5) This statement is not applicable to children of 7 years 
and younger and is of limited application to children 
bet'.;een the ages of 7 and 14. 
6) 103. 
7) 117 and 118, 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' is translated as 
'criminal responsibility'; cf Snyman (Stafreg) 127 . 
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is illustrated by five recent cases, two of them regarded as 
very important. 
The cases are Arnold,8) Chretien,g) Stellmacher,10) Baart-
man 11 ) and Weber v Santam Yersekeringsmaatskappy Beperk12 ) 
Arnold is a case about provocation. The accused, an emotionally 
unstable individual of forty-one had married a young woman of 
twenty-one who was emotionally immature and liable to be 
i nfl uenced for the worse by her mother. Accused had a strong 
emotional attachment to his wife and also to his youngest son 
from a previous marriage. This child was deaf. A situation of 
domestic conflict and tension arose between accused, his wife, 
his child and his wife's mother. 
On the day of the crime, accused's wife, who had previously left 
him returned to their home to take away SOIre of her belongings . 
Accused found her there and tried to persuade her to stay. On 
the findings of the trial judge she taunted and tantalized him, 
8) 1985 3 SA 256 (C), discussed by CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 240. 
g) 1981 1 SA 1097 (A). 
10) 1983 2 SA 181 (SWA). 
11) 1983 4 SA 395 (NC) . 
12) 1983 1 SA 381 (A). 
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enjoying his discomfort and the power she had over him. l3 ) 
Accused had to leave while she was talking to her mother and 
returned some time later having left his deaf son at an institu-
tion, where it was intended that the child should remain. 
Accused had a pistol in his possession which he kept loaded at 
all times. He spoke to his wife in the sitting-room while hold-
ing the pistol in his hand. As he spoke to her he knocked the 
pistol against a piece of furniture to emphasise points made by 
him. During this conversation a shot went off harmlessly. The 
conversation continued and a second shot went off killing the 
wife. Accused was the sole surviving witness of the final scene 
in the course of which the two shots went off. He could remember 
the fi rst shot and the events thereafter up to a stage when the 
deceased bent forward displaying her bare breasts to him through 
the top of her dress and referring to her activities as a strip 
dancer. 
Accused's recollection of what followed was poor . He remembered 
hea ri ng the second shot go 0 ff and seei ng deceased fall, but 
could not remember aiming the firearm or discharging it. When he 
became fully conscious of himself and his surroundings he had the 
13) Accused took a more charitable view of the unfortunate 
woman's behavi our but the cou rt had better ins i ght into 
her character, having heard psychiatric evidence concern-
ing it. The deceased appears to have made the mistake 
made by many an arrogant individual not to realize that an 
appa rently docil e person may eventually reta 1 i ate explo-
sively. The accused also appears to have been an excep-
tionally good witness. 
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pistol in his hand with his finger on the trigger and it was 
pointing at the spot where deceased had stood. He was distressed 
at her pl ight, surrmoned assistance and tried to help her, but 
shortly afterwards she died. 
Accused was acquitted on two grounds. The first was that he had 
not 'acted' when firing the fatal shot as his will had not been 
in command of hi s body. Thi s ground of acquittal does not con-
cern us here. The second ground is that at the time of the fatal 
shot the accused had lacked criminal capacity, in other words 
that he had been 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar'. 
Expert psych i atri c evi dence had been 1 ed by the defence. Inter 
ali a the judgment records the fo 11 owi ng concerni ng the uncon-
tested evidence of the psychiatrist: 14 ) 
'When asked whether the accused could appreciate the 
wrongful ness of his act, he replied that normally the 
accused was not deficient in this respect, but that at the 
relevant time the last thing in his mind was the question 
as to whether what he did was right or wrong. His con-
scious mind was so 'flooded' by emotions that it inter-
fered with his capability to appreciate what was right or 
wrong and, because of his emotional state, he may have 
14) 163 8-C. 
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lost the capacity to exercise control over his actions'15) 
The onus bei ng on the prosecuti on to prove eve ry element of the 
crime including criminal capacity, the prerequisite of fault, it 
was i nevitab 1 e in the 1 i ght of the above undi sputed evi dence, 
that the accused should be found to have lacked criminal capacity 
when firing the fatal shot. If the matter had been approached on 
the bas i s that he ei ther had mens rea or 1 acked it, the court 
would no doubt have found that intent to kill had not been estab-
lished, but that the accused had been negligent and he would have 
been convicted of culpable homicide. 
His negligence could have consisted in returning to an emotion-
ally tense situation with a loaded firearm in his hand, in hold-
ing the firearm in his hand and knocking it against a couch while 
tal king at an emotionally charged level with the deceased and in 
not putting the firearm away, at the very latest after the first 
shot had gone off. Thi s conduct speaks of gross negl i gence .16) 
But, relying on Chretien l ?) and van Vuuren l8 ) the trial judge 
decided - correctly it is submitted in the light of these 
authoriti es - that the matter had to be deci ded on the bas i s of 
the questi on whether the accused had or had 1 acked cri mi na 1 
15) Emphas is added. In other words, for the moment the 
accused did not think in terms of right or wrong, and lost 
hi s self-control. 
16) vi de Steynberg 1983 3 SA 140 (A); Nkwenya 1985 2 SA 560 
(A) • 
17) supra. 
18) 1983 1 SA 12 (A). 
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capacity. The finding was that he lacked criminal capacity and 
he was acquitted. 
This case has been discussed in some detail as it illustrates how 
the application of the test of criminal capacity can result in a 
total acquittal on a charge of murder in circumstances where in 
the past the prosecuti on coul d have expected a convi cti on of 
culpable homicide. 
The well-known Chretien case decided, inter alia, that a person 
rendered 'ontoerekeni ngsvatbaar' as a resul t of the vol untary 
taking of alcohol could not be convicted of a crime committed in 
that state. This led to the acquittal of the accused in Stell-
macher. 19 ) With a heavy calibre pistol in his possession the 
accused had, after a day of severe fasti ng, proceeded to dri nk 
somewhat unrestrainedly in the bar of a hotel. After consuming a 
large quantity of alcohol in a short time he had started firing 
shots in the bar . He wounded one person severely, hit a few 
articles in the bar and then fatally shot a person who had 
attempted to buy wine from him, the accused being behind the 
counter at the time. The accused pl eaded automati sm but was 
acquitted on the basis that he had been 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar' 
at the time of the fatal shooting . The evidence was very much in 
favour of the accused lacking intention to kill when the shot was 
19) supra - The investigation into the question of temporary 
insanity on the part of Stellmacher is not relevant to the 
present discussion. 
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fired. He had, however, been grossly negligent in drinking on an 
empty stomach with a dangerous firearm in his possession. The 
prosecution apparently did not press for a conviction of culpable 
homicide. This would have failed as the 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar-
heid' of the accused would have precluded any finding of fault on 
his part. 20 ) 
In Baartman21 ) the accused threatened to 'get drunk' in a few 
days time and then stab deceased to death. He duly did this. 
The prosecution adopted two lines of approach to establish dolus 
on his part. First that he was not so intoxicated at the time of 
the stabbing as to negative intent and, secondly, that on an 
application of the actio libera in causa principle he was in any 
event guilty of murder as he had corrmenced drinking with the 
intention of killing the deceased while drunk . On the facts 
Steenkamp J held that the accused had had the intent necessary 
for a conviction when he stabbed the deceased. The learned judge 
added, obi ter, that the 1 i ne of approach based on the acti 0 
libera in causa principle would have failed if he had found that 
the alcohol he had taken had rendered the accused 'ontoereken-
ingsvatbaar' at the time of the killing. This case is a signifi-
cant indication that 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' may exclude 
20) vi de du Pl es i ss 1984 THRHR 98 for a di scussi on of Stell-
macher in the light of Chretien. 
21) supra. 
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antecedent liability.22) 
Where youth is raised as a defence the law is that a child under 
7 is irrebuttably presumed to be doli incapax. 23 ) Children 
between the ages of 7 and 14 are also presumed to be 1 ack i ng in 
criminal capabil ity, but this presumption can be rebutted by 
evidence. 24 ) The approach in the past has been that a child 
between the ages of 7 and 14 is presumed not to know that what-
ever crime he may be committi ng is wrong. But once such know-
ledge on his part is proved, the prosecution on proof of fault 
would be entitled to a conviction. 25 ) 
The cri mi na 1 capacity the ch il d was presumed to 1 ack was there-
fore confined to inability to distinguish between right and 
wrong . The second requirement of criminal capacity; namely, the 
ability to control his conduct according to his knowledge of the 
22) Antecedent 1 i ab i 1 ity is a doctri ne to the effect that in 
evaluating an allegedly criminal course of conduct one 
does not view a final occurence in isolation, but views it 
in the 1 ight of the actor's preceding conduct. Fault 
absent at the time of the final criminal act may be 
present in the prior behaviour. Chretien has weakened, if 
not destroyed, the doctr i ne of antecedent 1 i abi 1 i ty: vi de 
Strauss 397; du Plessis 1982 SALJ 189, 201-2, 1985 SALJ 
394, 398-401. I n vi ew of the peremptory wordi ng of cer-
tain passages in Chretien it is difficult to agree with 
Strauss that Chretien's negligence in respect of his 
conviction of culpable homicide was founded on antecedent 
liability; vide du Plessis 1985 SALJ 394, 399. 
23) Burchell and Hunt 242 ff. --
23 ) i bid. 
24) Burchell and Hunt 244-5. 
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wrongful ness of what he is doing, allegedly did not receive the 
attention it ought to have received. 26 ) 
In a civil matter Jones NO vs Santam Beperk 27 ) a little girl of 
9 had been adjudged negl igent in that she had suddenly dashed 
from the side of the road in front of a pass i ng motori st. The 
standard applied to determine her negligence was that of the 
reasonable man. The case was generally not well received as it 
was regarded wrong to apply the test of the reasonable man to a 
child28 ) The hope was expressed in an Appellate Division judg-
ment29 ) that the law would be reviewed. 
This was done in Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Beperk30 ) 
The judgment being to the effect that the approach to the negli-
gence of young children had been correct in the · Jones case, but 
that apart from .the question of negligence, Itoerekeningsvatbaar-
heidi; namely, whether the child appreciated the wrongfulness of 
its conduct and also whether the child could control its conduct 
according to this appreciation,31) had to be considered. The 
child concerned was a little boy of 7 years and 2 months and the 
court hel d that although he had known that motor cars were 
26) Burchell and Hunt 247 n86 referring to Roxa v Mtshayi 1975 
3 SA 761 (A). 
27) 1965 2 SA 542 (A). 
28) Boberg 697-8. Cf I 1986 1 SA (0); Camplin 1978 1 AER 1236. 
29) That of Jansen JA-in Roxa supra n26. 
30) supra. 
31) 389-90 . 
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dangerous and ought to have known that pl aying behi nd one was 
dangerous, he did not have the ability to restrain his childish 
desire to play behind a car, as the exciting prospect of playing 
would remove from his mind all knowledge of danger and all the 
training to be careful he had received from his parents. It is 
noteworthy that in arriving at its decision the majority of the 
court relied specifically on views expressed in the third edition 
of De Wet and Swanepoel . 32 ) 
This discussion of recent decisions has been necessary to demon-
strate the influence of the concept of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' 
on the present state of our law. The development to this stage 
will now be traced and certain conclusions advanced. 
2 The defence of Provocation 
2.1 Introductory 
The history of the defence of provocation shows an interesting 
deve 1 opment from the adopti on of a mi xture of objecti ve and 
subjective standards to an emphasis on subjectivity. The history 
of the defence will be examined in some detail because of the 
interesting light it throws on the interaction between normative 
32) 389-H. 
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and psychological approaches to fault. 
2.2 Nathan 
The subject is treated in the light of the old authorities and 
Pascoe33 ) by Nathan. 34 ) The discussion is confined to a 
clear, terse statement of certain rules and exceptions to those 
rules in terms of which a killing that would otherwise be murder, 
becomes culpable homicide. 
The distinction between murder and culpable homicide consisted in 
the absence of 'malice aforethought' in the latter crime. Two 
types of provocation are discussed; namely, aggression and adult-
ery. 35) I f an aggressor provokes a sudden fi ght, stri kes or 
attempts to strike first and is killed, the killer is guilty of 
culpable homicide because of the absence of malice aforethought. 
If his temper had time to cool between the initial act of aggres-
sion and his fatal retaliation he would be guilty of murder. 
Compari son of thi s part of the text36 ) wi th the secti on on mur-
der37 ) creates the impression that although 'malice afore-
thought' is sai d to be i ntenti on it was really taken to mean 
intention coupled with a certain amount of premeditation. A 
sudden killing provoked by the deceased would not be murder, but 
33) 1884 2 SC 427. 
34) 2574-5 . 
35) ibid. 
36) ibid. 
37) 2567 -8. 
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culpable homicide, either because there was no premeditation, or 
because premeditation could not be inferred from the facts. The 
discussion, particularly that of murder, abounds with statements 
in which rules of law and of proof are simultaneously stated 
without any attempt to distinguish between them. 
The provocation occasioned by adultery discloses that in certain 
instances provocation could result in the crime of murder being 
reduced to culpable homicide without reference to the mens rea of 
the killer. The impression gained is that such a killing would 
be semi-lawfu1 38 ) or partially justifiable and therefore not 
murder. The general rule is stated thus: 39 ) 
'I f a man di scovers another in the act of commi tti ng 
adultery wi th hi s wife and kill s ei ther the adulterer or 
the adulteress, he is guilty of culpable homicide .•. • ' 
The author adds that: 40 ) 
38) 
39) 
40) 
'Certain of the Roman Dutch authorities . .. hold that if 
a man kill s an adulterer whom he fi nds in the act of 
It may be said that an act is either lawful or unlawful 
and that there are no degrees of unl awful ness, but some 
crimes are more seriously unlawful than others. Thus 
murder is a more serious deviation from lawful standards 
than culpable homicide. 
2575. 
ibid - The references to authorities are omitted from the 
quoted passage. 
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committing adultery with the slayer's wife, or if he kills 
his wife in such circumstances, this is justifiable 
homicide, and no penalty attaches to it. But the view of 
the majority of Roman-Dutch authorities, particularly the 
more modern ones, is that killing under such circumstances 
amounts to culpable homicide, and this view of the law has 
been adopted in South Africa.' 
This last observation is made on the strength of the instructions 
given to the jury by de Villiers CJ in Pascoe . 
In Pascoe the accused had k i" ed hi s wi fe and her lover wi th a 
hatchet. He alleged that he was lawfully married to the deceased 
woman and that he had caught the pair in the act of adultery. 
From the judge's summing up it seems as if both these statements 
were doubtful. The deceased woman coul d have been the second 
wife of the accused in a polygamous union contracted in terms of 
the rules of a religious denomination that recognised polygamy. 
The accused ' caught' the two deceased in the same room, but from 
certa in proven facts it was open to seri ous doubt whether they 
had been in bed together; 
The learned Chief Justice instructed the Jury as follows;41) 
41) 427. 
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'I must tell you that no person is justified by the law of 
this Colony in killing his wife, even if he sees her in 
the act of adultery. It is qui te true it woul d not be 
murder, but cul pab 1 e homi ci de. The 1 aw recogni zes the 
frail ty of human nature, and so 'where a man in a sudden 
transport of passion kills his wife upon discovering that 
she is unfaithful, and in the act of committing adultery, 
it is a case of culpable homicide and not of murder'. 
He added: 42 ) 
'Now as I have already said, the case for the defence is 
founded on two assumptions that these parties were legally 
married and that the prisoner found the parties in the act 
of adultery. If you fi nd ei ther of these assumpti ons is 
not supported by the evidence I am bound to tell you that 
it will be your duty to find the prisoner at the bar 
guilty of murder' . 
In referring to the concession made by the law to human frailty, 
the learned Chief Justice appears to have had mens rea in mind 
and that the man who acts in a sudden transport of passion does 
not act i ntenti ona lly. Nevertheless, even if this subjective 
factor is taken into account, it is not of over-riding importance 
when compared with the objective factor of the legality or 
42) , i bid. 
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otherwi se of the marri age and the equally formal i sti c questi ons 
whether adultery was actually bei ngcommi tted, or whether the 
wi fe and her lover had only been found together in compromi sing 
circumstances. 
If mens rea were in issue the question would be whether the 
accused had been so provoked as to lose his self-contro1 43 ) and 
to kill without thinking what he was doing. A man who finds a 
woman he loves and with whom he lives, in the act of adultery or 
in highly suspicious circumstances could become equally as angry 
as a man who finds his lawfully wedded wife in the act of adult-
ery. But only the latter could be found guilty of culpable homi-
cide and not of murder, and then only if the lawfully wedded wife 
was caught in flagrante delicto with her paramour. 
From this one must conclude that either the anger of the man who 
cannot prove both that the woman was hi s wi fe and that she was 
caught in flagrante delicto would not, irrespective of his real 
state of mind at the time of the killing, be regarded as a 
'lawful' or 'recognized' reason for negativing intent on his 
part, or that provocation is a ground of partial justification 
valid only if these two objective requirements were met. In the 
latter case the state of mind of the killer at the time of the 
killing i s also not relevant. One must, however, not omit to 
43) Loss of self-control was not vi ewed as the second ingred-
ient of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' in the days of Lord de 
Vil1iers. 'Toerekeningsvatbaarheid' was totally unknown. 
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mention that the judge concluded his instruction by stating that 
if the jury found the accused guilty of murder they could couple 
their verdict with a recommendation of mercy if the accused had 
received great provocation from his 'wife'. The subjective state 
of the accused could therefore serve as a factor to persuade the 
executive not to exact the supreme penalty. In other words it 
would reduce blameworthiness. 
2.3 Anders and El1son 
Anders and Ellson, writing some years after Nathan deal with pro-
vocation under the headings of assault44 ) and cul pable homi-
cide45 ) and mainly in the latter context. 
The term 'cul pable homicide' is used in two senses; firstly, 
homicide which is neither justified nor excusable and, secondly, 
homicide which is neither justifiable nor excusable and committed 
without malice aforethought. Culpable homicide in the first sense 
becomes murder if it is committed with mal ice aforethought. 46 ) 
Malice aforethought is apparently intention, but there are also 
elements of deliberation and premeditation.47 ) 
Culpable homicide in the first sense which does not become 
44) 52, 53. 
45) 122. 
46) 127. 
47) 126. 
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murder,48) is said to be committed mainly in the anger provoked 
by a sudden combat. An accused who kill s 'in the heat of the 
moment' in a combat not provoked by him is guilty of culpable 
homicide. The latter crime differs from murder essentially 
because of the absence of deliberation, or premeditation. 
These rules are qualified with reference to articles 245 and 246 
of Stephen's Digest from which the following is quoted with 
approval :49) 
'provocation does not extenuate the guilt of homicide 
(ie does not make it less than murder) unless the person 
provoked is at the time when he does the act deprived of 
the power of self-control by the provocation which he has 
received; and in deciding the question whether this was or 
was not the case, regard must be had to the nature of the 
act by which the offender causes death, to the time which 
el apsed between the provocati on and the act whi ch caused 
death, to the offender's conduct during that interval, and 
to all other circumstances tending to show the state of 
his mind.' 
48) In other words, which is or remains culpable homicide in 
the second sense. 
49) 122. 
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The passage shows a strong leaning to considering the mens rea of 
the accused and the effect of the provocation on it. There is 
also reference to his loss of self-control which comes close to 
the second ingredient of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' namely 
inabi1 ity to control one's conduct according to one's apprec-
iation of its wrongfulness. 50 ) 
In the discussion51 ) following the passage quoted certain 
objective requirements for provocation are set out and section 
141 of the (then) Transkei an Penal Code52 ) is menti oned. The 
general statement is made that this section together with the 
passages from Stephen's Digest referred to 'represent the law of 
this country on the subject'. pascoe53 ) is referred to as 
authority for this statement. 
The mention of Section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code is signi-
ficant as this section was for;- a long time to be regarded as 
stating the South African law. 
It reads as follows: 
'Homi ci de whi ch wou1 d otherwi se be murder may be reduced 
to culpable homicide, if the person who causes death does 
50) But see n49 supra. 
51) 122-4. 
52) Act no 24 of 1886. 
53) supra. 
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so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation. 
Any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be 
sufficient to deprive any ordinary person of the power of 
self-control may be provocation, if the offender acts upon 
it on the sudden, and before there has been time for his 
passi on to cool . Whether any parti cul ar wrongful act or 
insult, whatever may be its nature, amounts to provoca-
tion, and whether the person provoked was actually 
deprived of the power of sel f-control by the provocation 
which he received shall be questions of fact . ' 
In Butelezi 54 } the Appellate Division unequivocally regarded 
the section as stating the South African law on the subject. 
Thi s was accepted in Gardi ner and Landsdown55 } up to the sixth 
and last edition . 
The wording of the section has been criticized and analysed on a 
number of occasions and detailed analysis at this stage would be 
redundant. 56} 
The following must, however, be pointed out: It is not clear 
whether the first sentence states the partial excuse rule or 
not . 'Homicide which would otherwise be murder' must refer to 
54} 1925 AD 160. 
55} 6ed 102. 
56} Burche 11 and Hunt led 243 ff; 2ed 309 ff; De Wet and 
Swanepoel led 83 ff; 4ed 133 ff; Strauss 1959 THRHR 14 . 
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intentional killing. If the homicide becomes culpable homicide 
because of the absence of intention to kill the first sentence 
woul d be unnecessary. Thus one coul d interpret the secti on as 
being to the effect that if the conditions set for provocation 
are met, it becomes a defence which could reduce an intentional 
killing from murder to culpable homicide. On this interpretation 
the real intention, state of mind or mens rea of the killer would 
appear to be over-ridden by the consideration that he was 
provoked. If one looks at the Code's definition of murder which 
reads as follows: 
'Culpable homicide becomes murder in the following cases: 
a) If the offender means to cause the death of the 
person kill ed. 
b) If the offender means to cause to the person ki 11 ed 
any bodi ly i nj ury whi ch is known to the offender to 
be likely to cause death, and if the offender, 
whether he does or does not mean to cause death, is 
reckless whether death ensues or not. 
c) If the offender means to cause death or such bodily 
injury as aforesaid to one person, so that if that 
person be k i 11 ed the offender woul d be gUil ty of 
murder, and by accident or mistake the offender kills 
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another person, though he does not mean to hurt the 
person kill ed. 
d) If the offender for any unl awful object does an act 
which he knows or ought to have known to be likely to 
cause death, and thereby kills any person, he may 
have desired that his object should be affected with-
out hurting anyone; 
It would appear, particularly from sections 140(a) and 140(b), 
that the above i nterpretati on of secti on 141 is correct. In 
terms of section 141 facts would therefore be objectively viewed 
and provocation, if its requisities had been met, treated as a 
factor affecting the degree of unlawfulness57) if not neces-
sarily the mens rea of the killing. Another view could be that 
duly established provocation would reduce the blameworthi-
ness58 ) of the killing so that it would be treated as culpable 
homicide notwithstanding its having been intentional. 
From the judgment in Pascoe it seems that the defence of provo-
cation was treated as requiring a combination of subjective 
57) vide n38 supra. 
58) This view would be 'modern' in the sense of regarding 
fault as a reproach, or as the blameworthiness of an act. 
This seems to indicate that the normative fault theory, 
although not always known by that name, is nothing new. 
It could surprise some proponents of 'strafregwetenskap' 
to learn that section 141, so oft derided was, in a manner 
of speaking, a statutory measure creating normative fault, 
a concept nowadays so much espoused. 
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and objective features to succeed. 
2.4 Gardiner and Lansdown 
In the fourth edition of Gardiner and Lansdown the discussion of 
provocation commences as follows: 59 ) 
'The presumption of intent to kill may be rebutted by 
proof of certain circumstances affecting the mind of the 
accused at the time of the assault which show that this 
intent was absent. · Thus it may be shown that the accused 
was provoked by the deceased. To establish an absence of 
intent, the provocation must be of so gross a nature that 
it would upset the balance of mind of a reasonable man and 
deprive him for the time being of the power of self-con-
trol or of the faculty of realising what would be the 
probable consequences of his acts'. 
The same wording is used in the fifth 60 ) and sixth editions. 61 ) 
It seems strange that the actual state of mind of the accused is 
not referred to so much as a set of rules according to which his 
intent to kill is determined. If he killed he is presumed to 
59) 1554 ff. 
60) 1418 ff 
61) 1554 ff 
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have intended the killing. If he was provoked in a way that 
would have caused a reasonable man to lose his self-control, the 
presumption is rebutted. Proof of absence of intent would not 
rebut the presumption if a reasonable man would not have reacted 
as accused reacted. 
Referring to Pascoe, Gardiner and Lansdown state that the rules 
laid down in that case may have been relaxed so that a finding 
could be made in favour of a man who kills a woman with whom he 
has 1 ived for some time although he may not be married to her. 
They write: ' ... the affection of the man for the woman may be so 
great as to lead to the conclusion that the provocation deprived 
the accused temporarily of the power of sel f-control, or of 
realizing the probable consequences of his acts.,62) 
The discussions of the law relating to the effect of provocation 
on homicide is incl ined to be confusing in that objective re-
quirements and subjective requirements are mentioned in such a 
way that no cl ear di sti ncti on is drawn between them. In the 
fifth 63 ) and sixth64 ) editions a section on provocation is 
included in the chapter entitled 'Principles of Criminal Respons-
i bi 1 i ty' 65) 
62) 1554. 
63) 78 ff. 
64) 101 ff. 
65) Book I chapter IV in both editions. 
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There was no such secti on in the same chapter66 ) in the fourth 
edition. In both later editions the law is summarised as follows 
at the start of the section on provocation: 67 ) 
'On a charge of murder or assault with intent to murder or 
do gri evous bodily harm, the presumpti on of i ntenti on of 
reasonab 1 e and probable consequences may be negati ved by 
evidence that the accused was subjected by his victim to 
provocation which : 
a) was such as to upset the balance of mind of a reason-
able man and deprive him, for the time being, of the 
power of self-control or of the faculty of realizing 
the probable consequences of his act; and 
b) did, in fact, exercise such an influence on the mind 
of the accused; 
provi ded it be proved that the conduct of the accused 
immediately supervened upon the . provocation, was the 
natural reaction to it, and was not disproportionate to 
the provocation' . 
66) Book I chapter IV. 
67) Sed 78, 6ed 101 . 
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The rule stated is confined to three68 } crimes. Thi sis 
significant in view of the statement concerning the defence of 
provocation that' ... its effect, if established, is to deprive 
the crime of the particular intention ordinarily attaching to 
it and the further statement: 'Provocation is not, in 
itself, a mitigating factor, but a circumstance from which the 
jury may conclude that the specific intention averred was 
absent' . 
In the sixth edition this is followed by a reference to the 
statement in Thibani 69 } that provocation is a special kind of 
material from which, in association with the rest of the 
evidence, the decision must be reached whether or not the Crown 
has proved the intention which is an essential ingredient of the 
crime charged. 70 } 
In the fifth and sixth editions, in the latter particularly in 
view of the Thibani dictum, a more subjective approach was 
adopted. 
The issues raised by the defence of provocation became increas-
ingly narrowed down to one question namely, whether intent had 
been proved. The accused may have been so mentally upset by the 
68} 
69} 
70} 
Murder, assault with intent to murder and assault with 
intent to do grievous bodily harm. 
1949 4 SA 720 (A). 
101. 
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provocation that it could become doubtful whether he had indeed 
intended to bring about the resul t; namely, death or grievous 
bodily harm, brought about by him in this upset state of mind. 
Notwithstanding this clear statement that provocation was a 
factor in the evidential material before the court that had to be 
taken into account in deciding whether intent had been proved, 
there is sti 11 the statement that secti on 141 of the Transkei 
Penal Code sets out the law on the subject. 71 ) In other words 
the defence of provocation had not yet become divested of the 
objective factors that had been associated with it before and 
since Pascoe. 72 ) 
This appears clearly from the following requisites of the plea 
listed namely:73) 
71) 
72) 
73) 
'1) The provocation must have been of such a character as 
to upset the balance of a reasonable man and deprive 
him, for the time being, of the powe r of self-control 
and of the faculty of real izing the probable 
consequences of his act. 
2) The provocation must, in fact, have exercised that 
influence on the mind of the accused. 
6ed 102. 
In modern terms: the defence was viewed as affecting 
psychological and/or normative fault . 
6ed 103, Sed 79. 
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3) The act of the accused must have supervened irrmed-
iately upon the provocation and have been the natural 
reacti on to it. 
4) The mode of resentment must have borne a reasonable 
relationship to the provocation' . 
Comments on the first requirement are as follows: 
'As to the first of these, the provocation must have been 
such as to affect in the manner stated the mind of a reas-
onable man: an unusually excitable or pugnacious, or even 
a neuropathic individual would not be entitled to the 
relief unless it were shown that a reasonable man would 
have reacted in the way he did . . ,74) 
Considerations as to how a reasonable man would have reacted were 
still very much in evidence, thus creating the impression that 
anger arising in circumstances in which a reasonable man would 
not become angry would not be justified or justifiable anger. Or 
perhaps it would be better put to say that such anger even if it 
did affect the intent in question, would be ignored in determin-
ing the presence or absence of such intent. It is doubtful 
whether this was really the law in practice. It is far more 
74) 103- 4. 
- 264 -
likely that in practice the courts were sceptical as to whether 
provocation that would not have angered the reasonable man, did 
in fact anger the accused. In other words there was a tendency to 
regard the accused as bearing the onus to establish that notwith-
standing the objectively unreasonable nature of his reaction, he 
had in fact so reacted. Another view was that, although this is 
nowhere stated in so many words, a normative view was taken of 
provocation: if the provocation were not such as to affect a 
reasonable man the accused was expected not to be angered by it 
and he would be reproached as if he had not been provoked. The 
statement concerning the abnormally excitable, psychopathic or 
psycho-neurotic person75 ) is also similarly unsatisfactory. If 
an accused, because of a combination of provocation and subjec-
tive factors of this nature lacked intent, he lacked intent. To 
hol d otherwi se was to convict on the strength of mens rea or 
psychological fault which was not present. 
Of interest in the discussion was the mention of 'particular 
intent' or 'specific intent'. This was not so much the statement 
of a doctrine as a convenient mode of expression. The three 
crimes mainly under discussion; namely, murder, assault with 
intent to murder and assault with intent to do grievous bodily 
harm, are' resul t' crimes as opposed to formally defined crimes. 
If the accused was proved to have performed an act; for instance, 
to have thrown a brick at the deceased or the complainant as 
75) 103. 
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the case may be, and the act was proved to have had a result: the 
deceased was killed or the complainant seriously injured, the 
accused coul d hardly have been heard to say that he had thrown 
the brick unintentionally. His intention to throw the brick 
would usually have been easy to establish. But the prosecution's 
difficulties would have commenced when the accused alleged in his 
evidence that his mind was so clouded with anger and exasperation 
that he di d not, in throwi ng the bri ck, gi ve a thought to the 
fact that the brick might injure, maim, wound or even kill the 
person at whom he was throwing it. In cross-examination it would 
be put to him that he had been aware of these possible results of 
hi s conduct and he woul d probably respond that had he been so 
aware, he would not have thrown the brick. It would be put to 
him that in the 1 i ght of common experi ence he knew that bri cks 
thrown at people could seriously injure them. His answer would 
probably be that he had indeed known this since early childhood, 
but that in the heat of the moment occasioned by the anger 
engendered by the provocation, he had not thought of it. 
If it had been established that the accused had been provoked, 
that he had picked up the brick and had thrown it in immediate 
reaction to the provocation, that he had done no more than this 
and had tried to assist the person who had been injured, it would 
call for superhuman powers of cross-examination 'to break his 
story', and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, in throwing the 
bri ck, he had intended to kill or i nj ure the person at whom he 
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had thrown it. At the close of ttie case the defence woul d 
confi dently submit that although an intent to apply force had 
been proved, the specific intent to kill or infl ict serious 
injury had not been proved. If the person hit with the brick had 
died, culpable homicide would have been proved and if the person 
survived, common assault. 
It would all really be a question of whether the mens rea alleged 
by the prosecution had been established. Eye-witnesses may have 
testified that the accused had told the deceased or injured party 
as the case may be, to 'hang on a moment ' and he would be taught 
a lesson 'about bricks' that he would either not live to remember 
or would never forget if he were lucky enough to survive. They 
might also testify that the accused had spent some time looking 
for the brick and had then thrown it. He might al so have 
expressed satisfaction with the injuries inflicted on the other 
party. I f the prosecuti on were so fortunate as to have such 
evidence on record, there would be no doubt that the accused had 
indeed foreseen specifically that his throwing of the brick would 
seriously injure or kill the other party. 
Seen in this light, it is a bit astonishing that the use of the 
term 'specific intent' could have attracted so much adverse 
academic comment. 76 ) 
76) eg De Wet and Swanepoel led 85; cf Chretien 1103H-l104A. 
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2.5 Pitman 
In 1950 Pi tman77 ) adhered to the vi ew that secti on 141 of the 
Transkei Penal Code reflected our law relating to provocation. 
In the discussion a mixture of objective and subjective factors 
are mentioned. No clear statement as to proof of the actual 
state of mind of an accused who assaults or kills under provoca-
ti on is made. The foll owi ng is sai d concerni ng the effect of 
provocative conduct: 
'Such conduct is deemed so to have enraged the killer, so 
taken him out of himsel f, that for the moment he was 
rendered incapable of controlling himself and realizing 
the probable consequences of his conduct.'78) 
The use of the word 'deemed' is unfortunate. What one would have 
expected is a reference to what the accused was proved to have 
actually intended and the possible effect of evidence of provoca-
tion on the overall weight of the evidence tendered in support of 
the prosecution's averment that he acted intentionally. 
2. 6 Barlow 
Barlow79 ) stated the law relating to provocation as follows: 
77) 123-5. 
78) 124. 
79) 10-11. 
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a) Murder is reduced to culpable homicide if the accused 
is so provoked by the action of the deceased as to be 
temporarily deprived of self-control. 
b) The killing must take place immediately upon receiv-
ing of the provocation. 
c) Only under the most extreme circumstances will words 
amount to sufficient provocation to reduce the nature 
of the crime.' 
The discussion which follows consists of brief statements of 
particular rules governing the applicability or non-applicability 
of the defence. These rules consist of objective and subjective 
requirements. The initial statement is: 80 ) 
'Overwhelming anger, springing from some internal emotion, 
such as jealousy, is not in itself sufficient ground for a 
plea of provocation. The court must pay attention to the 
facts that give rise to the anger, not to the anger 
itself'. 
This statement, based on an unknown Outch writer,81) is in con-
trast to the views expressed in Thibani 82) 
-'---' 
but is in 
80) 11. 
81) van Diense writing in 1860. 
82) supra. 
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conformity with the general policy of viewing provocation object-
ively as well as, or perhaps 'rather than', subjectively, which 
appears from the authorities so far discussed. Section 141 of 
the Transkeian Penal Code is not referred to. 
Thi bani83 ) is referred to, but not in such a way as to suggest 
that the case was of any great importance. Thus, the author 
sai d: 84 ) 
'In the recent case of Thibani, it was held that provoca-
tion in South Africa was a problem of fact rather than of 
legal rules. It is probable, however, that the rules set 
out above will continue to guide our courts on the point.' 
2.7 Brolcensha 
The views of Gardiner and Lansdown, Pitman and Barlow were becom-
i ng outmoded in the 1 ate 1950' s. 85) They ought perhaps to be 
contrasted with a passage from Brokensha written in 1960: 86 ) 
83) 
84) 
85) 
86) 
supra. 
12. 
Some practitioners in the criminal courts were inclined to 
regard Gardiner and Lansdown as a 'Prosecutor's manual'. 
It does seem to have favoured the prosecution, and the 
retention of objective requirements for provocation to 
succeed as a defence, would have this effect. Barlow also 
appears to favour the prosecution. 
220 - The passage is based on Thibani. 
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'Since the clarification of the law following upon the 
cases of Woolmington and Ndhlovu provocation has assumed 
its proper place, not as a defence - though the Crown need 
not negative it unless the evidence reveals it as a poss-
ible factor in the case - but as a special kind of mater-
ial from which in association with the rest of the evi-
dence, the decision must be reached whether or not the 
Crown has proved the intent, as well as the act, beyond 
reasonable doubt.' 
Thibani is then referred to, obviously as the leading authority 
on the subject. 
2.8 De Wet and Swanepoel 
If one reviews the works so far referred to, except Brokensha, it 
is understandable why S Postma in a thesis on murder and culpable 
homicide completed in 195787) was extremely critical of our law 
of culpable homicide particularly in the context of the defence 
of provocation. 88 ) 
It is perhaps regrettable that a work which enjoyed such a 
favourable reputation as Gardiner and Lansdown and was held in 
87) Moord en Strafbare Mansl ag in di e Sui d-Afri kaanse 
Strafreg (Publlshed doctoral thesls Dmverslty of [elden 
1957). 
88) 81 ff. Postma's comment is marred by undisguised emotional 
anti-English statements . 
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such high esteem by our courts, did not adopt a more critical 
stance towards the untenable co-mixture of subjective and objec-
tive criteria for provocation that led to convictions of culpable 
homicide on charges of murder. It would probably have been out 
of keeping with its primary aim; namely, to state the positive 
law for practitioners and judicial officers. Nevertheless, 
although one must not be carried away by the wisdom of hindsight, 
it might have served a useful purpose had the authors drawn 
attention to the inconsistencies in the law and the doubtful 
nature of the statement that section 141 of the Transkeian Penal 
Code set out our common law on the subject, instead of their 
expositions in successive editions being little more than an 
inventory of often contradictory rules. 
In 1949 the first edition of De Wet and Swanepoel appeared. In 
many respects this book went to the opposite extreme from 
Gardiner and Lansdown and criticised almost every judgment of the 
Supreme Court on provocation, in many cases unjustifiably.89) 
Provocation is a topic under the general heading of 'toereken-
ingsvatbaarheid'.90) But in the first edition the authors say 
that the question to be considered under the heading of provoca-
tion was whether a 'toerekeningsvatbare' person could raise anger 
89) Thi s wi 11 be referred to more specifi ca 11y in the di scus-
sion of the decisions in question. 
90) led 70-91. 
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as an excuse for his deed. 91 ) The question, so they said, did 
not really belong under the heading of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' 
but would be discussed in that context because the old author-
ities and the courts sometimes connected quick-temperedness with 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid.'92) The discussion is such that 
the impression gained is that the authors should have placed more 
emphas is on 'toerekeni ngsva tbaarhei d' . 
The treatment of the topic commences with the statement that 
serious emotional upheavals do not simply exclude 'toerekenings-
vatbaarheid: ,93) men are expected to control their emotions and 
passions. If a man is incapable of controlling his emotions and 
passions he lacks criminal capacity, or his criminal responsi-
bility is diminished. Significant is the statement that it is 
not the particular passion or emotion that makes a person 
' ontoerekeningsvatbaar', but the inability of a person to control 
his passions that is indicative of his lacking capacity (being 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaar').94) It therefore follows that it is 
not the anger or passion that excuses the accused, but his lack 
of criminal capacity wh i ch was manifested in his inability to 
control himself. This could be a circular argument. But in the 
light of the recent development described in the introduction to 
91) 81. 
92) ibid. 
93) ibid. 
94) 82 ff. 
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. thi s chapter95 ), it is perhaps a pity that the authors di d not 
go more deeply into the question of the effect of provocation on 
'toerekeningsvatbaarheid'. 
The authors then embark on a criticism of English Law, the 
decisions of our courts, section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code 
and the suggestion that provocation could result in the inability 
to form an intention. Their conclusion is stated96 ) briefly to 
the effect that if the provoked accused has crimi na 1 
capacity,97) he is criminally liable. His anger and whether it 
was justified is only taken into account when punishment is 
considered. 
Noteworthy is the approval accorded a passage from the judgment 
of Stratford JA in Ngobese;98) namely, 
95) 
96) 
97) 
98) 
99) 
'That there was an absence of legal justification for that 
state of mind is irrelevant to the enquiry as to what the 
actual state of mind was. 
We are dealing not with a defence of justifiable homicide 
but with a mental attitude - the intention to kill. 99 ) 
supra 1.1. 
91 second paragraph - paraphrased. 
ie is neither a child, a mentally retarded or ill person, 
or intoxicated and has the necessary dolus or cUlpa. 
1936 AD 296. 
87. 
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Unfortunately this last mentioned attitude of De Wet and 
Swanepoel was not maintained in the second edition where the 
Thi bani deci s i on with its rati 0 very much in the spi ri t of the 
dictum of Stratford JA, was severely criticised100 ). The 
general discussion in the second edition 101 ) is largely similar 
to and in many respects identical with that in the first 
edition. The criticism of Schreiner JA's dictum in Thibani 102 ) 
to the effect that provocation is a special kind of material, 
from which in association with the rest of the evidence the 
finding must be made whether intent to kill had been proved, is 
puzzling. 
It is argued that Schrei ner JA' s vi ews are nei ther Roman Dutch 
1 aw nor Engl i sh 1 aw, nor reconcil ab 1 e wi th secti on 141 of the 
Transkeian Penal Code .103 ) Thi s may be so, but the authors 
were opposed to Engl ish law, very much opposed to the section in 
the Transkeian Penal Code and it is questionable whether 
Roman-Dutch law was clear on the subject of provocation, quite 
apart from the quest i on whether it woul d be advi sab le to return 
to Roman-Dutch ti mes when deal i ng with murder and provoca ti on 
towards the close of the first half of the twentieth century. 
100) 123 first line - the impression is that, try as he might, 
Schreiner JA coul d not do well in the eyes of De Wet and 
Swanepoel. 
lOll 1l7-2~. 
102) supra. 
103) 123. 
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Their further criticism 104) can not be supported. It is 
mainly to the effect that although anger is a factor from which 
the state of mind of an actor can be inferred, anger does not 
necessarily negative intent. It may have the opposite effect. 
It may be precisely because of provocation and resultant anger 
that an accused decided to kill. It could hardly be said that 
the Thibani judgment would contradict this statement. 
Provoca ti on as a defence can be a two-edged sword: thi s has 
always been known. It may result in a sudden welling up of anger 
and hurt feelings that makes it impossible to determine what was 
going on in the mind of the person concerned at the time, or it 
may give rise to a cold quiet rage which prompts the calculated 
deci si on to take revenge when the time is ri pe. In the latter 
case provocation is not a defence but a motive and might well 
serve to prove intent to kill or to injure seriously. 105) 
Genera 11 y the second editi on of De Wet and Swanepoe 1 strongl y 
favours the subjective approach to the effect of provocation on 
the mind of the person provoked and the criticism of the Thibani 
judgment is difficult to reconcile with this approach. 
The section on provocation concludes l ) with some positive 
suggestions of what the law ought to be; namely, 
104) ibid. 
105) cf Mokonto 1971 2 SA 319 (A), 326 C-D. 
1) 124. 
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a) that when anger is considered as a factor indicative 
of the mental attitude accompanying a person's con-
duct, it ought not to make any difference whether the 
anger is j ustifi ed or reasonable or whether it was 
brought about by 1 awful or wrongful conduct on the 
part of the other person; 
b) that, irrespective of its evidential effect as to the 
state of mind of the accused it should have a mitiga-
ting effect if justified; 
c) that the questi on of the effect of anger shoul d be 
determined with reference to the circumstances as 
viewed by the accused at the time and that the lawful 
or unlawful nature of the act giving rise to the 
anger, should not be taken into account; 
d) that section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code should 
not be followed except in the area for which it was 
enacted; 
e) that the view that anger can reduce murder to cul-
pable homicide should be recognised as English law, 
related to the distinction between murder and man-
slaughter in that system. 2) 
2) The Afrikaans text has been paraphrased. 
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This was a very positive attitude which appears eventually to 
have borne fruit in Mokonto. 3 ) 
The mixing of subjective and objective criteria described by 
Gardiner and Lansdown had become untenable. It was simply not 
sufficient merely to describe this state of the positive law. 
Some improvement ought to have been suggested. In this respect 
De Wet and Swanepoel proved its value as a book suggesting 
necessary change. One feel s that it is a pi ty that the book 
should have been marred with so much criticism of the courts . The 
courts were working in the direction of the same solution and the 
Thibani judgment was an important stage in the general 
development. Seen in perspective the purism of De Wet and 
Swanepoel and the pragmatic approach of the courts were working 
together towards the same end result. 
The third edition 4) repeats the criticism of Thibani, criti-
cises the dicta of Schreiner JA5) in Kru1l 6 ) and welcomes the 
decision in Mokonto. 7 
The use of the term 'speci fi c i ntenti on' in Mokonto is 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6 ) 
7l 
supra; vide De Wet and Swanepoel 3ed, 134 n185. 
127-35. 
134. It seems that unlike the King, this judge could 'do 
no right,' at least not in the eyes of De Wet and 
Swanepoel. 
1959 3 SA 392 (A). 
supra. 
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criticised8 ) as well as the term provocation. One is inclined 
to agree that it is not provocation that affects intention but 
the anger that arises from provocation. 
The fourth and most recent edition9 ) largely repeats what was 
said in the third edition. 
The section concl udes, referri ng to Lesch, 10) with the remark 
that a fresh approach in our decisions appears to be the tendency 
to treat provocation as affecting 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid.' One 
feels that perhaps a detailed discussion of this development 
would have been useful. 11 ) 
2.9 Burchell and Hunt 
The discussion of provocation in the first edition of Burchell 
and Hunt,12) has much to commend it. Section 141 of the Trans-
keian Penal Code is said to be a statement of English law rather 
than South African Law13 ) and Thibani 14 ) is regarded, rightly 
8) 134-6. 
9) 130-6; Thibani and Krull are criticised at 135. 
10) 1983 1 SA 814 (0). 
11) Instead one sentence is devoted to the topic. In 1985 de 
Wet and Swanepoel have to some extent arrived at the 
anachronistic position of Gardiner and Lansdown in 1956. 
12) 240-50. 
13) 240. 
14) supra. 
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it is submitted, as the decision which commenced a new approach 
to this defence.l5} This new approach is that provocation is 
viewed as a factor from which, among others, a decision is 
arrived at as to whether intent to kill has been proved. 
Provocation can also negative the specific intent required for 
assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm or any other crime 
requiring a specific intent. The submission is also made that as 
common assault is a crime requiring intent as its mens rea 
provocati on coul din gi ven ci rcumstances negati ve the intent to 
commit a common assault. 16 } 
Krull 17 } is referred to18 } with some approval but it is 
pOinted out that the statement of Schreiner JA that the idiosyn-
cracies of the accused, short of actual insanity, are not to be 
taken into account, is untenable and in any event obiter. The 
view taken in Tenganyika19 } that provocation can reduce an 
intentional killing to culpable homicide, is rejected. 20 } It 
is stressed that Krull has made it clear that in South African 
law provocation cannot reduce an intentional killing to culpable 
homi ci de. 
The view, expressed by de Wet and Swanepoe1 21 } that section 141 
15} 240-l. 
16} 241-2. 
17} supra. 
18} 243. 
19} 1958 3 SA 7 (Fe). 
20} 243. 
21} led 86, 2ed 122, 3ed 132, 4ed 135. 
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of the Transkeian Penal Code was accepted as stating South 
African law, in order to provide the courts with latitude in 
punishment at a time when death was the only penalty for murder 
is also adhered to. 22 ) 
Significant is the statement that for the defence of provocation 
to succeed it must be established that the provocation had caused 
the accused to lose his self-contro1. 23 ) This is not 
elaborated on. This seems to be coming close to saying that the 
accused must have become 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar', (in other words 
unable to control his conduct according to his appreciation of 
its wrongful ness). In practice, an accused would be far more 
likely to say that in the heat of passion occasioned by the 
provocation he had not weighed up the consequences of his 
conduct. For him to say that he had killed another because he 
lost his self-control and could not prevent himself from killing, 
would have been an extremely dangerous line of defence before the 
Chretien,24) Lesch25 ) and Arnold26 ) judgments, as it would 
have amounted to an admission of intent to kill. 
A further significant statement by Burchell and Hunt is that in 
view of the requirement of mens rea for cul pable homicide since 
22) 240. 
23) 244 ff. 
24) supra. 
25) supra. 
26) supra. 
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Bernardus27 it did not automatically follow that an accused 
whose intent to kill had not been proved, would automatically be 
convicted of culpable homicide. It might very well be, (so the 
authors submit), that his conduct had not been unreasonable in 
the circumstances. 2B ) In practice an accused charged with 
murder, would generally have pleaded guilty of culpable 
homi ci de. With Lesch29 ) and Arnol d30 ) on record, it may be 
advisable to plead not guilty altogether depending, of course, on 
the evidence available . 
The discussion in the second edition of Burchell and Hunt31 ) is 
very much the same as that in the first edition, except that the 
Mokont032 ) decision is, correctly it is submitted, viewed as 
having finally clarified the law relating to provocation, in that 
it has clearly indicated that provocation is to be viewed in the 
light of its subjective effect on the accused irrespective of his 
personal character traits or pecularities. 33 ) 
2.10 Snyman 
Snyman (Strafreg) ,34) and Snyman35 ) take the view that 
27) supra. 
2B) 242. 
29 ) supra. 
30) supra. 
31) 306-1B. 
32 ) supra. 
33 ) 314-5. 
34) 157-64. 
35) 145-54. 
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provocation is a factor to be taken into account when deciding 
whether the crime charged had been committed intentionally. The 
view that provocation can reduce an intentional killing to culp-
able homicide is rejected. 36 ) In connection with section 141 
of the Transkeian Penal Code it is stated that the courts 
overlooked the obvious interpretation that this section only came 
into operation once an intentional killing had been estab-
lished. 37) In this respect the interpretation placed on the 
section in Tenganyika38 ) is approved of. 39 ) 
Provocation is regarded as not strictly relevant to the topic of 
'toerekeni ngsvatbaarhei d' ,40) but is, neverthel ess, treated 
under that heading. The 1 earned author is not prepared to 
concede that provocation can lead to a complete acquittal on a 
charge of culpable homicide or common assault. 41 ) It can 
reduce a serious crime to a less serious crime, but cannot result 
in a complete acquittal. This latter view could be too objec-
tive. It could happen, though it is not easy to imagine, that 
the reactions of the accused may not be adjudged unreasonable in 
the circumstances, in which case he would not be guilty of 
36) Snyman 147-8. 
37) ibid. 
38) supra. 
39) 150. 
40) 151. 
41) 146, 151. 
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culpable homicide. In the event of no-one being killed it might 
a 1 so not be poss ib 1 e to prove the intent requi red for common 
assault. 
Snyman rejects the view that anger alone can render a person 
lacking in criminal capacity ('ontoerekeningsvatbaar') .42) The 
law expects us to control ourselves so it is argued and if a 
person reaches a stage of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' because of 
rage or anger, he is temporarily insane and should be dealt with 
in terms of section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 43 ) 
2. 11 Visser and Vorster 
Vi sser and Vorster44 ) di scuss provocati on under the headi ng of 
criminal accountability which is the term used i n this work for 
'toerekeningsvatbaarheid'. The authors, however, add that the 
topic ought not really to be discussed under that heading. 
The decision in Mokont045 ) is taken as stating the law on pro-
vocation correctly . 46) The authors accept the vi ew that rage 
coul d render a person 'ontoerekeni ngsvatbaar', but contend that 
this would be difficult to establish. 47 ) 
42) IS!. 
43) ibid. 
44) 271-83. 
45) supra. 
46) 279. 
47) ibid. 
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2.12 Bergenthuin 
In an unpublished thesis1) JG Bergenthuin made a detailed 
investigation into the law of provocation in England, West 
Germany and South Africa. 
He strongly favours 2) the subjective approach increasingly 
adopted by the courts since Thibani .3) At the same time he 
favours the normative fault theory4) and is of the opinion that 
fault in the sense of juridical fault as well as fault relevant 
to sentence, are gradations of moral blameworthiness. The 
normati ve fault concept is able to accommodate both types of 
fault better than the psychological fault concept. The basis of 
all fault, whether juridical or relevant to sentence only is 
'toerekeningsvatbaarheid'. There is no need for a concept of 
provocation. If general principles are consistently appl ied, 
considerations relating to the 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' of the 
accused will ensure that he is justly dealt with in terms of his 
moral blameworthiness . The concept of 'provocati on' then 
becomes, so it is argued, entirely redundant in the criminal 
law. 5 ) 
1) Provokasie as Verweer in die Suid-Afrikaanse Strafreg 
(Unpublished doctoral thesis University of Pretoria 1985); 
cf 1986 OJ 273. 
2) BergenthliTn 600. 
3) supra. 
4) 601. 
5) Bergenthuin's conclusions are stated in the 'Finale Stand-
punt-inname' in the thesis (599-602). 
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It seems that there is merit in Bergenthuin's views that the 
reaction of the accused should be subjectively considered, but on 
an application of normative fault objective considerations will 
inevitably come into the picture. On his view of fault the clear 
line drawn between juridical fault and fault relevant to sentence 
only6) is blurred and passionate reactions to provocation are 
no longer divisable into those that entitle the accused to an 
acquittal and those that mitigate sentence. 
It is submitted that Bergenthuin's views support the opinion that 
the normative fault doctrine functions best in a one-phase trial 
system. 7l It is a clumsy tool with which to determine guilt or 
innocence but useful when considering sentence. 
3 SOUTH AFRICAN DECISIONS ON PROVOCATION 
In Buthelezi 1) the statement is made that Gardiner and Lansdown 
correctly states section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code to 
reflect the South African common law. The accused had come home 
unexpected and found hi s wife arm-i n-arm wi th a man he had for 
some time suspected of being her lover . He reached for his knife 
with the i ntenti on of kill i ng thi s man, but the man fl ed. He 
then took his wife to their room and asked her who this man was. 
6) Theron supra. 
7) du Plessis 1985 SALJ 301, 317-9. 
1) 1925 AD 160. --
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She said she did not know. Then he stabbed her in the upper part 
of her 1 egs. One stab-wound penetrated the femoral vei n behi nd 
her knee. Blood spurted out of this latter wound and she soon 
bled to death. Accused lit a lamp at one stage and became aware 
that his wife was bleeding profusely. He left the room locking 
the door behind him. 
The court a quo had convicted him of murder. In an application 
for leave to appeal it was submitted that the accused had not 
intended to kill firstly, because: 
'the applicant had received such provocation that in the 
heat of pass i on he was depri ved of the power of se If-
control, and infl icted the injuries which resulted in 
death without any intention either of killing the deceased 
or of inflicting upon her such grievous bodily harm as was 
calcul ated to cause death; and secondly, that the nature 
and situation of the wounds inflicted show that there was 
no intention to kill or to inflict serious bodily injury, 
calculated to cause death. ,2) 
Clearly, counsel for the accused had approached the matter along 
subjective lines. It is also noteworthy that the court, both 
Solomon JA3) and Kotze JA4) approached the matter along 
2) 161. 
3) In his minority, but not dissenting judgment . 
4) In whose judgment Innes CJ concurred. 
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the lines whether intent to kill had been established. Intent to 
kill was found in the callous conduct of the accused in that he 
left the heavily bleeding woman without any effort to assist her 
or to obtain assistance. Using to-day's terminology: he was 
aware of the possibility that she might bleed to death and left 
her to bleed, recklessly careless as to whether she bled to death 
or not. His mens rea would therefore be adjudged dolus 
eventualis at a present-day trial. 
The contention that the accused had lost his self-control because 
of the provocation he had received, was rejected on the grounds 
that accused had acted too deliberately for the inference to be 
drawn that he had lost his self-control. 
The court made a strong recommendati on of mercy. The death 
sentence was regarded as inappropriate. Had the court wished to 
invoke secti on 141 of the Transkei an Penal Code to change the 
verdict to one of culpable homicide in order to make it possible 
for a more lenient sentence to be imposed, it could no doubt have 
done so. This was not 'done because the objective requirements of 
section 141 were not met. This could support the contention that 
the statement that, prior to 1935 the courts readily convicted of 
culpable homicide in order to avoid the death penalty, is not 
always true . The court applied the law and made a recommendation 
of mercy to the executive. 
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The decision also leads one to believe that in practice, when 
provocation was raised as an issue in homicide prosecutions, the 
main thrust of the investigation would be to determine whether 
intent to kill had been estab1ished. 5) 
In B10k1and6) the facts proved were that the accused had killed 
his wife in a fit of rage brought on by a strong suspicion that 
he had caught her at a stage when she was about to commit adult-
ery. The court?) accepted the law as stated in section 141 of 
the Transkeian Penal Code, subject to certain reservations. But 
the conviction of murder was reduced to one of culpable homicide 
because of evidence that at the time of the slaying the accused 
had been demented with rage. 
It seems that intent to kill had not been proved because of this 
extreme state of rage though this is nowehere so stated in the 
judgment. Consequently, the accused was guilty of culpable homi-
cide. A comparison of Bute1ezi and B10k1and is fruitful. In 
both cases subjective inquiries were made with the obvious 
purpose of determining whether there had been intent to kill. By 
to-days's standards Bute1ezi would still have been convicted. 
B10k1and might have been acquitted on the ground of 'ontoereken-
ingsvatbaarheid'; loss of se1 f-contro1 or inability to control 
5) Such provocation as an accused may have received would 
nowadays be considered as a possible extenuating circum-
stance, if he is convicted of murder. 
6) 1946 AD 940. 
7) per Davies AJA. 
- 289 -
his conduct according to his appreciation of its unlawfulness. 
Dihau Mobaso,8) referred to in Blokland, is a difficult case to 
understand. The accused killed a man caught in flagrante delicto 
committing adultery with his wife. He was charged and convicted 
of cul pable homicide by a magistrate and sentenced to 6 months 
imprisonment. On review the whole of the sentence was suspen-
ded. From the facts it would appear that intent to kill had not 
been proved. 9) But as the court was only concerned wi th sen-
tence, the question of intent was apparently not deemed necessary 
to discuss. The general tenor of the judgment gives the impres-
sion that the provocation would have reduced the crime to 
culpable homicide even if intent had been proved . 
In Tshabalala10 ) the approach to provocation was clearly objec-
ti ve. The accused had k i 11 ed hi s employer under di re provoca-
tion . The trial judge found that the provocation had deprived 
the accused of his self-control, but it was not such as to have 
deprived an ordinary person of his self-control. The accused had 
been convi cted of murder and the Appe 11 ate Di vi si on refused to 
interfere. The question was therefore not what the accused had 
in fact intended, but whether the provocation was such as to 
operate in his favour and to render his crime culpable homicide. 
8) 1944 OPD 192. 
9) It was in any event irrelevant in view of the charge. 
10) 1946 AD 1061. 
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Assumi ng that the accused had not intended to kill, one coul d 
submit that the court had appl ied a normative theory of fault. 
His fault did not depend on what had been going on in his mind 
but what the law prescribed his mental state ought to have been. 
If one assumes that he had intended to kill, the normative find-
ing is that, on the facts, this was not a case in which an inten-
tional killing could be treated as if it were culpable "homicide. 
In other words, in terms of the prescribed norms, the accused had 
to be convicted as if he had acted intentionally. 
Attwoodll ) is a grim case in which human folly and arrogance 
gave rise to two deaths by shooting . The person who did the 
shooting was sentenced to death. Attwood was a farmer experien-
cing financial difficulties and placed under pressure as a 
result. Hi s partner one Kretzner was di ssati sfi ed wi th the 
partnership. Also dissatisfied was a borehole contractor, one 
Geni s, who had not been pa i d for a borehole he had sunk for 
accused. Genis and Kretzner went to Attwood's home and in the 
presence and to the exasperation of Attwood Genis took some 
items Kretzner claimed were his. Genis told Attwood he would 
remove the casing he had put into Attwood's borehole. It was 
clear that Genis had decided to resort to self-help rather than 
sue Attwood. The attitude and threats of Genis incensed Attwood. 
11) 1946 AD 331. 
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Genis and Kretzner then drove to Attwood's borehole. Attwood 
took a loaded rifle and followed them. Exactly what happened at 
the borehole is not clear, but in the course of firing four shots 
from his rifle Attwood killed Genis and Kretzner. 
Attwood's defence was that he had acted in self-defence. On his 
version Genis had challenged him to a shoot-out pointing his 
(Genis') rifle at him. He had shot Genis after some careful 
manoeuvering to ensure that he was not killed. He then shot 
Kretzner dead as the latter bent down to pick up a rifle - so he 
thought - with which to shoot him. If accused's version were 
accepted he could at best have hoped to be convicted of culpable 
homicide in respect of Kretzner. 
His evidence in support of his plea of self-defence was uncon-
vincing and wisely his counsel sought to rely on provocation. 
Attwood himself had admitted that he had shot intending to kill. 
If the defence of self-defence was to be rejected, he would have 
had to be found guilty of murder unless provocation could reduce 
the two intentional killings to cul pable homicide. 
The majority of the Appellate Division held that he had indeed 
been provoked by the unlawful conduct of Genis; that a reasonable 
jury prope'rly instructed coul d have found the provocation suffi-
cient to have deprived an ordinary person of his self-control and 
that such a jury could have found that Attwood had killed Genis 
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while so deprived of his power of self-control. 
The conviction in respect of the killing of Genis was therefore 
reduced to one of culpable homicide. In respect of Kretzner's 
death the court refused to make a similar finding. Kretzner had 
not acted unlawfully, had sat quietly in the vehicle during the 
fatal episode between Attwood and Genis, had in no way provoked 
Attwood and vi s-a-vi s Kretzner Attwood coul d therefore not rely 
on provocati on. His conviction of murder in respect of 
Kretzner's death was therefore upheld. 
The decision has been severely criticised by De Wet and Swane-
poel 12 ) on the basis that the loss of sel f-control experienced 
vis-a.-vis Genis could not work directionally only and would still 
have been operative at the time of the shooting of Kretzner. This 
criticism is unfounded in the light of the evidence. On the evi-
dence of the accused he di d not shoot Kretzner in the heat of 
passion or while unable to control himself, but only after obser-
ving Kretzner bending down and on the supposition that Kretzner 
would try to shoot at him. Furthermore a Black labourer who was 
assisting Genis raised his hands above his head in token of 
surrender after the shooting of Kretzner. He was told by Attwood 
12) 2ed 122 n167. The statement that Attwood had killed his 
victims in a few seconds (in' n ·ommesientjie) is mislead-
ing. Attwood worked out the situation fairly carefully 
during the shooting. The glaring weakness in his case was 
that on his own version he had not shot Kretzner in 
response to provocation, but in putative self- defence. 
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to 'scatter'. It would seem that Attwood had been quite capable 
of deciding who to shoot. 
It is by no means certain that the objective standards employed 
by the court in upholding the conviction of murder would not have 
been given significantly less weight, had it not been plain on 
the evidence that accused had intentionally and deliberately 
killed Kretzner. 
The relevant portion of the judgment of Watermeyer CJ reads: 
'It was suggested in argument that the acts of Genis might 
have roused the accused to such a pitch of anger that he 
shot Kretzner wi thout real i zi ng what he was doi ng. But 
assuming that acts of Genis constituted provocation suffi-
cient to deprive the accused of his power of controlling 
his actions directed against Genis, this heat of passion 
woul d not have depri ved an ordi nary man of the power of 
controlling his action against Kretzner; and in any event 
the accused's evidence does not suggest that he lost his 
power of sel f-control so far as the shooti ng of Kretzner 
is concerned' .12a ) 
It is not, however, to be denied that the reference to an ordin-
ary man not being deprived of his power of sel f-control does 
12a) 342. 
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still retain an objective requirement reminiscent of Pascoe and 
to be found in section 141 of the Trankeian Penal Code. One won-
ders what the court would have decided if it had found that the 
accused had indeed 1 acked self-control when shooti ng Kretzner . 
Would the considerations that Kretzner had done nothing wrongful 
and that an ordinary person would not have lost his self-control 
to this extent, have weighed sufficiently heavily for a convic-
tion of murder in respect of an unintentional killing? A finding 
similar to that in Tshabalala13 } could have been made, but it 
is doubtful. 
Thibani 14 } is the case in which a definite stand in favour of a 
subjective approach to provocation and its effects was taken. It 
is generally hailed as a decision which commenced a decided shift 
from the application of objective requirements such as those set 
out in section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code to the evaluation 
of provocation or alleged provocation as evidential material 
relevant to the question whether intent had been proved. 
As has been pointed out with reference to Butelezi, Blokland and 
Attwood, the courts had not eschewed investigation into intent as 
a subjective factor before Thibani. But in Thibani the law is 
stated with unmistakeable clari tylS} as now requiring this 
13} supra. 
14} 1949 4 SA 720 (A). 
IS} vide Bergenthuin 168-9. Bergenthuin praises Schreiner JA's 
judgment and comments urifavourably on the cri ti ci sm to 
which it is subjected by De Wet and Swanepoel. 
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approach. 
On the facts it is doubtful whether the case is one about proyo-
cation as traditionally understood. 16 ) The accused suspected 
his wife of adultery. She gave him evasive answers and, apparen-
tly fearing that a 'show down' was about to take place, attempted 
flight. On accused's evidence (which the appeal court could not 
fault), he caught the deceased and proceeded to hit her with a 
light whip. She caught him by the private parts and dragged him 
about. He lost his self-control because of the excruciating pain 
thus inflicted and beat his wife without restraint for a fairly 
long period. Eventually he grabbed a stick and hit her over the 
head. This ended the struggle. She died afterwards of multiple 
bruises and shock. 
As the deceased had acted in self-defence she had not acted un-
lawfully and it was the accused who had set in motion the train 
of events by attacking her: 
Schreiner JA considered these factors, but stated that the funda-
mental inquiry was whether there had been an intent to kill. In 
the absence of such an intent there coul d be no murder. The 
following is an extensive extract from the judgment which 
16) The accused assaulted the deceased who inflicted excrucia-
ting pain on him in sel f-defence. He appears to have 
lashed out at her in order to bring an end to the pain she 
was inflicting on him. His defence therefore borders on 
that of necessity. 
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contains a summary of the principles involved and incidentally 
supports the view that in Attwood there are distinct signs of the 
court's employing subjective criteria : 17 ) 
'The general pri nci p 1 e that for murder there must be an 
intention to kill in one of the legally accepted senses is 
commonly supplemented by sub-rules to such matters as 
self-defence, provocation, intoxication and the like. The 
development of such sub-rules is a common and useful 
feature in the growth of a legal system as they hel p to 
make the 1 aw easi er to di scover and more certain. But 
until it is clear that the working of a particular sub-
rule is entirely satisfactory, some caution in its 
application may be desirable. The sub-rule that we are 
most obviously concerned with is that which deal s with 
provocation. The language of sec. 141 of the Transkeian 
Criminal Code was accepted in Rex v. Butelezi (1925, A.D. 
160) as correctly laying down our law on the subject . In 
Rex v. Attwood (1946, A.D. 331) the Chief Justice, while 
repeating the former general approval of sec. 141 as a 
statement of the common law, mentioned that it might in 
some cases need further elaboration; in this connection 
the treatment, at p.342, of the killing of Kretzner is 
significant, for it shows that provocation by Genis was 
17) 730-1. 
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not regarded as clearly irrelevant to the question whether 
Attwood intended to kill Kretzner. The possibi1 ity that 
further e 1 aborati on of the 1 anguage of the secti on mi ght 
be necessary was again referred to by Davis, A.J.A. in Rex 
v. B10k1and (1946, A.D. 940 at p.944), but that was not a 
case in which any such e1 aborati on was requi red. In none 
of these cases was it necessary to exami ne closely -the 
effect to be given to the word 'wrongful' in the 
expression 'wrongful act or insult' used in sec. 141, but 
that is the point with which we have to deal in the 
present case. It is not easy to see how the deceased in 
grasping the Appellant's private parts acted wrongfully in 
any ordi nary sense of the 1 atter word, si nce she was the 
victim of a cruel assault and only acted desperately in 
self defence. Does that then conc1 ude the matter, and is 
an act done in self-defence by .the victim never to be 
regarded as 'provocation', however completely the original 
wrong-doer has lost his self-control in consequence of the 
pain or other physical effects of the victim's act? If 
the matter were merely one between the original wrong-doer 
and the victim the position would properly be met by say-
ing that the wrong-doer had brought upon himself the 
victim's natural reaction and could not use its conse-
quences for his own protection. But this reason i ng would 
lead to a conflict between the sub-rule stating the limits 
of provocati on and the general pri nci p 1 e that the Crown 
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must prove the intention to kill. The sub-rule has not, I 
think, become established so clearly in the precise 
1 anguage of the Transkei an Code as to have produced a 
modification of the general principle. Si nce the 
clarification of the law following upon the cases of 
Woolmington (1935, A.C. 462) and Ndhlovu (1945, A.D. 369) 
provocation seems to me to have assumed its proper place, 
not as a defence - though the Crown need not negative it 
unless the evidence reveals it as a possible factor in the 
case - but as a special kind of material from which, in 
association with the rest of the evidence, the decision 
must be reached whether or not the Crown has proved the 
intent, as well as the act, beyond reasonable doubt'. 
The si gnifi cance of the reference to Wool mi ngton18 ) and 
Ndhlovu19 ) is that these cases had squarely placed the onus of 
proving intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt in murder cases on 
the prosecution. Rules of thumb according to which intent was 
rebuttably presumed20 ) had been jettisoned in English law in 
Woolmington, and South African law had followed suit in Ndhlovu. 
18) Woolmington vs DPP 1935 AC 462. 
19) 1945 AD 369 . -
20) Subject to further rules of thumb for instance those in 
section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code. 
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The criticism of Thibani by De Wet and Swanepoel is unsound. 21 ) 
What Schreiner JA decided in Thibani was that there could be no 
conviction of murder without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
intent to kill and that the excruciating pain inflicted on the 
accused had such an effect on his mind, that it could not be said 
that an intent to kill had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Assume that accused had desisted from beating deceased and that 
she had relinquished her grip. An hour or so later, reflecting 
on the indignity he had suffered and the pain he had endured, 
accused may have returned to exact revenge and beaten the woman 
21) 2ed 123, 3ed 133, 4ed 135 wording slightly altered. It is 
to the effect that things had gone completely awry (loop 
dinge heeltemal deurmekaar) in the judgment . They say 
that the defence had not served merely to excl ude dol us 
mal us in Roman-Dutch 1 aw, but that the effect had been 
exactly the opposite namely that provocation was a mitiga-
ting factor precisely where the accused had acted dolo 
malo . In English law provocation was recognized as reduc-
~murder to voluntary manslaughter where the accused had 
the intent to kill. They also state that the provisions 
of section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code were that 
murder, in other words intentional kill ing, would be 
reduced to culpable homicide by provocation. The attitude 
adopted in De Wet and Swanepoel is puzzl i ng . They appear 
to favour the approach of English law, which they seldom 
refer to, or the Transkeian Penal Code, to the enlightened 
subjective approach of Schrei ner JA. They add that they 
do not wish to suggest that provocation is of no import-
ance in respect of the inferences concerni ng hi s mental 
state to be drawn from a person's conduct. Their view is 
that this is not the sole function of provocation. Provo-
cation, if resulting in justified anger, can have a 
mitigating or extenuating effect on punishment. It is 
probably not really necessary to remark that Schreiner JA 
had by no means deni ed that provocati on coul d have thi s 
last-named effect; cf supra 2.8. 
- 300 -
to death. Then the 'provocation' he had suffered would have 
served as proof of motive or revengeful malice and of intent to 
k ill. The 1 atter hypotheti ca 1 events are also reconcil abl e with 
Schreiner JA's views on the function of provocation as evidential 
material. 22 ) De Wet and Swanepoel' s discussion would appear to 
miss this point 
More specifically, the Thibani decision can be said to have made 
convictions of culpable homicide on charges of murder in circum-
stances of provocation possible on the basis that the provocation 
coul d corroborate the evi dence of the accused that he had not 
intended to kill. An unlawful killing, not committed intention-
ally, amounted to cul pab 1 e homi ci de before Van der Mescht23 ) 
and Bernardus. 24 ) Since those two decisions culpa would have to 
be established in addition to the unintentional unlawful killing. 
Kennedy25) is a decision reported some t'l/O years after 
Thibani,26) which, it is submitted, represents a retrograde 
step when compared with the latter. Kennedy had arranged to re-
marry his ex-wife. On the eve of their planned re-marriage he 
visited her and found her in the amorous embrace of a young man 
with whom he knew that she had been having an affair. Kennedy 
22) 73l. 
23) 1962 1 SA 521 (A). 
24) 1951 4 SA 431 (A). 
25) 1951 4 SA 431 (A). 
26) supra. 
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immediately shot and killed his ex-wife and at the same time shot 
and seriously wounded her companion. 
Kennedy raised two incompatible lines of defence. First that he 
was a psychopath and had acted in an emotional storm which made 
it impossible for him to distinguish between right and wrong when 
killing the unfortunate woman; secondly, that the provocation of 
seeing his ex-wife and intended future wife in another man's arms 
had so affected his psychopathic mind that he had fired the shots 
without intending to kill. 27) 
The fi rst defence was rejected on the grounds that al though it 
was accepted that Kennedy was a psychopath, he had fail ed to 
prove on a balance of probabilities that he had acted in a state 
of psychopathic derangement when killing the deceased. 
The second defence was rejected on the grounds that Kennedy had 
been aware of the relationship between the deceased and her 
companion, and that the provocation of coming upon them in an 
amorous embrace was not such a shock as woul d have provoked a 
normal person into killing. The fact that Kennedy was a psycho-
path and therefore more prone to a violent reaction than persons 
who are not psychopaths, could not count in his favour. 
27) His one line of defence was therefore based on an intent 
to kill formed as a result of provocation and his other 
line of defence was that such an intent had been absent. 
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Provocation, to succeed as a defence had to be considered in the 
light of its effect on a normal person and not in the light of 
its effect on an individual with the personal traits and idio-
syncrasies of the particular accused. Schreiner JA concurred in 
the judgment of Greenberg JA and it has created surpri se28 ) 
that he coul d have done so in the 1 i ght of the vi ews he had 
expressed in Thibani. One must, however, bear in mind that the 
case against Kennedy was very strong, that there was no doubt 
that he had shot with the intention of killing and that there 
would have been little sense in rejecting the defence of psycho-
pathy in response to the submi ssi on that he had acted under an 
irresistible impulse, whilst accepting it in response to the 
submission that he had acted under provocation. 29 ) 
In Thibani there had also been no question of any personal pecu-
liarity on the part of the accused . It went without saying that 
any normal man would have experienced the excruciating pain he 
experienced. 
The Kennedy judgment is not very cl ea r on exactl y how a tri er 
of fact should determine the presence or absence of intention in 
28) vide Bergenthuin 270. 
29) It must also be borne in mind that at the time, and for 
many years afterwards, raising the defence that the 
accused was a psychopath was almost automatically doomed 
to fail ure. Psychopaths were regarded as persons who are 
not able to control themselves and the courts were 
inclined to regard them as people whose persistent 
criminal tendencies had been given a scientific name; cf 
Roberts 1957 4 SA 265 (A) . 
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the light of provocation. In this connection one may consider 
the following passage from the judgment of Greenberg JA:30) 
'In consi deri ng whether there was such provocati on as 
coul d reduce the crime from murder to cul pable homici de, 
the appellant is not entitled to any special consideration 
because of his psychopathic personality; the question on 
thi s factor of provocati on is whether an ordi nary person 
woul d have been deprived of his power of self-control by 
the act which caused the killing (Rex v. Attwood 1946 
A.D. 331). On this issue, however, the ~ is on the 
Crown to prove the intention to kill and if there is a 
reasonable possibility of the happening of such events as 
would be sufficient to deprive any ordinary person of his 
self-control, then, on this requisite the answer must be 
in the favour of the appellant'. 
It is not clear what is meant by loss of self-control . Nor is 
it clear what bearing loss of self-control would have on inten-
tion. Presumably a person who acts while having lost his self-
control, does not act intentionally. But it is not certain 
whether this is what was meant. A person may intend to kill some-
one and act in furtherance of this intention, precisely because 
he has lost his self-control. If he had been in control of 
himself he woul d not have given way to the impul se or desire to 
30) 438H to 439 pro 
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kill. On the other hand loss of self-control may mean that the 
person concerned is in such a state subjectively that his mental 
processes are too confused for it to be found that he had fully 
appreciated the possible, probable or obvious consequences of his 
conduct. 
An inquiry along the above lines would be subjective. The ques-
tion whether a normal person would have lost his self-control in 
the same circumstances would be irrelevant to the inquiry. The 
fact that the accused has a psychopathic - and therefore a more 
exp1 os i ve - personality than the normal person wou1 d be very 
relevant to such a subjecti ve inquiry. One must therefore con-
clude that notwithstanding the dictum in Thibani, Greenberg 
JA31) still viewed the law as being such that unless certain 
objective requirements were met, provocation could not negative 
intent to kill, irrespective of its significance as evidential 
material. 
The ratio of the decision is not clear. From the concluding 
passage of the judgment, it would seem that in rejecting the 
contention that the accused had been sufficiently provoked to 
negative intention on his part, the court was also not prepared 
to accept that a reasonab1 e person wou1 d have reacted as the 
accused did. This is a puzzling and inconclusive juxtaposition 
of subjective and objective considerations. 
31) Schreiner JA and Fagan JA concurring. 
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In Tenganyi ka32 ) the Federal Supreme Court expl ained and 
app 1 i ed the 1 aw ina manner whi ch, wi th the greatest respect to 
its South African counterparts, indicated a clearer grasp of the 
essenti a 1 effect of the provi s ions of secti on 141 of the Trans-
keian Penal Code, than any South African judgment . The section 
clearly does not require provocation to comply with the objective 
requirements enumerated before it is taken into account in deter-
mining whether an intent to kill had been proved. Once the 
intent to kill had been established, such provocation as may have 
been present, is evaluated for the second time to determine 
whether, notwithstanding proof of intent to ki 11, the accused 
ought in any event not to be convicted of culpable homicide 
rather than murder. 33 ) 
Difficulty is occasioned by the requirement of section 141 that 
the accused must indeed have lost his self-control. The answer 
is that the intentional killing would usually be the result of 
loss of self-control and, if the accused were a 'cool customer' 
who used the provoca ti on as an excuse for cal cul a tedly kill i ng 
the deceased, he would not be entitled to the reduction of the 
blameworthiness or degree of unlawfulness of his conduct. 
Tenganyika's case is also not founded on the bare provisions of 
32) 1958 3 SA 7 (FC). 
33) In view of the appearance in our law of the normative 
fault concept, the approach of the Federal Supreme Court 
is startl ingly 'modern'. The normative fault doctrine 
results in two inqulrles, first was there intent or 
negligence and second, if there was intent or negligence, 
are there grounds for reproaching the accused? 
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section 141 but on a view of the law which makes it similar to 
these provisions. 
The question of the personal idiosyncracies or intoxication of 
the particular accused is also dealt with satisfactorily in 
Tenganyika. Any such factor would be relevant to the question of 
the intent that must be established before the objective (norma-
tive?) requirements of provocation are considered in the second 
i nqui ry above referred to. 
It is submitted that Tenganyika's case embodied far sounder 
principles than its South African contemporaries. To view 
matters differently than in Tenganyika as was done by the South 
African courts, really amounted to using an additional measure 
favourab 1 e to the accused, once intent had been subj ecti vely 
proved, in such a way as to enable 'intent' to be held as proved 
in terms of objective standards in circumstances where it had not 
been proved subjectively.34) 
If one bears in mind that it was a rule of sUbstantive law rather 
than a rule of evidence that every man was presumed to intend the 
reasonable, probable and natural consequences of his actions 
until fairly recently,35) it is quite understandable that this 
34) In other words an objective measure designed to assist the 
accused was used to bring about his downfall subjectively. 
35) Burchell and Hunt led 146ff; De Bruyn 1968 4 SA 498 (A). 
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inverted application of the provisions of section 141 could have 
taken place. One must al so bear in mind that mens rea was 
presumed once actus reus had been proved up to Ndhlovu in 1945. 
Consequently provocation coul d be viewed as a factor rebutting 
this presumption, but only on certain circumscribed conditions 
being met. 36 ) 
The law as stated in Tenganyika has been consistently applied in 
Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesi a). It was reaffi rmed in Nangani. 37) 
The judgment of Fieldsend CJ is a model of clarity.38) 
As an example of clear straight-forward legal thinking the 
following is quoted from Fieldsend CJ's judgment: 39 ) 
36 ) 
37) 
38 ) 
39) 
'There are arguments both of pri nci p 1 e and expedi ency in 
favour of each of the two approaches. The South Afri can 
approach follows the logical and systematic application of 
the strict law that an intentional killing of another 
Tha t the provocati on was such as woul d ha ve provoked a 
reasonable man; that the accused had reacted immediately 
and that his reaction had been directed only at that 
individual or those individuals who had provoked him. 
1982 3 SA 800 (ZSC). 
Perhaps th i sis in no small measure due to the fact that 
Zimbabwean judges had one system of common 1 aw to apply. 
In South Africa we have the so-called purist German orien-
tated approach in which a system of abstract legal theor-
izing is made use of in our law, and a more traditional 
pragmati c Engl i sh-ori entated approach, whi ch 1 atter has 
been giving way steadily to the first-mentioned approach 
for decades. 
at 806-7. 
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person is murder unless there is a legitimate excuse, such 
as justifiable homicide (Rex v. Koning 1953 (3) SA 220 
(Tl) or self-defence (Rex v. Mathlau 1958 (1) SA 350 
(Al). To act under provocation, it is said, is not to act 
with any justification. As Schreiner JA put it in Krull's 
case supra at 399C: 
'I n self-defence the moti ve is fear, whi ch from the 
law's viewpoint is a better motive than anger, which 
operates in provocation'. 
Provocation may be an extenuating circumstance and a 
mitigating factor, but once it is established that a 
person acted with the intent to kill then he is guilty of 
murder. In my vi ew there are two answers to thi s vi ew. 
First, if the law recognises that provocation is an exten-
uating circumstance then there is no question of principle 
involved in recognising it as a circumstance which may 
reduce murder to culpable homicide. It is only a question 
of the effect to be given to it. Both sel f-defence and 
duress - see S.v. Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (A) - are now 
recognised as defences to murder. Either may be a com-
plete defence or may operate to reduce murder to culpable 
homicide dep.ending on the facts. But in each case it is 
accepted that what is excused or reduced is an intentional 
killing. There is therefore no anomaly in recognising 
that provocati on may have a simil ar effect, or at least 
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may reduce murder to cul pab 1 e homi ci de even where the 
killing is intentional. 
In the second place to exclude provocation as a defence to 
an intentional killing is to impose too demanding a stan-
dard on ordinary people and to overlook the realities of 
human behaviour. In practice what may happen when a per-
son is grievously provoked is that he becomes so angry 
that he intends to kill or to do serious injury to 
another. That is the position to the classic case of a 
person who kills his spouse caught in an act of adultery. 
It is not that he does not realize what he is doing, but 
that his self-control is so overborne that his intentional 
killing is partially excused. To require that the loss of 
self-control must be such that the consequences of the act 
are not intended is to ignore the true effect of provoca-
tion. Further, if strictly applied, such a test would in 
very few cases admit of the defence. It must be very rare 
for a person to be able to say that he lost control of 
himself to the extent of not intending the consequences of 
his reaction. The approach of Tenganyika's case supra and 
of the English common law authorities can be characterised 
as somewhat unsystematic and as departing from the strict 
definition of the offence of murder. It can also be said 
that the approach does not give sufficient weight to the 
importance of enforcing proper standards in trying to 
reconcile that aim with the objective of treating the 
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individual fairly. In its favour is that it recognises 
that criminal law must take into account the realities of 
human reaction to situations of stress. 
The choice between these two approaches is to be made 
rather on considerations of practicality than on strict 
legal theory. If duress is to be recognised as a complete 
defence to a charge of murder as a principal offender, as 
it is in South Afri ca and as Lord Wi 1 berforce and Lord 
Edmund-Davies would have advised in Abbott v R (1976) 3 
All ER 140 (PC) at 148, then I see no insuperable objec-
tion to allowing provocation to operate to reduce murder 
to culpable homicide even where there is proved an actual 
intent to kill. Both are defences which make some conces-
sion to human weakness, and provided they are suitably 
circumscribed I see no undermining of the fabric of 
soci ety by accepti ng them as defences. The same can be 
said of self-defence. This can be a complete defence. It 
can also reduce murder to culpable homicide if the bounds 
of self-defence are exceeded to a 1 imited extent. Both 
are inroads into strict legal logic, and a recognition 
that an unlawful intentional killing may be something less 
than murder. 
Both as a matter of principle and expediency I would 
favour the approach enunciated in Tenganyika's case supra 
and si nce followed in thi s country. Thi sis not the 
• 
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occasion on which to attempt to lay down authoritatively 
the limitations on the defence. It is sufficient for the 
purposes of this case to adopt the tests laid down in 
Tenganyika's case supra. The provocation must be such as 
to have actually caused the accused to have lost his self-
control, though not necessarily hi s capacity to intend to 
kill. The provocation must also have been such that in 
the ci rcumstances an ordi na ry man woul d have lost hi s 
self-control and acted in such a manner ' . 
Particularly interesting is the phrase: 'It must be very rare for 
a person to be able to say that he lost control of himself to the 
extent of not intending the consequences of his actions' . 
This shows that the learned Chief Justice was not prepared to 
equate loss or sel f-control in the sense of doing something 
i ntentionally which one would not normally do wi th the second 
requirement of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid'; namely, inability to 
control one's conduct in conformity with one's appreciation of 
its wrongfulness . The latter would amount to making the defence 
of insanity available to the sane. 
Under the influence of theories imported from Germany , South 
African law in Lesch 40 ) and Arnold41 ) appears to have reached 
this latter stage. 
40) 1983 ISA 814 (0). 
41) supra. 
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One may of course submit that, as the death sentence is no longer 
compulsory for every conviction of murder, it is more juristi-
ca lly pure to convi ct of murder and treat provoca ti on as an 
extenuati ng ci rcumstance, where intent to ki 11 is proved ina 
case involving provocation. This appears reasonable. But one 
must bear in mind that murder with extenuating circumstances is 
still a very seri ous crime (the accused coul d be sentenced to 
death)42) and to convi ct of murder and sentence as if the 
crime were culpable homicide, could possibly tend to make murder 
a minor offence in the public eye. 
From the South African 
speculation. To quote 
point of view the above is pure 
Skeen43 ) in · South Africa 'murder is 
murder is murder' which really means that intentional killing is 
murder, and nothing else. As has been shown,44) this is not 
necessarily always the case. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that 
our courts wi 11 adopt the vi ews of Fi el dsend CJ no matter how 
much there is to commend them. 
In Kru1l 45 ) Schreiner JA considered and rejected the ratio in 
Tenganyika, mainly on the basis that it was not in line with 
recogni zed South Afri can authori ty. The result was that the 
42) As in Roberts supra. 
43) Skeen 1983 SALJ 177, 179. 
44) Chapter II IS'UiJra. 
45) 19593 SA 392 (A). 
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Krull decision is unsatisfactory in that it is once more said 
that subjective factors pecul iar to the accused are not to be 
taken into account when deci di ng on the effect of provocati on. 
In spite of this statement of the law, in line with Kennedy but 
retrograde when compared with Thibani, the accused in Krull was 
convicted of culpable homicide as intent to kill could not be 
proved in all the circumstances of the case. These circumstances 
included his quick-tempered nature, his prior annoyance at a 
third party and the influence on him of liquor he had consumed. 
There are a large number of South African decisions in which the 
courts wavered in their statement of the law relating to provoca-
ti on. These decisions need not be discussed in the present 
context and have been recently closely scrutinized by Bergen-
thuin. 46 } 
Dissatisfaction with the state of the law, was expressed in 
Mangond047 } by Wi 11 i amson JA. But a cl ear statement was not to 
come until Mokonto. 48 } 
In Mokonto the accused raised the defence of provocation to a 
charge of murder . It is obvi ous that in the ci rcumstances the 
alleged provocation was really a motive for revenge. 49 } 
46} 249-307, eg Udiya 1890 NLR 222; Dunga 1913 CPD 110 ; 
Tsoyani 1915 EDL 380; George 1938 CPD 486. 
47} . 19634 SA 160 (A). 
48} 1971 2 SA 319 (A). 
49} It was so evaluated by Holmes JA 327 . 
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The accused be 1 i eved that the deceased had caused the death of 
hi s two brothers by witchcraft. He went to her to confront her 
with this state of affairs arming himself with a cane-knife and a 
stick. During the course of their confrontation she told him 
that he would not live to see the sun set. Believing that she 
could kill him with her sorcery he killed her and cut off her 
head. He was convicted of murder with extenuating circum-
stances50 ) by the trial court and sentenced to five years' 
imprisonment. 
On appeal two points of law were raised in his defence; first, 
that he had acted in self-defence in response to deceased's 
threat and should have been acquitted; second, that the threat 
had provoked him and that he should have been convicted of 
culpable homicide. 
The first ground was dismissed as accused's belief that deceased 
would be able to kill him was held to be unreasonable. 51 ) 
The defence of provocation was rejected and the following four 
50) The belief in witchcraft. 
51) The question whether putative self-defence ought not to 
have succeeded to the extent of reduci ng accused's mens 
rea to culpa was not considered. As he could have 
believed in good faith, though unreasonably, that his life 
was in danger, this part of the judgment is retrograde and 
could be ascribed to policy considerations, particularly 
in view of the remarks concerning the belief in witchcraft 
made by Holmes JA. 
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points were listed as stating our law on the subject: 52 } 
'1. Secti on 141 of the Transkei an Penal Code shoul d be 
confined to the territory for which it was passed. 
2. In crimes of which a specific intention 'is an ele-
3. 
ment, the question of the existence of such intention 
is a subjective one; namely, what was going on in the 
mind of the accused. 
Provocati on, i n te r ali a 53} .:.c.:.=.,--~c.:....::.' is relevant to the 
question of the existence of such intention. 
4. Provocation, subjectively considered, is al so rele-
vant to extenuation or mitigation'. 
The reference to specific intent is of interest. It apparently 
means that the mind of an accused may be so affected by provoca-
tion that he may not foresee the more remote consequences of his 
conduct. It appears from Mokonto that provocati on can only 
reduce murder to culpable homicide if, subjectively, its effect 
is to negative intent to kill. In practice it means that the 
provocati on coul d ra i se a reasonable doubt as to whether the 
accused realised that his actions would result in death. Provoca-
tion, objectively considered, could not reduce an intentional 
killing to culpable homicide. This is the effect of the first 
point listed. 
52} 326 F-H. 
53} Other factors such as self-defence were probably intended 
by Holmes JA. 
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It therefore took the greater part of a century for our 1 aw to 
arrive at what appears at this stage to be so simple and self-
evident; namely, that provocation is no more than a factor to be 
taken into account in determining whether an accused had 
assaulted his victim with intent to kill or to injure seriously. 
In this respect one is inclined to agree with De Wet and Swane-
poe1 54 ) that it is not so much the provocation that is to be 
considered but the anger and emotional upset55 ) occasioned by 
it. Once the matter is seen in this light, it becomes evident 
that provocation as a clearly defined concept standing alone 
purely as such becomes of 1 ittl e, if any, importance. One is 
concerned with the anger and/or other emotionally disturbed state 
of the accused, no matter what the cause may be. 
If provocation is regarded as a defence in its own right, 
irrespective of its actual effect on the state of mind with which 
the accused acted, one arrives back at section 141 of the 
Transkeian Penal Code (or similar rules of substantive law) in 
terms of which provocation as a concept standing on its own is 
defined. 
54) 130. 
55) 'Toorn en heftige gemoedsbeweging'. 
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At the stage when South African law was as stated in Mokont056 ) 
it stood in contrast to Zimbabwean law as stated in Tenganyika 
and confirmed in Nangani. There would be no second consideration 
of the effect of provocation on guilt or innocence, as would be 
the case in Zimbabwe, once an initial consideration had failed to 
negative intent. 
In so far as the Zimbabwean second inquiry involves objective 
considerations; for instance, the effect of provocation on a 
reasonable man, it may be difficult to apply. Nevertheless, 
similar considerations would have to engage the attention of a 
South Afri can court when cons i deri ng whether provocati on is a 
mitigating factor or an extenuating circumstance in a given case. 
The law as stated in Mokonto was acceptable. It was in keeping 
with the tendency that had grown stronger over the years to 
require intent to be established subjectively. It was also in 
keeping with the tendency to regard an intentional kill ing as 
murder irrespective of the motive that may have given rise to it. 
One aspect of provocation or of extreme anger or a state of being 
emotionally upset or disturbed, that had not received judicial 
attention, was the effect of such a subjective condition or such 
56) supra: the law is still as stated in Mokonto except that 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' has now come into the picture. 
- 318 -
subjective conditions on the criminal capacity of the accused. 
All four editions of De Wet and Swanepoe1 57) di scuss provoca-
tion in the context of anger, rage and serious emotional distur-
bance or pass i onate states of mi nd under the headi ng of 'toe-
rekeningsvatbaarheid'. They state however that discussion under 
this heading is not really appropriate and that anger and serious 
emotional disturbances cannot simply lead to 'ontoerekeningsvat-
baarheid'. Similar views are held by Snyman. 58 ) 
As long ago as 1958, however, SA Strauss59 ) advanced the vi ew 
that provocation ought not only to be considered in the light of 
its subjective effect on intent, but al so in the 1 i ght of its 
effect on criminal capacity. As Bergenthuin points out,60) 
this was a point of view amazingly in advance of juristic 
thinking on the subject at the time. A few years later views 
simi 1 ar to those of Strauss were expressed by Van Ni ekerk. 61) 
Writing after Lesch 62 ) but before Arnold63 ) Bergenthuin64 ) 
strongly supported the view that the effect of provocation on 
'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' should be given prime consideration. 
In Lesch the deceased appears to have been an extremely bad 
57) led 81, 2ed 117, 3ed 127, 4ed 130. 
58) 145. 
59) 1958 THRHR 14. 
60) 319. 
61) 1972 SALJ 169. 
62) supra-z.Tl. 
63) supra. 
64) 577ff. 
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neighbour, a bully who terrorised the weak and helpless and who 
appears to have derived a sadistic joy from this. 
He made threatening statements to the daughter of the accused and 
she advised accused of this by telephone. She was living with 
accused at the time. Accused came home and armed himself with a 
revol ver before goi ng to confront the deceased. Hi s daughter 
tri ed to di ssuade accused from taking the revol ver but he woul d 
not be di ssuaded. He went to deceased. Deceased told him 
rudely to come no nearer. 
and shot deceased dead. 
Then the accused took out the revolver 
His defence was that he had been 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaar' at the time of the shooting. He relied 
, on the second ingredient of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid'; namely, 
inability to control conduct in accordance with an appreciation 
of its wrongfulness. In support of this contention the accused 
stated in evi dence that at the moment when he shot deceased he' 
could not prevent himself from doing so. He had an overwhelming 
desire to completely destroy (vernietigl this man who was causing 
him and his daughter so much distress. 
The defence was rejected on the ground that he had nevertheless 
acted intentionally. With respect, one feels that Hattingh AJ 
missed the point a little in stating this. 
deny that he had intended to kill. 
The accused di d not 
On the contrary, he 
emphasised that he had intended to kill, but contended that this 
i ntenti ona 1 kill i ng was commi tted because he coul d not prevent 
himself from giving effect to the intention to kill . . His 
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inabil ity to exercise control and suppress the impul se to kill 
was due to the effect of the provoca ti on on hi s mi nd. I thad 
rendered him 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar'; unable to control his 
conduct in accordance with his appreciation of its unlawfulness. 
The judgment accepts that a person coul d become 'ontoerekeni ngs-
vatbaar' as submitted by the accused, but the evi dence di d not 
lend sufficient support to that contention for the defence to 
succeed in that particular case. 
The issue that had cl early come to the fore was that it had 
become possible for an intentional killing committed under 
provocation to result in a complete acquittal. This is indeed a 
view remote from that adopted when section 141 of the Transkeian 
Penal Code was severely criticized, as its application could 
result in an intentional kill ing being mechanically reduced to 
culpable homicide. 
Arnold65 ) has been discussed. 66 ) In this connection it is 
perhaps not inappropriate to consider the unreported case of 
Mundell 67). Mundell's case is in many respects similar to that 
of Arnold. The lady in Mundells life, had decided to leave him 
in favour of one of his friends, and after some procrastination 
had informed him of this. On the day of the crime she was having 
a bath. Mundell walked into the bathroom and she ordered him out 
65) supra. 
66) 1.2 supra. 
67) Unreported CPO 1981. Discussed in 1982 Speculum Juris 74. 
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as she was now someone el se' s woman. At the same time she 
di spl ayed her breasts68 ) to Mundell and smil ed. He 1 eft the 
bathroom, returned with a knife and stabbed her to death in an 
attack in which some fifty stab wounds, some serious and some 
minor, were inflicted on her. 
At his trial Mundell pleaded guilty to culpable homicide. The 
prosecuti on refused to accept the pl ea and he was tri ed for 
murder. 
Medical evidence indicated that Mundell had for some time shown 
the signs of depression that could lead to a 'rage reaction' 
during which the enraged person acts irrationally in an outburst 
of uncontrollable anger. Mundell had also been under the 
influence of liquor at the time of the killing. Chretien69 ) 
was decided during Mundell's trial and Mundell's counsel 
attempted to obtain a complete acquittal on the ground that 
Mundell had not 'acted' when killing the deceased. Further 
medical evidence was heard. It was to the effect that the 
accused's will was still in control of his body when he killed. 
He had therefore acted. His conduct was adjudged unreasonable 
and he was convicted of culpable homicide. 
It would appear that in the light of Lesch and more particularly 
68) Strangely similar to the conduct of the deceased in 
Arno 1 d supra. 
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Arnol d Mundell woul din all probabil i ty be acqu itted if on tri a 1 
to-day. His defence that he had not acted would be supported by 
a further defence that he had not been able to control his 
conduct in accordance with his realisation of its wrongfulness. 
The evidence supportive of the rage reaction could support the 
latter defence far more strongly than the former. 
Arnold will no doubt enjoy the support of the 'strafregwetenskap-
like' or 'purist' school who view 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' as an 
independent general factor at a criminal trial and not a factor 
that is considered only in conjunction with alleged insanity, 
youth or intoxication. In other words for the purist, an accused 
is 'ontoerekeni ngsvatbaar' if either he cannot appreci ate that 
what he is doing is wrong, or though able to do so is, 
nevertheless, unable to control his conduct in conformity with 
such an appreciation. How this unusual condition has been 
brought about is irrelevant. 
CR Snyman has written a thoughtful and well-informed article70 ) 
opposing the result in Arnold. He views the complete acquittal " 
as mistaken because of Arnold's prior negligent conduct. It 
mi ght be, argues Snyman, that Arnold was not negl i gent when he 
went into his house and spoke to his wife with a loaded pistol in 
his hand, but he was undoubtedly negligent when he failed to get 
rid of the pistol after the first shot had gone off . Snyman bases 
70) 1985 SALJ 240. 
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these views mainly on the concept of antecedent liability . His 
argument is, logically sound. A person should not be allowed to 
escape liability for criminal conduct simply because, at the last 
moment when bringing about a criminal result, he became 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaar'. The entire course of conduct leading up 
to the 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid ' and the crime committed in 
that state, shoul d be i nvesti gated. Fault, more parti cul arly 
negl igence may be found well before (or at least before) the 
state of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' supervened. It is submitted 
that Snyman' s vi ews are correct. He supports vi ews expres-
sed71 ) along these lines on Stellmacher. 72 ) The dicta of 
Rumpff CJ in Chretien to the effect that a person who cannot act 
cannot possibly be found to have fault (skuld) and that a person 
who 'acts' while 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar ' cannot have fault 
either, shoul d be cl ari fi ed at the earl i est opportunity by the 
Appellate Division. What is important in many cases i s not so 
much the inability to act or the state of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar-
heid' as what went before . 
Snyman is also of the opinion that 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' as 
a defence should only be allowed to mentally ill or mentally 
defective persons and the very young . He is prepared to allow it 
to the intoxicated but with reservation . He contends that a sane 
and sober adult ought not to be allowed to raise the defence of 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid '. This, would be allowing too wide a 
71) 1984 THRHR 98; CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 240, 243. 
72) supra. 
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scope to the 'subjective' approach to criminal liability. 
Although Snyman's arguments are sound, it is submitted that the 
Arnold decision is in accordance with our law as it is at 
present. 'Ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' has been allowed to figure 
as a defence di vorced from insanity and youth and has been 
increasingly considered independently. Thi s tendency has now 
brought our criminal law to the stage of allowing a sane accused 
who killed in anger to raise that anger as a defence to murder 
and to culpable homicide. This is a result of the comparatively 
recent triumph of 'purism'. 
4. THE DEFENCE OF INTOXICATION 
4.1 Introductory 1) 
The defence of in toxi cati on presents 1 ega 1 theori sts with thi s 
difficulty that intoxicants such as alcohol or drugs undoubtedly 
1) In view of the many notes and articles (Burchell 1981 SALJ 
177; du Plessis 1982 SALJ 189; 1984 THRHR 98; Badenhorst 
1981 SALJ 148; Mi ddl eton 1981 SACC 83; Kruger 1981 SACC 
84; Ems 1981 THRHR 175; Rabiel9'8l SACC 111; Skeen TIEL 
SALJ 547; van der Merwe 1981 Obiter 142; Oosthuizen 1985 
THRHR 406) that followed the judgment in Chretien as well 
as the 1 engthy di scuss ions in the textbooks (Burchell and 
Hunt 198ff; Snyman 134-45; De Wet and Swanepoel 129ff; 
Visser and Vorster 262ff) that have appeared since that 
judgment it would be a work of supererogation to discuss 
the defence of intoxication in any depth here. There is 
also available for general study a report (January 1986) 
of the South African Law Commission on the topic: 
'Offences Committed under the influence of Liquor or 
Drugs' . 
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influence the mental processes of persons who have taken them and 
can result in such persons becoming insulting, abusive, 
offensive, aggressive, dangerous, violent, uncontrollable and, 
sometimes, eventually lapsing into a state of automatism. In 
extreme cases insanity of a temporary or permanent nature could 
also supervene. 
Consequently a person who has committed an assault or a killing 
during a state of intoxication, could with some conviction 
advance the contention that he lacked mens rea in that he did not 
know what he was doing or that he could not control his actions 
in accordance with his appreciation of their wrongfulness or that 
he had lapsed into a state of automatism and could not 'act'2) 
at all. Logically, such an argument could negative dolus and 
also culpa entirely. But, to put it in colloquial terms; 'can 
the law allow a man to buy a defence to a serious criminal charge 
in a bottle and get away with it'?3) Less colloquially put, 
2) This is in accordance with the generally accepted doctrine 
that a person cannot be said to 'act' unless his will is 
in charge of his body. The contention that the accused in 
Johnson 1969 1 SA 201 (A) and Arnold supra could not act 
prompts one to ask somewhat superclliously: 'In that case 
who killed Johnson's cell-mate and who killed Arnold's 
wife? ' 
3) Strauss 110 makes the point very strongly that psychopaths 
who are not responsible for their inexplicable abnormal 
mental condition can be severely punished for their 
crimes, whereas intoxicated persons who are responsible 
for their intoxicated condition - often likened to insan-
ity - are treated relatively leniently. The accused in 
Roberts 1957 4 SA 265 (Al was a psychopath and he was 
executed for murder. Al though only temporarily insane the 
accused in McBri de 1979 4 SA 313 (VI) was committed to an 
institution. 
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one could ask the question whether the logic according to which 
intoxication succeeds as a defence is not based on premisses that 
are too narrow. 4) 
The logical argument that an accused who became intoxicated and 
committed a crime lacked mens rea or criminal capacity could also 
be met with the simple rejoinder that it is not the function of 
the courts to apply logic but law;5) and that the criminal law 
would be failing to meet the very purpose of its existence if it 
paralysed itself with 10gic6) and failed to protect the 
pub 1 i c. 7) 
No matter how socially unacceptable it may be to acquit an 
accused who has committed a serious crime while intOXicated, the 
thought of a man being punished for a 'crime' committed while he 
lacked mens rea or the ability to act voluntarily, does not 
4) A more broadly based and equally valid logic would lead to 
the conclusion that an accused ought not to be allowed to 
make himself a danger to his fellow-men and then raise the 
very conduct (namely drinking or taking drugs to excess) 
that made him such a danger as a defence to acts that 
resulted in injuries to his fellow-men. 
5) See Majewski 1978 2 AE 2 142 (HL) for some rather caustic 
remarks of members of the House of Lords in answer to the 
submission that intoxication should be a complete defence; 
cf du Plessis 1979 DR 119. 
6) Thi s appears to be exactly what De Wet and Swanepoel 
advocate 129-30 . 
7) In other words logical consistency could lead to social 
absurdity and it is more important for the law to avoid 
the latter than to conform with the former. 
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appeal to legal theorists. The result has been that our courts 
in the past tended to follow a middle course. If the intoxica-
tion was no defence on the merits, it was nevertheless treated as 
a mitigating factor. 8 ) 
If the crime charged was serious; for instance, murder, the 
intoxication could result in a conviction of a less serious 
crime; for instance, culpable homicide. 9) 
The approach was casuistic and pragmatic and, from the nature of 
the problem, a legal antinomy,10) only pragmatic and casuistic 
solutions were possible . Judicial officers were reluctant in the 
past to acquit in respect of crimes of violence where liquor was 
invol ved and they were sel dom rel uctant to reduce assault with 
intent, to common assault. If a police docket or the record of a 
preparatory examination revealed that the accused had been 
intoxicated when committing a killing he would in many cases be 
charged with culpable homicide. If indicted for murder before 
8) Thi s was the 'pure' Roman-Dutch rul e; vi de eg De Wet and 
Swanepoel 124. 
9) This could, in our law, be regarded as an extension of the 
Roman-Dutch principle that intoxication served to mitigate 
punishment . By reducing the crime from a serious to a 
less serious crime one paves the way for a lighter punish-
ment vide Pain 1974 SALJ 467, 487. 
10) ie a problem that results in two contradictory but equally 
logical answers. It is illogical to punish a man for 
something he did while he was so intoxicated as not to 
know what he was doing; it is also illogical to allow a 
man, guilty of conduct that would otherwise be criminal, 
to raise the self-induced condition that gave rise to the 
conduct as a valid defence to a prosecution in respect of 
the conduct . 
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the Supreme Court he woul d ei ther be convi cted of murder with 
extenuating circumstances or of culpable homicide. That was the 
law in practice. 11 ) 
4.2 The Law as Reflected in Johnson12 ) 
The position in practice as briefly outlined above was reflected 
in Johnson. But a change in the general approach to problems of 
the criminal law had been taking place prior to Johnson and the 
Johnson decision, to all appearances in conformity with the law 
as generally applied in the courts,13) was subjected to 
criticism,14) in some cases rather severe. 15 ) 
To understand the criticism of Johnson one must bear in mind that 
van der Mescht16 ) and Bernardus17 ) had resulted in culpable 
homicide becoming the unlawful negligent killing of another human 
being. Before these decisions culpable homicide was simply the 
unlawful killing of another human being . 
Consequently, before van der Mescht and Bernardus, if it was 
11) 
12) 
13) 
14) 
15 ) 
16 ) 
17) 
The prosecution would often be dissati sfied with lenient 
treatment meted out to such offenders; similarly the 
defence would often be dissatisfied that his intoxication 
had not been given greater weight in favour of an accused. 
1969 1 SA 201 (A). 
vide Pain 1974 SALJ 467, 185ff. Pain is one of the few 
commentators who--rcund any virtue in Johnson; cf Schafer 
1978 SACC 47; du Plessis 1979 DR 119. 
Burcherr-and Hunt led 232; De Wet and Swanepoel 3ed 126 . 
De Wet and Swanepoel ibid. 
supra. 
supra. 
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accepted at a murder trial that the accused had not intended to 
kill, or that intent to kill had not been proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, and the accused had relied on his intoxication at the 
time of the killing to negative such intent, he could in any 
event still be convicted of culpable homici de if it were proved 
that he had killed unlawfully. An accused who raised the defence 
of intoxication to a charge of murder would in most cases have 
pleaded gui lty of cul pab 1 e homi ci de. After van der Mescht and 
Bernardus, it became necessary to prove negligence on the part of 
, 
the accused in addition to unlawfulness. This would generally 
occas i on no diffi culty as a man who ki 11 ed another whil e drunk 
would obviously be acting unreasonably. But, matters become more 
involved with the advent of the concept of ' toerekeningsvatbaar-
hei d ' • If a person were so drunk that he could not appreciate 
the wrongful nature of his conduct or even if he could appreciate 
this, could not control his conduct in conformity with such an 
appreciation, he would lack criminal capacity. A person who 
lacked criminal capacity could have fault neither in the shape of 
dolus nor cUlpa. Similarly if a person became so intoxicated as 
to lapse into a state of automatism, his will would lose control 
of his body and he would not be able to 'act' for the purpose of 
the criminal law. 
The outl ine given above constitutes an example of mechanical 
reasoning based on concept jurisprudence. The concept of absence 
of cri mi na 1 capaci ty is such that it excl udes the concept of 
fault in the shape of either of its sub-concepts, dolus or 
- 330 -
cUlpa. The concept of a criminal act is such that its absence 
excludes the very possibility of criminal guilt as there can be 
no crime without a criminal act. Applied purely logically and 
without regard to practical exigencies, such arguments could 
result in the criminal law becoming a field of refined 
, 
theoretical debate, possibly headed for the limbo of interesting 
but useless systems of abstract thought. 
A more practical and useful approach to 'crimes' committed by 
persons who 1 ack crimi na 1 capaci ty, or who are unable to act, 
woul d be to i nqui re how they had got into one of these unusual 
states and how they had managed to commit 'crimes' while in such 
state. Concept juri sprudence eschews such an approach. It is 
reasoned that a person who lacks criminal capacity cannot have 
fault - caedit quaestio; similarly, a person whose will is not in 
command of his body cannot act - caedit quaestio. 
The facts in Johnson are well known. The accused was arrested 
for being drunk, and placed in a police-cell. There he smashed 
the head of a sleeping fellow-prisoner with a bucket . The trial 
court found that at the time of the killing he had not known what 
he was doing and had been in a state of drink-induced automat-
ism . The evidence in favour of this finding was over-
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whelming18 ) and on appeal the Appellate Division based its 
decision on the accused having been in such a state of automatism 
when killing the deceased. The accused's conviction of culpable 
homi ci de was confi rmed on the basi s that logi c had to make way 
for expediency ina case of thi s nature. In previ ous times the 
question of fault would probably not have been considered, as an 
unlawful killing would have been established. Botha JA who gave 
the judgment of the court did, however, investigate the question 
of fault and sai d that fault had to be sought at the stage when 
the accused commenced his drinking. 
The decision was generally criticized. 19 ) 
One criticism of Johnson 20 ) was that it amounted to an 
18) De Wet and Swanepoel 3ed 126 n137 make the suggestion that 
Johnson -had been wrongly decided on the facts. Apprecia-
tion of matters of evidence, procedure and proof is not a 
strong point of this textbook. If one considers the 
evidence in support of Johnson's defence that he had 
killed the deceased in a state of automatism, (summarised 
by Botha JA 201-3) it is cl ear that most of the evi dence 
favourable to the accused must have been given by witnes-
ses called by the prosecution. How could the prosecution 
have invited the court to reject such evidence? It has 
been demonstrated by the writer in 1982 SALJ 189 and 1984 
THRHR 98 that the suggesti on that Johnson was wrongly 
declded on the facts, is, with respect, untenable.Even had 
the onus been on the accused, the evidence in his favour 
was so strong that he would probably have succeeded in 
discharging it. 
19) Burchell and Hunt (led 232) were of the opinion that it 
ought to have been deci ded accordi ng to the establ i shed 
principles of our criminal law instead of in the service 
of expedi ency. De Wet and Swanepoel (3ed 126) were out-
spoken in their disapproval of the judgment. 
20) supra. 
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application of the versari in re illicita doctrine21 ): the 
accused had been convicted for his drinking and not for the crime 
'commi tted' whil e drunk. The vi ew of the South Afri can Law 
Commi ssi on22 ) that Botha JA was not applyi ng the doctri ne of 
versari in re illicita is to be preferred. The versari doctrine 
creates liability without fault and Botha JA did investigate the 
question of fault on the part of the accused. Botha JA was 
applying the common law as it bad been understood and applied at 
the time;23) namely, intoxication which negatived intent to 
kill was a valid defence to murder but not to culpable homicide. 
A further criticism of the decision was that fault ought not to 
have been projected from the initial drinking onto the eventual 
killing. 24 ) This criticism is also regarded as unjustified by 
the South African Law Commission. 25 ) Whether the Law Commis-
sion's views are sound in this connection is debatable. If the 
killing of a human being could not reasonably have been foreseen 
as a result of the dri nk i ng, it is diffi cult to understand how 
there could have been fault on the part of the accused in respect 
21) De Wet and Swanepoel 3ed 121, 127 and 104 n38. 
22) Drugs Report 43. 
23) He in fact made a, with respect, commendable practical and 
erudite effort to reconcile the law with the old authori-
ties and the practise of the courts at the time, vide Pain 
1974 SALJ 467, 485ff. 
24) Pain T974 SALJ 467, 486-7. 
25) Drugs Report 43. The Commission is of the opinion that 
'fault projection', a phrase used by Pain, was not 
necessary. It was simply a question whether at the time 
of the drinking the death of a person was foreseeable as a 
result of the drinking; thus the Commission. 
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of that kill i ng. In other words excess i ve dri nk i ng per se does 
not gi ve ri se to a negl i gent acti 0 1 i bera in causa unl ess a 
crime, in this case criminal homicide, is foreseeable as a result 
of the dri nk i ng. 26) The reasoni ng of Botha JA in Johnson gave 
fault in casu a much wider basis than this. Thus a person who 
drinks ought reasonably to foresee that he may commit a 
crime .27) Thi s argument is untenable as thousands of peopl e 
get drunk every week without committing crimes in consequence. 
It is respectfully submitted that it would have been far more 
realistic for the learned judge of appeal to have treated 
homicide committed by an intoxicated person as an exceptional 
case in whi ch, for sound reasons of pub 1 i c pol icy, an acquittal 
because of the absence of fault cannot be countenanced. It 
cannot be gainsaid that this would have amounted to treating 
certain offences as offences of strict 1 iabil ity when committed 
under the i nfl uence of 1 i quor or drugs . One coul d naturally 
reply to this objection that over-imbibing is fault of sorts and 
that intoxicated persons generally know what they are doing; 
their wrong-doings are often the result of the deterioration of 
social and moral inhibitions as a result of the effect of alcohol 
26) De Wet and Swanepoel 3ed 126 criticise the Johnson court's 
attempt to bring the accused's liability into the ambit of 
the actio libera in causa. The criticism appears valid 
although the remarks are restricted to an intentional 
actio libera in causa. To bring Johnson's liability into 
the ambit of the negligent actio 1 ibera in causa would 
amount to widening the scope of negllgence where intoxica-
tion is concerned to the point of making it criminally 
negl i gent to dri nk too much in any ,ci rcumstances. That 
would amount to 'stretching matters a bit'. 
27) eg a criminal homicide, in that condition. 
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on certain centres of the brain. Every body knows this and a 
person who over imbibes must be prepared to face the conse-
quences. 28 ) 
De Wet and Swanepoe 1 1 eve 11 ed a criti ci sm at the Johnson case 
which seems to have penetrated to the nub of the matter; namely, 
an accused who is so intoxicated that his will does not control 
his body cannot be said to 'act,.29) Before reaching this 
extreme state of intoxication a person could become 'ontoer-
ekeningsvatbaar' ,30) either in the sense of not appreciating 
that what he is doing is wrong, or of not being able to control 
his conduct in accordance with an appreciation of its wrongful-
ness. 31 ) 
Interesting is the criticism32 ) of Bourke33 ) in which a jury 
found, that an intoxicated individual, who had enticed a little 
girl of 11 years into accompanying him, had transported her to 
his hotel by cab, had told the cabby not to wait for her, had 
then taken her to his room and attempted to have intercourse with 
her, had not been responsible for his actions . According to 
28) Or as the 01 d sayi ng goes: 'wat ons koop wanneer ons dronk 
is, moet ons voor betaal wanneer ons nugter is'. 
29) 3ed 52; vi de also 115 . 
30) This is really the main thrust of De Wet and Swanepoel's 
attack on the Johnson decision (3ed 126-7). 
31) This is in conformlty with the view adopted in all four 
editions of De Wet and Swanepoel that intoxication can 
lead to absence of criminal capacity. 
32) De Wet and Swanepoel 3ed 120. 
33) 1916 TPD 303. 
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De Wet and Swanepoe1 34 ) the jury, gifted wi th propheti c 
fores i ght concerni ng the importance of 'ontoerekeni ngsvatbaar-
heid' some seventy years in the future, had better insight into 
the problem of i ntoxi cati on than the tri a 1 judge. The jury had 
realised that it was a question of whether the accused had 
criminal capacity in the sense of being able to control his 
conduct. In fact the · jury appear to have been out of their depth 
and to have been prepared to all ow a man, who in a state of 
slight inebriation had shrewdly committed a despicable crime 
while well aware of what he was doing, to go scott-free. 
De Wet and Swanepoel's criticism of the manner in which the 
courts had dealt with the problem of intoxication - a problem 
unique in the criminal law - shows a complete unwillingness to 
understand the diffi culti es the courts were faced wi th and an 
over-eagerness to find fault with their solutions and indulge in 
negative criticism. But one must give credit where credit is 
due. De Wet and Swanepoel, and the uniquely gifted prophetic 
members of the jury in Bourke, were right in their opinion that 
the liability of the accused who pleads intoxication would 
revolve around the question of criminal capacity. It would also 
revolve around the question whether the accused had reached such 
an advanced stage of intoxication as to be unable to 'act'. 
34) The passage from De Wet and Swanepoel (n32 supra) is 
illustrative of the point that according to this textbook 
our judge-made law is always wrong. 
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4.3 The law in Chretien 
In Chretien1) the accused, who was fairly heavily intoxicated, 
but not so intoxi cated as not to be able to dri ve a Kombi and 
wei gh up the advantages and di sadvantages of tak i ng one of a 
number of different courses open to him, had driven his Kombi 
into a crowd of people on a road, killing one and injuring five. 
His defence on charges of inter alia one count of murder and five 
counts of attempted murder was that he had believed that all the 
members of the crowd woul d be able to get out of hi s way before 
his vehicle collided with any of them. The trial court held that 
although no sober person could have held such a belief,2) it 
was reasonably possible that the accused could have held it 
because of his intoxication. 3 ) This finding excluded dolus on 
his part, it being reasonably possible that he had . not as a fact 
foreseen that he would possibly kill or injure a member of the 
crowd. 4 ) As his conduct had been grossly unreasonable he was 
1) 1981 1 SA 1097 (A). 
2) Chreti en 1979 4 SA 871 (D); the judgment of Fri edman J is 
unfortunately not fully reported where he deals with the 
mens rea of the accused; vi de du Pl essi s 1982 SAlJ 189, 
190-1. --
3) Intoxication was therefore an evidential factor taken into 
account in ascertaining whether dolus had been estab-
lished. 
4) Bearing in mind the fairly wide net of dolus eventualis 
the accused must obviously have come perilously close to 
being convicted of murder. He seems to have had his wits 
pretty well about him; vide analysis in du Plessis 1982 
SALJ 189, 190-1. 
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convi cted of cul pab 1 e homi ci de in respect of death of the one 
person who had been killed but acquitted in respect of the rest 
of the charges mentioned. 
The most interesting feature of the trial was the attempt of the 
prosecution to obtain convictions of common assault on the five 
counts of attempted murder with which the accused had been 
charged in respect of the five persons injured in the 'accident'. 
The prosecuti on had undertaken a di ffi cult task. The court had 
found that culpa had been proved but not dolus. Dolus is the 
mens rea of common assault. How could the prosecution hope to 
obtain convictions of a crime requiring dolus as its mens rea 
when only culpa had been established? It really amounted to 
inviting the court to find that culpa could suffice as the mens 
rea of common assault if such common assault were committed by an 
intoxicated person. 5 ) 
If one considers the effect usually given to intoxication in 
cases of assault with intent, the submission made on behalf of 
the prosecution is not as amazing as it may at first blush appear 
to be. 
The law concerning assaults committed by intoxicated persons had 
5) It was neither more nor less than an attempt to obtain a 
conviction on the basis of normative rather than 
psychological fault. Kok 1982 SACC 27 points out that the 
approach to the fault of intoxicated persons before 
Chretien was normative. It was perhaps not entirely so, 
but certainly partly so. 
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been that, whereas the intoxication of an accused may serve to 
negati ve or at least cast doubt on hi s specifi c intent to, for 
instance, inflict grievous bodily harm, it could nevertheless not 
serve to negative or cast doubt on his general intent to assault; 
that is, to apply force to the person of his victim. 6 ) Thus an 
accused who had, while intoxicated, stabbed or seriously injured 
someone could successfully say that his mind had been so befud-
dled with drink that he had not foreseen that he would inflict 
serious injury on his victim. He could nevertheless not submit 
with any hope of success that he had not intended to stab, (that 
is in essence to apply force) at all. 7 ) 
6) eg Johnson 1970 3 SA 535 (e); while intoxicated the 
accused had injured complainant seriously . As he did not 
have the specific intent required for assault with intent, 
he was held to be guilty of common assault. 
7) An unusual example is to be found in Jassane 1973 4 SA 658 (Tl. Whi 1 st under the i nfl uence of 11 quor Jassane had 
attempted to kill a little girl believing her to be a 
'tikoloshe'. He was charged with attempted murder but, in 
view of his not having intended to kill a human being he 
was not convicted of this crime. As -his mistake of fact, 
that is the mistaken belief that he was dealing not with a 
human bei ng but wi th an evi 1 entity, had been the result 
of his drinking, he was not acquitted, but convicted of 
common assault. In some way that is not clear from the 
reported porti on of the judgment, hi s i ntoxi cati on was 
treated as constituting the fault required for a convic-
tion of common assault. There is more than one way of 
i nterpreti ng thi s judgment. Ei ther that i ntoxi cati on is 
ignored when consi deri ng whether intent to cOlrrni t common 
assault has been proved, or the simple (normative?) rule 
is applied that in such a case a conviction of a crime 
with an intent going beyond the application of force is 
excluded, but conviction of common assault is automatic 
without considering the actual existence of intent or 
not. The result is unsatisfactory in view of the mistake 
made by the accused, more especially as the evidence 
revealed that the child had an unusual appearance that 
could have led to an intoxicated person, who believed in 
the existence of such beings , mistaking her for an evil 
entity. Had Jassane killed the child a conviction of 
culpable homicide would have been in order in the light of 
Johnson which was then still the law, but in those 
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In the course of time the prosecution, when the defence of 
intoxication was raised to a serious assault, had come to expect 
a conviction of corrmon assault as a matter of course, when the 
mens rea of assault with intent had been negatived by evidence of 
intoxication. 
In Chreti en the prosecution entertained the same expectati on. 
Chretien was charged with attempted murder. 8) What was 
overlooked by the prosecution, was that on the accused's version 
of events, accepted by the Court as reasonably possi b 1 e, 9) no 
intent to apply force to the person of his victims had been 
proved. He was not in the position of an intoxicated person who 
had struck someone and who could deny that he had intended to do 
grievous bodily harm, but who could not deny that he had intended 
to apply force to his victim's person. 
Chreti en's mens rea in respect of the person he ki 11 ed had been 
culpa. He had injured his other victims with exactly the same 
state of mind. To convict him of common assault in respect of 
the i nfl i cti on of these i nj uri es woul d amount to fi ndi ng that 
circumstances; namely, acting while making of a bona fide 
but unreasonable mistake, dolus could hardly be attrlbuted 
to the intoxicated man. It was simply a case out of line 
with the usual type of assault cases in which drunks are 
involved. Jassane had not, as drunks often do, become 
truculent as a result of his intoxication; he had become 
the victim of a delusion. 
8) In other words his application of force to the persons of 
the i nj ured parti es was vi ewed as an assault with the 
intent of killing them. 
9) viz that he had believed that he would not hit any member 
of the crowd with his Kombi. 
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culpa would suffice as the mens rea of common assault. Friedman 
J the trial judge refused to do this, stating that common assault 
is also a crime which requires a 'specific' intent as its mens 
rea)O) The argument of the 1 earned tri a 1 judge appeared to be 
unanswerable, except if one were to view common assault as a 
crime of strict liability if committed by an intoxicated 
accused. 11 ) 
There is also another feature that might have misled the prosecu-
tion; namely, that it was Chretien's intoxication that had 
enabled him to cast a reasonable doubt on the intent to kill 
alleged by the prosecuti on)2 ) I f the vi ew is adopted that when 
deciding on the presence or absence of the mens rea necessary for 
murder and attempted murder, one takes intoxication into account, 
but not when deciding on the presence or absence of the mens rea 
required for common assault, the factual material relating to 
intoxication would be ignored when deciding whether to convict of 
common assault and a conviction of this crime would follow. 
10) Chretien 1979 4 SA 871 (0) 875 G - 876 B. 
11) vide du Plessis 1982 SALJ 189,193. 
12) Put diffe r ently it wciUTO appear that in applying for five 
convictions of common assault, the prosecuti on had allowed 
itself to be misled by the facts it had attempted, but had 
fa i 1 ed to prove. In terms of the charge Chreti en had 
intentionally injured the persons hit by his Kombi, but 
dol us not bei ng proved, the case really became one of 
negll gent dri vi ng under the i nfl uence of 1 i quor. It is 
unheard of to convict a driver, who hits a pedestrian 
while driving negligently, of assault. If such a driver 
shoul d happen to be under the i nfl uence of 1 i quor his 
i ntoxi cati on does not have the effect of renderi ng hi s 
negligent conduct intentional. 
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There appears to be a tincture of this argument in the wording of 
the question of law reserved by the prosecution for the consider-
ation of the Appellate Division; namely,13) 
'Whether on the facts found proven by the Court the learn-
ed Judge was correct in law in holding that the accused on 
a charge of attempted murder coul d not be convi cted of 
common assault where the necessary intention for the 
offence charged had been influenced by the voluntary 
consumption of alcohol '. 
The prosecution apparently feared that the days of obtai ni ng 
convictions of common assault almost automatically when prosecu-
tions for assault with intent failed because of the intoxication 
of the accused, could be coming to an end; hence the decision to 
take the total acquittal on the five charges of attempted murder 
to the Appellate Division. It is perhaps not mistaken to say 
that the wording of the question of law carried the germ of its 
own destruction within it. 14 ) 
Bel ieving itself to be in danger of having to give up the 
favourab 1 e s i tua ti on of obtai ni ng convi cti ons of common assault 
13) 1102 C-D. 
14) The reference to 'the facts found proven by the court' and 
to the ' necessary intention' as havin~ 'been influenced by 
the voluntary consumption of alcohol are self-contradic-
tory. On the facts found proved there was no intention to 
commit the crime charged , but only gross negligence. The 
intention had not been proved. The alcohol had not 
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agai nst i ntoxi cated accused, the prosecuti on was apparently not 
prepared to run the ri sk of perhaps havi ng to gi ve up the even 
more favourable situation of obtaining convictions of culpable 
homicide against intoxicated persons charged with murder, hence 
there is no reference at all to negligence, culpa or culpable 
homicide in the question of law. 15 ) 
An acceptable answer could have been that Friedman J's reasoning 
could not be faulted, that intent to apply force had not been 
proved, that cul pa di d not suffi ce for a convi cti on of a crime 
requiring dolus, and that the accused had been correctly 
acqui tted on the fi ve charges of attempted murder. Thi s was, 
however, not to be. The Appellate Division used the opportunity 
to review the law relating to the defence of intoxication, 
entirely.16) 
affected the accused's intention - he had no intention to 
kill - it had merely on the findings of the court, dulled 
his judgment and caused him to act negligently. Had the 
prosecuti on worded the questi on of 1 aw di fferently and 
more clearly in conformity with the facts proved the 
question could have been: 'Was the finding of the learned 
Judge that ,Ul pa does not suffi ce as the mens rea of 
common assau t where the negl i gence on whi ch the fi ndi ng 
of cUlya is based was due to the voluntary consumption of 
alcoho , correct in law'? It would then have been clear 
tha t no success coul d be hoped for on appeal. Fri edman 
J's reasoning was, with respect, unassailable: the accused 
had accidentally, through his negligence occasioned by his 
drinking, hit five pedestrians with a vehicle he was 
driving. He could not be convicted of common assault. 
15) Drugs Report 46. 
16) ibid. 
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Rumpff CJ stated that Johnson had resulted from a tendency to 
allow logic to make way for expediency and to apply the law in a 
juri s ti ca lly impurel ?) manner in order to appease those members 
of society who objected to the lenient treatment of drunken 
offenders. He continued that a perusal of the law reports, how-
ever, revealed that there were not too many cases in which a 
crime had been commi tted by an accused who had not known that 
what he was doing was prohibited or whose inhibitions had com-
pletely disappeared. Consequently public policy did not require 
adherence to the principles applied in Johnson. 18 ) 
Furthermore an accused coul d be so drunk as to be making mere 
involuntary muscular movements, in which case his fault (skuld) 
need not be phil osophi sed about as he coul d in any event not 
'act' because of the absence of vol iti on .19) Consequently if a 
person were so drunk as to be unable to 'act' or 'ontoerekenings-
vatbaar' he could not be convicted of any crime. 
The question of law reserved was therefore answered in favour of 
the accused and against the prosecution. 
Conceding that a person might, because of intoxication, not be 
able to realise the extent of the harm his actions might result 
in, the learned Chief Justice stated that there was no room for 
17) 'Juri dies onsuiwer', 1103 D. 
18) 1106 D. 
19) 1104 E-G. 
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the English Law doctrine of specific intent in our law relating 
to the defence of intoxication. 20 ) 
The most important statements from the point of view of the law 
relating to culpable homicide is that an accused who cannot 'act' 
because of intoxication cannot be criminally liable and that a 
person who is' ontoerekeni ngsvatbaar' because of vol untary 
intoxication cannot be criminally liable. 21 ) The rejection of 
the 'specific intent' doctrine is really of little conse-
quence. 22 ) 
Assuming that a person who cannot 'act' because he is in a state 
of automatism or in a stupor lying down and making invol untary 
muscular movements, cannot commit a crime of which dolus is the 
mens rea, it is sti 11 by no means certa in that such a person 
cannot, on the basis of antecedent liability,23) commit a crime 
20 ) 
21) 
22) 
23) 
1103 H- 1104 pro 
What the judgment really amounts to is that absence of 
intent, absence of 'toerekeni ngsva tbaa rhei d' and absence 
of volition are complete defences even if ascribable to 
voluntary intoxication. The last two points mean that 
voluntary intoxication becomes a defence to culpable 
homi ci de. Johnson had been very clear on at 1 east one 
point viz that voluntary intoxication could not be a 
defence to culpable homicide. The provincial division had 
al so experienced no difficulty in convicting Chretien of 
culpable homicide. 
vide du Plessis 1982 SALJ 189, 194. The statement made 
there concerning specific and general intent has not been 
challenged. 
See Strauss 397. It is, however, doubtful whether the 
learned author's view is correct that Chretien has not 
affected antecedent liability. Johnson was based on 
antecedent liability and Chretien overruled Johnson. 
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of which culpa is the mens rea. 
Assume that a person is in charge of a small child . He is 
sitting at a table on which there is a lighted candle and he is 
'floating his powerful mind' in alcohol instead of tea as was 
done with the latter beverage by the mournful taxidermist Mr 
Venus in Our Mutual Friend. Eventually the 'floating of his mind 
in alcohol' has the effect of causing him to collapse in a drun-
ken sleep halfway on the table and halfway off it. He moves his 
hand involuntarily and knocks the candle off the table . The 
candle causes the carpet to catch fire and the room to burn 
down. The child dies in the blaze, but alert firemen save the 
intoxicated person. Would this latter party, if charged with 
culpable homicide, be able to plead successfully that his knock-
i ng the candl e off the table was not an 'act' but the result of 
an Involuntary muscular movement and that fault was not to be 
philosophised upon as there was in any event no act to which this 
fault could be coupled? On the strength of Rumpff CJ's dic-
tum24 ) about the 'dead drunk ' person lying somewhere making 
i nvol untary muscul ar movements whose fault need not be phil oso-
phi sed upon, such a pl ea ought to succeed as our 1 aw stands at 
present. It would be a clear case of mechanically applied 
concept jurisprudence; the accused was in a drunken stupor conse-
quently his involuntary muscular movements are not acts for the 
24) Chretien 1104 E-G. 
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purposes of the criminal law. Even if they should have results 
that would otherwi se be criminal the accused has committed no 
criminal act. Fault on his part is out of the question and he is 
discharged. Such a result would be unsatisfactory. But to avoid 
it a bench of five judges of the Appellate Division would have 
had to revise the statement that involuntary muscular movements 
render fault irrelevant. 
A si mil ar result has been brought about by Chreti en where an 
accused commits a kill i ng whil e 'ontoerekeni ngsva tbaar' because 
of intoxication. A person would presumably reach this stage of 
intoxication before passing into a state of drunken automatism 
although the two conditions might overlap.25) 
Suppose the accused were to commence heavy drinking in a 
situation were a reasonable man would foresee that once the 
alcohol had caused his inhibitions to crumble he might attack and 
kill someone. Further suppose that his inhibitions were to 
crumble until he could no longer control his conduct according to 
his appreciation of its wrongfulness and he were then to attack 
and kill someone, would his 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' absolve 
him from culpable homicide as well as murder because 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' excludes fault altogether? 
25) Chretien 1106 E-G. The two conditions appear to overlap 
in Stellmacher supra. 
- 347 -
On the strength of Chretien, Stellmacher26 ) and Baartman27 ) 
it is submitted that such a person should not to be convicted. 
It would be a simple matter of arguing in terms of the concepts 
of concept orientated criminal law; the accused was 'ontoereken-
i ngsvatbaar'; 'ontoerekeni ngsvatbaarhei d' excl udes faul t; faul t 
is therefore excluded, hence no conviction could follow. 28 ) 
If a court were to arrive at a different decision and convict 
notwithstanding a finding of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' it would 
be making an irregular finding, unless it were a bench of five 
judges of the Appellate Division who, after due consideration, 
had decided to limit the effect of the statements in the Chretien 
judgment concerni ng 'ontoereken i ngsva tbaarhei d' and the defence 
of intoxication. 
When considering the effect of Chretien on antecedent liability, 
one must bear in mi nd that Johnson was founded on antecedent 
liability inasmuch as Botha JA sought to find the 'skuld' (fault 
or mens rea) of the accused at the stage when he commenced 
drinking, and that Johnson was overruled in Chretien as being no 
26) supra. 
27) supra. 
28) These are mechanical arguments in terms of concepts 
similar to the argument employed in Alexander supra to 
arrive at the conclusion that dolus excludes cUlba 
therefore an accused who has cOl1l11i tted mu rder cannot e 
convicted of culpable homicide. Mechanical argument in 
terms of concepts is probably the most unfavourable result 
of the 'strafregwetenskaplike' analysis of the concepts 
that make up crimes and according to which criminal 
liability is determined. 
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longer in keeping with public policy. Perhaps. unfortunately. no 
investigation into the reliance placed on antecedent liability by 
Botha JA was made. 
From the general tenor of the Chretien judgment it would. how-
ever. appear that a person who kills another while drunk could be 
adjudged to have been negligent although the effect of his 
i ntoxi cati on mi ght be such that he di d not as a fact. when 
commencing his drinking. realise that his conduct could possibly 
result in the death of another. Before the stage of 'ontoereken-
ingsvatbaarheid' or automatism is reached an accused could still. 
notwithstanding intoxication be said to have acted unreason-
ably.29) This is in fact what happened to Chretien. His poor 
judgment was due to the effect of the alcohol. but he was found 
to have acted negl i gently. In this connection it is worth 
mentioning that Strauss 30 ) could be mistaken where he states 
that Chretien's conviction of culpable homicide was founded on 
antecedent liability . The trial court found that he had not been 
so intoxicated as not to have known what he was doing. but that 
his intoxication explained his faulty judgment in believing that 
he would not hit any of the members of the crowd he ploughed into 
with his Kombi .31) His driving into the crowd as a result of 
his poor judgment. was sufficiently negligent for a conviction of 
29) At a stage in his worsening state of intoxication when 
a 1 though no longer sober he was sti 11 in command of hi s 
faculties; vide Lombard 1981 3 SA 198 (A). 
30) 400 n12. 
31) Chretien 1979 4 SA 871 (D) . 
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culpable homicide. The culpable homicide conviction is not 
discussed in the Appellate Division jupgment. 32 ) The conviction 
of culpable homicide was not founded on antecedent liability but 
on the fault of the accused at the time when he kill ed the 
deceased . 
4.4 The Actio Libera in Causa 
The actio libera in causa is an old figure in the law. The rule 
is that if a person dri nks with the i ntenti on of ga i ni ng the 
necessary courage or determination to commit a crime that he 
woul d otherwi se not have the nerve to commit, he woul d be found 
guiltyl) if he commits that crime, and his intoxication would 
be no defence. Prior to Chretien such a person who intended to 
injure or kill another and gained the necessary courage from the 
bottle to injure or to kill, would not have been found guilty of 
common assault or culpable homicide because of the effect of the 
liquor, but of assault with intent or of murder, as the case may 
be. Similarly, so it was said,2) if he became an automaton he 
would have been regarded as a self-created zombi who had brought 
about the crime as a result of his pre-determined design. 
32) From which one concludes that the findings and grounds for 
such findings of the court a quo in respect of the convic-
tion must have been adjudged to be sound. 
l) In other words murder would not be reduced to cul pabl e 
homicide or assault with intent to common assault . 
2) Johnson supra 211, Drugs Report 34. 
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Even before Chretien it had become doubtful whether the latter 
proposition would still be acceptable because of the increasing 
acceptance of the doctrine that an 'act' can only be committed by 
a human being whose will is in control of his body.3) This 
latter aspect of concept jurisprudence had made considerable 
headway and once it is dogmatically laid down that the object of 
the concept 'act' coul d not exi st unl ess the person committi ng 
the 'act' were controlled by his will, it would follow that 
volition being absent, there could be no act; there being no act, 
there could be no crime. 4 ) 
In Chretien these misgivings were confirmed by the statement that 
if a person who had become dead drunk and who lay making involun-
tary muscul ar movements, happened to commit a crime in this 
condition, he could not be said to have acted (and his fault was 
not to be philosophised upon) .5) It must immediately be added 
that the learned Chief Justice did say that in Chretien he was 
not considering the case of the person who had commenc~d drinking 
with the intention of committing a crime whilst under the influ-
ence of alcohol. 6 ) 
3) vide De Wet and Swanepoel 3ed 115 n99. 
4) The mechanical nature of the reasoning in terms of con-
cepts is plain . 
5) Chretien 1104 E-G; 'In die geval van die onwillekeurige 
spierbewegings van 'n papdronke is ' daar geen sweem van 
beheer ni e en is di t dus ni e eers nogi g om oor skul d te 
filosofeer nie'. 
6) 1105 G-H. 
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At the same time Chretien took matters a step further. Thus, a 
person who was so intoxicated as to be 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar' 
could not be convicted of any 'crime' commited by him in that 
intoxicated state. Even though the learned judge did not state 
this, the inference was inescapable that if the man who drinks to 
gain courage were to drink so much as to lose his sense of right 
and wrong or the ability to control his conduct in conformity 
with his appreciation of its wrongfulness, he could not be 
convicted of a crime committed in this state. The intention with 
which he commenced his drinking would not affect the question of 
his guilt or innocence. This is the inference drawn correctly, 
it is submitted, by Strydom J in Baartman. 7) 
The South Afri can Law Commi ss i on does not agree with Strydom 
J.B) But the argument advanced by the commission 9 ) is uncon-
vincing. They compare a man who has become an automaton as a 
result of excessive drinking done with the intention of conrnit-
ting a crime while intoxicated, and who commits the originally 
intended crime while in the condition of automatism, to a terror-
ist who sets a time bomb and falls asleep or goes into a coma 
before the bomb goes off . The fact that at the time of the 
explosion of the bomb the terrorist is unable to act because his 
will does not control his body, will not absolve him from liabil-
ity as he sets his bomb while able to act. 
7) 1983 4 SA 3~5 (NC), 400 E-G. 
8) Drugs Report 34 . 
9) In Working paper 5, 33ff, but not repeated in the final 
Report. 
- 352 -
The comparision is not apt as the two cases are dissimilar in an 
important respect. The intoxicated automaton is the very person 
himself who corrrnenced drinking. A person who sets a time bomb 
knows that it will explode because of the mechanical and chemical 
processes at work in it that can only be stopped by an outside 
agency or internal malfunction. A person cannot turn himself 
into such a prograrrrned electro-chemical device . He retains his 
will and that will could at any stage steer him in a course 
different from the one he had in mi nd. 10 ) If the wi 11 does not 
steer him at all, he does not act and there the argument ends. 
It is also to be borne in mind that a person who becomes intoxi-
cated might get a different perspective on things after getting 
himself into a state of intoxication. Instead of attacking his 
victim he might decide that his intended victim is not really 
'such a bad chap' and join him in a drinking bout. 
It is submitted that it is a fallacy to treat the case of a man 
who drinks with the intention of committing a crime as identical 
with that of a man who sets in motion an infernal machine. 
Similar considerations would apply to the case of an accused who 
intending to corrrnit a crime, drinks himself into a state of 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' and then commits the crime. On the 
10) vide JMT Labuschagne 1981 ~ 335, 337-9. 
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strength of the dicta concerning 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' in 
Chretien it would seem that the positive law is now to the effect 
that the 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' would have a retroactive 
effect and erase all fault from the conduct of the accused . In 
the case of the automaton one woul d be deal i ng with a person 
whose wi ll had ceased to control his body because of his intoxi-
cation, and in the case of the 'ontoerekeningsvatbare' individual 
one would be dealing with a person who had lost the ability to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and/or to control it 
in conforming with such an appreciation, because of his intoxica-
tion. 
The situation that is more likely to arise out of the two exam-
ples mentioned, is that the accused who drinks to commit a crime 
would commit the crime while unable to control his conduct in 
conformity with his appreciation of its unlawfulness. The case 
of an intoxicated human automaton carrying out a plan formed 
while he was still sober, must in the nature of things, be rare. 
How a psychologist would be able to testify with a degree of 
certainty that excludes any reasonable doubt, that a man while in 
a state of intoxicated automatism was acting in furtherance of an 
intention formed before he started drinking, is difficult to 
imagine . The conscious mi nd of such a person would be in a state 
of suspensi on and unconsci ous impul ses that have nothi ng to do 
with the i ntenti on formed before the dri nk i ng conmenced, mi ght 
reasonably possibly be at work in him. 
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One could argue objectively that, had he not begun to drink with 
the intention of committing the crime, the cri me would not have 
been commi tted. That woul d, however, be an a rgument based on 
causal liability: it would not suffice to establish fault in the 
shape of intent work i ng from the commencement of the dri nk i ng, 
through the state of automatism to the commission of the 
offence. The human will is an incomprehensible causal factor and 
would still be unconsciously operative. How could the possibil-
ity be excluded that the original intention had disappeared 
during the state of intoxication and that other impulses had 
provided the internal dynamic that had caused the person concern-
ed to commit the crime? The psychological imponderables involved 
are enormous. If such a person were to be convicted of murder it 
would have to be on the simple basis of a legal rule that a 
person who dri nks wi th the i ntenti on of commi tti ng a certa in 
crime is taken to have committed that crime intentionally no 
matter that at the time of the actual physical commission of the 
crime, he lacked intention, volition and the ability to act. 
There is nothing in the nature of things that makes such a legal 
rule impossible, but it would be contrary to the subjective view 
nowadays taken of intention in our law and it would also be con-
trary to the dicta of Rumpff CJ in Chretien concerning the 
i nabi 1 ity of a dead drunk person to I act I. Such a rule would 
also not serve as a foundation for normative fault, as the 
inability to act would exclude all fault. 
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It woul d be a better founded argument to submit that had the 
accused not commenced his drinking with the intention of commit-
ting the crime, he would not have 'committed' it and that a 
reasonab 1 e man woul d have foreseen that a person who dri nks in 
order to commit a crime would possibly commit that crime in a 
state of intoxicated automatism. In other words the mens rea 
sought to be established would be culpa. 
This brings us to the question of the negligent actio libera in 
causa. It is disputed that there is a negligent actio 1 i bera in 
causa in our law. l1 ) De Wet and Swanepoel mention it in the 
first edition 12) , but it is not referred to in the three 
subsequent editions. Burchell and Hunt refer to it in both 
editions,13) but appear to reject it in the second edition. 
Criticizing Johnson, De Wet and Swanepoel state that it was in 
some respects an attempt to apply a negligent actio libera in 
causa ,14) The facts, they submi t, di d not fi t into a negl i gent 
actio libera in causa. It could not be seriously argued that a 
reasonable man in the position of the accused when he commenced 
drinking, would have foreseen that he would possibly kill the 
the deceased while drunk. This argument has much to commend it. 
11) Oosthuizen 1985 THRHR 407, 419. 
12) 81. 
13) led 227, 2ed 292. 
14) 3ed 1226, but contrast led 80 ng. 
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While the reasonable man would know, in general, that an intoxi-
cated person could become a danger to himsel f and others, he 
woul d have requi red speci al vi si onary powers to foresee that 
Johnson would be arrested, would lapse into a state of intoxi-
cated automatism in the police cells and would there in that 
condition kill a fellow prisoner. 
Not all killings committed by drunken automatons are of such an 
unforeseeable nature. Thus the man who drinks knowing that he 
may have to drive with passengers i n his car through heavy 
traffic, could easily foresee that he would be materially 
endangering the lives of others by his dr i nking.l5 ) Similarly 
the man who drinks while working in a railway signal office or 
who drinks while working with heavy building material on a high 
wall or roof, or who drinks while in charge of, or about to take 
charge of dangerous equi pment, coul d be 1 i ab 1 e on the bas i s of 
culpa in respect of any death resulting from hi s conduct. 
In Stellmacher16 ) there was ample evidence that the accused kill-
ed the deceased while in a state of intoxicated automatism. 17 ) 
He was acquitted on the ground that he had been 'ontoerekenings-
vatbaar' at the time of the killing. I f hi s case had been 
approached on the basis of a negligent actio libera in causa he 
could possibly have been convicted of culpable homicide notwith-
IS) De Wet and Swanepoel 122. 
16) supra. 
17) Strauss 400 nIl. 
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standing his automatism at the time of the firing of the fatal 
shot. Naturally the peremptory statement of Rumpff CJ that 
involuntary muscular movements can not amount to an act and that 
fault need not be philosophised upon when considering such a 
case, would have militated against such a finding. One could, 
however, argue that the example of a crime referred to by Rumpff 
CJ in that context was assault and that the learned judge could 
not be taken to have referred to crimes requiring culpa as their 
mens rea. Had the accused in Stellmacher appealed aga i nst hi s 
(hypothetical) conviction the Appellate Division would then have 
had to decide directly whether drinking in such dangerous circum-
stances amounts to negl i gence or a negl i gent acti 0 1 i bera in 
causa. This is no more than a 'might have been' but it is 
respectfull y submi tted, that Stellmacher was negl i gent when he 
started drinking heavily with a loaded pistol in his pocket and 
that his subsequent automatism ought not to have insulated him 
against a conviction of culpable homicide,18) He was in fact 
acquitted because of his 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid,19) and the 
same considerations should have militated against his total 
acquittal on this ground. 20 ) 
18) vi de du Pl essi s 1984 THRHR 98; cf Snyman 1985 SALJ 240, 
241; Bergenthuin 505-6 . 
19) vide du Plessis 1983 Speculum Juris 84. 
20) There is some doubt as to the preci se reason for the 
acquittal. He was apparently proved to have acted in a 
state of automatism and acquitted because of 'ontoereken-
ingsvatbaarheid': vide Strauss 400 nIl; Snyman 40 n8. 
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It would, however, have been contrary to the dicta in Chretien 
concerning the effect of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid ' on the crim-
inal liability of intoxicated persons, to have held that Stell-
macher was guilty of culpable homicide. 
Naturally, it could have been argued that the said dicta 21 ) in 
Chretien were not to be interpreted as excluding liability in 
such a clear case of negligent conduct resulting in death and the 
Appellate Division might have had the opportunity of stating 
whether, in overruling Johnson, Rumpff CJ had rejected all ante-
cedent liability including the actio libera in causa principle 
from our law. 
It is interesting to note that the South African Law Commis-
sion 22 ) and Bergenthuin23 ) pOint out that the actio libera in 
causa principle is unnecessary in our law. According to them it 
is merely a question of applying the general principles of 
criminal liability and the same result will be achieved. This 
view appears to be correct although the term actio 1 ibera in 
causa is convenient . As above pointed out, it is also difficult 
to see how an intention to commit a crime formed at the 
commencement of the drinking, could result in conviction of an 
intentional crime by a drunken automaton or an intoxicated 
person lacking criminal capacity, unless a construct such as the 
21) To the effect that an accused's inability to act makes 
inquiry into his fault superfluous 1104 E- G. 
22) Drugs Report 33. 
23) 504. 
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actio libera in causa is employed. 
The submission that the ordinary principles of criminal liability 
should be employed, is very attractive. But they must not be 
employed like the trap-doors, sliding partitions and concealed 
loop-holes in a chinese puzzle . What is meant is that we should 
avoid the methods of concept jurisprudence in terms of which 
immutable concepts are mechanically constructed and employed in 
much the same way as the concepts of the crimi nal act, and 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' were employed in Chretien,24) 
Stellmacher25 ) and Arnold. 26 ) The rule that ' toerekeningsvat-
baarheid' is such an absolute prerequisite that it excludes 
negl i gence incases such as Ste 11 mac her and Arnold shoul d be 
abandoned . I n the same way the rul e that a crimi na 1 act is such 
that Stellmacher and Arnold could not be said to have acted, 
should also be abandoned. Whether this can be done as long as 
the dicta in Chretien are binding as at present, is doubtful. It 
woul d undoubtedly be a benefi ci a 1 step forward in ou r crimi na 1 
law if conduct such as that of Stellmacher and Arnold could be 
looked at in i ts entirety to determine criminal liability. The 
employment of the concepts 'criminal act' or 'criminal capacity' 
should not shut the door to a conviction no matter how socially 
desirable and in accordance with pre-Chretien principles such a 
conviction might be. 
24) supra. 
25) supra. 
26) supra. 
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The subjective approach to dolus would in any event, rightly it 
is submitted, result in killings being adjudged to be culpable 
homicide in most cases where fault is based on antecedent 
liability, of which the actio libera in causa is but an example. 
The rule that actus reus and mens rea must be contempor-
aneous, 27) al so needs to be closely examined and re 1 axed if 
necessary. If it were to be rigidly applied28 ) antecedent 
1 i abil ity woul d become an unworkable doctri ne or concept. No 
matter how negligent a man like Stellmacher might have been when 
he commenced his drinking, he could not be said to have had mens 
rea at the time of the killing. The negligence and the killing 
would not be contemporaneous. If, on the other hand, the require-
ment of contemporaneity is relaxed one could simply view the 
matter in the light that when he commenced his drinking Stell-
macher negl igently set in motion a train of events which resulted 
in the death of the deceased. In respect of Arnol done coul d 
submit that he negligently set in motion a course of events that 
resulted in the death of his wife when he commenced an emotion-
ally highly charged discussion with her, whilst holding a loaded 
pi sto 1 in hi shand. The fact that he was unable to I act I when 
27) This view is strongly supported by Burchell and Hunt 106-
8; vide Bergenthuin 1986 SACC 21, 24-5 for discussion of 
contemporaneity and the aCTIO 1 i bera in causa. The vi ews 
advanced are unacceptable. 
28) As a further example of mechanical concept jurisprudence . 
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the course of events so set in motion resulted in the shot being 
fired ought not to have absolved him. He was able to act at the 
initial stage, when he set the train of events in motion. 29 ) 
It is accordingly sumitted that the above may be construed as 
contradicting the criticism levelled at the South African Law 
Commission's analogy of the terrorist and the time-bomb. There 
is no obj ecti on to the analogy as long as it is confi ned to 
crimes of which culpa is the mens rea. It is only when the 
analogy is sought to be applied to crimes of which dolus is the 
mens rea that it is no longer apt. Dolus presupposes active 
spontaneous subjecti ve factors that are not to be found in a 
time-bomb, or to the best of our knowledge, in creatures other 
than man. 
With reference to the actio libera in causa whether intentional 
or negl i gent, and with reference to antecedent 1 iabil i ty 
generally, it is submitted that the rigid application of dogmatic 
rules that an act is not an act unless its commission or perfor-
mance is voluntary, and that 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' excludes 
the very consi derati on of mens rea shoul d not be adhered to . 
Insofar as Chretien supports or appears to support views of the 
'act' and 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' that would tend to narrow 
29) vi de Oosthui zen 1985 THRHR 407; the author advanced the 
vi ew that even in the 1 i ght of Chreti en the accused in 
Johnson could still be convicted. Bergenthuin 1986 SACC 
21, 28 submits that Arnold was correctly decided . 
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the scope of antecedent 1 i abil ity or rej ect the enti re concept 
from our law that decision should, with respect, be revised. 
4.5 Involuntary Intoxication 
The defence of involuntary intoxication lies at the extreme 
opposite end of the scale to antecendent liability, more particu-
larly antecedent liability in the shape of the intentional acti o 
1ibera in causa. 
The law relating to the defence of voluntary intoxication prior 
to Chretien could be summed up as being to the effect that volun-
tary intoxication could not be a complete defence to a killing or 
an assault . 1) At most its effect on dolus could be to reduce 
intent to do grievous bodily harm to intent to apply force and 
to negative intent to kill and place in ' its stea.d culpa where an 
intoxicated person had committed a killing. 
If the accused had been brought to a state of involuntary intoxi-
cation this could be a complete defence, provided that the 
intoxication was of such a degree as to negative intent, criminal 
capacity or the abil ity to act. It if were of a lesser degree 
and only made him aggressive or careless while still in posses-
sion of his faculties, it would not be a defence. The decision 
1) Johnson supra. 
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in Hartyani 2 ) has confirmed this view which had previously been 
stated in Innes-Grant. 3 ) 
Chretien has had the effect of placing the defence of vol untary 
intoxication on the same footing as the defence of involuntary 
intoxication. For that reason alone, Chretien should be treated 
with some scepticism in the same way as the jurisprudential 
development in our criminal law that preceded it. A system of 
criminal law designed to protect society against its dangerous 
and wayward members should be able to draw a distinction between 
the crimi na 1 1 i abi 1 ity of a man who overi mbi bes knowi ngly and 
that of a man who does so unwittingly. 
4.5 Specific intent and the defences of provocation and intox-
ication 
The so-called doctrine of specific intent has been severely 
attacked by De Wet and Swanepoel. 4 ) No doctrine of specific 
intent has ever been worked out systematically by the courts or 
our legal writers. 5 ) It appears to have been a somewhat 
2) 1980 3 SA 613 (T). 
3) 1949 1 SA 753 (A). 
4) led 77, 85; 2ed 111-110; 3ed 119ff; 4ed 124 ff. 
5) It is said to have been first imported into our law in 
connection with intoxication in Fowlie 1906 TS 505 by the 
distinguished jurist, judge and legal historian Sir John 
Wessels (whose treatise on contract must still qualify as 
one of the most scholarly books written in South Afric~~ 
law), and then to have been rejected in Bourke 1916 TPD 
303. The Headnote in Bourke is misleading, but was 
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loosely used term which made more sense in practice than on 
paper. 6 ) 
One of the main theoretical objections to this doctrine was that 
there was no clear categorisation of crimes into crimes of 
specific intent or crimes of general intent to be found anywhere 
in our decisions or legal writings.7) The solution to the 
problem whether specific intent was a requirement for conviction 
on a specific charge would seem to be that this would only become 
clear in the course of the trial. As the evidence unfolded it 
would become clear to the bench, the prosecution and the defence 
whether any specific intent was in issue, what that specific 
intent was, and whether the prosecuti on was bei ng successful in 
its · attempts to prove it. If, for instance, the accused had 
stabbed the complainant seriously in the arms, ·legs or torso it 
would generally not be difficult for the prosecution to persuade 
the court that he had intended to inflict grievous bodily harm. 
But the accused may rai se the defence that in the course of an 
argument he had stabbed in the direction of the complainant 
intending at most to frighten him, but that the complainant had 
followed in later cases with the result that Bourke was 
quoted as authority for the acceptance of a doctrine which 
had in fact been rej ected in it; vi de Pain 1974 SALJ 467. 
Be that as it may, there are many references to specifi c 
or speci al intent in Gardi ner and Lansdown subsequent to 
Bourke and it was a term in constant use in our courts for 
more than two decades after the appearance of the si xth 
and last edition of that text-book. 
6) vide Chretien 1103 pr where the term is authoratively 
rejected for the first time. 
7) Burche 11 and Hunt led 230; 2ed 295-6; Snyman (Stra freg) 
149-50; Paine 1974 SALJ 467. 
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unexpectedly moved forward and that this had resulted in his 
being injured in a manner not intended by the accused. The 
stabbi ng as averred by the accused woul d amount to a common 
assaul t and the di spute between prosecuti on and defence woul d 
then revolve around the question whether the accused had intended 
to inflict serious bodily harm or not. As a matter of linguistic 
conveni ence the court woul d consi der the questi on whether the 
prosecution had proved that the accused had the 'specific' intent 
to infl ict grievous bodily harm or whether only the intent to 
commit a common assault had been proved. The same approach would 
be found in cases where the prosecution attempted to prove murder 
and the defence was prepared to admit culpable homicide resulting 
from an assault, but denied any intention to kill. An intent to 
injure may be clearly proved, but the question remains, had there 
been a specifi c intent to ki ll? The use of the word 'specifi c' 
in the latter context would serve, linguistically, to define the 
issue before the court clearly. 
The question whether the accused had a specific intent to inflict 
grievous bodily harm or to kill could be affected by many fac-
tors. Was he threatened and did he strike out wildly because of 
fear. 8 ) If so, was he aware that his actions could result 
8) The doctrine of specific intent is not dealt with in rela-
tion to self-defence in the text books, but its linguistic 
use in a self-defence situation is easily recognized. For 
instance one could ask whether the accused in Ntuli had 
merely intended to ward off the assault of his assailant 
or whether he had specifically intended to kill her unlaw-
fully. An accused, bewildered by an attack on his person, 
mi ght say that he had been so confused that hi s mi nd had 
not focussed specifically on killing, or the possibility 
that he mi ght kill. 
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in the death of the deceased? The accused may have been 
provoked. Could he, with his mind clouded by violent emotions, 
foresee that his actions would result in death? He may have been 
under the i nfl uence of 1 i quor when stabbi ng or stri king, or 
shooting. Was his mind perhaps not so befuddled by alcohol that 
he did not realise he might kill? In all these cases the 
terminology used would be whether a 'specific' intent to kill had 
been proved apart from the intent to strike, shoot, wound, 
repulse, hurt and so forth. 
The way in which such an issue arises at a trial is well 
illustrated by the facts in Chretien .9) The prosecution had 
proved that the accused had hit and injured five people with his 
Kombi. It alleged that he had intended to kill them. The specific 
intent to kill became the issue in dispute on the evidence. The 
prosecution failed to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Then 
the poi nt in issue changed : di d the accused intend to apply 
force? In other words did he have the specific intent to commit 
common assault?10) Once more the prosecution failed; the 
accused coul d be proved to have been negligent only. The 
unusual feature about the facts in Chretien was that there was a 
9) 1979 4 SA 87 (D) . The famous Chreti en case stemmed from 
this Durban case. 
10) That is apart from the intention to drive the vehicle at 
the crowd, trusting (so he said), that he would not hit 
any member of it. 
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question as to whether an intent to cOlTl11it cOlTl11on assault had 
been proved. This does not often happen. But when the prosecu-
tion attempts to obtain a conviction for common assault arising 
from negligent driving it must prove that in addition to driving 
negligently the accused had intended to apply force. Although 
common assault could have been regarded as a crime not requiring 
specifi c intent ,11) the issues raised by the facts in Chreti en 
soon showed that it di d. Did the accused, in addition to the 
intent to drive in the direction of the crowd, have the specific 
intention to hit one or more of the people in the crowd with the 
Kombi? That was the question the tri a 1 court had to deci de on. 
Pl aci ng hi s i ntoxi cati on in the scales the court found that it 
tilted the evidence in his favour. The specific intent to apply 
force to the person of another or others had not been proved. 
This view of the so-called doctrine of specific intent is referr-
ed to by Rumpff CJ in Chretien as follows: 12 ) 
'Vanselfsprekend kan 'n hof vol gens ons reg wel bevind dat 
'n persoon weens invloed van drank 'n bepaalde gevolg nie 
11) It is interesting to note the Burchell and Hunt led 230 
suggest that common assault requires specific intent. 
Their statement that it is the intent to injure is of 
course mistaken, an intent to apply force without injuring 
is sufficient for common assault (that is when mere 
threats are not the substance of the crime). 
12) 1104 A. 
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voorsien nie wat hy wel kon voorsien het indien hy nugter 
was, en dat hy dus aan 'n minder ernstige misdaad skuldig 
is' .13 ) 
This is a perfectly logical and, with respect, sensible view of 
the law. The failure to foresee could also be due to fear, 
anger, di stress, mental confus i on or other si mil ar causes and 
need not be confined to intoxication. Viewed in this way the 
doctrine of 'specific' intent is no more than the use of a 
certain terminology to describe the narrowing of the issues 
raised on the evidence at a criminal trial. 
If one considers the passage just cited from Chretien the much 
criticized term 'able to form an intention' also becomes 
clearer. The criticism, mainly by De Wet and Swanepoel 14 ) is 
to the effect that if a person can not form an intention or a 
specific intention to infl ict grievous bodily harm, it is diffi-
cult to see how he could form any intention at all; for instance, 
the intention to cOlTTnit common assault. Similarly if he coul d 
not form the i ntenti on to k ill how coul d he form any i ntenti on 
at all? The answer woul d appear to be that knowl edge or fore-
sight is part of dolus. A person's mind could be so befuddled 
13) 'Undoubtedl y a court can fi nd in te rms of our 1 aw that 
because of the effect of liquor a person failed to foresee 
certain results which he would have foreseen had he been 
sober and he is accordingly guilty of a less serious 
crime' (my translation). 
14) led 85; 3ed 118; Snyman (Strafreg) 149. 
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by alcohol, confused by fear or clouded by anger that he lacks 
the judgement to foresee that his actions could result in the 
infliction of serious bodily injury or death. But he may,at the 
same time, be able to foresee and intend that his actions should 
amount to the app 1 i cati on of force to the person of another. 
There is nothing esoteric about this. In this context the abil-
ity to form an intention is nothing more than being sufficiently 
in possession of one's faculties to foresee the results of one's 
conduct. 
There is also another view of specific intent that has never been 
systematically worked out in our law; namely, that crimes are to 
be divided into crimes of specific intent and crimes of general 
intent and that specific intent can be rebutted by intoxication, 
provocation or the state of mind with which a person exceeds the 
bounds of self-defence or private defence. But this latter rule 
would not apply to general intent. This doctrine could possibly 
have been appl ied in Johnson15 ) and Jassane,16) It appears to 
be a normative doctrine of fault; namely, that irrespective of 
his real or actual state of mind17 ) an accused would be treated 
as if he had the intention to commit a less serious crime if he 
successfully raised intoxication or provocation as defences to, 
for instance, the more serious crime of assault with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm. A similar result would follow where self-
15) 1970 3 SA .535 (e). 
16) 1973 4 SA 658 (T). 
17) ie his psychological fault . 
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defence is raised to this latter crime, but the bounds of 
self-defence are found to have been exceeded. 
This objective approach to dolus is obsolete. It is a mechanical 
application of presumptions and rebuttals, and if this is what 
was rejected by Rumpff CJ in Chretien when he said: 18 ) 
'Wat ons reg betref behoort die hele idee van "specific 
intent" in verband met drank, soos dit in die Engelse reg 
verskyn, as onaanvaarbaar beskou te word : 8y 'n 
behoorlike toepassing van ons reg is daar geen plek vir 
di e besondere benaderi ng ni e' ,19) 
there is a decided positive benefit to be derived from that 
decision. 
As far as the law of culpable homicide is concerned it has always 
been a matter of cardinal importance at murder trials whether the 
accused had the 'specific intent' to kill. If he lacked this 
intent a conviction of culpable homicide would generally follow. 
In view of Chretien the reference to 'specific intent' would now 
simply become a reference to 'i ntent' but the 1 aw remai ns the 
18) 1103 H - 1104 pro 
19) 'As far as our law is concerned, the whole idea of 
"specific intent" in connection with liquor as it is found 
in English law, ought to be regarded as unacceptable. On 
the proper application of our law there is no room for 
this particular approach' (my translation). It is, with 
respect, an improvement in our Law . 
- 371 -
same. It is not in the fields of dolus or culpa as such that the 
main importance of Chretien is to be found, but in respect of 
inquiries into criminal capacity and the ability to 'act;' in 
other words, whether the presence or absence of dol us or cul pa 
are to be investigated at all. The nett result is that where 
absence of 'specific intent' to kill had in the past almost 
automatically led to a conviction of culpable homicide, this is 
no longer necessarily the case, even where the conduct of the 
accused was patently unreasonable: he may have been 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaar'. 
4.7 Statutory Culpable Homicide arising from intoxication 
The effects of the Chretien decision have after six years, during 
which time a protracted in-depth investigation by the South 
African Law Commission has taken place and been reported on,l) 
resulted in a proposal of the South African Law Commission which 
will be considered by Parliament in terms of which it would 
become a statutary offence to commit a 'crime' while under the 
influence of liquor or drugs. 
The legislation proposed by of the Law Commission reads as 
follows: 
'I) Any person who voluntarily consumes liquor or any 
drug or substance which affects his mental faculties, 
knowing that such liquor, drug or substance has that 
1) Working Paper 5 (January 1984), Drugs Report (January 
1986) . 
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effect, and who, while his mental faculties are thus 
affected, commits an act for which he would have been 
criminally liable had his mental faculties not been 
thus affected, shall be gu i lty of an offence and 
shall be liable on conviction to any punishment, 
except the death penalty, which could have been 
imposed on him had he been held criminally liable for 
such act. 
2) If, ina prosecuti on on a charge of any offence, it 
is found that the accused is not criminally liable 
for the offence charged, owing to the fact that his 
menta 1 faculti es had been affected by 1 i quor or any 
drug or other substance, the accused may be found 
guil ty of the offence in subsecti on (1) if the evi-
dence proves such offence'. 
If this or a similar measure were to become law a person who 
kills while unable to 'act' because of the consumption of liquor 
or drugs or who acts while lacking criminal capacity for the 
same reason, could be convicted of a crime. Such a crime would, 
s tri ctly speak i ng, be neither murder nor cul pab 1 e homi ci de. But 
insofar as it would be punishable homicide it could be called 
culpable homicide, the term culpable being used in a very wide 
sense. 2 ) 
2) If the measure is to the effect that the accused could be 
convicted notwithstanding absence of mens rea and/or 
criminal capacity it would create a crime of strict 
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In this connection it is worth noting that Germany has for many 
years had a statutory measure,3) similar to the one proposed by 
the South Afri can Law Commi ss i on, in the German Penal Code. A 
consideration of the German positive law in addition to German 
criminal legal theories might very well have caused the many 
critics of Johnson to temper their expressions of dissatisfaction 
with the judgment . Irrespective of what the German theorists may 
say the accused in Johnson would have been convicted of a 
statutory offence in Germany . He would probably have received a 
term of imprisonment in excess of the suspended sentence imposed 
on him in South Africa and his sentence would probably not have 
been suspended. 4 ) 
liability and, in this context, culpable homicide would be 
the unlawful killing of a human being . If the accused 
could also be convicted if the crime is committed in a 
state of drunken automation he could be convicted of con-
duct which did not amount to an 'act' ie he could be con-
victed in respect of a kill ing without having 'killed'. 
This would reveal the latent >absurdities in the dogmatic 
view that only voluntary acts are acts and that 'ontoerek-
eningsvatbaarheid' at the time of the actual commission of 
a crime always absolves; vide du Plessis 1985 SALJ 394, 
401; contra Bergenthui m 1986 SACC 21, 22-3. --
3) StGB 323 (9). The crime is known as 'Yollrausch'. 
4) The wri ter spent 6 weeks attendi ng at crimi na 1 tri a 1 sin 
German criminal courts and cannot regard himself an 
expert. However, as an old denizen of South African 
ciminal courts, his instincts soon told him that the day-
to-day administration of criminal justice is very realis-
ti c. One accused ra i sed the defence of i ntoxi cati on to a 
charge of 'predatory extorti on' (ril.uberi sche Erpressung). 
The public prosecutor told the writer this was a mistake 
as the accused would be more seriously punished. He was 
convicted of 'Yollrausch' and sentenced to one years' 
imprisonment. In a South African court he would probably 
have been sentenced to somethi ng 1 i ke R30 or 30 days for 
common assault involving threats only. What was clear was 
that crimes of vi 01 ence are severely puni shed in Germany 
and excuses of 'I was drunk' or 'I was not my true self' 
are treated with scepticism. 
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5 THE DEFENCE OF YOUTH 
The South African positive law is - to the effect that chil dren 
under the age of seven years are not liable to criminal prosecu-
tion.l) It is submitted that this ought simply to be regarded 
as a rule founded on common sense. 
Traditionally it was said that such children were irrebuttably 
presumed to be doli incapax. 2 ) The reference to dolus was 
clearly not a reference to criminal intention only. but a 
reference to wrongfulness generally3) as such children could 
not be prosecuted for any crime including crimes of negligence 
and strict liability. 
De Wet and Swanepoe 14 ) poi nted out that the rul e was based on 
the immaturi ty of such chil dren whi ch rendered them 'ontoereken-
ingsvatbaar' and that the question of intent (or any other form 
of fault) on their part was therefore irrelevant. This point of 
view seemed to be acceptable. Unfortunately. however. it latent-
ly contained the idea that a sane person could be 'ontoerekening-
svatbaar'. The obvious fallacy. of no importance in respect of 
the criminal liability of children under seven. is that no dis-
tinction is drawn between the sane and the mentally ill or 
mentally defective child. 
1) Burche 11 and Hunt 242. 
2) ibid. 
3) ibid. 
4) led 71-2. 
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In respect of children between the ages of seven and fourteen the 
tradi ti ona 1 vi ew was that they were rebuttably presumed to be 
dol i incapax. 5) The prosecuti on coul d rebut thi s presumption 
by proving that the child knew that what he was doing was wrong. 
It was easier to rebut the presumption where the crime in ques-
tion was a malum per se than where it was a malum prohibitum, 
and, naturally, the presumption was more readily rebuttable in 
respect of older than younger children. 
De Wet and Swanepoe1 6 ) criticized the rule on the ground that 
the inquiry should not be confined to an investigation of the 
child's appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct, but that 
the ability of the child to control his conduct in accordance 
with his appreciation of its wrongfulness should also be investi-
gated. The latter inquiry should be the main inquiry and the 
guidance of psychologists and psychiatrists should be obtain-
ed. 7 ) In other words the question to be answered would be 
whether the child had been 'toerekeningsvatbaar'. 
The obvious fallacy of this approach is that no distinction is 
drawn between the sane and the insane accused fall ing in the 
group.8) Not to be able to control one's conduct in conformi ty 
5) Burchell and Hunt 242ff . The law is still as stated in the 
text: it is not yet clear whether the Weber case will have 
any effect on the criminal law, but it--probably will. 
6) led 72. 
7) led 72; 2ed 100; 3ed 107; 4ed 111 . 
8) The treatment of the topic by De Wet and Swanepoel (prev-
ious note) is also such that no distinction is drawn 
between the young and the mentally ill or defective. 
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with an appreci ation of its wrongful ness is a symptom of mental 
illness or defect . It indicates some abnormality of the mind. 
To state that youthful immaturity of mind with resultant poor 
judgment and a weaker resi stance to temptati on than that of a 
mature person is an abnormality of the mind is unacceptable. 
Infancy and youth are normal stages through which everyone 
passes. 
Thus far, the view that 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' has to be 
fully investigated and rebutted by the prosecution when the 
accused is between the ages of seven and fourteen has not found 
favour in the criminal courts. g ) Weber's10) case will in all 
probability give rise to the adoption of the rule that it is not 
only the ability of the youthful accused to appreciate the wrong-
ful nature of his conduct that is in issue in criminal trials but 
the full question of his 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid,ll) 
Weber was a case in which bad law that had been established in 
Jones 12 ) had to be removed. To investigate the 'toerekenings-
vatbaarheid' of a child such as the little boy in Weber was cer-
tainly infinitely better than to arrive at the untenable result 
in Jones that the negl igence of children is to be determined by 
g) Although a child's inability to resist the pressure of 
grown-ups has frequently been held in his favour vide 
Snyman (Strafreg) 143. 
10) Weber vs Santam Yersekeringsmaatskappy Beperk supra. 
11) De Wet and Swanepoel do not appear too hopeful about this 
possible development (111-2, n57). 
12) Jones NO vs Santam supra. 
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applying the same standards as those applicable to adults, with-
out any qualification based on the immaturity of children. The 
Weber rule that the ability of the child to control his conduct 
is such a qualification has served a good purpose. It is, how-
ever, submitted that a finding that small children are lacking in 
good judgment because of their immaturity and that the standards 
of negligence applicable to adult behaviour are not to be applied 
to their behaviour for this reason, would have been more real-
istic. 13 ) The Weber finding that the little boy in question 
forgot his training about the danger of motor cars and yielded to 
the impulse to play behind a car, is on close consideration a 
finding that he acted unreasonably - by adult standards. 14 ) 
In the context of youth an investigation into 'ontoerekeningsvat-
baarheid' when investigating criminal negligence would be an 
improvement on the rule that the criminal negligence of young 
ch i 1 dren is to be determi ned along the same 1 i nes as that of 
adults. But one must be aware that what is really happening is 
that the defence of insanity is being made available to the sane. 
13 ) 
14) 
How unrealistic the Weber inquiry was, becomes evident 
when one considers that at the trial the child, then aged 
ten years, had to testify concerning his knowledge of the 
dangerous nature of motor cars when he was seven, cf 1. 
supra. 
It is therefore an indirect and somewhat contrived finding 
that the negligence of children should not be judged 
accordi ng to adult standards. Thei r self-defence is 
deficient compared with that of an adult. 
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It is one thing to say that a person was unable to resist a 
temptation and is therefore criminally liable; it is another 
thing to say that inability to resist temptation should be a 
defence to the sane. 
In conclusion it is submitted that the ages of irrebuttable and 
rebuttable lack of criminal capacity are too low in our law.1 5 } 
The legislator ought seriously to consider raising the age up to 
which a child is not liable to criminal prosecution to ten years 
and the age up to which a child is held to be rebuttably doli 
incapax or 'ontoerekeningsvarbaar' to sixteen years. 
Had the law of delict been to this effect, neither the Jones nor 
the Weber case would have posed any problem. It appears incom-
prehensible, with respect, that the 'negligence' of a child of 
nine and a child of seven years and two months should have been 
the subject of serious investigation by our courts. It is so 
obviously misdirected to treat children as if they were adults as 
to make comment superfluous . 16 } 
6 ' TOEREKENINGSVATBAARHEID' IN RELATION TO THE DEFENCES 
DISCUSSED IN THIS CHAPTER 
The defence of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' consisting as it does 
of the two 1 egs of not apprec i a ti ng the wrongful ness of one's 
15} vide Snyman (Strafreg) 141-2. 
16} Unless it be the famous ungrammatica l dictum of the Beadle 
in Oliver Twist: 'The law is a ass' _ But see! supra. 
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conduct and not being able to control one's conduct in accordance 
with an appreciation of its wrongfulness,I} belongs to the 
fi e 1 d of mental abnormal i ty. 
People who act in anger, or who insult or assault others or beat 
their children unmercifully, are colloquially said to have lost 
their self-control. This is far from saying that they are 
i ncapab 1 e of controll i ng thei r conduct in accordance with an 
appreciation of its wrongfulness. 2} The man who acts in anger 
could be better described as having given way to his anger rather 
than as having become 1 iterally incapable of controll ing him-
sel f. In the same way a 1 azy person may deci de to 'gi ve way' to 
his laziness and not do his work, or an amorous individual may 
give way to hi s desi res and attempt to seduce a gi rl, or a 
cricket loving articled clerk may give way to hi s love of the 
sport to watch a cri cket match rather than take some urgent 
process to the court as instructed by his principal. 
I} The two legs of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' have their 
origin in the so called cognitive and conative functions 
of the mind and the ability to 'will'. It is obvious that 
ignorance is not a cognitive malfunction and it ought to 
be equaly obvious that yielding to temptation is not a 
conative malfunction . The first leg does not mean 
ignorance of the law, but a failure, due to some abnormal 
state of the mind, to understand or appreciate that what 
one is doing is wrong . The second leg can obviously only 
have a bearing on some mental abnormality. Normal persons 
can and do control themselves. When a man becomes 
i ncapab 1 e of contro 11 i ng himself and i ncapab 1 e of 
preventing himself from doing what he knows to be wrong, 
there is something abnormal about his mental state. 
2} ie that they suffer from some conative malfunction. 
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These examples may seem facetious. But one can take them further 
step-by-step to clarify the argument. 
Batsmen are often 'out' in cricket matches because of ill-advised 
'nibbling' at rising balls moving away outside the off-stump. 
Every cricketer knows that one of the surest ways of throwing 
away one's wicket is to play at that type of delivery unless 
one's eye is well and truly 'in'. No batsman who has lost his 
wicket in this way will deny that he was aware of the danger, nor 
wi 11 he say that he coul d not have held hi s bat back had he 
wanted to. Why then did he play the shot? He yielded to tempta-
tion! A determinist would say that a man yielding to temptation 
has no real choice in the matter. Such a statement is of doubt-
ful truth and cannot be allowed into the criminal law as it would 
undermine the very basis of the criminal law; namely, that people 
must resist the temptation to indulge in criminal conduct. 
Of course some temptations are stronger than others . An angry 
man may be tempted to give the man who angered him a punch on the 
nose; a man whose wife tells him she intends to 'move in' with 
another man may be tempted to beat or kill her. The strength of 
the temptation may serve as a mitigating factor if the individual 
concerned yields to it. Yielding to or resisting temptations to 
commi t wrongful acts are a common occurrence. But when a man 
cannot but yield to a temptation his mental condition is no 
longer normal. 
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A man may be tempted to dri nk wh il e on duty or when about to 
drive a car. He is able to yield or resist. If he is an alco-
holic his ability to resist may be very low. But if he is really 
unable to resist, his alcoholism may with some justification be 
described as a disease. The man who is attracted by a woman may 
work out a complicated scheme to seduce her. If she resists he 
may show great persistence. But if he gives expression to his 
carnal appetite and rapes her he is guilty of a serious crime. 
Yielding to the urge to have sex with her at any cost is no 
defence. One can hardly imagine rape in which the sex urge com-
bined with a certain sadism is not exceedingly strong. This does 
not make all rapists 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar' on the basis that 
they could not control their conduct in accordance with their 
appreciation of its wrongfulness. Colloquially speaking, they 
may have lost thei r se If-contro 1 . But if a rapi st falls in the 
category of persons who cannot control their conduct in conform-
ity with an appreciation of its wrongfulness he must be adjudged 
to be insane. 
The above considerations have not been mentioned as an excercise 
in lay psychology, but merely as a reminder that criminals gener-
ally have some motive for their crimes and if these motives are 
a 11 owed to become defences under the general headi ng of 'on-
toerekeningsvatbaarheid' the criminal law will cease to fulfil 
any function. Thus, a psychiatrist who subscribes to determinism 
could easily be found to testify that the individual concerned 
had no choice but to yield to the temptation in question. 
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From the above it should be plain that it is submitted that the 
defence of not being able to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's 
conduct or of not bei ng able to control it in accordance wi th 
such an appreciation, should be limited to the case of the menta-
lly di sea sed or defecti ve. Extendi ng it to the youthful is of 
doubtful validity but, provided one is fully aware that the sane 
are being treated as if they were insane, it is not necessarily 
harmful. 
Extending the defence to the intoxicated as happened in Chret-
ien3) which now states the law, has special problems of its 
own. One is here dealing with a field of the criminal law where 
the wrong-doer has provi ded himself with a defence aga i nst the 
criminal consequences of his conduct, which is the very reason 
for the loss of self control which resulted in the conduct com-
plained of. There is something incongruous about allowing a man 
to buy his 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' in a bottle, and then to 
wreak havoc. 4 ) The effect would be to allow him to hide behind 
that very 'ontoerekeni ngsvatbaarhei d' when the results of hi s 
conduct are sought to be brought home to him. 
To have 'solved' the problem by a simple application of the rule 
that an 'ontoerekeningsvatbare' person cannot have criminal 
3) supra. 
4) As for instance in Stellmacher supra. 
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faul t, is, wi th the utmost respect to the 1 earned judges in 
Chreti en not sati sfactory. 5} The homily on the need for courts 
to be sceptical about such a defence is pointless particularly in 
view of the onus of proof. 6 } 
Instead of solving the problem of how to deal with the intoxica-
ted offender, Chretien, with respect, appears to have aggravated 
it and legislation is being considered?} to make the law more 
practical. 
Legislation unless it were of a very drastic nature amounting to 
a direct interference with the general principles of the Common 
Law,8} could not arrest the tendency to extend the ambit of the 
defence of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' beyond the field of the 
defence of insanity. 
In the case of the intoxicated person one can submit that the use 
5} The Chretien judgment is a good example of concept juris-
prudence mechanically applied: 'Ontoerekeningsvatbaar-
heid' excludes 'skuld' X was 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar and 
can therefore have no 'skul d' . Here the concepts of 
'toerekeningsvatbaarheid' and 'skuld' achieve an absolute 
predominance in the relevant legal thinking and the prac-
tical consideration that X was responsible for his own 
'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' is overlooked. 'Jurisdiese 
suiwerheid' in the Chretien sense means the mechanical 
application of concepts. 10 realise to what an extreme one 
is dealing with concept jurisprudence in Chretien, van der 
t~erwe 1981 Obiter 142-52 ought to be carefully perused, 
particularly 144-7. 
6} vide van der ttJerwe's comments at the conclusion of the 
article referred to in the previous note. 
7} vide Drugs Report. 
8} A type of legislation seldom if ever encountered. 
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of 1 i quor or drugs, because of the effect these substances have 
on the human brain, could result in temporary insanity giving 
rise to 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid'. Matters are entirely 
different when one is dealing with the sane, sober adult who 
becomes enraged, depressed or generally 'fed-up' to the extent 
that psychol ogi sts or psychi atri sts may be prepared to describe 
his conduct as temporarily pathological. To allow such a person 
successfully to plead that he lacked criminal fault because he 
became unable to control his conduct according to his apprecia-
tion of its wrongfulness, is neither more nor less than allowing 
the sane to pl ead insanity to a crimi nal charge. A man may 
experi ence a strong urge to k i 11 a wife who taunts hi m as 
Arnold's wife did, or to kill a woman who taunts him as ~lundell 's 
live-in lover did or to violently confront a neighbour brutal as 
was the neighbour of Lesch, but to lose all self-control in such 
circumstances is no excuse. 9 ) It may be a strong mitigating 
factor or extenuating circumstance. But that a person who killed 
another simply because he became exceedi ng1y angry shou1 d escape 
liability altogether is untenab1e. 1O ) Such a person may be 
9) Unless it indeed amounts to genuine identif i able and 
certifiable mental illness or defect . 
10) The fact that the temperament or peculiar emotional cir-
cumstances of the accused contributed to his giving way to 
his anger ought not to absolve him entirely from liabil-
ity: vide CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 240 esp 249-50. Snyman made 
a thorough analyses of Arn<>ra supra and the dangers invol-
ved in extendi ng the defence of 'ontoerekeni ngsvatbaar-
heid' before Arnold was reported in the SALR. 
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able successfully to advance the defence that he did not intend 
to kill as he was too angry to realise that his conduct could 
result in death, but to absolve him from liability for culpable 
homicide in respect of a killing committed in the course of 
patently unreasonable conduct, ought not to be acceptable. 
In Arnold and Stellmacher there is, however, a factor that is not 
to be over-looked and that is that the accused both killed while 
ina state of automati sm· ll ) In Arnold it was specifically 
found by the Court that Arnold could not act at the time of the 
killing.l2 ) Although the court made no such specific finding 
in Stellmacher, it is nevertheless clear from the evidence that 
he had fired the fatal shot while in a state of automatism. l3 ) 
The i nabil i ty of these two men to control their conduct had 
therefore gone beyond the stage of what, for want of a better 
term, one coul d call 'consci ous ontoerekeni ngsvatbaarhei d' and 
their wills were no longer in control of their bodies. Their 
defences therefore di d not amount to sayi ng : 'I knew that what I 
was doi ng was wrong, but was unab 1 e to control my conduct in 
11) In other words they acted unconsciously not knowing what 
they were doing . . This is a condition entirely different 
from that advanced on behal f of the accused in Lesch 
supra . Lesch allegedly knew what he was doi ng but cou 1 d 
not control himself. The very suggestion that such a 
defence, advanced by a mentally normal person, could 
possibly succeed, endangers our Criminal Law (vide CR 
Snyman supra n10 247-8 contra Bergenthuin 1986 SACC 21, 
23-8) . 
12) 263 H-I. 
13) supra. 
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accordance with this knowledge'. What was meant was; 'I neither 
knew what I was doing, nor did I know that I was doing anything 
at all'. The significance, as pointed out by CR Snyman,14) is 
tha t these two accused coul d not be sa i d to have 'acted' in the 
sense in which the word 'act' has come to be used in the criminal 
law. Totally to lose one's conscious volition is an infinitely 
more serious aberration than temporarily to be unable to say 'no' 
to the temptation or an impulse to do something violent. 
In Lesch the condi ti on of the accused did not progress to thi s 
advanced stage of absence of or total loss of control. Lesch 
knew what he was doing and intended to kill the deceased. His 
defence that he could not prevent himself from yielding to the 
impulse to kill the deceased, failed. 15 ) There would therefore 
appear to be no case on record so far where a sane and sober 
accused has been acquitted on the basis that he killed intention-
ally knowing full well what he was doing and that it was wrong, 
but that he 1 acked the abil ity to control hi s conduct accordi ng 
14) supra n10 242-3 . 
15) That the defence was considered at all is disquieting 
(CR Snyman supra n10, 247). To allow a sane, sober adult 
to pl ead that he knew what he was dOing but could not 
prevent himself from doing it is to open the door to 
determinism. Psychiatrist Arno Plack, making a well 
directed attack on the very existence of the criminal law 
in his book 'Pladoyer fur die Abschaffung des Strafrechts' 
uses as the malnSprlng of hlS argument the proposition 
that the human will is not free. Plack is a determinist. 
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to his appreciation of its wrongfulness. 16 ) 
It is al so doubtful whether an appreciable number of accused 
persons would advance this defence. To admit openly at a murder 
trial that the killing was deliberate and intentional would be a 
very dangerous line to adopt. If the 'inability to control ,17) 
leg of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' fails, the accused will have 
rel i eved the prosecuti on of the necessi ty to 1 ead evi dence of 
intent to kill. 
'Ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' of the conscious variety as raised in 
Lesch can be regarded as a defence that wi 11 only be raised in 
exceptional cases, with no very great prospect of success. It is 
to be guarded against and the tendency to allow a sane, sober, 
adult who has committed an intentional killing to successfully 
raise the defence that he was 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar' in the 
sense of not being able to resist a temptation or to curb a 
violent impulse,18) is to be discouraged. 
From the point of view of the law of culpable homicide, it is 
16) I f one may be allowed the co 11 oqui ali sm Lesch supra and 
van Vuuren 1983 1 SA 12 (A) were 'near misses'. These two 
cases and Arnol d supra shoul d be compared with Kennedy 
1951 4 SA 431 (AJ to see how a former generation of Judges 
dealt with violence committed under provocation and emo-
tional stress by an emotionally unstable person . 
17) ie the conative 'leg' of criminal capacity. 
18) vide CR Snyman supra n10, 250. 
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alarming that persons like the accused in Stellmacher and Arnold 
could not have been convicted of that crime. Their conduct was 
grossly unreasonable and their eventual inability to act or their 
lack of criminal capacity ought not to have absolved them from 
all fault, including culpa. In the latter context courts should, 
with respect, pay more attention to considerations of antecedent 
liability,19) and prosecutors should argue strenuously in 
favour of its application. 
A Court should not find that a person who, while in possession of 
all his faculties, embarks on a course of conduct that could 
reasonably foreseeably result in another person's death, is 
absol ved from 1 i abi 1 ity for murder as well as cul pab 1 e homi ci de, 
should such death eventuate and he be adjudged unable to have 
acted and/or to have been 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar' when the final 
fatal act, in the purely physical sense, was committed. Men who 
kill because they cannot control their violent passions are 
murderers, and men who bri ng about the death of others through 
acting without reasonable foresight are guilty of culpable homi-
cide. That is what the law has been for decades and that is 
19) vide CR Snyman supra n10, 243 for a clear exposition of 
'antecedent 1 i abi 1 i ty'. Regrettably thi s doctri ne is not 
receiving sufficient attention in our courts. Neverthe-
less it was applied in a very practical manner in Steyn-
~erg 1983 3 SA 140 (A) (vi de esp 352 C-D). Nkwenya 
supra) can also be regarded as a case in which conV1C-
tions of culpable homicide were based on antecedent lia-
bility (vide du Plessis 1986 SALJ 1, 1-3, contra Bergen-
thuin 1986 SACC 20, 22ff). 
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how it ought to remain if it is to fulfil a social function and 
not become an intellectual chess-board where concepts are moved 
about like bishops, knights and pawns. 20 ) 
20) vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 50, 55. 
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CHAPTER Y 
THE ELEMENT OF UNLAWFULNESS IN CULPABLE HOMICIDE 
1 General remarks on unlawfulness 
In the Anglo-American legal system unlawfulness as an element of 
criminal conduct has not been given much attention.!) This is 
no doubt due to the pragmatic approach adopted to criminal law by 
Anglo-American lawyers, and also to their adherence to the 
division of criminal conduct in the two basic elements of actus 
reus and mens rea. 2) A pragmati st woul d simply take the vi ew 
that all acts forbidden by the criminal law are prima facie un-
lawful and should an accused aver that his conduct although 
apparently unlawful, was justified, it is for him to raise the 
relevant defence of justification and for the prosecution to 
rebut it. 3) 
1) Strauss (Toestemming) 231-2; Van der Westhuizen 385-6. 
2) Van der Westhuizen 326 ff. 
3) South A fri can crimi na 1 1 awyers have adopted thi s approach 
for decades and no in-depth discussion of unlawfulness as 
an element of crime was embarked on in any of the main 
textbooks until the appearance of Snyman (Strafreg) in 
1981. Although Snyman's discussion (74ff) is not unduly 
lengthy he deplores the superficial discussion in De Wet 
and Swanepoel and advises that the in-depth treatment of 
the element of unlawfulness by Strauss (Strauss (Toestem-
ming) 246-64) and by Van der Westhuizen (371, 452-96) 
should be studied. 
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In German criminal law the picture is different. With their love 
for dogmatic discussions the German Criminal legal theorists have 
investigated 'das Wesen'4) of 'Rechtswidrigkeit'5) 'zum Uber-
druss,6) as they have done with all the other elements of 
crime. In their system of concept jurisprudence the concept of 
unlawfulness has been 'given the full treatment' and the reader 
of thei r works is spared nothi ng in thei r i ndefati gab 1 e efforts 
to arrive at an accurate description of, and a profound insight 
into, the nature and essential being (das Wesen) of unlawful-
ness. 7 ) Their investigations, with respect, appear to be 
largely wasted effort and an example of the preponderance of the 
means over the end. 
The only real value to be found in this part of the work of 
Strauss and van der Westhuizen, particularly that of van der 
Westhuizen which is the more recent, is that there is a brief 
summary of all the main views on unlawfulness, and these are 
legion, held by particularly German but also Dutch, Swiss and 
Austrian writers on criminal law and the law of delict over the 
1 ast 180 years or so. The positive contribution of all this 
4) The nature or rather 'the essence'. 
5) Unlawfulness. 
6) ad nauseam . 
7) The discussion in Strauss (Toestemming) and van der 
Westhuizen is largely devoted to the views of German 
writers. Perusal of van der Westhuizen 452-75 (or only 
the index (ix) should suffice to indicate the tedious 
nature of these investigations by the German theorists 
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theoretical writing on the Continent is not very substantia1 8 ) 
and it is submitted that in terms of positive results the 
Angl o-Ameri can system in whi ch unl awful ness has not been 
investigated in any comparable depth is not very much poorer than 
the German system in which it has been investigated with great 
diligence. 
The commencement of the dogmatic problem posed by the nature of 
unlawfulness is the rejection of the statement that that is un-
lawful which is forbidden by the law, as a tautology leading to a 
vicious cycle. 9 ) In other words the statement 'that is unlaw-
ful which is forbidden by the law' is rejected as a purely quan-
titative statement. It does not qualify the nature of unlawful-
ness. Furthermore the statement 'that is unlawful which is not 
justified' is circular as becomes evident once one adds the 
qual ification: 'and that which is nO.t justified is unlawful'. To 
put it plainly; the statement 'that is unlawful which is not 
justified and that is not justified which is unlawful' says 
nothing. 
Now, one virtue that a tautological statement has, is that it is 
8) Commencing with the view that it is tautologous to define 
that as unlawful which is forbidden by the law, the theor-
eticians seem to go 'full cycle' after pages and pages of 
discussion and arrive back at the tautology they initially 
rejected; vide van der Westnuizen 465. It would also seem 
that some of the theories differ from each other in name 
only; vide van der Westhuizen 463-4; Snyman 69. 
9) van der Westhuizen 437-8. 
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incontrovertibly formally true. Many tautol09ical statements are 
so obvi ously true that there is no poi nt in mak i ng them. These 
are called fatuous tautologies. In such tautologies the predi-
cate is identical with the subject, for instance 'a man is a 
man', or 2=2. Unless one wishes to make an excursion into the 
irrational philosophy of Nietzsche or the supremely rational 
philosophy of Hegel in both of which systems the proposition of 
identity namely A=A is denied, such statements hardly merit 
consideration. Not all tautologies are of this nature. Some are 
useful in that the predicate tells us something about the subject 
that would not be apparent from a bare repetition of the 
subject. Thus 1+1=1+1 tells us nothing10 ) but 1+1=2 or 2=1+1 
though strictly speaking tautologous ll ) are statements in which 
the subject is clarified by the predicate. 
The statement: 'that is unl awful whi ch is forbi dden by the 1 aw' 
is at 1 eas t a useful tautology. It tells us that nothing is 
unlawful which is not forbidden by the law in other words it is a 
10) 
11) 
Unless we go outside the proposition and investigate what 
the proposition 1+1=1+1 tells us about the mind that holds 
it to be incontrovertibly true. This wouT"dlie a Nietz-
schean i nqu i ry. 
The tautologous and analytical nature of mathematical 
propositions was seriously questioned by Kant. He held 
that 7+5=12, and by the same token every propositi on of 
pure mathematics, is an a priori synthetic proposition. 
This is the basis of his critical philosophy and a serious 
attack is made on it by those who aver that such proposi-
tions are tautologous. 
I 
1 
I 
! 
1 
i 
1 
! 
1 
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statement of the principle of legality.12) Seen in this light, 
it is a most meani ngfu 1 or usefu 1 tautology or perhaps not a 
tautology at all. 
The statement : 'That is unlawful which is forbidden by the law 
and not justified in the circumstances' tells the criminal lawyer 
a great deal. It is more than an empty circular repetition of 
one and only one statement, the ci rcul ar nature bei ng di sgui sed 
by the use of the synonymous phrase 'not justified' for 'unlaw-
ful '. The statement tells us that forbidden conduct is unlawful 
unl ess, in the ci rcumstances, some ground of justifi cati on is 
present. In other words once an unlawful act has been establish-
ed, its unlawfulness is not necessarily final but prima facie 
only and rebuttabl e by proof of or fail ure to di sprove a ground 
of justification. 
It is in this latter connection that the dogmatic investigation 
into the nature of unlawfulness is largely to be seen. There is 
also the question whether unlawfulness is determined purely 
objectively, that is by considering solely the physical side of 
allegedly criminal conduct complained of, or whether subjective 
factors al so determi ne unl awful ness apart from their beari ng on 
fault. 
12) On arrlvlng at this conclusion one may be said to have 
gone 'outside the proposition'. But legal propositions 
are statements of rules within a living system not state-
ments reflecting some aspect of logical form. 
I!' 
!. 'I'!' i " 
i I ~ 
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\ 
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Snyman 13 ) states the problem succinctly as being to the effect 
that the grounds of justification are not a numerus clausus and 
that the statement 'all conduct which is forbidden by law is 
unlawful' is defective as a definition of unlawfulness as it 
gives no indication as to which grounds of justification may be 
recognized in future and it also does not indicate the limits of 
present or future grounds of justification. 
If we see the question of the nature of unlawfulness as the 
questi on: 'What characteri sti cs must a ground of justifi cati on 
have to be recognized as such?' it becomes clear that the nature 
of unlawfulness, in this sense, must remain a mystery. At any 
given stage in the history or development of a system of criminal 
law it can only be partially and tentatively answered. A most 
learned and convincing argument and set of submissions may be 
advanced in favour of a hitherto unknown ground of justification 
and a court may rej ect it without ceremony; or a ground of 
justification previously consistently rejected may be recognized 
somewhat unexpectedly .14) One can at most try to predi ct such 
results in a spirit of modesty by investigating judicial trends 
and the current - therefore possibly future - mood of the courts. 
13 ) 68. 
14) eg necessity or duress. This defence was consistently 
rejected si nce Dudl ey and Stevens 1884 14 QBD 273 as 
appears from Hercules 1954 3 SA 826 (A), but accepted in 
Goliath 1972 3 sA I(A). What is puzzling about Goliath is 
how the Provincial Division could have acquitted Goliath 
in view of Hercules and Bradbury 1967 1 SA 387 (A). 
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This statement will no doubt be called ' positivist' .15) Inso-
far as a positivist is a man who believes that people should eat 
when they are hungry and drink when they are thirsty and that the 
mai n concern of the 1 awyer is the 1 aw of the courts, the charge 
is admitted and far from bei ng treated as a reproach it is 
regarded as a compliment. 16 ) 
If one does not accept the positi vist approach as above outlined, 
one must seek the possible val idity of hitherto unknown grounds 
of justification in the metajuridical field. 1?) The answer to 
what would found a defence of justification is then to be sought 
' in the stars' or in natural law or natural reason or an a priori 
sense of justice inbuilt in the human mind, soul or psyche be-
fore, pri or to and with ascendancy over all earthly systems of 
law. There might very well be this LAW beyond the laws, these 
NORMS (one is tempted to wri te norms) beyond the norms embodi ed 
in criminal prohibitions, but, this LAW and these NORMS have as 
yet neither been fi nally di scovered, fully uncovered nor 
comprehensively described. It is also not to be overlooked that 
even if the true a pri ori legal or moral nature of unlawfulness 
were to be conclusively demonstrated by some genius of a stature 
15) vi de CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 126. 
16) vide Forsyth VII for .asTmilar credo. 
17) Strauss (Toestemming) 284 seems to deny this, but the view 
that future, as yet unknown, grounds of justification are 
already part of the positive law is patently a legal fic-
tion, part of the beloved fiction that all future develop-
ments of the common law are merely clearer expos i t i ons of 
the law as it always has been . 
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and abil ity hitherto not encountered among mortal men, 18) the 
courts might still, on grounds of expediency or public policy or 
common sense, rej ect it. The 1 egi sl ature may also deci de not to 
embody its precepts in legislation, and we would still be left 
with positivism, in other words the law of the courts. 
If one were to hazard a guess, or make a prognosis on what con-
siderations would weigh with the courts in deciding whether a 
hitherto unknown or unrecognized ground of justification should 
be accorded the status of a defence excluding unlawfulness, one 
would possibly not be far wrong if one were to say that the 
courts would be guided by what they consider to be reasonable and 
in accordance with the community's sense of justice.19) The 
limits of any defence of justification would also be determined 
by what is considered reasonable in the circumstances. 20 ) 
An obvious criticism of these views is that neither the com-
munity's sense of justice nor what is reasonable is defined . 21 ) 
18 ) 
19) 
20) 
21) 
He would have to be the superior of Plato, Aristotle, 
Thomas Aqui nas, Groti us and Illl1lanuel Kant. Kant's phil 0-
sophy of the Categorical Imperative is perhaps the most 
ambitious and impressive attempt to find a NORM above the 
norms but although still greatly respected it is no longer 
accepted. 
Goliath seems to be based on considerations of what could 
be reasonably expected of a normal person in the position 
of the accused. 
vide Visser and Vorster 107. 
That instead of defining unlawfulness one unknown has 
merely been expressed in terms of another unknowm. Logic-
ally the criticism is unanswerable but practically one has 
merely to read the judgments referred to immediately 
afterwards in the text to real ise that the courts work 
with vague terms like 'the cOlll1lunity's sense of justice' 
or 'public policy'. 
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As regards the community's sense of justice; it is indefinable. 
But that obvi ous consi derati on has not deterred the Appell ate 
Division from having recourse to it in Ewels,22) Chretien 23 ) 
and Goliath. 24 ) It is also clear from Goliath, Bailey,25) 
Ntuli 26 ) and the cases on section 49 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act,27) that a ground of justification is exceeded if the 
conduct of the accused becomes unreasonable in the circumstances 
and the standard of reasonableness is that of the reasonable man. 
Whether unlawfulness is to be determined objectively only or 
whether subjective factors are also to be taken into account, has 
given rise to considerable debate. The pragmatic approach is 
that it is objectively determined whether an actus reus has been 
commi tted by the accused, and that the questi on whether the 
accused has acted unlawfully is also determined with reference to 
his physical conduct. If any physical act forbidden by the 
criminal law is established, its unlawfulness is likewise estab-
lished, at least prima facie, and what remains to be decided upon 
before convi cti on or acquittal is whether there has or has not 
been fault. In other words unlawfulness is an attribute of the 
physical element of crime and fault is determined with reference 
to the state of mind of the accused. 
22) Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) . 
23) supra. 
24) supra. 
25) 1982 3 SA 772 (A). 
26) 1975 1 SA 429 (A) . 
27) vide Ch III supra. 
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This view can be criticized as an over-simplification. Considera-
ti on of attempt makes th i s cl ear. The objective act of the 
accused in an attempt is very often per se not unlawful. Never-
theless, viewed in conjunction with the state of mind of the 
accused; namely, an intent to achieve the completed crime, it is 
seen to be unlawful. 28 ) This is particularly true of attempts 
to do the imposs i b 1 e. An accused who attempts an aborti on on a 
woman whom he believes to be pregnant but who is not pregnant, 
cannot commit the crime of abortion no matter how hard he tries. 
The unlawful act of bringing about an abortion is simply not 
possible in the circumstances. There is, however, no doubt that 
in our law as it stands at present such conduct would be adjudged 
unlawfu1. 29 ) The element of unlawfulness would be supplied by 
the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the woman 
was pregnant and that he could effect an abortion on her. 
Similarly the objective unlawfulness of homicide is not and can-
not be present if one shoots, stabs or in some other way attempts 
to 'kill' a 'person' who is already dead. But such conduct 
could, depending on 'the circumstances, amount to attempted 
murder. 30 ) 
The same physical conduct could also, depending on the intent 
with which it is committed, amount to a lawful chastisement or an 
28) Thi sis the essence of the problem with whi ch the court 
was faced in Ndhlovu 1984 3 SA 23 (A). 
29) Davies 1956 3 SA 52 (A); W 1976 1 SA 1 (A); Ndhlovu supra. 
30) Ndhlovu supra. -
- 400 -
unlawful assault. If a school teacher inflicts corporal punish-
ment on a child to vent his wrath, that would be an assault; if 
the same act were done for the purpose of i nfl i cti ng puni shment 
according to law it would be lawful . 31 ) 
These considerations seem to contradict the division of crime 
into physical and mental elements and certainly to contradict the 
view that unlawfulness is ascertained objectively only.32) The 
problem is, however, more apparent than real. The division of 
crimes into actus reus and mens rea is usually effected without 
difficulty. The exceptional cases where the act requires a men-
tal element before it becomes unlawful, or where an objectively 
unlawful act is not unlawful because of the mental attitude of 
the actor,33) merely indicate that one is not dealing with a 
system of concept jurisprudence where concepts are given absolute 
delimitations from which no deviation is tolerated. The fact 
remains that there can be no crime without some physical element 
and, unless one is dealing with crimes of strict liability, mens 
rea or fault is always a requirement . 
Criticism of the division into actus reus and mens rea usually 
comes from writers who thi nk in terms of concept juri sprudence. 
31) Snyman 108; CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 124. 
32) CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, l~egards I 1976 (1) SA 781 
(RA) as a clear----pDlnter that unlawfulness can depend on 
subjective factors. The case also indicates that grounds 
of justification are determined with a view to publ ic 
policy. 
33) As for instance in.!. supra. 
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Once one realises that one is not dealing with the rigid concepts 
of a system of concept jurisprudence the criticism is seen to be 
beside the point. 34 } It is submitted that a system of fluid 
concepts is superior to a system of rigid concepts as only fluid-
ity and elasticity of legal thinking can cope with the multi-
farious problems and problematic situations that arise from or 
are encountered in criminal conduct which is after all part of 
life itself: a boundless totality of objective and subjective, 
physical and mental, fluidity. 
For present purposes conduct will be viewed as unlawful if it is 
forbidden by the law and not held to be justified in the circum-
stances. 35 } 
2 The unlawfulness of culpable homicide 
Homi ci de ought at fi rst bl ush to pose no problem at a 11 on the 
34) The division of crimes into actus reus and mens rea is 
generally regarded as Anglo-American. A Danish Criminal 
Lawyer (LLD and Professor of Law in Copenhagen) told the 
present writer that the same view is held in Denmark. 
Anglo-American jurists use the division as a flexible 
matter of convenience and do not regard it as an 
inviolable dogmatic basis of the criminal law; vide van 
der Westhuizen 326 ff. 
35) The Germans are forced to resort to this approach as well; 
vide van der Westhuizen 490. Conduct is formally unla'lIful 
if it is in contravention of a criminal provision. It is 
materially unlawful if it cannot be justified. There are 
therefore two concepts of unlawfulness viz formal and 
material. This reminds one of the fact that because his 
phil osophy coul d not accommodate time, Hegel postul ated 
normal time and absolute time, thereby dividing one 
incomprehensible concept into two! 
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questi on of unl awful ness. One shoul d take as one's starti ng 
point the proposition that human life is the most precious thing 
known to the law. To kill a person is therefore prima facie 
unlawful. The unlawfulness and the killing are therefore 
simultaneously established. Grounds of justification for the 
kill ing of a human being must al so because of the sanctity of 
human 1 ife, be very few and difficult to establ ish. The above 
genera 1 statements probably refl ect ni nety per cent or more of 
every-day practi ce in homi ci de cases. But there are theoreti cal 
difficulties that ought to be considered. One such is the 
question whether it is indeed so that conduct is either lawful or 
unlawful. 1 ) To accept this is to accept what logicians call 
the rule of the 'excluded middle'. It may be stated thus: if 
all A is either X or Y there is no A which is neither X nor Y. 
If all conduct is either lawful or unlawful there is no conduct 
which is neither lawful nor unlawful. 
Bearing in mind the difficulties experienced in attempting to 
define exactly what is unlawful, it is submitted that the rule of 
the excluded middle must be approached with caution in respect of 
lawfulness and unlawfulness. 
There is also the statement that there are no degrees of 
1) This view is generally held; vide Strauss 1970 SALJ 471, 
477 and van der Westhuizen 438ff. 
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unlawfulness. 2 } In view of the uncertainty concerning the 
precise nature of unlawfulness it is also a statement that should 
be approached with circumspection. 3 } 
Could there be killings that are neither lawful nor unlawful? 
Could there be unlawful killings that are more unlawful than 
others or killings that are unlawful from one point of view but 
lawful from another . Are there killings that are objectively 
lawful but unlawful because of the state of mind of the 
killer?4} 
It woul d be arrogant to bel ieve that one can answer these ques-
tions with any degree of finality. It would also be impossible 
to investigate them thoroughly in this one chapter. 
Leaving aside the law of delict the first question could be 
2} Van der Westhuizen 438 ff. 
3} There are white cats and black cats but there are also 
grey cats and as Rudyard Kipl ing wrote : 'Of the grey-coat 
coming who can say? When night is gathering all is grey' 
(Barrack Room Ballads: 'The Ballad of the King's jest'). 
In view of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 one 
is forced to comment wryly that Wali Dad the victim of the 
King's jest was only about 100 years out in his warning of 
an impending invasion. 
4} A consideration of these and other related questions has 
brought JMT Labuschagne (1977 OJ 310, and 1974 OJ 108) to 
the conclusion that the searchfor material unTawfulness 
is mi sdi rected . There is much to be sa i d for Labu-
schagne's approach. It is only a great pity that this 
author encases some clear th i nking in almost 
unintelligible language, some of the terms being of his 
own invention. He is, however, no young Osric (Hamlet 
5,2, 129-35) and his work is well worth reading; 
Labuschagne's views are summarised in van der Westhhuizen 
421ff. 
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rephrased as follows: are all kill ings either lawful or unlawful 
in terms of the criminal law or are there killings that the crim-
inal law does not forbid but does not sanction either. Posed in 
this fashion it is submitted that the first question takes on an 
entirely different complexion. One knows this almost instinct-
ively. A killing which is the result of sheer misfortune is not 
forbi dden by the crimi na1 1 aw, but that is far from sayi ng that 
it is authorised or sanctioned by the criminal law. If we were 
to personify the criminal law as a demi-God giving instruction it 
could well be imagined as saying; 'do not kill negligently, if 
you do you will be punished. You will not be punished if you 
should kill through sheer misfortune but if such a killing can at 
all be avoided; please do so'. 
One cou1 d of course say that it is unreasonable to kill if one 
can at all avoid the killing. But in saying this one overlooks 
that the standard of care expected of a man is that of the 
reasonable man, the diligens paterfamilias not the diligent-
issimus paterfamilias. Although one may not be puni shed for 
failing to observe standards of unpractical ultra-caution the 
criminal law personified or semi-deified as above, would certain-
ly not give one a pat on the back for causi ng death in such a 
way. 
An objection to this line of argument would be that unlawfulness 
or the absence of it, is being made dependent on mens rea. The 
objection misses the point. A killing that is purely accidental 
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involves no mens rea; it is not even unlawful. Insofar as the 
criminal law would in any event prefer people to avoid it, it is 
not 1 awful either - at 1 east not 1 awful in the sense of bei ng 
enjoined and sanctioned by the law. I n other words, it is 
neither unlawful nor justified and one could not be faulted for 
placing it in a 'grey' or 'middle' area between what is clearly 
lawful and what is clearly unlawful. At this stage, it is, 
perhaps, apposite to remark that that which is not justified is 
not necessarily unlawful. Killing a person by misfortune is not 
justified. We are neither enjoined nor authorised to do this. 
Compared with killings that are justified it is, therefore, of a 
more neutral nature and coul d fit into a grey or mi ddl e area 
between what is justified and what is unlawful. The existence of 
such a grey area is more readily acceptable than of a grey area 
between what is unl awful and what is 1 awful . One could go 
further and, using a fourth descriptive term, assert that purely 
accidental killings are neither justified, lawful nor unlawful, 
but they are certainly not criminal .5) 
To pursue this line of thinking: is the lawfulness of a killing 
done in self-defence the same as the lawfulness of a purely 
accidental killing? Concerning the first, one could say that the 
killing is justifiable; concerning the latter, the terms would be 
inappropriate. Is the lawfulness of a killing done by an execu-
5) The use of this term is a sharp reminder that once one 
strays off the straight and narrow path of objective 
unlawfulness, involvement in mens rea, becomes almost 
immediately inevitable; 'crimi nal' has overtones of fault. 
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tioner with due observance of all formalities prescribed by law 
in terms of a duly pronounced sentence of a court of law the same 
as the 1 awful ness of a ki 11 i ng in terms of secti on 49 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act,6) or the lawfulness of a killing in 
se 1f defence, or a ki 11 i ng commi tted under duress? There are 
obvious differences. If the executioner were to take pity on a 
condemned man and allow him to escape instead of hanging him the 
executioner would be guilty of a crime. A private citi zen 
effecting an arrest may lawfully decide not to kill whereas a 
policeman may be in a different position. A man forced to kill, 
as was the accused in Gol i ath, but who 'takes hi s chances' and 
decides not to kill will be praised rather than reproached, 
assuming he escapes from the person applying the duress. 
Similarly a man who is attacked may possibly, on religious 
grounds, deci de not to defend hi mse If. . He woul d be acti ng 1 aw-
fully. If, on the other hand, his child is under attack and he 
decides not to protect the child his conduct may on the strength 
of Ewel s, 7) turn out to be unl awful. In other words there are 
situations in which one is enjoined by the law to kill lawfully 
and situations where it would be lawful to kill and also not to 
kill. It is therefore submitted that the proposition that con-
duct is ei ther 1 awful or unlawful and that there is neither a 
neutral middle area, nor degrees of unlawfulness, should be very 
6) 51 of 1977. 
7) Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A). In Ewels 
it was held that policemen were under a duty to protect a 
person who was bei ng assaul ted in thei r presence. The 
decision was based on public policy and the cOl1111unity's 
sense of justice. 
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carefully treated. It might very well be false and is one of the 
main reasons why such entertaining, but impractica.l, anomalies as 
the following can be devised: 
A threatens B with death unless he kills C. B submits and 
attempts to kill C but Cis stronger or 'qui cker on the 
draw' than B and kills B instead. Has C acted 
1 awfu 11 y?8) One cannot 1 awfully defend oneself against 
a lawful attack. If B' s attack was lawful C's defence was 
unl awful. 
There are several possible answers to this conundrum . One is 
that only the survivor will be in court and no formal pronounce-
ment need be made on the lawfulness or otherwise of the 
deceased's conduct. g) Another is that C would be defending 
himself against the unlawful attack of A.lO) A further solu-
tion is that C could not be acting unlawfully in doing something 
he is entitled to do namely to defend himself. ll ) The last 
solution may be said to amount to a petitio principii as C is not 
entitled to defend himself against a lawful attack. What the 
last solution, indeed the whole conundrum, demonstrates is that 
unlawfulness can be variable. 12 ) From the point of view of B he 
8) vide CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 124; Labuschagne supra 115. 
9) This ready answer would not be available if both Band C 
were to survive and either or both were to be charged with 
attempted murder. 
10) vide du Plessis 1985 SALJ 503, 510 . 
11) JMT Labuschagne 1974 ~08, 117. 
12) ibid, Labuschagne pOints out that conduct may be lawful in 
one respect and unlawful in another. Worthy of note is 
his apparent approval of the fluid English approach to 
actus reus and mens rea (112-4). 
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is entitled to save his life by killing C; from the point of view 
of C he is entitled to save his life by killing B. The matter 
would be entirely different if B were a policeman with a warrant 
for C's arrest and C we,e to shoot and kill him in 'self defence' 
while he was attempting to shoot C lawfully in terms of section 
49 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 13 ) 
A comparison of the case of the pol iceman with that of the man 
acting under duress supports the contention that there could be 
degrees of unlawfulness or lawfulness. When acting in the execu-
tion of A's unlawful design there is some taint of unlawfulness 
about B' s conduct. 14 ) No such taint attaches to the conduct of 
the policeman. 
Another conundrum is posed by the consi derati on that a 1 ewd 
suggestion made to a prostitute does not amount to crimen injuria 
as she has no dignitas to impair. 15 ) A prostitute would there-
fore not be acting lawfully if she were to slap a man moderately 
in 'defending' herself against his lecherous suggestions. The 
obvi ous answer is that on the bare facts of the problem it may 
appear insoluble but in a real-life situation it may appear 
13) 51 of 1977. 
14) If B were to kill C the killing would be adjudged unlawful 
at a prosecuti on of A, but 1 awful at a prosecuti on of B. 
Clearly the word unlawful has no single, clear immutable 
meaning. 
15) JMT Labuschagne 1974 ~ 108, 116 . 
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that the man was being vindictive or that the prostitute was 
feigning indignation. In the absence of these factors the prosti-
tute would probably be found to have acted lawfully as there is 
in any event some taint of immorality or unlawfulness attached to 
making lewd suggestions to any woman no matter how low her stan-
dards. 
A third example is that of a man defending himself against a very 
mild attack. The attacker would be acting lawfully on the basis 
that the defence de minimis non curat lex renders the trivial 
'crime' lawful. 16 ) The answer is that an attack covered by the 
de minimis rule would nevertheless bear a taint of unlawful-
ness l 7) and that the defender woul d al so have to defend himself 
in an equally trivial manner or his defence would be excessive 
and therefore unl awful. If his defence is as trivial as the 
attack both defence and attack, would fall under the heading of 
de minimis. 
16) ibid. JMT Labuschagne refers to Burchell and Hunt (led) 
as authori ty for the propos iti on that the defence de 
minimus excludes unlawfulness. This is, however, based on 
a dictum of Troll ip JA in KgO~OT1Q 19BO 3 SA 600 (A) with 
which Burchell and Hunt (382-3 dlsagree . It is submitted 
that Burchell and Hunt are right, that the crime remains a 
crime but that the 1 aw refuses to take cogni zance of it 
because it is trivial, not because the conduct concerned 
is lawful. The acquittal of the accused is a procedural 
formal ity and not a pronouncement that his conduct was 
1 awful. 
17) Even if unlawfulness were excluded the conduct would be 
criminal in every respect except that it is trivial. 
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These conundrums discussed in an interesting manner by JMT Labu-
schagne,18) serve little purpose except to illustrate that 
unlawfulness ought to be treated as a fluid concept. In terms of 
a system of concept juri sprudence where the del imi tati ons of a 
concept are rigidly adhered to, these comparatively harmless 
riddles could cause 'elementological' havoc of a high order. 
If the killing of a human being is per se unlawful all killings 
before van der Mescht19 ) woul d have amounted to cul pab 1 e homi-
cide. This was not the case. What then was the peculiar nature 
of the unlawfulness that rendered killings unlawful in the days 
when culpable homicide was defined as the unlawful killing of a 
human being? The unlawfulness of such killings stenmed from 
their being the result of some unlawful activity and the applica-
tion of the rule versanti in re illicita omnia imputantur quae ex 
delicto seguunter. If one considers the facts in van der Mescht 
this is clarified. Van der Mescht melted gold amalgam privately 
an unl awful acti vity. This caused certain bystanders, 
including some children, to inhale a poisonous gas resulting in 
their death. Their deaths had been caused by the unlawful 
activity of van der Mescht; he had, therefore, killed them 
unlawfully . The court rejected the versari doctrine and also 
18) 1974 OJ 108. He refers to more such examples all of which 
i ndi cate the danger of bei ng shackl ed by a ri gi d concept 
of unlawfulness. 
19) 1962 (1) SA 521 (A). 
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fO'Jnd that van der Mescht had not acted negligently. He was 
acquitted. Can it be said that the killings had been lawful? 
As the killings had, on the finding of the court, been the result 
of an unforeseen and unforeseeable accident, albeit the result of 
an unlawful activity, it could be submitted that the killings 
were not unl awful. One baul ks at the suggesti on that they were 
lawful; they had after all resulted from an unlawful course of 
conduct. The killings therefore belong to a twilight zone where 
they are neither clearly lawful nor clearly unlawful. Had the 
deceased been passengers in van der Mescht' s ca r and had they 
died in a road accident van der Mescht would have been convicted 
of culpable homicide had the accident resulted from his negli-
gence. If, however, he was not proved to have been negl i gent, 
would the killings have been lawful? It is submitted that such 
killings though not unlawful are not lawful either in that the 
criminal law would rather they did not take place. 20 ) 
The consi derati on of facts such as those in van der Mescht 
provide a further pointer, it · is submitted, at the doubtful 
nature of adopting the dogmatic stance that conduct is either 
1 awful or unl awful and of denyi ng that there are degrees of 
unlawfulness, or that what is unlawful from one point of view 
could be lawful from another point of view. 
20) Or else one could say that the rule of public policy wh i ch 
proscribes killing and places a high value on human life, 
and which underlies the law of murder and culpable homi-
cide would rather that such a killing not take place. 
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Can the presence of mens rea change an otherwise lawful killing 
into an unlawful killing? Here we have arrived at the 
Dadson 21 ) anti nomy. Dadson was a pol iceman who shot a person 
stea 1 i ng wood. The offence, as fa r as Dadson knew, was of a 
minor nature and Dadson was not entitled to shoot the offender. 
In fact the offender had previous convictions thereby making the 
offence, corrmi tted in Dadson' s presence, a felony. Dadsonwas 
enti tl ed to shoot a felon. On a charge of unlawful wounding 
Dadson was convicted notwithstanding the objective lawfulness of 
his conduct. His ignorance of the fact that he was shooting at a 
felon was the basis of the conviction. 
There have been many arguments advanced in support of the convic-
ti on and many condemni ng it. 22) The debate coul d conti nue till 
doomsday without any definite result being reached. The view 
taken by anyone group of writers woul d probably depend on the 
general trend of social thinking at the time and, possibly, on 
the temperament of the individual jurist. In the present South 
African situation where many people believe, rightly or wrongly, 
that police powers should be curbed, the decision would probably 
be supported . In vi ew of our 1 aw on attempt to commi t the 
impossible an accused in Dadson's position would probably be 
21) 1850 4 Cox CC 358. 
22) vide Smith and Hogan 4ed 328, 5ed 33 . The views expressed 
on page 34 of the 5ed carry great conviction; cf Burchell 
and Hunt 115 n79. 
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convi cted . 23) Among writers on criminal law it is possibly 
only the rugged indi vi dua 1 i st, the supreme positi vi st who woul d 
dismiss Dadsons's knowledge or ignorance as irrelevant and state 
that a man cannot be convicted of a crime for committing a lawful 
act, no matter what beliefs he may entertain in his ignorance. 
Dadson represents a real 1 i fe conundrum and one must simply 
accept that the answer to the riddle is not written in the stars 
but depends on the pol i cy followed by the courts. The deci si on 
does indicate beyond any dispute that an objectively lawful act 
can lead to a conviction because of the mens rea of the actor. 
In respect of culpable homicide the question is whether the kill-
ing of a human being is per se unlawful or whether it becomes 
unlawful because it is negligently committed. The latter is the 
view of Hunt. 24 ) But it is submitted that one cannot allow 
the unlawfulness of homicide to depend on the mens rea of the 
perpetrator. In the latter case kill ings, committed by young 
children, 'ontoerekeningsvatbare' intoxicated people, mentally 
ill or defective persons and persons provoked to the stage of 
being 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar' would have to be adjudged lawful . 
This would obviously be absurd and the only answer is that the 
unl awful ness or otherwi se depends on many factors i ncl udi ng the 
mens rea of the perpetrator and on the exact ci rcumstances of 
23) Dadson would also be convicted in England to-day, (Smith 
and Hogan 34, Gl anvi 11 e Wi 11 i ams (Textbook) 498) because 
of a statutory provision. 
24) Discussed supra ch I, 5.3. 
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each case. To put forward a different view would amount to no 
more than advancing one more inconclusive theory. 
3 CONCLUSION 
Culpable homicide is generally committed in road or industrial 
accidents, or is the result of a fatal assault where intent to 
ki 11 is either absent or can not be proved. In the case of 
assault there can be little dispute about the unlawfulness unless 
one of the defences di scussed above25 ) is ra i sed. Road and 
industrial accidents pose a mere serious problem as the activi-
ties concerned are not intrinsically unlawful. If negligence is 
not established there will in any event be no conviction and from 
the point of view of the criminal law it would be irrelevant 
whether the killing was lawful or not. It would, however, clear-
ly belong to that category of lawful conduct that is not recom-
mended or enjoined. 
In the average homicide prosecution one must simply accept the 
general approach that the killing is prima facie unlawful and 
that the unlawfulness is accepted as proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt unless a ground of justification is raised and not rebutted 
by the prosecution. Ours is not a system of rigid concept juris-
prudence and to make more of unlawfulness would result in compli-
cated discussions that are of little, if any, practical value. 
25) Ch IV. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE ENGLISH LAW RELATING TO MANSLAUGHTER 
1 SOME GENERAL INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON MURDER AND 
MANSLAUGHTER IN ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW. 
1.1 Introductory 
English law presents a different picture from German law: one 
of the main differences being that there is little, if any,strict 
adherence to elementological concepts that dominate legal 
thinking in a dogmatic way . This is well expressed by Smith and 
Hogan1) as follows: 
'The analysis into actus reus and mens rea is for 
convenience of exposition only. The only concept known to 
the law is the crime; and the crime exists only when actus 
reus and mens rea coincide. Once it is decided that an 
element is an ingredient of an offence, there is no legal 
si gnificance in the classification of it as part of the 
actus reus or mens rea'. 
Thi s approach has the advantage of avoi di ng steril e debates on 
the nature of concepts and it also avoids acquittals on purely 
dogmatic grounds where convictions on a straightforward 
1) 30 
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ap~lication of the law are clearly called for. 2 } The same 
applies to convictions on purely dogmatic grounds where acquit-
tals are clearly called for. 3 } 
It is perhaps interesting to note that English positivism or 
empiricism decried by some,4} and praised by others,S} is 
probably partly a product of Kantian thinking,6} just as German 
rationalism is. 
A disadvantage of the English empirical or positivist approach is 
that it may result in a number of divergent specific rules on the 
same general topi c, diffi cult to reconcil e with each other and 
often in confl i ct with one another. English judges are also 
individualists and are not prone to allow dogmatic or logical 
reasoning to override their perception of their duty to apply the 
1 aw. 7} Where 'the law' is 'unjust' due to changing circum-
stances or accidents of history, this can result in what Glan-
ville Williams8 } has called a 'legal hocus pocus' in order to 
2} 
3 } 
4} 
5} 
6 } 
7} 
8} 
For an effect of concept jurisprudence vide the 'intent to 
kill precludes conviction of culpable homicide' debate 
discussed in du Plessis 1984 SALJ 50; supra ch 1, 1.1. 
Smith and Hogan 36-7. --
eg Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 128-30. 
eg Forsyth vii -=vTii . 
vide Cairns H Legal Philosophy from Plato to He,el 390. 
Majewski 1976 2 AER 142 (HLJ IS a good examp e of this 
JudIcIal individualism. The case was about an accused who 
pleaded that he had committed serious assaults while in a 
state of drug and dri nk induced automati sm. The court 
refused to accept the 'logical' argument that the accused 
had no mens rea and convi cted of cri mes of 'general' 
intent; vide du Plessis 1979 DR 119. 
Glanville Williams (Textbook}-red 226. 
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arrive at an equitable result. 
A student approaching English law with the pre-conceived notions 
of a system of dogmatic concept jurisprudence is therefore bound 
to find it frustrating and exasperating. Similarly, a positivist 
is not likely to exercise patience with or display understanding 
for the dogmatic investigations of German 'Straf-
rechtswissenschaft'. 
In the field of the law relating to homicide, English law does 
present a rather confusing picture. 9) But patient study and an 
earnest attempt to understand the reasoning of the English judges 
is often rewarding. 
1.2 Murder in English Criminal Law 
As the primary interest in this study is the mens rea of man-
slaughter, the killing with the attendant problems of causation 
will not be investigated. 
Expressed in termi nol ogy readi ly unders tood by a South Afri can 
student, the actus reus of murder may be described as the killing 
of a human being. The mens rea of murder in Engl ish law, is 
9) Williams (Textbook) 259. 
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however, more compl ex than in South African Law. It is 
traditi ona lly termed 'malice aforethought' . But this is a 
misleading term. 10 ) Mal ice in the sense of wicked or evil 
motives is not requi red. The term 'aforethought' need not refer 
to any premeditation in the sense of planning a homicide in 
advance. An intent formed in a 'split second' would suffice. 
Smith and Hogan ll ) quote the following statement by the Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment with approval; namely, that 
malice aforethought: 
is simply a comprehensive name for a number of 
different mental attitudes, which have been variously 
defined at different stages in the development of the law, 
the presence of anyone of which in the accused has been 
held by the courts to render a homicide particularly 
heinous and therefore to make it murder'. 
Smith and Hogan 12) summari se 'rna 1 ice aforethought ' in present-
day English law as follows: 
10) Smith and Hogan 291. Glanville Williams (Textbook) 249 
refers to 'malice aforethought' as a ' ... term of art, if 
not a term of decepti on'; cf Cross and Jones 155-6; 
Bassiouni 234-5 esp 234 n18; Gardner and Mani an 405; Dix 
and Sharlot 453. 
11) 291. 
12) 292. 
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1) An intention to kill any person. 
2) An intention to do an act knowing that it is highly 
probable (or perhaps, probable) that it will kill any 
person. 
3) An intention to cause grievous bodily harm to any 
person. 
4) An intention to do an act knowing that it is highly 
probable (or, perhaps, probable) that it will cause 
grievous bodily harm to any person. 
Categories 3 and 4 would obviously not qualify as the mens rea of 
either murder or culpable homicide in South African Criminal 
Law. They seem to state result liability as encountered in Ger-
man Criminal Law before 1953 . In other words one is dealing 
with 'the infliction of grievous bodily harm with death result-
ing' where no element of fault is required in respect of the 
resultant death. 13 ) 
As Glanville Williams 14 ) points out, killings resulting from 
the infliction of grievous bodily harm and other dangerous acts 
be long more properly to the fi e 1 d of mansl aughter than mu.rder, 
and prosecutions arising from such killings are usually in res-
pect of the former crime. To use terminology frowned upon in 
13) vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301, 309-10 . 
14) Glanville Williams (Textbook) 250-1. 
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South African Criminal Law for some time and rejected in 
Chretien15 ) categories 3 and 4 literally applied, could result 
in convi cti ons of murder where no specifi c intent to kill has 
been established. 
Although this section is more particularly concerned with man-
sl aughter, the reference to murder has been necessary because of 
these two categories of mens rea which would, in a South African 
court, at most lead to a conviction of culpable homicide . In the 
light of Bernardus16 ) and van As,17) convictions of this 
offence would only follow if negligence in respect of the death, 
quite apart from the intentional infliction of injury, could also 
be established . 
2. Manslaughter in English Criminal Law. 
2.1 Introductory 
Smith and Hogan 18 ) state the following concerning manslaughter: 
'Manslaughter is a diverse crime, covering all unlawful 
homicides which are not murder'. 
15) 1981 1 SA 1097 (A); vide supra ch IV 4.5. 
16) 1965 3 SA 287 (A). 
17) 1976 2 SA 921 (A). 
18) 298. 
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This is a negative definition, and is qualified by the statement: 
but it is customary and useful to divide manslaughter 
into two main groups which are designated "voluntary" and 
"involuntary" manslaughter respectively'.19 ) 
2.2 Voluntary manslaughter 
Voluntary manslaughter is distinguished from murder in that, 
although the accused may have killed with the malice afore-
thought required for murder, there is nevertheless one of three 
specified factors present which reduces the crime to man-
sl aughter . 20) 
There was only one such factor recognised by the common law; 
namely, provocati on. 21) But under the Homi ci de Act of 1957 a 
killing which would otherwise be murder becomes manslaughter if 
the accused was sufferi ng from dimi ni shed responsi bil ity at the 
time of the commission of the crime,22) and such a killing also 
becomes manslaughter if it is committed in the execution of a 
suicide pact. 23 ) 
19) ibid . 
20) Smith and Hogan 198-9. 
21) ibid. 
22) sec 2. 
23) sec 4. 
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2.3 Involuntary manslaughter 
According to Smith and Hogan: 'Thi s category incl udes all 
varieties of unlawful homicide which are committed without malice 
aforethought'.24) 
The authors quote the following passage with approval: 25 ) 
'Of all crimes manslaughter appears to afford most 
difficulties of definition, for it concerns homicide in so 
many and so varying conditions .•. the law ... recognises 
murder on the one hand based mainly, though not 
exclusively, on an intention to kill, and manslaughter on 
the other hand, based mainly, though not exclusively, on 
the absence of intent to kill, but with the presence of an 
element of "unlawfulness" which is the elusive factor' 
Concerning the 'elusive factor' Smith and Hogan26 ) state that 
although it is difficult to define' .,. it would seem to comprise 
the following varieties and combinations of mens rea and 
negligence: 
1) an intention to do an act directed against another 
24) 311. 
25) 311, quoted from the speech of Lord Atk i n in Andrews 1937 
2 AER 552, 554-5. 
26) 312. 
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which, whether 0 knows it or not, is unlawful and 
dangerous in the sense that it is likely to cause 
immediate personal injury, though not necessarily 
seri ous i nj ury; 
2) an intention to do an act, or to omit to act where 
there is a duty to do so, being grossly negl igent 
whether death, or serious injury be caused; 
3) an i ntenti on to do an act, or to omi t to act where 
there is a duty to do so, bei ng reckl ess whether 
death, or personal injury, or possibly, any injury to 
"health or welfare", be caused'. 
Cross and Jones 27) define the mens rea of involuntary 
manslaughter more simply as follows: 
'A person who causes the dea th of another is gui lty of 
manslaughter if he does so by: 
a) a reckless act or omission; or 
b) an act which is unlawful and dangerous'. 
Glanville Williams 28 ) writes as follows concerning involuntary 
manslaughter: 
27) 176. 
28) Glanville Williams (Textbook) 259. 
- 424 -
'Involuntary manslaughter .•. means the form in which 
there is (or need be) no intention (voluntas) to kill or 
do grievous bodily harm (a strange meaning of "involun-
tary"). There are two subspeci es, both of them, as wi 11 
be painfully seen in this chapter, exhibiting the common 
1 aw at its worst. We cannot even gi ve the fi rst of them 
an uncontroversial name, since the courts have failed to 
settle clearly what fault is involved; in this book it 
will be called "reckless manslaughter", though the word 
"reckless" will give us trouble. The other subspecies is 
constructive manslaughter'. 
The ana lysi s of Smith and Hogan is more deta il ed than that of 
the other writers referred to. But, basically, the analyses 
amount to the fact that there are two types of invol untary man-
slaughter; namely, reckless manslaughter and constructive man-
51 aughter. In thei r di scussi on Smith and Hogan29 ) di sti ngui sh 
between constructive manslaughter, manslaughter which is killing 
by gross negligence and manslaughter which is reckless killing. 
29) 312-324. 
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3 THE I£NS REA OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WHICH INVOLVES A 
DISCUSSION OF PROVOCATION, DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND 
SUICIDE PACTS 
3.1 Provocation 
Provocation in English Criminal Law is a defence available only 
in respect of murder)) It may be a mitigating circumstance in 
respect of other crimes, but i t is no defence. 2 ) 
Provocation, however, is not a complete defence to a charge of 
murder, but only a partial defence in that, if successful, it 
serves to reduce murder to manslaughter. 3 ) Provided, there-
fore, that the provocation complies with certain requirements, it 
has the effect of reduci ng what woul d otherwi se be murder to 
vol untary mansl aughter. Where an accused all eges provocati ve 
conduct on the part of the deceased this may be part of the 
evidentiary material on which the finders of fact decide whether 
1) Glanville Williams (Textbook) 524; Samuels 1983 JCL 276, 
(The English law relating to provocation is briefl~fully 
stated in this article); Cross and Jones 168. Bergenthuin 
discusses the English law on provocation fully, 68 ff. 
This aspect of English Law probably gave rise to 5141 TPC. 
2) This has lead to some debate as to whether provocation can 
be a defence to attempted murder. (Glanville Williams 
(Textbook) 526-7; English 1973 CLR 727; Cross and Jones 
168) . 
3) Smith and Hogan 298-9. The prevailing English law is 
strongly reminescent of South African Law, while the doc-
trine of 'partial excuse' was still recognised. 
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malice aforethought has been established. 4) In this sense, 
provocation is not a defence eo nomine; it is simply part of the 
general evidential material presented to the court in the course 
of the dispute of fact as to whether there was mal ice afore-
thought or not. 
Once the finding is made that there was indeed a killing with 
malice aforethought, the alleged provocation is considered in 
order to determine whether, as a matter of law, it reduces the 
crime to voluntary manslaughter. This has prompted the comment 
by TurnerS) that vol untary mansl aughter under provocati on is 
really murder in extenuating circumstances. 
The question which comes to mind is whether the provocation 
reduces the fault or mens rea of the accused, or whether it 
reduces the unlawfulness of the killing. As killing under provo-
cation is not justified in English law,6) one must conclude 
that it is the fault or blameworthiness of the act which is 
4) 
S) 
6) 
Cross and Jones 167 state the following: 'While evidence 
that the accused was provoked is a circumstance which the jury mus t take into account, along wi th all the other 
circumstances, in deciding whether he intended to kill or 
cause grievous bodily harm, the defence of provocation is 
concerned with the situation where the accused did intend 
to kill or cause grievous bodily harm but acted under a 
sudden loss of self-control '. Compare Thibani 1949 4 SA 
720 (A). 
Turner (Mental Element) 223-4; Glanville Williams (Text-
book) led refers to 'mitigated murder' 223. 
If it were 'justified' provocation could result in an 
acquittal, which it does not. 
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reduced.7} Engl ish writers woul d not appear to be di sposed to 
arguing along these lines and their answer would probably be that 
it does not matter what is reduced or affected; the simple fact 
is that provocation, properly established, reduces murder to 
manslaughter. 
Speaking in terms that have come into use in South Africa in 
recent years one might say that it is not the psychological fault 
of the accused (in other words, his malice aforethought), which 
is reduced, but his normative fault (in other words, his blame-
worthi ness) . It is, however, submi tted that the better approach 
would be to view the matter historically. This reveals that mur-
der was reduced to manslaughter to avoid the compulsory death 
pena lty, 8) and that the true effect of provocati on in Engl i sh 
law is to empower the court to pass a more lenient sentence. In 
this sense it does affect blameworthiness, but it has nothing to 
do with either psychological or normative fault,g) or the 
degree of unlawfulness (assuming that unlawfulness has degrees) 
of the conduct of the accused. 
What is particularly noticeable when considering provocation in 
English Criminal Law is that there is no question of an absence 
7) If the view that there are no degrees of unlawfulness, is 
accepted, it would also appear that the effect of 
provocation is to reduce fault or blameworthiness. 
8) vide Russell 517 ff; Gordon 764 ff; Bergenthuin 70 ff. 
9) Unless one regards normative fault as fault (or 
blameworthiness) applicable to sentence and not to the 
question of guilt or innocence. 
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of criminal capacity (in the sense of 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid') 
totally absolving the accused. On the contrary, the defence 
rests mainly on the consideration that provocation deprives a 
person of his power of self-control 10 } and that he should 
therefore be treated with some leniency as a concession to human 
fra i lty. Thi s was expressed as long ago as 1837 by Col eri dge J. 
in Kirkham;ll} namely, 
'Though the law condescends to human frailty, it will not 
indulge human ferocity. It considers man to be a rational 
bei ng and requ i res that he shoul d exerci se a reasonable 
control over his passions'. 
The requi rements for the defence of provoca ti on to succeed are 
partly subj ecti ve and partly obj ecti ve. · A fai rly ri gi d approach 
is adopted in determining whether the objective requirements of 
the defence are met. 12 } Thi s was even more so in the past than 
it is at present, the present law being governed by the Common 
Law as relaxed by section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957,13} which 
reads as follows: 
10} Smith and Hogan 301 ff; Cross and Jones 167. Thi sis 
similar to the views of De Wet and Swanepoel 131-6. 
II} 1837 C and T lIS, 119 . 
12} Cross and Jones 168-9. 
13} ibid. 
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'Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which 
the jury can fi nd that the person charged was provoked 
(whether by thi ngs done or by th i ngs said or by both 
together) to lose his self-control, the question whether 
the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as 
he di d shall be 1 eft to be determi ned by the jury; and in 
determining that question the jury shall take into account 
everything both done and said according to the effect 
which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable 
man' . 
Before the passi ng of thi s enactment only stri ctly ci rcumscribed 
and 1 imited types of conduct could constitute provocation. A 
violent act committed by the deceased against the accused was 
generally required as well as the 'classic' requirement of the 
deceased being the accused's spouse caught in the act of adul-
tery.14) The section has made it possible, inter alia, for 
words spoken to constitute provocation and the provocative words 
or deeds need not have emanated from the deceased.l 5 ) It woul d 
appear that the words or conduct need not have been di rected at 
or agai nst the accused, although there appears to be some doubt 
on this point. 16 ) 
14) ibid . 
15) Cross and Jones 169 ff. 
16) Cross and Jones 169. 
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The provocation must also have been such as would have caused a 
reasonable man to lose his self-control. ln These are the main 
objective requirements. The subjective requirement is that the 
provocati on must in fact have deprived the accused of hi s power 
of self-control .18) 
Russell 19 ) regards the English law of pr'ovocation as unsatis-
factory and ascribes this to a historical development in which 
rules of evidence were confused with rules of law. 20 ) Prior to 
the third decade of the 19th century, the question whether 
alleged provocation would suffice as a defence reducing murder to 
manslaughter was a matter of law decided on by the judge. But 
from then on, it became increasingly a matter of fact to be 
deci ded by the jury. The I reasonab 1 e man I was then made use of 
to enable the jury to decide on the facts whether the accused had 
rea lly been so provoked as to lose hi s self-controL 21 ) I f a 
reasonab 1 e man woul d not have lost hi s self-control then it was 
unlikely that the accused had. From this the development 
followed that if a reasonable man would not have lost his self-
control, the accused ought not to have lost his self-control. 
Unreasonable loss of self-control by the accused would therefore 
not serve as a state induced by provocation that could reduce the 
crime. 
17) Smith and Hogan 303 ff. 
18 ) Glanville Williams (Textbook) 527. 
19) 522 ff. 
20) This is also the opinion of Postma 40 ff . 
21) Russell 523 ff. 
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In terms of present-day South African terminology one could say 
that the 'reasonable man' test is normative. Notwithstandi ng 
psychological fault being absent or reduced through loss of self-
control caused by provocation the accused would not 'receive' the 
benefit of his loss of self-control if it were unreasonable for 
him to have lost it. 
The reason for this normative rule is clear. The courts needed a 
rul e to all evi ate the harshness of the compul sory sentence for 
murder. As the substantive law relating to punishment for murder 
could not be altered, the substantive law relating to successful 
defences agai nst murder was. In thi s case the defence was no 
longer one directed at defeating the Crown's case that there had 
been a killing with malice aforethought, but a 'special defence' 
that, notwithstanding proof of a killing with malice afore-
thought, the verdict could be one of manslaughter only. 
The rule really amounted to making a defence out of a mitigating 
factor or extenuating circumstance. In the process the mitiga-
ting factor became closely circumscribed to allow it to operate 
as a defence. From this arose the question whether the personal 
characteristics and idiosyncracies of the accused could be 
ascribed to the reasonable man when deciding whether a reasonable 
man, subjected to the provocation to which he had been subjected, 
would have lost his self-control. In Bedder22 ) the accused, an 
impotent youth 18 years of age, was jeered at because of his 
22) 1954 AER 801. 
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impotence by a prosti tute wi th whom he had attempted i nter-
course. He was also humiliatingly assaulted by the woman. He 
lost hi s sel f-control and stabbed her to death. In a deci si on 
that has been cri ti ci zed, and no longer represents the 1 aw, 23) 
the Court of Criminal Appeal decided that the trial judge had 
been correct in instructing the jury not to consider the personal 
idiosyncracies of the accused; namely, his impotence and his 
extreme sensitivity about this condition, in deciding whether a 
reasonable man would have lost his self-control in the circum-
stances. 
Subsequently the House of Lords decided in Camplin 24 ) that 
section 3 of the Homicide Act had effected changes sufficient for 
the decision in Bedder no longer to be binding. In Camplin the 
accused, a boy of 15, raised the defence of provocation in that 
after performing an act of paederasty on him against his will, 
the deceased had taunted him with it. Thi s had caused the 
accused to lose his self-control and he had killed the deceased 
by hitting him on the head with a heavy kitchen utensil. 
The main point to be decided on appeal was whether, in the light 
of Bedder, the trial judge had been correct in instructing the 
jury not to take into account the you th of the accused when 
deciding whether a reasonable man would have reacted as the 
23) Smith and Hogan 304; Glanville Williams (Textbook) 532; 
Cross and Jones 171. 
24) 1978 1 AER 1236. 
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ac:used had reacted. It was held that section 3 of the Homicide 
Act had changed the law as stated in Bedder. Among the factual 
material to be considered by the jury, the youth of the accused 
had to be taken into account in determining whether he had re-
acted as a reasonable man (in his case a reasonable youth) could 
have been expected to react. 25 ) It was further hel d that the 
principle in Mancini 26 ) namely that there has to be a 
reasonabl e balance between the provocati on and the reta 1 i ati on, 
and the principle in Holmes27) that words alone could not be 
sufficient provocation for the defence to succeed, had been 
overruled by section 3 of the Homicide Act. 
The effect of Campl in was to render the defence of provocati on 
more flexible and to allow juries a broader field to inquiry 
within which the defence could be found to have been established. 
The law as stated in Camplin was modified in Newell. 28 ) The 
effect of Newell, the case of an alcoholic who had killed under 
provocation while drunk, is summarized as follows by Cross and 
Jones :29) 
'A "characteristic", it was held is a physical or mental 
25) Smith and Hogan 304-5; Cross and Jones 171-2. 
26) 1941 3 AER 272 . 
27) 1942 2 AER 124. 
28) 1980 71 Cr App Rep 331. 
29) 172. 
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qual ity, or some such more indeterminate attribute as 
colour, race or creed, which has a sufficient degree of 
permanence to warrant its being regarded as something 
consti tuti ng part of the accused's character or person-
al ity; a temporary or transitory state of mind, such as a 
mood of depression or irascibility or intoxication, is not 
a "characteristic". 
Newell al so ill ustrates the requi rement that the reasonable man 
is not invested with any characteristic of the accused which is 
not directly connected with the provocative words or conduct. 
From a South African point of view it is important to note that 
in the English law relating to provocation it is accepted that, 
apart from the 'reasonable man' requirement, the defence succeeds 
only if the accused did in fact lose his self control. 3D ) This 
is not regarded as a defence entitling him to an acquittal on the 
grounds that he had lost criminal capacity (in the sense of being 
'ontoerekeni ngsvatbaar' by vi rtue of not bei ng ab 1 e to control 
his conduct in conformity with his appreciation of its unlawful-
ness) but as a factor which renders the killing less blameworthy 
in the sense of calling for less severe punishment. 
It is submitted that although South African Law is perhaps more 
30) A feature which seems to have been overlooked by Postma 
(32ff) in his criticism of the English Law of provocation . 
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advanced in so far as it looks at the actual mens rea (in other 
words the psychological fault, of the accused) to determine 
whether provocati on succeeds as a defence, Engl ish 1 aw is to be 
preferred for this reason that it does not allow a sane violent 
criminal's loss of self-control to be regarded as a defence. 31 ) 
As CR Snyman32 ) rightly points out, in the latter respect South 
African law has gone too far along the subjective road. 
3.2 Diminished Responsibility 
According to Smith and Hogan1) the defence of irresistible 
impulse has managed to gain admission into English law through a 
statutory measure. The Statutory measure in questi on is secti on 
2 of the Homicide Act 1957 which reads as follows : 
'I) Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of 
another he shall not be convicted of murder if he was 
suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether 
ari si ng from a conditi on of arrested or retarded 
development of mind or any inherent causes induced by 
disease or injury) as substantially impaired his 
mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in 
doing or being a party to the killing. 
31) Smith and Hogan 302. 
32) 1985 SALJ 240, 250 . 
1) 185. --
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2) 
3) A person who but for thi s secti on wou 1 d be 1 i ab 1 e, 
whether as principle or as accessor, to be convicted 
of murder shall be liable instead to be convicted of 
mans1 aughter. ' 
The secti on introduces the cona ti ve '1 eg' of 'toerekeni ngsvat-
baarheid' into English criminal law in a restricted form: 2) 
restricted that is to the crime of murder. 
It is a measure designed to bring relief in the shape of lighter 
punishment to the mentally abnormal who do not fall under the 
McNaghten rules. The measure can therefore not be regarded as a 
contribution to the law of manslaughter, but as statutory relief 
from the severe penalty for murder for the mentally abnormal 
accused who is not able to raise the defence of insanity 
successfull y. 
2) Smith and Hogan 186-7; Glanville Williams (Textbook) 
544-5; Cross and Jones 100. Cross and Jones state : 
'Section 2(1) makes it plain that the accused may rely on 
the defence although he knew what he was doi ng and knew 
that it was wrong and soon after the section came into 
force it was held that the fact that a killing is 
premeditated, does not destroy a defence of 'diminished 
responsibility'. The defence only applies in cases of 
mental abnormality (Smith and Hogan 186) the treasure is 
similar to Section 78(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act no 
51 of 1977, cf Archbold 1413-7. 
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3.3 Suicide Pacts 
Section 4(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 provides that the survivor 
of a parti ally successful suici de pact shall be gUil ty of man-
sl aughter and puni shabl e with a maximum of 14 years impri son-
ment. It is al so to be seen as a measure intended to reduce the 
severity of the punishment for murder and cannot be regarded as a 
contri buti on to the 1 aw of mansl aughter. It is a normative 
statutory measure in terms of which, notwithstanding intent to 
kill, the accused is liable to the punishment prescribed not for 
murder but for manslaughter. 
4 THE MENS REA OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 
4.1 Introductory 
Writers 1) on English Criminal Law appear to be in general 
agreement that the law of involuntary manslaughter is in need of 
reform. Dividing involuntary manslaughter into two classes; 
namely, reckless manslaughter and constructive manslaughter, 
Glanville Williams states :2) 
1) Cross and Jones 188; Smith and Hogan 324; Glanville 
Williams (Textbook) 286. 
2) Glanville Williams (Textbook) 259. In the first edition 
of this work the author preferred the tenn 'straight-
forward manslaughter ' to 'reckless manslaughter' 224. 
Harris (442) refers to Manslaughter resulting from 
'criminal negligence' and not to recklessness. Archbold 
(1421) expresses the difficulty as follows: 'Simple lack 
of care is not enough ... Probably of all the epithets 
that can be applied, 'recklessness' most nearly covers the 
case. Cf Cross and Jones 8ed 168-71; Harris 444-5. 
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'We cannot even give the first of them an uncontroversia1 
name, si nce the courts have fail ed to sett1 e c1 early what 
fault element is involved, in this book it will be called 
"reck 1 ess mans1 aughter" . Though the word "reck 1 ess" wi 11 
give us trouble '. 
As mentioned above, Smith and Hogan3) define three types of 
mens rea for involuntary manslaughter; namely, (1) the intention 
to do an un1 awful and dangerous act, (2) the i ntenti on to do a 
grossly neg1 igent act and (3) the intention to do a reckless 
act. Consequently these authors distinguish between (1) con-
structive mans1 aughter whi ch requi res the fi rst form of mens 
rea, (2) manslaughter which amounts to killing by gross negli-
gence, and (3) manslaughter which amounts to killing recklessly. 
Cross and Jones4 ) divide involuntary manslaughter into 
manslaughter by (a) a reckless act or omission and (b) an act 
which is unlawful and dangerous. 
Writing on the Criminal Law of Scotland, Gordon 5) defines 
involuntary culpable homicide as follows: 
'Involuntary culpable homicide is the causing of death 
uni ntenti ona 11 y but ei ther with a degree of neg1 i gence 
3) 312. 
4) 176. 
5) 788. 
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which is regarded as sufficient to make the homicide 
cul pab 1 e but not murderous or in ci rcumstances in whi ch 
the law regards the causing of death as criminal even in 
the absence of any negligence'. 
Archbold,6} a practical handbook in which theoretical develop-
ments are taken into account, states the following concerning 
involuntary manslaughter: 
'The authorities on involuntary manslaughter are difficult 
to reconcile, but the following proposit i ons appear to be 
established: 
I} The killing is manslaughter if it is either: 
a} The result of a grossly negligent (though it may 
be otherwise lawful) act or omission on the part 
of the accused; or 
b} the result of his unlawful act (though not his 
unlawful omission), where the unlawful act is 
one, such as an assaul t, whi ch all sober and 
reasonable people would inevitably realise must 
subject the victim to some harm resulting there-
from, albeit not serious harm, whether the 
accused realised this or not. 
6} 1420H. 
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2) Mens rea is essential to manslaughter but it can 
consist of either (in (a) above) gross negligence or 
(in (b) above) the mens rea appropriate to the unlaw-
ful act, or both. 
3) For the purpose of (b) above an act which is unlawful 
by the manner of its execution eg dangerous driving, 
is not an unlawful act. 
The division of Smith and Hogan, which does not differ substan-
tially from that of the other writers referred to, will be mainly 
adhered to in the following discussion, because it is more 
comprehensive. 
4.2 Constructive manslaughter 
The crime of constructive manslaughter is reminescent of the 
South African law relating to culpable homicide before the van 
der Mescht7) and Bernardus8) decis i ons and also, to some 
extent of the minority judgment9) of Rumpff JA in Bernardus. 
The English law relating to constructive homicide appears to have 
been particularly harsh some centuries ago when a man committing 
some slight offence; for instance, shooting at a guinea fowl, 
7) 1962 1 SA 52l (A). 
8) 19653 SA 287 (A). 
9) 301 D-G. 
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could have been convicted of murder if the offence resulted in 
the death of a human bei ng. The questi on whether the accused 
had foreseen the death in any way or whether it had been 
obj ecti ve ly foreseeable made no di fference to the questi on of 
guilt. 10 ) This rule was mitigated in course of time, but the 
development was slow. 11) 
The law as it is at present is summarised by Cross and Jones 12 ) 
as follows: 
'To secure a conviction on the basis of constructive man-
slaughter, the prosecution must prove three things: 
a) the commission of an unlawful act; 
b) that the act was directed at another; 
c) that the act was dangerous, in the sense that it was 
1 ikely to cause immediate injury to another'. 
If it were not for the first two requirements, especially the 
first one, the third requirement - standing alone - would almost 
be a statement of the minority views 13 ) in Bernardus. 
10) Smith and Hogan 312 ff, De Wet and Swanepoel led 68. 
11) Turner (Mental El ement) 210 ff. Gl anvi 11 e Will i ams 
(Textbook) 268-9. 
12) 182. 
13) ie the views of Rumpff and Hoexter JJA. 
- 442 -
4.2.1 The requirements of an unla~ful act, directed at another 
The most common examples of unlawful acts causing death and 
resulting in convictions of manslaughter are assaults and 
batteri es. l4 1 Other unl awful acts can suffi ce, but it is not 
always easy to determine whether an act not per se constituting 
an offence directed at another suffices for manslaughter if such 
an act should result in death. 
Cross and Jones state: 15l 
and 
an act is never criminally unlawful in itself. One 
thing, at least, which is required to render an act crim-
inally unlawful is that it should occur in those circum-
stances and/or 1 ead to those consequences prescri bed by 
law as constituting the actus reus of an offence'. 
the fact that a person has committed the actus reus 
of an offence does not in itself make his act criminally 
unlawful; it only does so if the accused had the mens rea 
required for that offence'. 
It therefore seems that the accused must have committed a crime 
in the sense of actus reus and mens rea bei ng present16 ) from 
14) Cross and Jones 182 . 
15) ibid . 
16) Cross and Jones 183. 
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which the death ensued. One is therefore not here concerned with 
an abstract notion of unlawfulness but crime consi sting of an 
unlawful physical and mental element. 
The el ement of unl awful ness has occasi oned diffi culty where the 
act appears to have been patently unlawful, resulted in death and 
yet, on closer investigation, it turns out not to have been a 
crime 'directed at another'. 
This is illustrated by cases l 7) concerning the unlawful 
administration of drugs to others at their request and with their 
consent and resulting in their death. The administration of the 
drug may be unl awful, but is it 'di rected at another' if that 
person consents to the admi n i strati on? It may be argued that 
whether the recipient consents or not the administration is 
unlawful, but if there is consent, it is only the handling of the 
drug that is unlawful, not its administration. 
The hair-spl itting casuistic nature of such an argument is a 
result of the 'act' not falling in the normal ambit of unlawful 
acts directed at other persons causing death, namely assaults and 
batteries. 
As a death has ensued and its cause can be traced back to unlaw-
ful conduct, prosecutors are rel uctant not to prosecute and a 
17) eg Cato 1976 1 AER 856; Dalby 1982, 1 AER 916. 
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similar reluctance appears, with respect, to be discernible on 
the part of judges to instruct juries not to convict. 
Glanville Williams18 ) alludes to the far-fetched story 
sometimes told that the accused pulled out a knife or razor to 
frighten the deceased whereupon the deceased promptly fell onto 
the knife or razor, killing himself. Judges generally instruct 
juries to convict if they accept this evidence19 ) and one must, 
with respect, on practical grounds support the instruction. 
Whether the act of frightening the deceased is really an act 
'directed at' him, is debatable. 20 ) 
The tendency, sometimes reversed and sometimes advanced, was for 
the judges to 1 imi t the scope and nature of unl awful acts that 
would give rise to convictions of manslaughter if they resulted 
in death. 21 ) This gave rise to the ruling in Church22 ) which 
has met with academic approval. 23 ) It was said in this 
decision24 ) that it would be 'wrong to direct a jury that to 
cause death by any unlawful act in relation to a human being is 
necessarily manslaughter' 
'For such a verdict inevitably to follow, the unlawful act 
18) Glanville Williams (Textbook) led 239. 
19) ibid, Larkin 1943 1 AER 217. 
20) Cross and Jones 186. 
21) Smith and Hogan 312 ff. 
22) 1965 1 AER 72. 
23) Smith and Hogan 313; Cross and Jones 187. 
24) 70 cf Smith and Hogan 313. 
- 445 -
must be such as all sober and reasonable people would 
inevitably recognise must subject the other person to at 
1 east, the ri sk of some ha rm resulti ng therefrom, a 1 bei t 
not serious harm. 
Church was· followed in Newbury.25) In Newbury the unlawful act 
consisted in throwing a piece of paving stone from a bridge while 
a train was approaching. This resulted in the death of a guard 
on the tra i n and the accused was convi cted of mansl aughter the 
conviction being upheld on appeal to the House of Lords. It is 
not cl ear what the unl awful act 'di rected at the deceased' was, 
but, as Smith and Hogan 26 ) say, the act was so patently unlaw-
ful that the House did not deem detailed discussion necessary. 
It is also well established that an otherwise lawful act will not 
become unlawful for the purposes of conviction of manslaughter, 
because of the negligent manner in which it wa~ done. 27 ) 
4.2.2 The act must be dangerous 
By 'dangerous' in this sense is meant an act likely to cause 
physical harm though not of a serious nature. To intend to 
25) 1976 2 AER 365. 
26) 314-5; cf Cross and Jones 182-4; Glanville Williams (Text-
book) 269-70. These writers are unanimous in their view 
that the finding of an unlawful act ' directed at another ' 
is no easy task in Newbury. 
27) Smith and Hogan 316-7. 
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inflict serious injury could result in conviction of murder. 28 ) 
A decision which would be puzzling to South African practitioners 
is Lamb. 29) The accused and the deceased were pl ayi ng with a 
revolver. Accused made quite sure that the chamber in the 
cyl inder directly opposite the harrmer was empty. There was a 
cartridge in the chamber adjacent to the empty chamber. Accused 
sincerely believed that it would be safe to pull the trigger as 
the hammer would fallon the empty chamber. What he did not know 
was that pull i ng the tri gger woul d cause the chamber to revolve 
thereby moving the chamber with the cartridge in it, into posi-
ti on opposi te the hammer. 30) He pull ed the tri gger, the shot 
went off and kill ed hi s fri end. He was successful on appeal 
against a conviction of manslaughter as it was held that the 
trial judge had misdirected the jury in instructing them that 
pointing the revolver and pulling the trigger was an unlawful and 
dangerous act. The deceased had consented to the pointing and as 
accused had not intended to harm him, there had been no assault . 
A South African court would probably have convicted of culpable 
homicide because of the inherent unreasonableness involved in 
28) Cross and Jones 176. 
29) 1967 2 AER 1282. 
30) Police 'experts' who gave evidence testified that, like 
the accused, they had believed that the cylinder would 
revolve after the shot had been fired. In a way they were 
right:it would move after the firing of one shot but the 
movement would be caused by pulling the trigger to fire 
the next shot, which reminds one of Mr Bloom's reflection 
in Ulysses that the last unit in one series is often the 
first unit in a subsequent series . 
' . 
- 447 -
pointing a revolver with a cartridge in its cylinder at a person 
and pulling the trigger. The mechanical intricacies of whether 
the cartri dge woul d or woul d not ha ve moved into a I fi ri ng I 
position would have been irrelevant. The fact that accused had, 
before pulling the trigger, inspected the revolver to ensure that 
it was safe, would count in his favour on sentence. 
4.3 Killing recklessly or by gross negligence 
4.3.1 Introductory 
The questi on whether a reckl ess or grossly negl i gent kill i ng 
amounts to invol untary mansl aughter in Engl ish Criminal Law can 
lead the investigation into a very wide field. There is no doubt 
that a killing corrmitted recklessly or· grossly negligently can 
lead to conviction of manslaughter. But it is a matter of some 
di ffi culty to determi ne what reck 1 essness and gross negl i gence 
are in English law and where the dividing line between these two 
forms of mens rea is to be drawn. 31 ) 
For some considerable time there has been fluctuation between the 
subjective and objective approaches to recklessness. 
On the subjective approach, recklessness is conscious risk-
taking . The accused is aware of a possibility of harm resulting 
31) Cross and Jones 37 ff; Glanville Williams (Textbook) 96 
ff; Smith and Hogan 52 ff; Morkel (Rational Policy) 82-4. 
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from his conduct and carries on with such conduct reckless as to 
whether the harm results or not. On the objective approach; the 
accused carries on with conduct that could obviously result in 
harm without adverting, as he ought to, to the possibility of 
harm. 
Glanville Williams32 ) is of the opinion that the first form of 
recklessness is ideal. But, as it is difficult to prove, there 
is a danger that juries would acquit too easily. Consequently, 
judges tend to instruct them in terms of the second form. The 
second form is really gross negligence. 
The test in Cunningham33 ) regarded as authoratative for some 
time was subjective and based on the statement of recklessness by 
Professor Kenny 34). 
In Caldwe1l 35 ) the two tests were combined and in terms of that 
decis i on, recklessness consists in taking a risk realising that 
32) Glanville Williams (Textbook) 98. 
33) 1957 2 AER 412 . 
34) In 1902, quoted in Smith and Hogan 53 : ' ... in any statu-
tory definition of a crime 'malice' must be taken not in 
the old vague sense of 'wickedness' in general, but as 
requiring either (i) an actual intention to do the par-
ticular kind of harm that in . fact was done, or (ii) reck-
lessness-as-to whether such harm should occur or not (ie 
the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm 
mi ght be done, and yet has gone on to take the ri sk of 
it). It is neither limited to, nor does it indeed 
requ i re, any ill-will toward the person injured. 
35) 1981 1 AER 961. 
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it might result in harm ~ in carrying on with conduct inadvert-
ently where a moment ' s reflection would reveal that it might be 
potentially harmful. 
A further feature is that if a person takes a risk, even a stupid 
risk, but first satisfies himself, however ineffectively, that 
the risk is eliminated, he is not reckless. He did care about 
the possible results of his conduct. He could, therefore, only 
be negligent or grossly negligent, but not reckless. The accused 
in Lamb is an example of such a person. Although he played a 
dangerous and fatal game with his revolver, he was not reckless. 
Before firing the fatal shot he 'made sure', in his ignorance, 
that it was safe to do so.36) 
4.3.2 Manslaughter Committed Recklessly or by gross negligence 
Smith and Hogan submit that the Caldwell-type of recklessness is 
only applicable to statutory offences. 37 ) The decision in 
Caldwell has also been subjected to strong academic criti-
cism. 38 ) It has however, notwithstanding the reservations 
expressed by judges, been consistently applied and would appear 
to represent the law as it is at present and as it is likely to 
remain in the foreseeable future. 
36) Cross and Jones 177. 
37) 319. 
38) A tone of despair is almost detectable in Archbold v-vi; 
Mitchell 1985 JCL 2B4 summarises views on the decision; cf 
Ashall 1984 CL~67; Syrota 1984 CLR 476; Briggs 1984 CLR 
479; Briggs nB3 CLR 764; Syrota fmD CLR 776. 
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If this type of recklessness is only applicable to statutory 
offences, it is not applicable to manslaughter but to the related 
offence of causing death by reckless driving. 39 ) 
It would appear that recklessness will suffice as the mens rea of 
manslaughter where the accused foresees the possibility of caus-
ing death or the possibility of causing bodily harm and neverthe-
less proceeds with his conduct. 40 ) 
A case that has given rise to some comment is Pike. 41 ) Pike's 
perversion was that he preferred a woman to be unconscious when 
having intercourse with her. He had discovered that a certain 
household cleansing agent could render a person unconscious and 
had made a practice of rendering women unconscious with this 
chemical compound. None had come to serious harm except the last 
one who died. Pike was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury 
who had been instructed to convict ei ther on the basi s of reck-
1 essness or gross negl i gence. To a South Afri can 1 awyer the 
conviction on the ground of negl igence would appear self-evi-
dent. Anaethetising a person is a dangerous thing to do and the 
risk of death must be present, unless clinical conditions are 
observed on all occasions. Glanville Williams 42 ) is of the 
opinion that once the 'sex' element is taken away it becomes 
39) Sec 1 of the Road Traffi c Act 1972; vi de Smi th and Hogan 
456-7. 
40) Smith and Hogan 319-24; Cross and Jones 176 ff; Glanville 
Williams (Textbook) 259-62. 
41) 1961 CLR 114; 452. Discussed by Smith and Hogan 323-4. 
42) Glanville Williams (Textbook) led 117-8. 
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plain that Pike should have been acquitted because the substance 
used is harmless. It is difficult to agree with this view as 
Pike was not a trained anaethetist. 
As gross negligence suffices for the mens rea for manslaughter it 
is doubtful whether any real purpose is served by debating 
whether Caldwell type recklessness is applicable to corrmon law 
manslaughter or not. It is so close to gross negligence that in 
practice the difference must be minimal .43) 
In contrast to South African law as laid down in Meiring,44) 
neg1 i gence other than gross neg1 i gence wi 11 not suffi ce for a 
convi cti on of mansl aughter. In th i s connecti on the foll owi ng 
dictum from Bateman45 ) has long been regarded as stating the 
law: 
'To support an indictment for manslaughter the prosecution 
must prove ... that the negligence or incompetence of the 
accused went beyond a mere matter of compensati on and 
showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as 
to amount to a crime against the State and conduct 
deserving punishment.' 
Although the dictum has been said to be tautologous, it is never-
43) Cross and Jones 177; Smith and Hogan 57. 
44) 1927 AD 4l. 
45) 1925 AER 45. 
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theless regarded as a useful statement of the law. 46 ) 
Due to the rel uctance of juries to convict of manslaughter in 
cases of death resulti ng from motor acci dents the offence of 
killing as a result of reckless driving was created by stat-
ute. 47) Common 1 aw mansl aughter coul d sti 11 be commi tted and 
has continued to exist side-by-side with the statutory crime. 
The common law offence, referred to as 'motor-manslaughter' is 
seldom prosecuted. 48 ) 
The co-existence of these related crimes resulted in the decision 
in Seymour49 ) which has been criticised by writers and which 
has given rise to the view that the Caldwell-type of recklessness 
could be applicable to common law manslaughter or, at least, to 
common law motor manslaughter. 50 ) 
The problem in Seymour seems to arise from the facts which are 
such that the accused might very well have been guilty of murder, 
that is intentional killing, but this could not be proved. The 
heinous nature of what the accused probably intended tends to 
cloud one's judgment in dealing with what he was proved to have 
intended. Seymour had an altercation with a woman with whom he 
46) Smith and Hogan 322; Glanville Williams (Textbook) 259. 
47) Harris 445. Causing death by reckless driving was made an 
offence in terms of s 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1972; vide 
Smith and Hogan 456-8. 
48) Cross and Jones 178 . 
49) 1983 2 AER 1058. 
50) Cross and Jones 180. 
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had been living and shortly afterwards there was a slight colli-
si on between a lorry dri ven by hi m and a car dri ven by the 
woman. She al ighted and walked towards the lorry. Seymour set 
the lorry in motion with the intention, so he said, of pushing 
the car out of the way. I n the process he crushed the woman to 
death between the lorry and the car. This was accidental, so he 
said . Seymour was charged with common law manslaughter. The 
prosecution apparently realised ab initio the futility of attemp-
ting to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had killed inten-
tionally. He was convicted of manslaughter and appealed on the 
grounds that the direction given by the judge to the jury had 
been mi staken . 
The di recti on had been based on a di recti on approved in Law-
rence51} a case of killing as a result of reckless driving. In 
Lawrence the direction, approved by the House of Lords, had been 
that in causing death by reckless driving the accused must have 
driven in such a manner as to create an obvious and serious risk 
of causing physical injury to some other person who might be 
using the road; or in such a manner as to run the risk of causing 
substantial damage to property. Further that either the accused 
had not gi ven any thought to the poss i bi 1 ity of there bei ng any 
such risk or, having recognised that there was some risk in-
volved, had nonetheless gone on to 'take-it.' This is Caldwell-
type recklessness : awareness of the risk is not a necessary 
51) 1981 1 AER 974. In this case, decided on the same day as 
Caldwell, Caldwell-type recklessness was reaffirmed . 
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requirement, inadvertence to serious risk would suffice. 
Seymour seems to have read the effect of making the Cal dwell-
type of recklessness applicable to common-law manslaughter. How-
ever, it might be that it is only applicable to motor man-
slaughter thereby giving effect to the rule that the ingredients 
of manslaughter and death caused by reckless driving are the 
same. 52 ) 
Recklessness in the subjective sense, is a form of mens rea. 
But in the objective sense it appears to be gross negligence and 
therefore, on the English law view of negligence, conduct. 
The standard according to which negl igence is determined is the 
objective standard of the reasonable man and little if any 
concession is made to the personal idiosyncracies of the accused. 
There appears to be a strong tendency among wri ters on Engl ish 
law to de-criminalise negligent manslaughter53 ) and to support 
change to the effect that only conscious recklessness should 
suffice as the mens rea of involuntary manslaughter. The law of 
delict would, on this approach, provide sufficient redress in 
respect of harm inflicted negligently.54) 
52) Govt of USA v Jennings 1982 3 AER 104. 
53) Smith and Hogan 57-8, 81 ff. 
54) Smith and Hogan 324; Cross and Jones 388; Glanville 
Williams (Textbook) 286-7. Contra Briggs 1983 CLR 764. 
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5 THE EFFECT OF THE DEFENCES OF PRIVATE DEFENCE. LAWFUL 
AUTHORITY. DURESS AND INTOXICATION 
5.1 Introductory 
The effect of the defences discussed in this chapter, when raised 
to a charge of murder is to some extent markedly different from 
South African law. It will not be necessary to investigate the 
defences in detail as the main concern will be with the question 
whether the defence, if successful or partially successful, 
reduces murder to manslaughter. 1 ) 
5.2 Private defence or self-defence 
The defence of private defence or self-defence2) is well recog-
nised in English law and applies to the defence of person as well 
as property. 3) There are certain requirements to be met 
1) Manslaughter not necessarily being negligent killing, the 
difference between Engl ish 1 aw and South Afri can 1 aw is 
fairly big, in theory and probably in practise also; vide 
Gordon 762 for Scots law. 
2) Sel f-defence at common law overl aps with the defence 
created by section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 which 
provides for the use of force in the prevention of crime, 
vide Smith and Hogan 326; Cross and Jones 436-7; Glanville 
Williams (Textbook) 503. 
3) Smith and Hogan 326 ff; Cross and Jones 436 ff; Gl anvi 11 e 
Williams (Textbook) 501 ff. The scope of the defence 
when it is property that is being defended is limited. 
Smith and Hogan write: I It can rarely, if ever, be reason-
able to use deadly force merely for the protection of 
property I (328-9). 
- 456 -
before the defence succeeds. In the case of kill ing in self-
defence the main consideration relevant to the present inquiry is 
that the defensive steps should be commensurate with the harm 
sought to be warded off. Unless this is so, the defensive meas-
ures are unreasonab 1 e. 4) Once the bounds of private defence 
that would be reasonable in a given situation are exceeded the 
accused is regarded as havi ng no longer acted defens i vely, but 
offensively.5) If the defence fails on this ground the crime 
is murder and not manslaughter, there being no rule that self-
defence reduces murder to manslaughter. 6 ) 
This rule may appear harsh but it is mitigated in two ways. 
First, self-defence having failed, provocation will be 
investigated, and this investigation may result in the reduction 
of the crime from murder to mansl aughter. 7l Second, the law 
may be to the effect that what is reasonable in the circumstances 
depends to a large extent on the accused's own assessment of the 
4) Smith and Hogan 327; Cross and Jones 437-8; Glanville 
Williams (Textbook) 502; Archbold 1404 ff. 
5) Archbold 1405-6. 
6) Smith and Hogan 330; Archbold 1405 (relying on Palmer 1971 
1 AER 1077). 
7) Archbold 1405. 
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situation. 8 ) If this latter rule is indeed the law,9) the 
application of the defence in English law is wider than in South 
Afri can 1 aw. In South Afri can 1 aw the conduct of the accused is 
judged objectively and if it is adjudged unreasonable a convic-
tion of culpable homicide is almost automatic. In English law 
conduct objectively unreasonable could nevertheless, if reason-
able when viewed from the point of view of the accused, result in 
a complete acquittal.l0 ) It is, however, not certain that this 
is the law. 
If the accused makes a mistake of fact in deciding that he should 
act in private defence, this would not necessarily defeat the 
8) Archbo 1 d 1405; Smith and Hogan 331. Smith and Hogan refer 
to the Austral i an case of McKay 1957 VR 560 where the 
doctrine that a person who unreasonably uses excessive 
force kills in self-defence ought to be convicted of man-
slaughter instead of murder was accepted. This doctrine 
has been rejected in English law, but in Palmer supra it 
was held that one of the surest ways of determining what 
was reasonable in the ci rcumstances wou 1 d be to cons i der 
the immediate reaction of the accused . This latter 
approach woul d make an acqui ttal 1 i kely in ci rcumstances 
where an Australian court would convict of manslaughter 
and a South African court of culpable homicide; vide Smith 
and Hogan 331-2. Cross and Jones (438-9) take a more 
objective view; Glanville Williams (Textbook) takes a more 
subjective view, relying on Shannon 1975 AC 717. 
9) It is likely that it is the law, but Smith and Hogan 
(331-2) express some doubt. 
10) It must be borne in mind that this statement is tenta-
tive. The basic approach is objective in English law, but 
'armchair' objectivity is eschewed when considering the 
reaction of a man who is, or believes himself to be, in 
imminent peril. vide (in connection with rape) Morgan 1975 
1 AER 8. 
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defence. ll ) He may still lack the intent to kill. A mistake 
of law would not avail. 
5.3 Lawful Authority 
Killing in the course of preventing crime or arresting offenders 
is now governed by statute in English Law. 
Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 reads as follows: 
'1) A person may use such force as is rea so nab 1 e in the 
circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in 
effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of 
offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. 
2) Subsection (1) above shall replace the rules of the 
common law on the question when force used for a 
purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by 
that purpose'. 
According to Smith and Hogan12 ) the scope of the defence is 
uncertain, but it will apparently only fail in the case of 
11) The accepted vi ew appears to be that he shou1 d be judged 
in the light of what he believed to be the case, provided 
he believed so on reasonable grounds, not in the light of 
what was in fact the case . This is, however, not free of 
diffi cuHy; vi de Smi th and Hogan 329-30; Cross and Jones 
440-1; Glanville Williams (Textbook) 504. 
12) 325-6. 
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killing if the killing was unreasonable. The criteria of what is 
reasonab 1 e have not been exactly defi ned. I f the defence fa il s 
the accused will be guilty of murder and not of manslaughter. 13 ) 
5.4 Duress 
It is now accepted in English law that duress could be a defence 
to any crime except murder as a principal.l4) It would there-
fore be a defence to manslaughter in the case where an unlawful 
act resulting in death is performed under duress. 
There is no rule that duress, necessity or compulsion reduces 
murder to manslaughter. 
5.5 Intoxication 
The defence of intoxication in English law is very similar to 
South African law before Chretien. 
The leading authority is Majewski 15 ) a well known decision of 
the House of Lords. 
13) Smi th and Hogan 330. 
14) This has been the law since Lynch 1975 1 AER 913 . 
15) 1976 2 AER 142; vide Dashwood 1977 CLR 532. 
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In terms of this decision intoxication, even if it results in 
compl ete automati sm, cannot succeed as a defence to a crime of 
general intent; it can only serve to reduce a crime of specific 
intent to a crime of general intent. If murder is viewed as a 
crime of specific intent,16) intoxication can reduce murder to 
manslaughter a crime of general intent. 17 ) 
English law appears to recognise what we would call the inten-
, 
tional actio libera in causa.l8 ) In other words if a person 
drinks with the intention of gaining the nerve to kill someone 
and he carries out this plan, he will be guilty of murder. This 
would appear to be the case even should the accused eventually 
kill in a state of automatism. 
In connection with the defence of intoxication it is to be noted 
that Majewski has been criticized, one of the main grounds of 
criticism being that there is no clear statement of crimes fall-
ing in the category of specific intent and crimes falling in the 
category of general intent. 19 ) 
16) This is the general view, vide Smith and Hogan 193. Smith 
and Hogan submi t that mu rder cou 1 d be a cri me of 'bas i c 
intent' in certain circumstances. For the difficulties 
involved vide Gordon 407 ff. 
17) Smith and Hogan 194 . 
18) Glanville Williams (Textbook) 468; vide Gordon 401 ff for 
a fuller discussion. 
19) Smith and Hogan 193-4. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
There is a fa i r amount of di fference between South Afri can law 
and English law in relation to the defences referred to in this 
chapter. The differences are due mainly to murder being differ-
ently defined in English law from South African law, that man-
slaughter is by no means equivalent to culpable homicide and that 
mistake of law whether reasonable or unreasonable, is no defence 
in English law. 20 ) 
Culpa is a wider concept than the various forms of mens rea that 
suffice for a conviction of manslaughter in English law21) and 
an accused raising one of the defences discussed in this section 
to a charge of murder is apparently more likely to be convicted 
of culpable homicide in a South African Court than of man-
slaughter in an English court. 22 ) 
It is also important that voluntary intoxication cannot succeed 
as a defence in English law if it results in lack of self control 
on the part of the accused. The relevance of 'toerekeningsvat-
baarheid', important in South African law in the light of 
Chretien, is not recognized in English law. An accused may rebut 
20) Certainly not if it leads to an unlawful killing. 
21) This has been so since Meiring 1927 AD 41. 
22) Ba rnard 1985 4 SA 431 (W) has not yet been expanded on. 
Adopti on of the normati ve fault doctri ne as in Barnard 
could result in convictions of murder where convictions of 
culpable homicide could presently be expected. 
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eV 'j dence of intent with evi dence of i ntoxi cati on in that an 
intoxicated person is more likely to make a mistake than a sober 
one. But the fact that intoxication causes inhibitions to 
crumble is no defence. 23 ) 
23) Smith and Hogan 191. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE GERMAN LAW CONCERNING NEGLIGENT KILLING AND CRIMES 
RESULTING IN DEATH NEGLIGENTLY CAUSED 
1. INTRODUCTORY 
1.1 General background 
In postulating the existence of two possible approaches to 
Criminal Law: namely, the 'axiomatic closed' and 'problematic 
open ' approaches, Badenhorst 1) refers to German Crimi na 1 Law as 
a very good exampl e of an 'axi omati c closed' system. Such a 
system could also be described as a system in which rationalism 
is the basis of approach as opposed to systems in which 
pragmatism is the basis. 2) 
That the fundamental theoretical approach in German Criminal Law 
should be rational is readily understood if one considers the 
origins of modern German criminal law. The theoretical basis of 
modern German criminal law is rooted in the philosophy of the 
German Aufkl~rung or enlightenment and the philosophical movement 
known as German idealism which resulted from that. 3) 
1) 283 ff. 
2) vide CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 126-8; du Plessis 1985 SALJ 
503, 512-3. 
3) Schmidt 222 ff. 
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If one regards the period of the AufkHrung as roughly the last 
sixty years of the eighteenth century the question arises, what 
was German criminal law before the Aufklilrung if modern German 
criminal law commenced during and after the Aufklilrung. The 
answer is that in the geographical ,area that was politically 
unified by Bismarck after the Franco-Prussian war in 1871, 
criminal law had fallen into virtual total chaos by the middle of 
' the eighteenth century.4) According to Fischl the criminal law 
in the numerous states that were later unified by Bismarck, had 
degenerated into a system of local jurisdictions in which scant 
attention to any legislation or precedent was paid by judges and 
law-enforcement agencies. This was largely the result of the 
obsession with persecutions for witchcraft and the desire of 
local pri nces and other rul ers to be independent of any hi gher 
central control. 5 ) 
Intellectuals of the Aufklilrung were painfully aware of the poor 
state of the criminal law. Efforts were made to remedy this, but 
initial progress was slow. 
The philosopher Kant became the intellectual giant of the German 
states after the appearance of his Critique of Pure Reason, Crit-
ique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment. 
4) Fischl 1 - 7 . 
5) ibid. 
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Kant laid the foundation of rationalism, a system of philosophy 
in which it is taken as established that reason provides the key 
to the attainment of universally valid knowledge and universally 
valid insight. It also provides a theoretical basis for the 
erection of universally valid theoretical systems including a 
universally valid system of legal concepts. 6 ) 
The first modern German criminal legal theorist of intellectually 
predominant stature was Anselm Feuerbach. 7 ) Feuerbach commen-
ced his stuqies intending to become a philosopher. Later in his 
1 ife he became a lawyer thus following in the footsteps of his 
father. But his initial philosophical training, which had been 
Kantian remained the basis of his legal thinking. Feuerbach had 
an enormous effect on German criminal law, his main achievement 
being the drafting of the Bavarian Criminal Code of 1813. 8 ) 
Feuerbach's successors ·were al so strongly under the infl uence of 
Kant's phi 1 osophy. But Hegel became intellectually predomin-
ant,9) having become the intellectual giant of Ge r many towards 
the end of his life. His rationalism was an advance on that of 
Kant. 
6) Schmidt 219-22; von Hippel (Il 289 ff. 
7) Schmidt 283 ff; von Hippel (I) 293 ff . 
8) von Bar 248 ff; Schmi dt 248 ff. 
9) von Bar 276 ff; Schmidt 283 ff; von Hippel (Il 305 ff. 
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When the inf1 uence of Hegel waned10 ) towards the end of the 
nineteenth century there came the neo-Kantian movement which 
provided the theoretical basis for the so-called classical school 
of German criminal legal theory which flourished from about the 
foundation of Bismarck's Empire to well after the first World 
War. H ) 
The underlying rationalism of German criminal legal theory is the 
main reason for its being an 'axiomatic closed' system. The 
nature of such a system can be gl eaned from the comments of two 
American writers. Thus, Kretschman writes the fo11owing: 12 ) 
'Rationalism in whatever field it finds expression 
stresses principles of reason in opposition to empirical 
facts, it professes a supreme contempt for positive law, 
which it regards as founded in experience rather than in 
principles of reason, and sets up in opposition thereto 
its own system of "rational" law as a system derived 
deductively from such principles. Reason, the rational-
ists contend, demands certainty and logical coherence. 
Rational law alone achieves these for they can be obtained 
only by a law which deduces rules from immutable princi-
ples. But positive law, dominated in its development by 
10) We1ze1 (Natura1ismus) 60 ff. 
11) Badenhorst 234 ff. 
12) PM Kretschman 'An exposi ti on of Kant's Phi losophy of Law' 
included in The Heritage of Kant ed G Tapley (247). 
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hi stori ca 1 and non-rati onal factors, affords conti ngent 
principles only, principles which cover only the situa-
tions out of which such principles have arisen'. 
This passage is followed shortly afterwards by the following 
sentence .13 ) 
'With rationalism, Kant contends that the basic principles 
of law cannot be derived from experience. Reason supplies 
these principles from its own resources'. 
For his part, Sheldon writes the following: 14 ) 
'Kant's method implies or suggests that knowing has a 
pecul i ar nature of its own, independent of that whi ch is 
known; that that nature is the norm which tests the truth 
or falsity of assertions. By independent is here meant, 
not that there need be no object of knowledge, but that 
obj ect - e. g. its complex of sense qual i ti es - does not 
affect the essential structure of the knowing. That 
structure is self-determined (systematic categorizing) and 
therefore there can be deduced beforehand the general 
structure of the real world. For if the very nature of 
13) ibid. 
14) WH Sheldon 'Some Bad Results of Kant's Thought' in The 
Heritage of Kant ed G Tapley (166-7). 
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knowi ng detenni nes those categori es, then the object of 
knowledge must conform to them. Now the result of such a 
claim is that the philosopher's interest in the concrete 
detail of the external world must lapse '" Infallibly he 
will lose interest in the specific make-up of the world 
about him'. 
A rationalist approach to legal thinking would, therefore, 
inevitably result in an approach in which concepts refined in the 
general parts of the criminal law would be strictly applied in 
individual cases where criminal liability is considered. 15 ) A 
pragmatic solution such as that found in Johnson 16 ) where an 
accused was convicted of culpable homicide notwithstanding his 
inabil ity to 'act' and his lack of criminal capacity at the time 
of the killing would not be acceptable in such a system. The 
practical requirements that persons who commit crimes in a state 
of voluntary intoxication ought not to be allowed to shelter 
behind their self-induced condition would carry no weight. A 
result such as that brought about in Chretien1?) would be 
preferred and the socially unacceptable side of this result would 
be left to the l~gislator to remedy by special legislation. 18 ) 
15) du Pl essi s 1984 SALJ 301, 304-5; contra Snyman 1985 SALJ 
120. --
16) 1969 1 SA 201 (A). 
1?) Chretien 1981 1 SA 109? (A). 
18) Ih1S 1S the entire purpose of the Drugs Report. In the 
German Criminal Code there is a statutory provision (StGB 
323 (a)) making it a crime to commit a crime while 
'schuldunf~hig' ie lacking in criminal capacity, because 
of voluntary intoxication. The fact that such a measure 
had to be specially enacted is perhaps an indictment 
against the theoretical system; vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 
300, 314. 
- 469 -
It could, therefore, be regarded as fair comment that although a 
rationalist approach to criminal law leads to a theoretically 
coherent system, in practice there are legislative measures in 
confl i ct with the theoreti cal background and designed to avoi d 
logically consistent but socially unacceptable results. 19 } 
1.2 Procedure 
There can be no question that the law of procedure and evidence 
has laid its stamp on English criminal law. 20 } Thus the 'reas-
onable man' could be regarded as the ordinary member of an 
English jury using his commonsense. The Caldwell-type of reck-
lessness 21 } with its objective component could be a measure 
taken by the House of Lords to ensure that acquittal s do not 
result too readily where the prosecution has difficulty in 
provi ng subjecti ve recklessness . The process is possibly more 
difficult to detect in German criminal law, than English criminal 
1 aw but sub stanti ve German cri mi na 1 1 aw has been i nfl uenced by 
German criminal procedure. 
19} Beside the crime of 'Vollrausch' (StGB 323 (a}) there is a 
crime of strict liability 'Totschlag bei einer Schlllg-
erei' (StGB 227) or homicide committed in the course of a 
brawl. Strict adherence to the subjective requirement of 
fault and the objective requirement of causation, would 
a 11 ow too many 'brawl ers' to escape the resul ts of thei r 
dangerous activities, vide Preisendanz 727. 
20} Mezger-SchBnke - Jescheck 139-40. 
21} vide supra. 
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The German crimi na 1 tri ali s a one-phase tri a 1 . Gui It or i nno-
cence and appropriate sentence are investigated in one inquiry in 
court and in the absence of a 'Freisprache', or acquittal, there 
is a condemnation, or 'Verurteilung', to a certain punishment in 
respect of a certain crime. 22 ) 
German criminal procedure has many commendable features, not the 
least of which is the feature that persons against whom there is 
not a fairly strong prima facie case are not brought to trial. 
The procedure followed in the course of a German criminal prose-
cution can be divided into three stages; namely,23) 
(1) investigation undertaken by the police under the con-
trol of the prosecutor; 
(2) consideration of, and decision on, the question 
whether the prosecution should be permitted to open a 
trial; and 
(3) the trial at which guilt or innocence and appropriate 
sentence are simultaneously investigated. 
In practice the judge or judges who arrive at a decision on the 
second stage are inclined to be critical of the case put before 
them by the prosecution and where the prosecution is allowed to 
proceed to the thi rd stage, that is an actual tri al in open 
22) Langbein 36 . 
23) Naucke 32, Langbei n 8 ff. 
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court. the probabilities are that there will be a convic-
tion. 24 } This is not to be construed as a criticism of German 
trials as being trials at which convictions are a foregone 
conclusion - far from it. It is merely an inevitable and commen-
dable result of the safeguard against a large number of 
unsuccessful prosecutions - generally painful to the accused 
notwithstanding his acquittal - provided by the second stage. 
Inevitably. many trials are largely investigations into approp-
riate sentence. and. as sentence is dependent on 'Schuld'25} or 
fault they are investigations into fault with a view to sentence. 
24} In the trial of Dr Brach as described in Langbein 3-60 
there could have been little doubt of a conviction and a 
great deal of time was spent investigating factors rele-
vant to sentence. The present writer observed several 
trials in Germany. In only one was there any chance of an 
acquittal. It was a case in which leave to open a trial 
had been refused but this decision .had been reversed on 
appeal lodged by the prosecuti on. In another case the 
accused disputed only intent to kill on a charge of 
'Totschlag' {StGB 212} the intent was proved in 'five 
minutes' by medical evidence of a vicious attack in which 
blows were initially struck on the head of the deceased 
with metal tongs and afterwards the deceased. while 
unconscious. was throttled with extreme force. The main 
i nqui ry was into sentence and about 10 nei ghbours of the 
accused were called to give evidence on the character of 
the accused and the relationship between him and his 
mother {the deceased}. None of these witnesses could cast 
any light on how the killing had taken place. They had 
not witnessed it nor had the accused made statements to 
them. Their evidence as to sentence was important: 
deceased had treated accused very badly and had repeatedly 
said that she preferred her cats to her son. 
25} StGB 46 {l}. 
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This, to a large extent, explains the emphasis on the 'blame-
worthiness' of conduct in German criminal law. In a two-phase 
trial, 'blameworthiness' or reproach is investigated and decided 
upon after conviction, but it is unavoidably also, though to a 
lesser extent, investigated during the investigation into the 
meri ts. 26) 
It is al so because of the Angl o-Ameri can two-phase sy stem that 
questions of psychological fault, (mainly intent), are given 
grea t wei ght. Psychological fault may not be sufficient for 
conviction but it is necessary. The result is that normative 
fault, if one understands by this term what was to be expected of 
the accused in the circumstances, is relegated to a minor 
position at a two-phase trial. Normative fault would simply be 
totally irrelevant in the absence of psychological fault. Once 
psychological fault is established, conviction follows almost 
automatically and only then is there any point in considering the 
blameworthiness or normative fault of the accused. 
At a German trial there is not this definite stage at which the 
presence or absence of psychological fault is decided upon once 
and for all and after which, in the event of conviction, norma-
tive fault becomes relevant. The result is that German theorists, 
particularly since the work of Hans Welzel began to have an 
26) The nature of fault in the two-phase trial is stressed in 
Theron 1984 2 SA 868 (A). In studying this judgment it 
1S well to bear in mind that the German trial is a 
one-phase trial and then to pose the question how fault is 
investigated at such a trial. 
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effect on German crimi na1 1 ega1 theory, have spent a great deal 
of discussion on the position of psychological fault in their 
system. 27) Clearly it was not sufficient for the purposes of 
sentence to find that an accused had acted with psychological 
fault. It could still be found that he ought not to be 
punished. This has resulted in the view that psychological fault 
belongs with the act and ought not to be ' called fault at all. 
Once the act is found to be proved (i n other words once an 
'Unrecht', wrongdoing or crime28 ) has been established), its 
blameworthiness remains to be considered. 
The procedural feature that there was only one inqui ry wou1 d 
render a theoretical dividing line between psychological and 
normative fault necessary. In a two-phase tri a1 the di vi di ng 
1 i ne wou1 d be c1 early provi ded by the feature that the accused 
would be formally convicted before sentence would be formally 
considered. 29 ) 
1.3 CONCLUSION 
In dealing with German criminal law one may expect a dogmatic 
approach with the SOCially unacceptable results of such an 
27) 
28 ) 
29) 
vi de du Pl essi s 1985 SALJ 300; CR Snyman 1979 SACC 3 and 
136. -- --
von Hippe1 (I) 270 ff provides an i nteresting discussion 
of the development of the 'Schu1dbegriff' to 1930. The 
contrast between 'Unrecht' and 'Schul d' is stressed. For 
a modern exposition vide Maurach-Zipf (I) 392-3. 
Theron supra. 
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approach alleviated by special provisions in the German Criminal 
Code. 
The one-phase German trial,30) and the emphasis on 'Schuld' as 
the yard-stick of puni shment, may be expected to lead to the 
result that criminal fault is viewed and defined differently in 
German criminal law from Anglo-American criminal law. 
2 NEGLIGENT KILLING IN GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 
2.1 Homicide in the German Criminal Code 
There are a large number of measures dealing with homicide in the 
German Criminal Code and it is remarkable that, notwithstanding 
the 'axiomatic closed' or dogmatic theoretical approach, there is 
not a simple division of h.omicide into intentional killing and 
negligent killing. 1) 
There are two forms of intentional killing: The fi rst is 
30) 
1 ) 
What has been said in the text concerning German Criminal 
Procedure must not be regarded as criticism. It is an 
excell ent system marred only by lengthy and often point-
less consideration of hear-say evidence (Langbein 1-2). 
The result is that the uniform theoretical approach is not 
always reflected in the StGB. The casuistry eschewed by 
the theorists makes an unexpected appearance in the posi-
tive law; vide Schmidhlluser (AT) 22 ff; Schmidhlluser (BT) 
22 ff; SchBnke-SchrBder 264 ff; Rudolphi (AT) 1/2, 100 ff, 
Rudolphi (BT) 17, 35ff; Preisendanz 102ff; Dreher-TrBndle 
97 ff; Lackner 98 ff; Jescheck 209 ff. Schmi dhMuser is 
the only writer who is critical of the multiplicity of 
crimes that are all really forms of negligent killing. 
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'Mord'2) (murder) which is an intentional killing accompanied 
by certain specified aggravating features. This crime is not 
relevant to the present discussion. 
Then there is intentional killing or 'Totschlag' .3) The diffe-
' rence between 'Mord' and 'Totschlag' is that the latter crime is 
a simple intentional killing without the aggravating features 
specified in respect of the former. 
The thi rd mai n form of homi ci de in the German Crimi nal Code is 
negligent killing or 'Fahrl1!ssige TBtung,4) . This is negligent 
killing without qualification as to the way in which the killing 
came about. 'Fahrl1!ssige TBtung' is not the only form of negli-
gent killing known to the German Criminal Code. There are a 
large number of other crimes that could be classified as negli-
gent ,killings in the ~erman Criminal Code and this is a result of 
a distinguishing feature of German Criminal Law; namely, the 
prevalence of crimes qualified by their results or 'die durch 
ihren Erfolg qualifizierte Delikte' 
2.2 Crimes qualified by their results in German Criminal Law 
Crimes qualified by their results have been known in German 
2) StGB 211. 
3) StGB 212. StGB 213 allows for a reduced sentence where the 
accused had killed intentionally under provocation. 
4) StGB 222. 
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Criminal Law for centuries. 5 ) What is meant by a crime 
qualified by its results is that a certain penalty is fixed in 
respect of a crime with a further stipulation that should the 
crime have been followed by a certain specified result, the 
penalty would be increased. 6) 
Two of the results most commonly encountered in this context in 
the German Criminal Code are bodily harm ('K8rperverletzung') and 
death ('Tod').7) The present discussion is concerned with 
resultant death only. 
Examples of crimes qualified by their results are : the infliction 
of bodily harm with death resulting,8) intentional arson with 
death resulting,9) negligent arson with death resulting,10) 
eviction 11 ) with death resulting,12) the administration of 
poison with death resulting,13) unlawful incarceration with 
death resulting,14) kidnapping with death resulting,15) 
5 ) 
6 ) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
12) 
13) 
14) 
15 ) 
Frederick the Great approved of these crimes in a rescript 
issued shortly before his death. It was unacceptable to 
the Great King (and with some justification) that a person 
who had k i 11 ed in the course of a robbery or an assault 
shoul d escape 1 i abil ity in respect of the k i 11 i ng by 
saying that he had not intended to kill. 
Jescheck 209 . 
ibid. 
StGB 226 vide Langbein 13. 
StGB 307 (1). 
StGB 309. 
Aussetzung. 
StGB 221. 
StGB 229 (2) . 
StGB 239 (3). 
StGB 239 (a) (2). This section of the code specifies that 
the increased penalty comes into operati on if death is 
caused through gross negligence (Leichtfertigkeit). 
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intentionally causing a flood with death resulting,16} 
negl i gently caus i ng a flood with death resulti ng1l} and rape 
with death resulting . 18 } This list is not exhaustive but it is 
unnecessary to add to it for present purposes. 
Up to 1953,19} these crimes were largely examples of versari in 
re illicita in that the increased penalty would follow on the 
supervening of the specified result, irrespective of whether the 
result had been foreseen or foreseeable by the accused. 20 } 
This could result in hardship and various efforts21 } were made 
by theori sts to protect an accused aga ins t the more seri ous 
penalty attached to the result of a crime where such result was 
totally unforeseeable. A noteworthy attempt in this direction is 
the so-called 'socially adequate' theory of causali ty 22} in 
terms of which an effect could only be regarded as ' caused' for 
the purposes of the crimi nal 1 aw if it were such as to be 
commonly encountered according to human social experience. 
Another noteworthy attempt to limit causal liability is the 
16} StGB 312. 
17} StGB 317. 
18} StGB 177 (3). The requirement of gross negligence 
(Leichtfertigke i t) is specified . 
19} Jescheck 209 . 
20} vide Swanepoel 55-7. 
21} Radbruch (VDAT) 242. 
22} Jescheck 229 ff. Writing before 1953 von Liszt (125) 
criticised the theory as limiting liability in a way that 
amounted to an unjustifiable amendment of the Code. Snyman 
discusses the theory favourably (48-51). 
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initial advancing of the final-conduct theory of Hans Welzel. In 
its original formulation 23 } this theory, which has had 
far-reaching effects, was an attempt to limit causal liability 
by limiting the scope of the criminal act. A person may only be 
punished because of a criminal act. An act has to be defined in 
terms of human conduct and human conduct is goa l-di rected. 24) 
Such consequences of an act as were neither foreseen nor 
foreseeabl e coul d not be sai d to have resulted from an 'act' or 
from human conduct. A person could therefore not be held liable 
for the unforeseen or unforeseeable resul ts of his conduct as 
such results would not be part of a goal-directed act or course 
of conduct. 
The work of the theorists who opposed causal liability bore fruit 
in 1953 when a secti on25 } of the German Penal Code was enacted 
to the effect that if a more severe punishment is provided in 
respect of a crime in the event of a certain effect resulting 
from the commi ssi on of the crime, the measure i ncreasi ng the 
prescribed punishment would only come into operation if the 
accused had been at least negligent in respect of the supervening 
result. 
If the accused had acted intending to bring about death, the 
crime would be either 'Mord' or 'Totschlag' . Consequently, when 
23) Welzel. (Kausalitllt und Handlung); vide du Plessis 1985 
SALJ 300, 309-10. 
24) ror-criticism vide du Plessis 1985 SALJ 300. 
25) StGB 18 formerly 56. 
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death is the result qualifying a crime, the crime is in practice 
a form of negligent killing. 
There are certain of these crimes where the resulting death only 
bri ngs about a greater penalty if it is brought about by gross 
negligence (Leichtfertigkeit).26) 
The typical equivalents of culpable homicide in South African law 
woul d therefore be 'Fahrlllssi ge Tlltung' in respect of negl i gent 
accidental killings and 'K~rperverletzung mit Todesfolge' in 
respect of unintentional but foreseeable killings resulting from 
assaults. 27) In saying that these crimes are the equivalent of 
culpable homicide in South African law, one must bear in mind 
that German criminal law recognizes conscious negligence 
(bewusste Fahrlllssigkeit) which would be dolus eventualis in our 
positive law as it presently stands. 
2.3 Negligence in German criminal law 
2.3.1 Introductory 
The concept of negl i gence was all egedly the step-chil d of the 
26) Both consci ous and unconsci ous negl i gence can be gross; 
vide Preisendanz 27. 
27) Interesting problems arise where the initial crime is 
attempted and the attempt fails but nevertheless the vic-
tim dies. This is discussed by Preisendanz (104) who sub-
mits that where a person loses hi s 1 i fe ina foreseeable 
manner while evading an attack aimed at wounding him, the 
crime is negligent killing ie 'FahrHssige T~tung'. 
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German criminal legal theorists for many years. 28 ) But towards 
the end of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century it 
attracted ever-increasing attention. 29 ) 
This is due on a practical level to the large number of acciden-
tal deaths that can be caused in our industrial age, particularly 
because of the enormous increase in road traffic. On the theor-
etical level it is due to the inability of Welzel 's final-conduct 
theory to accommodate cri mi na 1 negl i gence. Thi slatter feature 
has given rise to 1 ively discussions, as yet unabated, in which 
the fi na 1 i sts submi t that the fi na l-conduct theory accommodates 
negl i gence more sa ti sfactorily than any other theory. But thei r 
opponents submit that the final-conduct theory is unacceptable as 
a theory of criminal conduct as it cannot accommodate criminal 
negligence, at least not unconscious negligence. 30 ) 
The history of the various successive theories of criminal negli-
gence up to 1910 is admirably summarised by Exner. The main 
probl em with which the theori sts had to contend, was how uncon-
scious negligence could give rise to criminal liability as negli-
gent conduct is not willed and only an evil will (bllser Wille) 
28) Binding Die Normen und ihre Ubertretung vol IV 311. 
29) A number of monographs on negl i gence appeared from about 
1908 eg von Hippel Vorsatz und FahrlMssigkeit, Exner, 
Kllhler, Engisch and more recently Binavince. The massive 
Die Normen und ihre Dbertretung by Karl Binding was 
initially planned as a treatise on negligence only. 
30) Maurach-Zipf 192-3. 
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ought to be punished. 31 ) The basis of the problem can be 
traced to the philosophers of the Aufkl~rung who widely accepted 
the view that all fault pertains to the wi1l 32 ) or, as it is 
stated in German, 'alle Schuld ist Willensschuld'. 
Immanuel Kant based his formidable moral philosophy on the state-
ment: 
'Es ist tlberall nichts in der Welt, ja tlberhaupt auch 
ausser derselben zu denken mtlglich, was ohne EinschrMnkung 
f1Jr gut ktlnnte geha lten werden, a 1 s, all ei n ei n guter 
Wille' .33) 
Clearly, if only a will can be good in the moral sense, only a 
will can be bad. As unconscious negligence can by definition, 
not give rise to 'willed' or desired results, it is an impos-
sible task to relate unconscious negligence to the will. But 
31) Exner devotes the first five chapters to a discussion of 
the various attempts at reconcil ing conscious negl igence 
as fault with the doctrine that all fault pertains to the 
will. Maurach-Zipf (394 ff) express the current view that 
unconscious negligence is not a state of mind or a condi-
ti on of the wi 11 but merely a value judgment passed on 
conduct. In other words it is normative fault. 
32) Ltlffler 213, 164; Feuerbach (Revision) II 57 fn. 
33) It is the opening sentence of hi s Grundlegung zur Meta-
physik der Sitten and may be translated as follows: 'No-
where ln the world, or, for that matter, outside it, can 
anything be regarded as good without any qualification , 
except only a good will' (my translation). 
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many fine minds made the attempt; notably, Anselm Feuerbach, 
Ernst Ferdinand Klein, L Hascher von Almendingen, Christian 
Reinhold KBstlin, Albert Friedri ch Berner and Karl Binding. 
It is unnecessary to investigate the works - interesting though 
they undoubtedly are - of these wri ters whi ch span the peri od 
from about 1800 to 1920. But it is worth noti ng that in Hans 
Welzel's final-conduct doctrine one is faced with the same 
problem concerning criminal negligence with which Feuerbach had 
wrestl ed in 1800. 34 ) The problem is how to defi ne negl i gence 
in terms of intent or how to justify prescribing punishment for 
negl i gent conduct as only an evi 1 wi 11 or an evil intent shoul d 
be punished and unconscious negligence cannot be related to 
intent or to the will. Suffi ce it to state at thi s stage that 
irrespective of the theoretical difficulties above alluded to, it 
is well established that negligence founds criminal liability in 
German law. 35 ) 
Negligence is known in two forms in German Criminal Law; namely, 
unconsci ous negl i gence and consci ous negl i gence. 
gence is called 'Leichtfertigkeit'. 
Gross negl i-
Section 15 of the German Penal code prescribes the principle 
nulla peona sine culpa. It is a fundamental section and reads as 
follows: 
34) du Plessis 1985 SALJ 301, 313-4. 
35) Morkel (Nalatigheid) 136 ff. 
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'Strafbar ist nur vorslltzliches Handeln, wenn nicht das 
Gesetz fahrlllssiges Handeln ausdrUcklich mit Strafe bed-
roht' .36) 
2.3 . 2 Unconscious negligence 
The German Civil code contains a defi niti on of negl i gence. But 
negligence is not defined in the Criminal Code. 37) It is, 
therefore, left to the writers and the courts to establish what 
negl igence is in theory and in practice. The general view of 
negligence is that it amounts to a failure to observe the 
standard of care generally required in the circumstances in which 
a person finds himself. 38 ) 
There is generally strong support for the view that not to act 
as a normal sensible, careful person39 ) would, is negligent. 
This is an objective view, based on the standards of a construct 
36) 'Only intentional conduct is punishable, unless the 
Statute specifi cally prescri bes puni shment in respect of 
negligent conduct' (my translation). 
37) A definition of criminal negligence was suggested in the 
draft that preceeded the present StGB, but it was not 
incorporated in the StGB; vide Sch~nke-Schr8der 1ged 232. 
Negligence is defined in article 276 (il of the Civil 
Code. 
38) 'Verletzung einer Sorgfaltsplicht' (Jescheck 456) in other 
words: 'breach of a duty of care'. Jescheck (459, 460) 
favours the vi ew that unconsci ous negl i gence is a 
subjective state. 
39) Einer einsichtigen und besonnener Mensch' (Preisendanz 28; 
Lackner 81; Jescheck 456 ff). 
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very much like the 'reasonable man'.40} 
This type of negligence is sufficient to found unlawfulness. The 
most generally accepted view is that negligence as fault is sub-
j ecti ve ly tested. 41 } I n other words, di d the accused act ca re-
lessly in terms of his own standards? If not he was negli-
gent. 42} These vi ews are a result of a development fo 11 owi ng 
on the appearance of Welzel 's final-conduct doctrine. 
This development is to the effect that crimes of negligence have 
40} vide Morkel (Nalatigheid) 140. 
41} Jescheck (457) states that negl i gence is tested twi ce and 
according to a two-fold standard (nach einem doppel ten 
Maszstab). Preisendanz (28) states that a novice driver 
negligently causing a motor accident could not allege that 
his conduct was lawful. Objectively his conduct would be 
unlawful . Subjectively, in the light of his inexperience 
it may not have been negl i gent and he-Woul d have no 
'Schuld'. Maurach-Zipf (II) discusses the unlawfulness of 
negl i gent conduct exhausti vely 102-12. Some ri sk to 1 ife 
and limb is dictated by the exigencies of our technolog-
ical age: to exceed socially acceptable risks is negli-
gent and unlawful. Schenke-Schreder (220-2) express views 
similar to those of Jescheck; cf Lackner 80-8 (esp 86). 
Dreher-Trendle (81-2) are sceptical of the two-fold test 
for negl i gence, Rudol phi (AT) 1/2, 70-82 supports it. The 
genera 1 vi ew expressed by the wri ters is that objecti ve 
negligence founds an 'Unrecht' (Wrongdoing) and that sub-
jective negligence (that the accused is subjectively to be 
blamed for his failure to meet the objective standard) 
founds 'Schuld'. 
42} In theory the subj ecti ve test for negl i gence shoul d take 
into account all the personal traits of the accused rele-
vant to the questi on whether he coul d have observed the 
objective requirements demanded by the situation; vide 
references in n41 supra. 
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a different 'Aufbau' (structure) from intentional crimes. 43 } 
In the case of the intentional crime, 'intent ' belongs to the act 
and knowledge of unlawfulness belongs to fault. As there can be 
no knowledge of unlawfulness in the case of a crime committed 
unconsciously negligently, this latter fault element is supplied 
by the consideration that the accused was subjectively capable of 
realising that his conduct was unlawful. In failing to realize 
this, he acted negligently. Objective negligence therefore 
belongs to the act or 'Handlung' and, as such, to the 'Unrecht' 
or wrong while subjective negligence belongs to fault or 
'Schul d' . In terms of secti on 16 of the German Penal Code a 
mistake of fact excludes intent, but not negligence. In terms of 
section 17 a mistake of law is only excusable if it was inevit-
able in the circumstances. Ignorance of the law is only inevit-
able if, subjectively, the accused was not able to know the law. 
In the German one-phase trial the two inquiries into subjective 
43} vi de references n41 supra. Wel ze 1 submi tted that intent 
(Vorsatz) belongs with the act (Handlung) and that subjec-
tive factors other than intent eg knowledge of unlawful-
ness, and the decision in favour of crime belong to fault 
or 'Schuld' . Where the crime is one of negl igence the 
negl i gence descri pti ve of the act be longs wi th the 'Hand-
1 ung', the subj ecti ve factors amounti ng to negl i gence (i e 
failure to observe the objective requirements) belong to 
'Schuld'; vide Rudolphi (AT}1/2, 82. It is submitted that 
thi s bol sters the vi ew that ina two-phase tri al system 
like ours Welzel 's doctrine amounts to this that culpa and 
dolus are investigated before conviction; and other 
subJective factors relevant to sentence, after conviction; 
vide du Plessis 1984 SALJ 301, 320. 
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and objective negligence are inevitable in that the former 
inquiry is relevant to sentence. It is submitted that whether the 
latter inquiry is one into fault or unlawfulness, is immaterial. 
For 'dogmatic' reasons the finalists would be compelled to regard 
it as an inquiry into unlawfulness rather than fault. 44 } 
2.3.3 Conscious negligence 
This concept was first expounded by Anselm Feuerbach. 45 } 
Influenced by Kant and other philosophers of the Aufkl~rung his 
theory of criminal liability is based on the fundamental doctrine 
that fault pertains to the will. 
Conscious negl igence is more readily accommodated by this doc-
trine than unconscious negligence. There is a 'volitional 
component' in conscious negligence in that the actor is aware of 
the danger, but his will, although not welcoming the result, does 
not reject it either. The actor merely hopes or trusts that it 
will not eventuate. 46 } 
Schmi dh!l.user47} sums up two possi bl e forms of consci ous negl i-
gence; namely, first as viewing a possible result as very remote, 
or second as hoping that a possible result will not come about. 
On either version the result is not taken into the bargain. He 
44) cf references in nn 42, 43 supra. 
45) Exner 17. 
46) Jescheck 460-1; Maurach-Zipf 394-5 . 
47} AT 223. 
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rejects both forms stating that on the existing theory conscious 
negligence can only come into being when the actor, at the moment 
of acting, trusts that the result foreseen as a possibility, will 
not eventuate. 48) Thi sis, in fact, at the moment of acti ng, 
unconscious negligence. 
Schmi dhlluser appears to be the only German writer of importance 
to hold this view. The others 49 ) subscribe to conscious negli-
gence as not bei ng dolus eventual i sin that the actor either 
regards the possibil ity as remote50 ) or hopes or trusts that 
the result will not ensue. 51 ) His will therefore does not 
accept it and dolus with its 'volitional component' is absent. 
2.3.4 Negligence in Crimes qualified by resultant death 
Schmidhlluser52 ) points out that the negligence encountered 
where death results from a crime (for instance the infliction of 
grievous bodily harm) committed intentionally, is different from 
unconscious and conscious negligence. It consists in one compo-
nent only; namely, the failure to foresee foreseeable death as a 
result of the initial crime. 
48) AT 223-4 
49) Maurach-GHssler-Zipf 96; Jescheck 483-4; SchHnke-SchrHder 
242; Preisendanz 26-7; Rudolphi (AT) 1/2, 64-5, 90; 
Lackner 87; Dreher-TrHndle 78-80. 
50) 'Warscheinlichkeitstheorie' (probability theory); Dreher-
TrHndl e 79. 
51) 'E inwi 11 i gungstheori e' (acceptance theory); Dreher-TrHndl e 
79. 
52) 221-2, criticising particularly Jescheck 464. 
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The element of unlawfulness is supplied by the initial crime. 
Where the initial crime is negligently committed there is in fact 
only one negligence in respect of the death . 53) 
2.4 Conclusion 
Negligent killing in German law appears to be unduly diversified 
and compl ex. As Schmi dhlluser54 ) poi nts out, it is not the 
resultant death that qualifies the initial crime, but negligent 
kill i ng whi ch is qual i fi ed by the manner (for instance woundi ng) 
in which it was brought about. 
One crime of negligent killing, like our culpable homicide, would 
probably suffice to cover all the examples of negligent killing 
in the German Penal code. The manner in which the negligent 
killing came about would be a factor affecting sentence. 
2.5 Normative fault 
Traditionally, fault in German criminal law has been treated as 
b 1 ameworthi ness or a ground for reproach. It is sai d to be the 
relationship bebleen the actor and his act which renders the act 
blameworthy.55) Another way of stating this is to say that it 
is the subj ecti ve factor, accompanyi ng the act that renders the 
53) Schmidhlluser 230. 
54) ibid. 
55) 8eling 1 ff; Jescheck 326; Maurach-2ipf 440 . 
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actor liable to reproach . 
Prior to the work of Welzel and other finalists, fault was regar-
ded as consi sti ng of intent or negl i gence. It was, however, 
pointed out that a sane or 'Zurechnungsfghige' actor could commit 
a crime intentionally, or negligently, and nevertheless escape 
reproach. Fault, therefore, had to be more than, or different 
from, intent or negligence . This gave rise to the view that 
fault is the blameworthiness of conduct. 56 ) Conduct would 
consist of objective and subjective elements and the question of 
blameworthiness would be considered once this had been 
established. 
The objective elements were regarded as the 'Tat', or deed, or as 
the 'Unrecht' or wrongdoi ng. Fault separated from this was 
i ni ti ally regarded as the subj ecti ve factors accompanyi ng the 
objective 'Unrecht'. In the absence of these factors the person 
who had committed the 'Unrecht' would not be punishable . 
As there could be an intentional or negligent 'Unrecht' which was 
neverthe 1 ess not blameworthy, the vi ew was advanced that the 
blameworthiness, or 'Schuld' attaching to an 'Unrecht' could not 
consist of intent or negligence but of blameworthiness in the 
sense that the actor had intentionally or negligently acted in a 
56) vide Jescheck 328-35 for a full discussion. 
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way he ought not to have acted. 
Jescheck 57 } traces thi s development to vi ews on the freedom of 
the wi 11 . Whether an i ndi vi dua 1 's wi 11 was free to di rect hi s 
conduct in another direction than that of the crime he committed, 
can never be conclusively proved or disproved. The most one can 
say is that a . normal person or another person in his place could 
have or coul d not have acted otherwi se. The actor is therefore 
blamed for intentional or negligent conduct when measured against 
the conduct of this normal person. The normal person personifies 
society's expectation of the individual or his 'Zumutbarkeit'. 
If a normal person would have acted otherwise, in other words if 
society could expect the accused to have acted otherwise, he had 
fault in the normative sense; otherwise not. 
This reduces fault to decision-making,58} more particularly the 
decision in favour of wrong rather than right. This decision can 
only be blameworthy if the accused was aware that his decision 
was in favour of wrong in other words if he had awareness of 
unlawfulness. 
Thi sis a broad sketch: there are many confl i cti ng vi ews among 
German wri ters. 59} The nett result appears to be that fault 
becomes awareness of unlawfulness or blameworthy lack of such 
57} ibid. 
58} Maurach-Zipf 392. 
59} ibid. 
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awareness. 60 ) Thi s becomes the foundati on of a reproach on 
which sentence is based. 
It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that in such a concept of 
fault elements of criminal conduct and factors effecting sentence 
are inextricably interwoven. This is a result of the German 
one-phase trial. 
The normative fault doctrine is generally accepted in Germany and 
is complimentary to the final-conduct doctrine. 
2.6 Final conduct 
Although not his sole work, the final-conduct doctrine is mainly 
associated with Hans Welzel .61) 
Wel zel came to the concl usion that intent and negl igence belong 
to the criminal act, or 'Unrecht ' , rather than to the blame-
worthiness, or 'Schuld', associated with the act. 62 ) He sought 
to base these views on the scientific premise that all human 
conduct is goal-directed. An intentional act is obviously goal-
directed and a negligent act is one in which the actor is unaware 
of the undesirable results of his goal-directed act or conduct 
because of a poor appraisal of all the implications of his 
proposed conduct. 
60) vide Snyman 1979 SACC 3 and 136. 
61) i bi d and du Pl es sTST984 SALJ 30l. 
62) Snyman 1985 SALJ 120, 121-.-
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It is generally accepted that the doctrine 'cannot accommodate 
negligence. 63 ) If it accommodates only intent it is little 
more than the tautology that all intentional conduct is inten-
ti onal. 
This has, however, not been its sole result. Intent in the shape 
of colourless intent, in other words intent separated from aware-
ness of unlawfulness, is regarded as part of the act and aware-
ness of unlawfulness plus the decision to act notwithstanding 
such awareness, is fault. As such fault is blameworthiness. 
Welzel's theory is a theory that fits well into the German one-
phase trial, but could only lead to unnecessary complications in 
our two-phase tri al where actus reus and mens rea are ideally 
investigated separately from the question whether and to what 
extent the combination of actus reus and mens rea resulting in a 
crime is subject to reproach or punishment. 
2.7 Conclusion 
When deal ing with German criminal law one should not forget the 
German one-phase trial and the inevitable result this procedural 
feature must have on the fault concept. As subjective factors 
have become increasingly recognized as supremely relevant to 
63) CR Snyman 1979 SACC 3 and 136; du Pl essi s 1984 SALJ 30l. 
Badenhorst who supports Welzel's final ism regards crimes 
of negligence as not being 'true' crimes; vide Badenhorst 
10. 
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sentence, the marked subjectivism of German law should be seen in 
context. It is not guilt or innocence in our sense that is 
decided on alone, but sentence also when subjective 
blameworthiness (Schuld) is placed at the pinnacle of the German 
criminal legal edifice. 
Once one is aware of thi s and once one real i zes that subj ecti ve 
factors are accorded due wei ght by our courts in arri vi ng at 
sentence, a more flexible approach to guilt or innocence becomes 
possible and extreme subjectivism cannot result in an undesirable 
total acquittal such as happened in Arnold64 ) and could have 
happened in Lesch .65 ) 
3 THE DEFENCES OF PRIVATE DEFENCE, NECESSITY, PROVOCATION 
AND INTOXICATION IN RELATION TO NEGLIGENT KILLING 
3. 1 Introduction Mistake in German Criminal Law 
The German Penal code ' provi des for mi s take of 1 awl) as we 11 as 
mistake of fact 2) to be defences to a criminal charge. 
In the case of a mistake of fact the accused could escape liabi-
~4) 1985 3 SA 256 (C). 
65) 1983 1 SA 814 (0). 
1) 'Verbotsirrtum' StGB 17. 
2) 'Irrtum Uber TatumstMnde' StGB 16. 
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1 ity altogether or be convi cted of a cri me of negl i gence3) 
depending on the nature of the mistake. Killing while labouring 
under a mistake of fact could, therefore, result in a conviction 
of negl i gent kill i ng if the mi stake was negl i gently made in the 
circumstances. 
Mistake of law is mere di ffi cult to apply as it only serves as a 
val i d defence if unavoidable in the circumstances;4) the 
underlying rati onal e apparently being that there is a duty on the 
subj ect to ascertain the law. 5) 
3.2 Exceeding the bounds of Private Defence 
In terms of the German Penal Code an act that would otherwise be 
criminal is lawful or justified if it is committed in private 
defence. 6) The lawfulness only extends to defensive measures 
that are necessary to avert the threatened danger. 7) 
There are two possible types of mistake that could lead to 
exceeding the bounds of private defence . First the danger may be 
3) StGB 16 (2). 
4) StGB 17. The requirement that the mistake must have been 
unavoidable is a stricter requirement than the standards 
set for non-negligent conduct; vide Maurach-Zipf 514-5. In 
the case of an avoidable mistake of law punishment may be 
reduced ito StGB 49; vide Maurach-Zipf 506; Jescheck 365. 
5) Jescheck 367. 
6) StGB 32. 
7) The conditions set for the defence to succeed are fairly 
strict but need not be discussed in any detail for present 
purposes; vide eg Preisendanz 176 ff; Lackner 170ff. 
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non-exi stent or not as great as the accused bel i eved it to be. 
This is putative private-defence. 8 ) If the mistake is reason-
able the accused is entitled to an acquittal. If the mistake is 
unreasonable, he may be convicted of a crime of negligence,9) 
in other words a killing could become a negligent killing instead 
of an intentional killing. This is a clear application of the 
principle laid down in section 16 of the Code. 
There is, however, an important exception to this rule which may 
be interpreted as a measure embodying normative fault and is 
reminescent of our now discredited partial excuse rule. The sec-
tion in question 10 ) provides that where a person exceeds the 
bounds of self-defence because of confusion, fear or fright his 
conduct shall not be punishable. This appl ies even if the con-
duct is such as would, in the absence of this section, have given 
rise to punishment on the ground of negligence. l1 ) It is not 
clear whether the accused escapes punishment because of absence 
of unlawful ness or absence of faul t.1 2 ) The most acceptable 
8) Jescheck 399; Maurach-Zipf 309. 
9) ibid. The topic is fully discussed in all the commen-
taries when dealing with sections 32 and 33 StGB. 
10) StGB 33. 
11) Maurach-Zipf (437ff) regard the section as a statutory 
limitation on 'Zumutbarkeit' in other words on what may be 
expected of an accused. They also mention the view that 
the section creates an irrebuttable presumption against 
negligence in given circumstances. 
12) The majority of writers are of the opinion that the 
measure excludes fault (Rudolphi (AT) 1/2 247ff; Lackner 
178-9; Sch8nke-Schr8der 462 ff). Maurach-Zipf are highly 
critical of the measure (438). Schmidh~user (245) regards 
the measure as unnecessary, as the same results would be 
obtained by applying general principles and as it necessi-
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view seems to be that because of the situation a confused, 
fearful or fri ghtened person cannot be expected to act in a 
normal way. In other words the approach is normative and the 
accused lacks 'Zumutbarkeit' in the sense that lawful conduct 
could not have been expected of him. 13 ) 
Although one finds an application of the general principle that 
mistake negatives fault where one exceeds the bounds of 
se If-defence there is a rul e re 1 ati ng to confusi on, fear or 
fright which appears to cut across principle in a pragmatic way, 
in favour of equity and as a concession to human frailty.14) 
3.3 Exceeding the bounds of Necessity 
Two defences of necessity are provided for in the German Penal 
Code; namely, necess ity whi ch j ustifi es otherwi se crimi na 1 
conduct, 15) and necessity whi ch negati ves fault l6 ) in respect 
tates a di vi s ion into two types of the phenomenon of 
exceeding the bounds of self-defence, so-called extensive 
as opposed to intensive excess of self-defence. Detailed 
discussion is unnecessary, but the measure seems to 
indicate that the 'axiomatic closed' nature of German 
crimi nal 1 aw is more apparent than real on an analysi s of 
the Penal Code as opposed to the work of the theorists. 
33 StGB is apparently des i gned to protect the confused, 
fearful or frightened individual and on the principle 
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius to take away protec-
tl0n from the angry or revengeful lndividual (SchmidhMuser 
245; Jescheck 397ff). 
13) Jescheck 397. 
14) The measure is reminescent of section 141 of the former 
Transkeian Penal Code. 
15) StGB 34, so-called 'rechtfertigender Notstand'. 
16) StGB, so-called 'entschuldigender Notstand'. 
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of conduct which is otherwise criminal. 
Necessity which justifies conduct is a defence in respect of 
conduct whi ch averts i mmedi ate danger to 1 i fe, person, 1 i berty 
honour or any other interest in respect of the accused or another 
person if, in balancing the threatened interest with the interest 
harmed, it is found that the former is substantially greater than 
the latter. This measure is also only applicable if the means 
employed to avert the harm are appropriate in the circumstances. 
Allowing for error in a crisis situation, the defence is strictly 
construed and if the actions of the accused exceed the exigencies 
of the occasion his conduct is unlawful and treated as such. It 
must be borne in mind that this is not a measure affecting fault 
and the attitude of the courts and the writers is that it is not 
for the accused but for the legislator to determine what is 
lawful in a given situation)?) Mistake can and often does 
give rise to a reduction in sentence . 18 ) 
The second form of necessity; namely, that which excludes fault, 
is more narrowly prescribed . It is only available to a person 
who acts to avert an immedi ate danger to the 1 ife, person or 
liberty of himself, a near relation or a person in respect of 
whom he has a close relationship. If the actor could have been 
expected to accept the danger the defence is not applicable, but 
sentence may nevertheless be reduced. 
17) Jescheck 395; SchBnke-SchrBder 497. 
18) ibid and Maurach-Zipf 506. 
- 498 -
Mistake in relation to this form of necessity is of very limited 
appl ication io favour of the accused. A mistake as to the 
existence of the state of necessity is only excusable if it was 
unavoidable.l 9 ) Should the mistake be bona fide, but avoid-
able, punishment may be reduced. 20 ) According to Jescheck 21 ) 
this is a form of mistake of fact, but it is very similar to 
mistake of law. 
The reason for what appears to be a rather harsh approach; 
namely, that mistake does not reduce intent to negligence but can 
only result in a reduction of punishment and then only if the 
mistake was unavoidable, appears to be the consideration that the 
accused is acting on the assumption that he may excusably commit 
a crime. It is his duty to ensure that this assumption is well-
founded. He acts intentionally and knowingly, and if the 
assumption is mistaken that is his misfortune and he is punished 
for such intentional crime as he may have committed. 22 ) This 
19) StGB 35 (2). 
20) i bid. The measure therefore provi des for either total 
acquittal in the case of unavoidable mi stake or possible 
reduction of sentence in the case of avoidable mistake, in 
thi s respect it resembles the effect of mi s take of 1 aw. 
There is no provision for mistake in this context leading 
to conviction of a crime of negligence instead of a crime 
of intent; vide Rudolphi (AT) 1/2263-4; Schllnke-Schrllder 
495-7; Preisendanz 193. 
21) 395; cf Schllnke-Schrllder 395. 
22) This appears to be in keeping with Welzel's finalistic 
vi ew that human conduct is goa l-di rected and an .actor 
should bear in mind the implications of his goal-directed 
conduct. It is also in keeping with a normative view of 
fault: one is expected to make sure of one's assumptions 
before embarking on harmful conduct. 
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attitude appears to be in keeping with the normative fault 
doctrine and is strongly reminescent of the reasoning adopted by 
Coetzee J in Barnard. 23 ) The defence of necessity in German 
criminal law has been investigated in a recent contribution24 ) 
to South African Criminal Legal literature. 
3.4 Provocation 
Provoca ti on 25 ) is not dealt with separately in the German 
criminal law as a defence or doctrine standing on its own. It is 
treated according to the general principles of the criminal law 
and is dealt with in the context of intent or 'ZurechnungsfMhig-
keit'26) and the way these requirements of criminal liability 
23) 1985 4 SA 431 (W). 
24) Van der Westhuizen 293ff, 511ff. 
25) Bergenthuin (131-45) makes a detailed analyses of provoca-
tion in German Criminal Law. He concludes (239ff) that 
the relevant rules represent a systematic application of 
basic general principles in keeping with the 'axiomatic 
closed' nature of German Criminal Law. It is difficult to 
agree with this conclusion. Provocation is not a separate 
topic in German criminal law (131), but the effect of pro-
vocation on unlawfulness and fault is found in a conglom-
erate of diverse rules in which measures like StGB 33 and 
StGB 213 and their application lead to a totality 'of 
rules, sub-rules and exceptions that are more reminescent 
of a 'problematic open' system than an ' axiomatic closed' 
one. The topic goes beyond the scope of the present dis-
cussion, but study of Bergenthuin's exhaustive exposition 
could lead one to believe that the 'axiomatic closed' 
nature of the system is more apparent than real . The 
casuistry eschewed by the theorists is patent and latent 
in the Code. This conclusion is inescapable when one 
considers the discussion of the decisions (176ff) by 
Bergenthui n. 
26) 'Zurechnungsfilhigkeit' or, as it is nowadays more often 
called, (Bergenthuin 191) 'Schuldfilhigkeit' means criminal 
capacity or 'toerekeningsvatbaarheid'. It is formally 
defined in StGB 20. 
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are affected by serious emotional disturbances. 
For present purposes 'lurechnungsfMhigkeit' or 'Schuldf~higkeit' 
in German Criminal Law may be regarded as very similar to 'crimi-
nal capacity' in South African criminal law, particularly in the 
most recent developments of the latter . 27 } 
A very much provoked individual may become so emotionally upset 
as to lose his power to distinguish between right and wrong and/ 
or hi s power of se 1 f-contro 1 . German courts and writers are 
sceptical about allowing a person to successfully plead lack of 
criminal capacity because of anger. But, as Bergenthuin28 } 
points out, the situation may be such that on an application of 
normati ve fault, it may be he 1 d that the i ndi v i dual concerned 
could not have been expected to act otherwise . 
Where the provocation is coupled with sel f-defence it may be such 
as to absolve the accused entirely because of confusion, fear or 
fright. 29 } 
There is a specific provision in terms of which provocation 
reduces the punishment for intentional killing. 30 } This does 
not specifically apply to 'Mord', but the provocation may be such 
as to negative an aggravating factor that would have made the 
27} Bergenthuin 216 ff, 231 ff. 
28} 213 . 
29} ie ito StGB 33. 
3D} StGB 213, Bergenthuin 235-7. 
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crime 'Mord'; the crime would then become 'Totschlag' and the 
provocation would have the further effect of reducing the 
punishment for this less serious crime. 3l ) 
3.5 Intoxication 
In terms of general principles intoxication could have the effect 
of negati vi ng 'Schul dfllhi gkei t' . To prevent persons corrmitti ng 
crimes in this condition from escaping liability altogether there 
is the crime of 'Vollrausch,.32) A person is guilty of this 
crime if he knowingly or negl igently imbibed so as to lose his 
criminal capacity and in this condition corrmitted a crime. A 
person who has not yet lost his criminal capacity because of 
imbibing may still be convicted on the basis of intent or negli-
gence. 33 ) 
The actio libera in causa is well known in German Criminal Law 
and a person who dri nks in ci rcums tances in whi ch he does or 
ought to foresee that he will commit a crime while 'under the 
influence' would be guilty of a crime of intent or negligence as 
the case may be. 34) 
3.6 Conclusion 
Examination reveal s that notwithstanding the strict adherence to 
31) Bergenthuin 233-9 . 
32) StGB 323 (a). 
33) Dreher-TrBndle 1360-1. 
34) Jescheck 364 ff. 
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principle supported by writers on German criminal law the 
treatment of the defences di scussed in thi s secti on, in the 
German Penal Code, shows a tendency to employ pragmatic rul es 
sometimes at variance with principle, on practical grounds. 
The defences do not have the same important bearing on negligent 
killing as their counterparts have on culpable homicide in South 
African criminal law. 
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CONCLUS.ION 
1 PURISM AND PRAGMATISM 
This study commenced with a review of the debate of whether 
murder is a defence to a charge of culpable homicide. 1) 
The debate was illustrative of the two currents at work in our 
criminal law; namely, the German law orientated purist current, 
and the 'traditional' and to some extent English law orientated 
pragmatic current. 
The two stances taken in the debate were first the purist stance 
that dolus and culpa were irreconcileable concepts and that proof 
if intent to kill rendered a conviction of culpable homicide out 
of the question. Opposed to this was the pragmatic stance that 
intent to kill was a more serious form of fault than negligence 
and that the presence of the former shoul d not be allowed to 
prevent convictions of culpable homicide in cases where convic-
tions of murder were incompetent for procedural reasons. 
The debate was resolved by the Appellate Division in Ngubane. 2) 
1) Ch I, 1. 
2) 1985 3 SA 677 (A). 
- 504 -
The answer is comparatively simple and pragmatic: negligence is 
unreasonable conduct and viewed as conduct an intentional killing 
is also unreasonable. Proof of intent therefore does not render 
a conviction of culpable homicide out of the question. 
In the upshot our 1 aw benefi tted from the debate and its sol u-
tion. The views of purists and pragmatists who had written on 
the debate al so assisted the court in sifting the legal prin-
ciples involved. The exi stence of the puri st and pragmati st 
currents in our 1 aw therefore has th i s advantage that it keeps 
debate on legal problems alive, stimulates the expression of 
contrasting points of view and assists our courts in arriving at 
solutions to problems. 
The history of the defence of provocation3 ) is more illustra-
tive of the process at work than the 'murder as a defence to 
culpable homicide' debate. 
When section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code was regarded as 
stating our law on provocation, a set of formalistic, pragmatic 
rules relating to this defence, came into being. They were set 
out in Gardiner and Lansdown 4 ) and presented an unsystematic 
and unsatisfactory picture. This was unacceptable to purists and 
3) Ch IV, 2 supra. 
4) Ch IV, 2.4 supra. 
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pragmatists alike and mainly because of the purist criticism of 
De Wet and Swanepoel,5) a satisfactory solution was adopted in 
Mokonto. 6) The unsatisfactory or possibly even dangerous side 
of purism is, however, now making its presence felt in respect of 
this defence. Subjectivism is going too far and loss of self-
control through emotional stress7) could result in complete 
acquittals on charges of murder where convictions of culpable 
homicide are clearly called for. This is a result of giving the 
purist concept of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid' too wide an area of 
application. It would be beneficial to our law if purists and 
pragmatists could work together to curb this tendency.8) 
The defence of intoxication has reached what is submitted to be 
an unsatisfactory stage, mainly because of purist influence. The 
extension of the area of application of the concept of 'ontoerek-
eningsvatbaarheid' is largely the cause of this. If the 
proposals of the South Africa Law Commission9) are given effect 
to, a pragmati c sol uti on wi 11 fi nd its way into our 1 aw in the 
shape of legislation. It is submitted that this would be bene-
fi ci alto our 1 aw as the effects of the adopti on of puri sm in 
Chretien 10 ) are proving unsatisfactory. 11) 
5) Ch IV, 2.8 supra . 
6) 1971 2 SA 319 (A). 
7 ) vi de CR Snyman 1985 SALJ 240. 
8) CR Snyman supra could be seen as pointing the way. 
9) Drugs Report 118-9. 
10) 1981 1 SA 109 7 (A). 
11) eg Stellmacher 1983 2 SA 181 SWA; cf Baartman 1983 4 SA 
395 (NC). 
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In recent years the normative fault concept has received atten-
tion in our criminal legal literature and it has been discussed 
although not accepted by the Appellate Division. 12 ) Its recent 
parti a 1 acceptance13 ) by a 1 oca 1 di vi si on of the Supreme Court 
is with respect, not to be welcomed in context. As was shown in 
the discussion on provocation, normative fault is not new. It 
has simply not been described by that name in the past. It 
appears to be a quantitative rather than a qual itative approach 
to faul t. The accused is judged accordi ng to what others woul d 
have done in his position and he is reproached for failure to 
1 ive up to what the communitjl coul d expect of him as a normal 
person. Insofar as negligence is objectively judged according to 
the standards of the reasonable man it is a normative concept of 
fault and should be treated as such. An inquiry into criminal 
intent is and should remain subjective; It is a qualitative 
determination of what was going on in the mind of the accused. 
As crimes of intent are generally more seriously punished than 
crimes of negligence the assessment of intent should remain 
psychological or qualitative, in other words beamed on the state 
of mind of the individual accused . 
2 ENGLISH LAW AND GERMAN LAW 
Accordi ng to the Engl i sh wri ters whose works are referred to in 
Chapter VI the English law relating to manslaughter is in need of 
12) Bailley 1982 3 SA 772 (A). 
13) Barnard 1985 4 SA 431 (W) . 
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reform. To express an opinion after the brief examination in 
that chapter woul d be wrong. A very thorough investigation 
supplemented by a great deal of practical experience gained in 
the English courts would be required before an evaluation of any 
worth cou 1 d be made. No 1 anguage barri er exi sts and South 
African lawyers are in a very favourable position to study 
English textbooks and other legal writings as well as English law 
reports. From this a very clear picture of problems and possible 
solutions may be gained. It would, however, be mistaken to 
believe that this is enough unless one has extensive experience 
of how the law works in practice. 
The body of literature on German criminal law is enormous . 
Working against the background of a tradition that can be traced 
back to the work of some of the greatest modern philosophers,14} 
the theoretical investigations have always been aimed at estab-
lishing system. A reviewIS } of the many crimes in the German 
Code that could be classified as negligent killing leads to the 
conclusion that the German positive law is perhaps not as 
systematic as a study of the works of the theorist might lead one 
to suppose. This conclusion is strengthened by reviewing the way 
in which, for example necessity, private defence and provocation 
are dealt with in the Code. A study of the German theorists is 
time consuming but not without reward. They highlight and 
I4} Kant, Fichte, Hegel. 
IS} Ch VII, supra. 
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investigate many problematic features of criminal law that are 
inadequately dealt with in a pragmatic system. It would, how-
ever, be dangerous to be I taken in tow I by the theoreti ca 1 
discussions. What is required is that theoretical study be 
supplemented by close observation of the proceedings in the 
German courts. 16 ) Thi s coul d serve to put our writers and 
perhaps al so our courts on thei r guard agai nst accepti ng German 
theoretical developments without knowing their practical effects. 
3 CONCLUSION 
The state of our law relating to culpable homicide is generally 
sound but there is one grave danger and that is that over-exten-
sion of the ambit of the defence of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaar-
heid ,l7) may lead to acquittals where · convictions are called 
for. This tendency has its origins in purism. Ngubane, at 
present our 1 eadi ng case on cul pab 1 e homi ci de, shoul d serve to 
curb an unfavourable dogmatic or purist development and it is 
submitted that it would be to the benefit of our law if a similar 
curb on the extension of 'ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid ' could emerge 
from an authoritative decision in the near future. 
16) The present wri ter spent 6 weeks in German courts. Thi s 
is hopelessly inadequate. 
17) As happened in Chreti en, Arnol d 1985 3 SA 251 (C) and 
Stellmacher (supra). 
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